use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn, TxOut, Transaction, SigHashType};
use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
-use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
use bitcoin::util::bip143;
use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
-use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
+use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures};
use ln::msgs;
use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
-use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER};
use ln::channelmanager::{PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailReason, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
-use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, LocalCommitmentTransaction, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, PreCalculatedTxCreationKeys};
+use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor};
use ln::chan_utils;
use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
-use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
-use chain::keysinterface::{ChannelKeys, KeysInterface};
+use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER};
+use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
+use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface};
use util::transaction_utils;
-use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable, Writer};
+use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
use util::logger::Logger;
use util::errors::APIError;
use util::config::{UserConfig,ChannelConfig};
use std::default::Default;
use std::{cmp,mem,fmt};
use std::ops::Deref;
+#[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
+use std::sync::Mutex;
use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
+use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0;
#[cfg(test)]
pub struct ChannelValueStat {
pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
- pub their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
- pub their_dust_limit_msat: u64,
+ pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
+ pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
}
enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
/// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
/// ChannelMonitor::would_broadcast_at_height) so we actually remove the HTLC from our own
/// local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
- /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info will not include this HTLC.
+ /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
}
const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
-const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
+pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
/// Liveness is called to fluctuate given peer disconnecton/monitor failures/closing.
/// If channel is public, network should have a liveness view announced by us on a
DisabledStaged,
}
+/// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
+enum HTLCInitiator {
+ LocalOffered,
+ RemoteOffered,
+}
+
+/// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
+struct HTLCCandidate {
+ amount_msat: u64,
+ origin: HTLCInitiator,
+}
+
+impl HTLCCandidate {
+ fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
+ Self {
+ amount_msat,
+ origin,
+ }
+ }
+}
+
// TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
// has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
// calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
// inbound channel.
-pub(super) struct Channel<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
+//
+// Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client.
+// Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
+pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: Sign> {
config: ChannelConfig,
user_id: u64,
channel_id: [u8; 32],
channel_state: u32,
- channel_outbound: bool,
secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
channel_value_satoshis: u64,
latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
- #[cfg(not(test))]
- local_keys: ChanSigner,
- #[cfg(test)]
- pub(super) local_keys: ChanSigner,
+ holder_signer: Signer,
shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
destination_script: Script,
// generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
// cost of others, but should really just be changed.
- cur_local_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
- cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
+ cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
+ cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
// is received. holding_cell_update_fee is updated when there are additional
// update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
- next_local_htlc_id: u64,
- next_remote_htlc_id: u64,
+ next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
+ next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
update_time_counter: u32,
feerate_per_kw: u32,
#[cfg(debug_assertions)]
/// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
- max_commitment_tx_output_local: ::std::sync::Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
+ holder_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
#[cfg(debug_assertions)]
/// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
- max_commitment_tx_output_remote: ::std::sync::Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
-
- last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u32, u64, Signature)>, // (feerate, fee, our_sig)
+ counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
- funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
+ last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u32, u64, Signature)>, // (feerate, fee, holder_sig)
/// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction reached our CONF_TARGET. We use this
/// to detect unconfirmation after a serialize-unserialize roundtrip where we may not see a full
pub(super) last_block_connected: BlockHash,
funding_tx_confirmations: u64,
- their_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
+ counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
#[cfg(test)]
- pub(super) our_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
+ pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
#[cfg(not(test))]
- our_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
+ holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
#[cfg(test)]
- pub(super) their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
+ pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
#[cfg(not(test))]
- their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
- //get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(): u64,
+ counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
+ //get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(): u64,
/// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
- local_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
- // get_remote_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sats: u64): u64
- their_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
- our_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
- their_to_self_delay: u16,
- our_to_self_delay: u16,
+ counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
+ // get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sats: u64): u64
+ counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
+ holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
#[cfg(test)]
- pub their_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
+ pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
#[cfg(not(test))]
- their_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
- //implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: our_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
+ counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
+ //implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
minimum_depth: u32,
- their_pubkeys: Option<ChannelPublicKeys>,
+ pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
-
their_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
+
counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
-
their_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
- their_node_id: PublicKey,
+
counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
+ counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
- their_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
+ counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
network_sync: UpdateStatus,
+
+ // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
+ // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
+ // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
+ // `build_commitment_transaction`.
+ #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
+ next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
+ #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
+ next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
+}
+
+#[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
+struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
+ fee: u64,
+ total_pending_htlcs: usize,
+ next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
+ next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
+ feerate: u32,
}
pub const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50; //TODO
};
}
-impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> Channel<ChanSigner> {
+impl<Signer: Sign> Channel<Signer> {
// Convert constants + channel value to limits:
- fn get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
+ fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
channel_value_satoshis * 1000 / 10 //TODO
}
/// required by us.
///
/// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
- pub(crate) fn get_remote_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
+ pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000)) //TODO
}
- fn derive_our_dust_limit_satoshis(at_open_background_feerate: u32) -> u64 {
+ fn derive_holder_dust_limit_satoshis(at_open_background_feerate: u32) -> u64 {
cmp::max(at_open_background_feerate as u64 * B_OUTPUT_PLUS_SPENDING_INPUT_WEIGHT / 1000, 546) //TODO
}
// Constructors:
- pub fn new_outbound<K: Deref, F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, their_node_id: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel<ChanSigner>, APIError>
- where K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
+ pub fn new_outbound<K: Deref, F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
+ where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
F::Target: FeeEstimator,
{
- let our_to_self_delay = config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay;
- let chan_keys = keys_provider.get_channel_keys(false, channel_value_satoshis);
+ let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay;
+ let holder_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(false, channel_value_satoshis);
+ let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
if channel_value_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, channel_value_satoshis)});
if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
}
- if our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
- return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", our_to_self_delay)});
+ if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
+ return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
}
let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
- if Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_remote_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis) < Channel::<ChanSigner>::derive_our_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate) {
+ if Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis) < Channel::<Signer>::derive_holder_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate) {
return Err(APIError::FeeRateTooHigh{err: format!("Not enough reserve above dust limit can be found at current fee rate({})", background_feerate), feerate: background_feerate});
}
let feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
+ let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+ secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
+
Ok(Channel {
- user_id: user_id,
+ user_id,
config: config.channel_options.clone(),
- channel_id: keys_provider.get_channel_id(),
+ channel_id: keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes(),
channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
- channel_outbound: true,
- secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
- channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis,
+ secp_ctx,
+ channel_value_satoshis,
latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
- local_keys: chan_keys,
+ holder_signer,
shutdown_pubkey: keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(),
destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
- cur_local_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
- cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
+ cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
+ cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
value_to_self_msat: channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat,
pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
pending_update_fee: None,
holding_cell_update_fee: None,
- next_local_htlc_id: 0,
- next_remote_htlc_id: 0,
+ next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
+ next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
update_time_counter: 1,
resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
#[cfg(debug_assertions)]
- max_commitment_tx_output_local: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
+ holder_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
#[cfg(debug_assertions)]
- max_commitment_tx_output_remote: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
+ counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
last_sent_closing_fee: None,
- funding_txo: None,
funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
short_channel_id: None,
last_block_connected: Default::default(),
funding_tx_confirmations: 0,
feerate_per_kw: feerate,
- their_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
- our_dust_limit_satoshis: Channel::<ChanSigner>::derive_our_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate),
- their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
- local_channel_reserve_satoshis: 0,
- their_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
- our_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
- their_to_self_delay: 0,
- our_to_self_delay,
- their_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
+ counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
+ holder_dust_limit_satoshis: Channel::<Signer>::derive_holder_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate),
+ counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
+ counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: 0,
+ counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
+ holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
+ counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
minimum_depth: 0, // Filled in in accept_channel
- their_pubkeys: None,
- their_cur_commitment_point: None,
+ channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
+ holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
+ holder_selected_contest_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
+ is_outbound_from_holder: true,
+ counterparty_parameters: None,
+ funding_outpoint: None
+ },
+ counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
- their_prev_commitment_point: None,
- their_node_id: their_node_id,
+ counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
+ counterparty_node_id,
- their_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
+ counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
network_sync: UpdateStatus::Fresh,
+
+ #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
+ next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
+ #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
+ next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
})
}
/// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
/// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
- pub fn new_from_req<K: Deref, F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, their_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel<ChanSigner>, ChannelError>
- where K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
+ pub fn new_from_req<K: Deref, F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
+ where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
F::Target: FeeEstimator
{
- let mut chan_keys = keys_provider.get_channel_keys(true, msg.funding_satoshis);
- let their_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
+ let holder_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(true, msg.funding_satoshis);
+ let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
+ let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
payment_point: msg.payment_point,
delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
};
- chan_keys.on_accept(&their_pubkeys, msg.to_self_delay, config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay);
let mut local_config = (*config).channel_options.clone();
if config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
}
- Channel::<ChanSigner>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
+ Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
- let max_to_self_delay = u16::min(config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
- if msg.to_self_delay > max_to_self_delay {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_to_self_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
+ let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
+ if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
}
if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
}
- if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > 483 {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than 483", msg.max_accepted_htlcs)));
+ if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
}
// Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
// Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
- let their_announce = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
+ let announce = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
if config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
- if local_config.announced_channel != their_announce {
+ if local_config.announced_channel != announce {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
}
}
// we either accept their preference or the preferences match
- local_config.announced_channel = their_announce;
+ local_config.announced_channel = announce;
let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
- let our_dust_limit_satoshis = Channel::<ChanSigner>::derive_our_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate);
- let remote_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_remote_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis);
- if remote_channel_reserve_satoshis < our_dust_limit_satoshis {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). our_dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", remote_channel_reserve_satoshis, our_dust_limit_satoshis)));
+ let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::derive_holder_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate);
+ let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis);
+ if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, holder_dust_limit_satoshis)));
}
- if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < our_dust_limit_satoshis {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, our_dust_limit_satoshis)));
+ if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, holder_dust_limit_satoshis)));
}
- if remote_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, remote_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
+ if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
}
// check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
let to_local_msat = msg.push_msat;
let to_remote_msat = funders_amount_msat - background_feerate as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT;
- if to_local_msat <= msg.channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 && to_remote_msat <= remote_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
+ if to_local_msat <= msg.channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 && to_remote_msat <= holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial commitment".to_owned()));
}
- let their_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
+ let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
&OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
- // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. We enforce it while receiving shutdown msg
- if script.is_p2pkh() || script.is_p2sh() || script.is_v0_p2wsh() || script.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
- Some(script.clone())
// Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
- } else if script.len() == 0 {
+ if script.len() == 0 {
None
// Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. Fail the channel
- } else {
+ } else if is_unsupported_shutdown_script(&their_features, script) {
return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. script: ({})", script.to_bytes().to_hex())));
+ } else {
+ Some(script.clone())
}
},
// Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
}
} else { None };
+ let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+ secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
+
let chan = Channel {
- user_id: user_id,
+ user_id,
config: local_config,
channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
- channel_outbound: false,
- secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
+ secp_ctx,
latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
- local_keys: chan_keys,
+ holder_signer,
shutdown_pubkey: keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(),
destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
- cur_local_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
- cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
+ cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
+ cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
pending_update_fee: None,
holding_cell_update_fee: None,
- next_local_htlc_id: 0,
- next_remote_htlc_id: 0,
+ next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
+ next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
update_time_counter: 1,
resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
#[cfg(debug_assertions)]
- max_commitment_tx_output_local: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
+ holder_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
#[cfg(debug_assertions)]
- max_commitment_tx_output_remote: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
+ counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
last_sent_closing_fee: None,
- funding_txo: None,
funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
short_channel_id: None,
last_block_connected: Default::default(),
feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
- their_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
- our_dust_limit_satoshis: our_dust_limit_satoshis,
- their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
- local_channel_reserve_satoshis: msg.channel_reserve_satoshis,
- their_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
- our_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
- their_to_self_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
- our_to_self_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
- their_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
+ counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
+ holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
+ counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
+ counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: msg.channel_reserve_satoshis,
+ counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
+ holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
+ counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
minimum_depth: config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth,
- their_pubkeys: Some(their_pubkeys),
- their_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
+ channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
+ holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
+ holder_selected_contest_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
+ is_outbound_from_holder: false,
+ counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
+ selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
+ pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
+ }),
+ funding_outpoint: None
+ },
+ counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
- their_prev_commitment_point: None,
- their_node_id: their_node_id,
+ counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
+ counterparty_node_id,
- their_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
+ counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
network_sync: UpdateStatus::Fresh,
+
+ #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
+ next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
+ #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
+ next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
};
Ok(chan)
}
- // Utilities to build transactions:
-
- fn get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self) -> u64 {
- let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
-
- let their_payment_point = &self.their_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap().payment_point.serialize();
- if self.channel_outbound {
- sha.input(&self.local_keys.pubkeys().payment_point.serialize());
- sha.input(their_payment_point);
- } else {
- sha.input(their_payment_point);
- sha.input(&self.local_keys.pubkeys().payment_point.serialize());
- }
- let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
-
- ((res[26] as u64) << 5*8) |
- ((res[27] as u64) << 4*8) |
- ((res[28] as u64) << 3*8) |
- ((res[29] as u64) << 2*8) |
- ((res[30] as u64) << 1*8) |
- ((res[31] as u64) << 0*8)
- }
-
/// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
/// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
/// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
/// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
/// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
/// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
- /// Returns (the transaction built, the number of HTLC outputs which were present in the
+ /// Returns (the transaction info, the number of HTLC outputs which were present in the
/// transaction, the list of HTLCs which were not ignored when building the transaction).
/// Note that below-dust HTLCs are included in the third return value, but not the second, and
/// sources are provided only for outbound HTLCs in the third return value.
#[inline]
- fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> (Transaction, usize, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
- let obscured_commitment_transaction_number = self.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor() ^ (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number);
-
- let txins = {
- let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
- ins.push(TxIn {
- previous_output: self.funding_txo.unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
- script_sig: Script::new(),
- sequence: ((0x80 as u32) << 8*3) | ((obscured_commitment_transaction_number >> 3*8) as u32),
- witness: Vec::new(),
- });
- ins
- };
-
- let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, Option<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)> = Vec::with_capacity(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() + 2);
+ fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> (CommitmentTransaction, usize, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
+ let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
+ let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
- let dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.our_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.their_dust_limit_satoshis };
+ let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
- log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...", commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number), self.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
+ log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...", commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number), get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
- if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
+ if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
- txouts.push((TxOut {
- script_pubkey: chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc_in_tx, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh(),
- value: $htlc.amount_msat / 1000
- }, Some((htlc_in_tx, $source))));
+ included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
} else {
log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
}
} else {
let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
- if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
+ if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
- txouts.push((TxOut { // "received HTLC output"
- script_pubkey: chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc_in_tx, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh(),
- value: $htlc.amount_msat / 1000
- }, Some((htlc_in_tx, $source))));
+ included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
} else {
log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
{
// Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
// channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
- let mut max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
- self.max_commitment_tx_output_local.lock().unwrap()
+ let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
+ self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
} else {
- self.max_commitment_tx_output_remote.lock().unwrap()
+ self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
};
- debug_assert!(max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.local_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
- max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
- debug_assert!(max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_remote_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) as i64);
- max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
+ debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
+ broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
+ debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) as i64);
+ broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
}
- let total_fee = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (txouts.len() as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
- let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.channel_outbound {
+ let total_fee = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (included_non_dust_htlcs.len() as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
+ let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
(value_to_self_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
} else {
(value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64)
};
- let value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
- let value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
+ let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
+ let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
- if value_to_a >= (dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
+ if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
- txouts.push((TxOut {
- script_pubkey: chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&keys.revocation_key,
- if local { self.their_to_self_delay } else { self.our_to_self_delay },
- &keys.a_delayed_payment_key).to_v0_p2wsh(),
- value: value_to_a as u64
- }, None));
+ } else {
+ value_to_a = 0;
}
- if value_to_b >= (dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
+ if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
- let static_payment_pk = if local {
- self.their_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap().payment_point
- } else {
- self.local_keys.pubkeys().payment_point
- }.serialize();
- txouts.push((TxOut {
- script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0)
- .push_slice(&WPubkeyHash::hash(&static_payment_pk)[..])
- .into_script(),
- value: value_to_b as u64
- }, None));
- }
-
- transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts, |a, b| {
- if let &Some(ref a_htlc) = a {
- if let &Some(ref b_htlc) = b {
- a_htlc.0.cltv_expiry.cmp(&b_htlc.0.cltv_expiry)
- // Note that due to hash collisions, we have to have a fallback comparison
- // here for fuzztarget mode (otherwise at least chanmon_fail_consistency
- // may fail)!
- .then(a_htlc.0.payment_hash.0.cmp(&b_htlc.0.payment_hash.0))
- // For non-HTLC outputs, if they're copying our SPK we don't really care if we
- // close the channel due to mismatches - they're doing something dumb:
- } else { cmp::Ordering::Equal }
- } else { cmp::Ordering::Equal }
- });
-
- let mut outputs: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::with_capacity(txouts.len());
- let mut htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(txouts.len() + included_dust_htlcs.len());
- for (idx, mut out) in txouts.drain(..).enumerate() {
- outputs.push(out.0);
- if let Some((mut htlc, source_option)) = out.1.take() {
- htlc.transaction_output_index = Some(idx as u32);
- htlcs_included.push((htlc, source_option));
- }
+ } else {
+ value_to_b = 0;
}
- let non_dust_htlc_count = htlcs_included.len();
+
+ let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
+
+ let channel_parameters =
+ if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
+ else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
+ let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
+ value_to_a as u64,
+ value_to_b as u64,
+ keys.clone(),
+ feerate_per_kw,
+ &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
+ &channel_parameters
+ );
+ let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
+ // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
+ htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
- (Transaction {
- version: 2,
- lock_time: ((0x20 as u32) << 8*3) | ((obscured_commitment_transaction_number & 0xffffffu64) as u32),
- input: txins,
- output: outputs,
- }, non_dust_htlc_count, htlcs_included)
+ (tx, num_nondust_htlcs, htlcs_included)
}
#[inline]
fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
- let our_channel_close_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&self.shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
- Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script()
+ let channel_close_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&self.shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
+ Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script()
}
#[inline]
- fn get_closing_transaction_weight(a_scriptpubkey: &Script, b_scriptpubkey: &Script) -> u64 {
- (4 + 1 + 36 + 4 + 1 + 1 + 2*(8+1) + 4 + a_scriptpubkey.len() as u64 + b_scriptpubkey.len() as u64)*4 + 2 + 1 + 1 + 2*(1 + 72)
+ fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
+ let mut ret =
+ (4 + // version
+ 1 + // input count
+ 36 + // prevout
+ 1 + // script length (0)
+ 4 + // sequence
+ 1 + // output count
+ 4 // lock time
+ )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
+ 2 + // witness marker and flag
+ 1 + // witness element count
+ 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
+ self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
+ 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
+ if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
+ ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
+ spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
+ }
+ if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
+ ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
+ spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
+ }
+ ret
}
#[inline]
let txins = {
let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
ins.push(TxIn {
- previous_output: self.funding_txo.unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
+ previous_output: self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
script_sig: Script::new(),
sequence: 0xffffffff,
witness: Vec::new(),
let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, ())> = Vec::new();
let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
- let value_to_self: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.channel_outbound { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
- let value_to_remote: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.channel_outbound { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
+ let value_to_self: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
+ let value_to_remote: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
if value_to_self < 0 {
- assert!(self.channel_outbound);
+ assert!(self.is_outbound());
total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_self) as u64;
} else if value_to_remote < 0 {
- assert!(!self.channel_outbound);
+ assert!(!self.is_outbound());
total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_remote) as u64;
}
- if !skip_remote_output && value_to_remote as u64 > self.our_dust_limit_satoshis {
+ if !skip_remote_output && value_to_remote as u64 > self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
txouts.push((TxOut {
- script_pubkey: self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap(),
+ script_pubkey: self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap(),
value: value_to_remote as u64
}, ()));
}
- if value_to_self as u64 > self.our_dust_limit_satoshis {
+ if value_to_self as u64 > self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
txouts.push((TxOut {
script_pubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
value: value_to_self as u64
}, total_fee_satoshis)
}
+ fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
+ self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
+ }
+
#[inline]
/// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
/// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
/// our counterparty!)
- /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke ownership of (ie a "local" transaction)
+ /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
/// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
- fn build_local_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
- let per_commitment_point = self.local_keys.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
- let delayed_payment_base = &self.local_keys.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
- let htlc_basepoint = &self.local_keys.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
- let their_pubkeys = self.their_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap();
+ fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
+ let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
+ let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
+ let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
+ let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
- Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &their_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &their_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint), "Local tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
+ Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint), "Local tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
}
#[inline]
fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
//TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
//may see payments to it!
- let revocation_basepoint = &self.local_keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
- let htlc_basepoint = &self.local_keys.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
- let their_pubkeys = self.their_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap();
+ let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
+ let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
+ let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
- Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &their_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &their_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint), "Remote tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
+ Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint), "Remote tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
}
/// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
/// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
/// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
- make_funding_redeemscript(&self.local_keys.pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.their_funding_pubkey())
+ make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
}
/// Builds the htlc-success or htlc-timeout transaction which spends a given HTLC output
/// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
/// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
fn build_htlc_transaction(&self, prev_hash: &Txid, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, local: bool, keys: &TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Transaction {
- chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(prev_hash, feerate_per_kw, if local { self.their_to_self_delay } else { self.our_to_self_delay }, htlc, &keys.a_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key)
+ chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(prev_hash, feerate_per_kw, if local { self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay() } else { self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay() }, htlc, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key)
}
/// Per HTLC, only one get_update_fail_htlc or get_update_fulfill_htlc call may be made.
pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, config: &UserConfig, their_features: InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
// Check sanity of message fields:
- if !self.channel_outbound {
+ if !self.is_outbound() {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
}
if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.channel_reserve_satoshis {
return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve ({}) and dust_limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
}
- if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < self.our_dust_limit_satoshis {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? channel_reserve_satoshis was ({}). our_dust_limit is ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.our_dust_limit_satoshis)));
+ if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? channel_reserve_satoshis was ({}). dust_limit is ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)));
}
- let remote_reserve = Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_remote_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
+ let remote_reserve = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > remote_reserve {
return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, remote_reserve)));
}
if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
}
- if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > 483 {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than 483", msg.max_accepted_htlcs)));
+ if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
}
// Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
}
- let their_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
+ let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
&OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
- // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. We enforce it while receiving shutdown msg
- if script.is_p2pkh() || script.is_p2sh() || script.is_v0_p2wsh() || script.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
- Some(script.clone())
// Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
- } else if script.len() == 0 {
+ if script.len() == 0 {
None
// Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. Fail the channel
+ } else if is_unsupported_shutdown_script(&their_features, script) {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. script: ({})", script.to_bytes().to_hex())));
} else {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. scriptpubkey: ({})", script.to_bytes().to_hex())));
+ Some(script.clone())
}
},
// Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
}
} else { None };
- self.their_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
- self.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
- self.local_channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.channel_reserve_satoshis;
- self.their_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
- self.their_to_self_delay = msg.to_self_delay;
- self.their_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
+ self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
+ self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
+ self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.channel_reserve_satoshis;
+ self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
+ self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
self.minimum_depth = msg.minimum_depth;
- let their_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
+ let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
payment_point: msg.payment_point,
htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
};
- self.local_keys.on_accept(&their_pubkeys, msg.to_self_delay, self.our_to_self_delay);
- self.their_pubkeys = Some(their_pubkeys);
+ self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
+ selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
+ pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
+ });
- self.their_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
- self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey = their_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
+ self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
+ self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
Ok(())
}
- fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Transaction, LocalCommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
+ fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
- let local_keys = self.build_local_transaction_keys(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number)?;
- let local_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number, &local_keys, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
- let local_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&local_initial_commitment_tx).sighash_all(&local_initial_commitment_tx.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
+ let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
+ let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
+ {
+ let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
+ let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
+ let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
+ // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
+ log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script));
+ secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
+ }
- // They sign the "local" commitment transaction...
- log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.their_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&local_initial_commitment_tx), log_bytes!(local_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script));
- secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &sig, self.their_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
+ let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
+ let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
- let localtx = LocalCommitmentTransaction::new_missing_local_sig(local_initial_commitment_tx, sig.clone(), &self.local_keys.pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.their_funding_pubkey(), local_keys, self.feerate_per_kw, Vec::new());
+ let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
+ let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
+ log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty ID {} tx {}", counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
- let remote_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
- let remote_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, &remote_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
- let pre_remote_keys = PreCalculatedTxCreationKeys::new(remote_keys);
- let remote_signature = self.local_keys.sign_remote_commitment(self.feerate_per_kw, &remote_initial_commitment_tx, &pre_remote_keys, &Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
+ let counterparty_signature = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
.map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
- // We sign the "remote" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
- Ok((remote_initial_commitment_tx, localtx, remote_signature))
+ // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
+ Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
}
- fn their_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
- &self.their_pubkeys.as_ref().expect("their_funding_pubkey() only allowed after accept_channel").funding_pubkey
+ fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
+ &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
}
- pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
- if self.channel_outbound {
+ pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
+ if self.is_outbound() {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
}
if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
}
if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
- self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
- self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
+ self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
+ self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
}
- let funding_txo = OutPoint{ txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
- self.funding_txo = Some(funding_txo.clone());
+ let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
+ self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
+ // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
+ // funding_created_signature may fail.
+ self.holder_signer.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
- let (remote_initial_commitment_tx, local_initial_commitment_tx, our_signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
+ let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
Ok(res) => res,
+ Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
+ self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
+ },
Err(e) => {
- self.funding_txo = None;
- return Err(e);
+ // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
+ // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
+ panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
}
};
+ let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
+ initial_commitment_tx,
+ msg.signature,
+ Vec::new(),
+ &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
+ self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
+ );
+
// Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
- let their_pubkeys = self.their_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap();
let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
- macro_rules! create_monitor {
- () => { {
- let mut channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.local_keys.clone(),
- &self.shutdown_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay,
- &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
- &their_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, &their_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
- self.their_to_self_delay, funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
- self.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(),
- local_initial_commitment_tx.clone());
-
- channel_monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&remote_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
- channel_monitor
- } }
- }
+ let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
+ let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
+ &self.shutdown_pubkey, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
+ &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
+ &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
+ funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
+ obscure_factor,
+ holder_commitment_tx);
- let channel_monitor = create_monitor!();
+ channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
- self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
- self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
+ self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
+ self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
channel_id: self.channel_id,
- signature: our_signature
+ signature
}, channel_monitor))
}
/// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
/// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
- pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
- if !self.channel_outbound {
+ pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<Signer>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
+ if !self.is_outbound() {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
}
if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
}
if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
- self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
- self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
+ self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
+ self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
}
let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
- let remote_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
- let remote_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, &remote_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
-
- let local_keys = self.build_local_transaction_keys(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number)?;
- let local_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number, &local_keys, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
- let local_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&local_initial_commitment_tx).sighash_all(&local_initial_commitment_tx.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
+ let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
+ let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
+ let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
+ let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
- let their_funding_pubkey = &self.their_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap().funding_pubkey;
+ log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty ID {} tx {}", counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
- // They sign the "local" commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
- if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &msg.signature, their_funding_pubkey) {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
+ let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
+ let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
+ {
+ let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
+ let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
+ let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
+ // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
+ if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
+ }
}
- let their_pubkeys = self.their_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap();
+ let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
+ initial_commitment_tx,
+ msg.signature,
+ Vec::new(),
+ &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
+ self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
+ );
+
+
let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
- let funding_txo = self.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap();
+ let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
- macro_rules! create_monitor {
- () => { {
- let local_commitment_tx = LocalCommitmentTransaction::new_missing_local_sig(local_initial_commitment_tx.clone(), msg.signature.clone(), &self.local_keys.pubkeys().funding_pubkey, their_funding_pubkey, local_keys.clone(), self.feerate_per_kw, Vec::new());
- let mut channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.local_keys.clone(),
- &self.shutdown_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay,
- &self.destination_script, (funding_txo.clone(), funding_txo_script.clone()),
- &their_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, &their_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
- self.their_to_self_delay, funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
- self.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(),
- local_commitment_tx);
-
- channel_monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&remote_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
-
- channel_monitor
- } }
- }
+ let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
+ let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
+ &self.shutdown_pubkey, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
+ &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
+ &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
+ funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
+ obscure_factor,
+ holder_commitment_tx);
- let channel_monitor = create_monitor!();
+ channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
- self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
- self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
+ self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
+ self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
Ok(channel_monitor)
}
self.update_time_counter += 1;
} else if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) != 0 &&
// Note that funding_signed/funding_created will have decremented both by 1!
- self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
- self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) ||
+ self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
+ self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) ||
// If we reconnected before sending our funding locked they may still resend theirs:
(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) ==
(ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32)) {
- if self.their_cur_commitment_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
+ if self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect funding_locked with a different point".to_owned()));
}
// They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the funding_locked, which is required
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a funding_locked at a strange time".to_owned()));
}
- self.their_prev_commitment_point = self.their_cur_commitment_point;
- self.their_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
+ self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
+ self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
Ok(())
}
(COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * self.feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
}
- // Get the commitment tx fee for the local (i.e our) next commitment transaction
- // based on the number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next
- // commitment tx. `addl_htcs` is an optional parameter allowing the caller
- // to add a number of additional HTLCs to the calculation. Note that dust
- // HTLCs are excluded.
- fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, addl_htlcs: usize) -> u64 {
- assert!(self.channel_outbound);
+ // Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
+ // number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx, plus an additional
+ // HTLC if `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs
+ // are excluded.
+ fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
+ assert!(self.is_outbound());
+
+ let real_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
+ let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
+
+ let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
+ if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
+ match htlc.origin {
+ HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
+ if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
+ addl_htlcs += 1;
+ }
+ },
+ HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
+ if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
+ addl_htlcs += 1;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ let mut included_htlcs = 0;
+ for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
+ if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
+ continue
+ }
+ // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
+ // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
+ included_htlcs += 1;
+ }
- let mut their_acked_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len();
for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
- if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= self.our_dust_limit_satoshis {
+ if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
continue
}
match htlc.state {
- OutboundHTLCState::Committed => their_acked_htlcs += 1,
- OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => their_acked_htlcs += 1,
- OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => their_acked_htlcs += 1,
+ OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
+ OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
+ OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
+ // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
+ // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
+ // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
_ => {},
}
}
for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
match htlc {
- &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { .. } => their_acked_htlcs += 1,
- _ => {},
+ &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
+ if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
+ continue
+ }
+ included_htlcs += 1
+ },
+ _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
+ // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
}
}
- self.commit_tx_fee_msat(their_acked_htlcs + addl_htlcs)
+ let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
+ let res = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs);
+ #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
+ {
+ let mut fee = res;
+ if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
+ fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs - 1);
+ }
+ let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
+ + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
+ let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
+ fee,
+ total_pending_htlcs,
+ next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
+ HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
+ HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
+ },
+ next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
+ HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
+ HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
+ },
+ feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
+ };
+ *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
+ }
+ res
}
- // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction
- // based on the number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their
- // next commitment tx. `addl_htcs` is an optional parameter allowing the caller
- // to add a number of additional HTLCs to the calculation. Note that dust HTLCs
- // are excluded.
- fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, addl_htlcs: usize) -> u64 {
- assert!(!self.channel_outbound);
+ // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
+ // pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx, plus an additional HTLC if
+ // `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs are
+ // excluded.
+ fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
+ assert!(!self.is_outbound());
+
+ let real_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
+ let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
+
+ let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
+ if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
+ match htlc.origin {
+ HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
+ if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
+ addl_htlcs += 1;
+ }
+ },
+ HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
+ if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
+ addl_htlcs += 1;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
+ // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
+ // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
+ let mut included_htlcs = 0;
+ for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
+ if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
+ continue
+ }
+ included_htlcs += 1;
+ }
- // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next
- // commitment_signed, all inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be
- // included) and only committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
- let mut their_acked_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len();
for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
- if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= self.their_dust_limit_satoshis {
+ if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
continue
}
- // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next
- // commitment_signed, i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
+ // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
+ // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
match htlc.state {
- OutboundHTLCState::Committed => their_acked_htlcs += 1,
- OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => their_acked_htlcs += 1,
+ OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
+ OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
+ OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
_ => {},
}
}
- self.commit_tx_fee_msat(their_acked_htlcs + addl_htlcs)
+ let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
+ let res = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs);
+ #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
+ {
+ let mut fee = res;
+ if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
+ fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs - 1);
+ }
+ let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
+ let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
+ fee,
+ total_pending_htlcs,
+ next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
+ HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
+ HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
+ },
+ next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
+ HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
+ HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
+ },
+ feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
+ };
+ *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
+ }
+ res
}
pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
}
- if msg.amount_msat < self.our_htlc_minimum_msat {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.our_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
+ if msg.amount_msat < self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
}
let (inbound_htlc_count, htlc_inbound_value_msat) = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats();
if inbound_htlc_count + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", OUR_MAX_HTLCS)));
}
- let our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis);
- if htlc_inbound_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
+ let holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis);
+ if htlc_inbound_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
}
- // Check remote_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
+ // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
// the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
// something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
// Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
// Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
// feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
- let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.channel_outbound { 0 } else {
- // +1 for this HTLC.
- self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(1)
+ let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
+ let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
+ self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
};
if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
};
let chan_reserve_msat =
- Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_remote_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) * 1000;
+ Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) * 1000;
if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
}
- if !self.channel_outbound {
- // `+1` for this HTLC, `2 *` and `+1` fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from the
- // spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the receiver's side,
- // only on the sender's.
- // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output fees,
- // we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep the extra +1
- // as we should still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of
- // being sensitive to fee spikes.
- let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(1 + 1);
+ if !self.is_outbound() {
+ // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
+ // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
+ // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
+ // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
+ // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
+ // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
+ // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
+ // sensitive to fee spikes.
+ let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
+ let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - chan_reserve_msat < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
// Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
// the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
}
} else {
// Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
-
- // +1 for this HTLC.
- let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(1);
- if self.value_to_self_msat < self.local_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot receive value that would put us under local channel reserve value".to_owned()));
+ let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
+ let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
+ if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
}
}
-
- if self.next_remote_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.next_remote_htlc_id)));
+ if self.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
}
if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
}
// Now update local state:
- self.next_remote_htlc_id += 1;
+ self.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
- let local_keys = self.build_local_transaction_keys(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
+ let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
let mut update_fee = false;
- let feerate_per_kw = if !self.channel_outbound && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
+ let feerate_per_kw = if !self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
update_fee = true;
self.pending_update_fee.unwrap()
} else {
self.feerate_per_kw
};
- let mut local_commitment_tx = {
- let mut commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number, &local_keys, true, false, feerate_per_kw, logger);
- let htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_tx.2.drain(..).map(|htlc| (htlc.0, htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
- (commitment_tx.0, commitment_tx.1, htlcs_cloned)
+ let (num_htlcs, mut htlcs_cloned, commitment_tx, commitment_txid) = {
+ let commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, feerate_per_kw, logger);
+ let commitment_txid = {
+ let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.0.trust();
+ let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
+ let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
+
+ log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script));
+ if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
+ return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
+ }
+ bitcoin_tx.txid
+ };
+ let htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_tx.2.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
+ (commitment_tx.1, htlcs_cloned, commitment_tx.0, commitment_txid)
};
- let local_commitment_txid = local_commitment_tx.0.txid();
- let local_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&local_commitment_tx.0).sighash_all(&local_commitment_tx.0.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
- log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.their_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&local_commitment_tx.0), log_bytes!(local_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script));
- if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey()) {
- return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
- }
+ let total_fee = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (num_htlcs as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
//If channel fee was updated by funder confirm funder can afford the new fee rate when applied to the current local commitment transaction
if update_fee {
- let num_htlcs = local_commitment_tx.1;
- let total_fee = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (num_htlcs as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
-
- let remote_reserve_we_require = Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_remote_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
- if self.channel_value_satoshis - self.value_to_self_msat / 1000 < total_fee + remote_reserve_we_require {
+ let counterparty_reserve_we_require = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
+ if self.channel_value_satoshis - self.value_to_self_msat / 1000 < total_fee + counterparty_reserve_we_require {
return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned())));
}
}
+ #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
+ {
+ if self.is_outbound() {
+ let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
+ *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
+ if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
+ let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
+ + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
+ if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
+ && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
+ && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
+ && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
+ assert_eq!(total_fee, info.fee / 1000);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
- if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != local_commitment_tx.1 {
- return Err((None, ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), local_commitment_tx.1))));
+ if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != num_htlcs {
+ return Err((None, ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), num_htlcs))));
}
- // TODO: Merge these two, sadly they are currently both required to be passed separately to
- // ChannelMonitor:
- let mut htlcs_without_source = Vec::with_capacity(local_commitment_tx.2.len());
- let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(local_commitment_tx.2.len());
- for (idx, (htlc, source)) in local_commitment_tx.2.drain(..).enumerate() {
+ // TODO: Sadly, we pass HTLCs twice to ChannelMonitor: once via the HolderCommitmentTransaction and once via the update
+ let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
+ for (idx, (htlc, source)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
- let htlc_tx = self.build_htlc_transaction(&local_commitment_txid, &htlc, true, &local_keys, feerate_per_kw);
- let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &local_keys);
- let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&htlc_tx).sighash_all(&htlc_tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]);
- log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(local_keys.b_htlc_key.serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript));
- if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &local_keys.b_htlc_key) {
+ let htlc_tx = self.build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, &htlc, true, &keys, feerate_per_kw);
+ let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
+ let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]);
+ log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript));
+ if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
}
- htlcs_without_source.push((htlc.clone(), Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx])));
htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source));
} else {
- htlcs_without_source.push((htlc.clone(), None));
htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source));
}
}
- let next_per_commitment_point = self.local_keys.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
- let per_commitment_secret = self.local_keys.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number + 1);
+ let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
+ commitment_tx,
+ msg.signature,
+ msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
+ &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
+ self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
+ );
+
+ let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
+ let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1);
// Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
- let mut need_our_commitment = false;
- if !self.channel_outbound {
+ let mut need_commitment = false;
+ if !self.is_outbound() {
if let Some(fee_update) = self.pending_update_fee {
self.feerate_per_kw = fee_update;
// We later use the presence of pending_update_fee to indicate we should generate a
// commitment_signed upon receipt of revoke_and_ack, so we can only set it to None
// if we're not awaiting a revoke (ie will send a commitment_signed now).
if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) == 0 {
- need_our_commitment = true;
+ need_commitment = true;
self.pending_update_fee = None;
}
}
}
- let their_funding_pubkey = self.their_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap().funding_pubkey;
-
self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
- updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo {
- commitment_tx: LocalCommitmentTransaction::new_missing_local_sig(local_commitment_tx.0, msg.signature.clone(), &self.local_keys.pubkeys().funding_pubkey, &their_funding_pubkey, local_keys, self.feerate_per_kw, htlcs_without_source),
+ updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
+ commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs
}]
};
} else { None };
if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
- need_our_commitment = true;
+ need_commitment = true;
}
}
for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
Some(fail_reason.take())
} else { None } {
htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(fail_reason);
- need_our_commitment = true;
+ need_commitment = true;
}
}
- self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
- // Note that if we need_our_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
+ self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
+ // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
// send_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
// In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
// to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
- if need_our_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
+ if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
// If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
// the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
// includes the right HTLCs.
return Err((Some(monitor_update), ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA".to_owned())));
}
- let (our_commitment_signed, closing_signed) = if need_our_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
+ let (commitment_signed, closing_signed) = if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
// If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
// we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
// free_holding_cell_htlcs().
self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
(Some(msg), None)
- } else if !need_our_commitment {
+ } else if !need_commitment {
(None, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator))
} else { (None, None) };
Ok((msgs::RevokeAndACK {
channel_id: self.channel_id,
- per_commitment_secret: per_commitment_secret,
- next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
- }, our_commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update))
+ per_commitment_secret,
+ next_per_commitment_point,
+ }, commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update))
}
/// Used to fulfill holding_cell_htlcs when we get a remote ack (or implicitly get it by them
update_fulfill_htlcs,
update_fail_htlcs,
update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fee: update_fee,
+ update_fee,
commitment_signed,
}, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail))
} else {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
}
- if let Some(their_prev_commitment_point) = self.their_prev_commitment_point {
- if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned())) != their_prev_commitment_point {
+ if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
+ if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned())) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
}
}
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
}
- self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
+ #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
+ {
+ *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
+ *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
+ }
+
+ self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
.map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
- idx: self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
+ idx: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
}],
};
// OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
// channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
- self.their_prev_commitment_point = self.their_cur_commitment_point;
- self.their_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
- self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
+ self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
+ self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
+ self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA...");
let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
}
self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
- if self.channel_outbound {
+ if self.is_outbound() {
if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee.take() {
self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
}
/// further details on the optionness of the return value.
/// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
fn send_update_fee(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> {
- if !self.channel_outbound {
+ if !self.is_outbound() {
panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
}
if !self.is_usable() {
Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
channel_id: self.channel_id,
- feerate_per_kw: feerate_per_kw,
+ feerate_per_kw,
})
}
},
}
});
- self.next_remote_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
+ self.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
- let needs_broadcast_safe = self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) != 0 && self.channel_outbound;
+ let needs_broadcast_safe = self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) != 0 && self.is_outbound();
// Because we will never generate a FundingBroadcastSafe event when we're in
// MonitorUpdateFailed, if we assume the user only broadcast the funding transaction when
// monitor on funding_created, and we even got the funding transaction confirmed before the
// monitor was persisted.
let funding_locked = if self.monitor_pending_funding_locked {
- assert!(!self.channel_outbound, "Funding transaction broadcast without FundingBroadcastSafe!");
+ assert!(!self.is_outbound(), "Funding transaction broadcast without FundingBroadcastSafe!");
self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = false;
- let next_per_commitment_point = self.local_keys.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
+ let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
channel_id: self.channel_id(),
- next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
+ next_per_commitment_point,
})
} else { None };
pub fn update_fee<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
where F::Target: FeeEstimator
{
- if self.channel_outbound {
+ if self.is_outbound() {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
}
if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
}
- Channel::<ChanSigner>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
+ Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
self.pending_update_fee = Some(msg.feerate_per_kw);
self.update_time_counter += 1;
Ok(())
}
fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
- let next_per_commitment_point = self.local_keys.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
- let per_commitment_secret = self.local_keys.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
+ let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
+ let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
msgs::RevokeAndACK {
channel_id: self.channel_id,
per_commitment_secret,
if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
match msg.data_loss_protect {
OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss) => {
- let expected_point = self.local_keys.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
+ let expected_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&data_loss.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
.map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
}
- if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number {
+ if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
return Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(
"We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting".to_owned()
));
}
// We have OurFundingLocked set!
- let next_per_commitment_point = self.local_keys.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
+ let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
return Ok((Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
channel_id: self.channel_id(),
- next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
+ next_per_commitment_point,
}), None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, shutdown_msg));
}
- let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number {
+ let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
// Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
// Note that if we need to repeat our FundingLocked we'll do that in the next if block.
None
- } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number {
+ } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
None
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
};
- // We increment cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
+ // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
// revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
// AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
// the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
- let our_next_remote_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
+ let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
- let resend_funding_locked = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
+ let resend_funding_locked = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
// We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateFailed resending FundingLocked
- let next_per_commitment_point = self.local_keys.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
+ let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
channel_id: self.channel_id(),
- next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
+ next_per_commitment_point,
})
} else { None };
- if msg.next_local_commitment_number == our_next_remote_commitment_number {
+ if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
if required_revoke.is_some() {
log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
} else {
} else {
return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
}
- } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == our_next_remote_commitment_number - 1 {
+ } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
if required_revoke.is_some() {
log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
} else {
fn maybe_propose_first_closing_signed<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F) -> Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>
where F::Target: FeeEstimator
{
- if !self.channel_outbound || !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() ||
+ if !self.is_outbound() || !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() ||
self.channel_state & (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK ||
self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
return None;
if self.feerate_per_kw > proposed_feerate {
proposed_feerate = self.feerate_per_kw;
}
- let tx_weight = Self::get_closing_transaction_weight(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(), self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap());
+ let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(proposed_total_fee_satoshis, false);
- let our_sig = self.local_keys
+ let sig = self.holder_signer
.sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
.ok();
- if our_sig.is_none() { return None; }
+ assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= tx_weight);
+ if sig.is_none() { return None; }
- self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((proposed_feerate, total_fee_satoshis, our_sig.clone().unwrap()));
+ self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((proposed_feerate, total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone().unwrap()));
Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
channel_id: self.channel_id,
fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
- signature: our_sig.unwrap(),
+ signature: sig.unwrap(),
})
}
- pub fn shutdown<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
+ pub fn shutdown<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
where F::Target: FeeEstimator
{
if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
}
assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
- // BOLT 2 says we must only send a scriptpubkey of certain standard forms, which are up to
- // 34 bytes in length, so don't let the remote peer feed us some super fee-heavy script.
- if self.channel_outbound && msg.scriptpubkey.len() > 34 {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got shutdown_scriptpubkey ({}) of absurd length from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
- }
-
- //Check shutdown_scriptpubkey form as BOLT says we must
- if !msg.scriptpubkey.is_p2pkh() && !msg.scriptpubkey.is_p2sh() && !msg.scriptpubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() && !msg.scriptpubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
+ if is_unsupported_shutdown_script(&their_features, &msg.scriptpubkey) {
return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
}
- if self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
- if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
+ if self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
+ if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
}
} else {
- self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
+ self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
}
// From here on out, we may not fail!
// immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown cause we won't send
// any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
- let our_shutdown = if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
+ let shutdown = if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
None
} else {
Some(msgs::Shutdown {
self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
self.update_time_counter += 1;
- Ok((our_shutdown, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), dropped_outbound_htlcs))
+ Ok((shutdown, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), dropped_outbound_htlcs))
}
- fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, tx: &mut Transaction, their_sig: &Signature, our_sig: &Signature) {
+ fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, tx: &mut Transaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) {
if tx.input.len() != 1 { panic!("Tried to sign closing transaction that had input count != 1!"); }
if tx.input[0].witness.len() != 0 { panic!("Tried to re-sign closing transaction"); }
if tx.output.len() > 2 { panic!("Tried to sign bogus closing transaction"); }
tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
- let our_funding_key = self.local_keys.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
- let their_funding_key = self.their_funding_pubkey().serialize();
- if our_funding_key[..] < their_funding_key[..] {
- tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
- tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
+ let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
+ let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
+ if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
+ tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
+ tx.input[0].witness.push(counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
} else {
- tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
- tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
+ tx.input[0].witness.push(counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
+ tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
}
tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
}
- if msg.fee_satoshis > 21000000 * 10000000 { //this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
+ if msg.fee_satoshis > 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000 { //this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
}
if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee greater than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}", msg.fee_satoshis)));
}
- let mut sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&closing_tx).sighash_all(&closing_tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
+ let mut sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&closing_tx).signature_hash(0, &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]);
- let their_funding_pubkey = &self.their_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap().funding_pubkey;
-
- match self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, their_funding_pubkey) {
+ match self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
Ok(_) => {},
Err(_e) => {
// The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
// limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
- sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&closing_tx).sighash_all(&closing_tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
- secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.their_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
+ sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&closing_tx).signature_hash(0, &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]);
+ secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
},
};
- if let Some((_, last_fee, our_sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
+ let closing_tx_max_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(
+ if let Some(oup) = closing_tx.output.get(0) { Some(&oup.script_pubkey) } else { None },
+ if let Some(oup) = closing_tx.output.get(1) { Some(&oup.script_pubkey) } else { None });
+ if let Some((_, last_fee, sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
- self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &our_sig);
+ self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
+ assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= closing_tx_max_weight);
+ debug_assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 >= closing_tx_max_weight - 2);
self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
self.update_time_counter += 1;
return Ok((None, Some(closing_tx)));
macro_rules! propose_new_feerate {
($new_feerate: expr) => {
- let closing_tx_max_weight = Self::get_closing_transaction_weight(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(), self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap());
- let (closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction($new_feerate as u64 * closing_tx_max_weight / 1000, false);
- let our_sig = self.local_keys
+ let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
+ let (closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction($new_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000, false);
+ let sig = self.holder_signer
.sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
.map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
- self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some(($new_feerate, used_total_fee, our_sig.clone()));
+ assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= tx_weight);
+ self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some(($new_feerate, used_total_fee, sig.clone()));
return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
channel_id: self.channel_id,
fee_satoshis: used_total_fee,
- signature: our_sig,
+ signature: sig,
}), None))
}
}
- let proposed_sat_per_kw = msg.fee_satoshis * 1000 / closing_tx.get_weight() as u64;
- if self.channel_outbound {
- let our_max_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
- if (proposed_sat_per_kw as u32) > our_max_feerate {
+ let mut min_feerate = 253;
+ if self.is_outbound() {
+ let max_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
+ if (msg.fee_satoshis as u64) > max_feerate as u64 * closing_tx_max_weight / 1000 {
if let Some((last_feerate, _, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
- if our_max_feerate <= last_feerate {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something higher ({}) than our Normal feerate ({})", last_feerate, our_max_feerate)));
+ if max_feerate <= last_feerate {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something higher ({}) than our Normal feerate ({})", last_feerate, max_feerate)));
}
}
- propose_new_feerate!(our_max_feerate);
+ propose_new_feerate!(max_feerate);
}
} else {
- let our_min_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
- if (proposed_sat_per_kw as u32) < our_min_feerate {
- if let Some((last_feerate, _, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
- if our_min_feerate >= last_feerate {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something lower ({}) than our Background feerate ({}).", last_feerate, our_min_feerate)));
- }
+ min_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
+ }
+ if (msg.fee_satoshis as u64) < min_feerate as u64 * closing_tx_max_weight / 1000 {
+ if let Some((last_feerate, _, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
+ if min_feerate >= last_feerate {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something lower ({}) than our Background feerate ({}).", last_feerate, min_feerate)));
}
- propose_new_feerate!(our_min_feerate);
}
+ propose_new_feerate!(min_feerate);
}
- let our_sig = self.local_keys
+ let sig = self.holder_signer
.sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
.map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
- self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &our_sig);
+ self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
+ assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= closing_tx_max_weight);
+ debug_assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 >= closing_tx_max_weight - 2);
self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
self.update_time_counter += 1;
Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
channel_id: self.channel_id,
fee_satoshis: msg.fee_satoshis,
- signature: our_sig,
+ signature: sig,
}), Some(closing_tx)))
}
/// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
/// get_outbound_funding_created.
pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
- self.funding_txo
+ self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
+ }
+
+ fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
+ self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
+ }
+
+ fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
+ &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
+ }
+
+ fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
+ self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().selected_contest_delay
+ }
+
+ fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
+ &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
}
/// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
- pub fn get_their_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
- self.their_node_id
+ pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
+ self.counterparty_node_id
}
/// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
- pub fn get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
- self.our_htlc_minimum_msat
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
+ self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
}
/// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
// Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
// to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
// channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
- self.channel_value_satoshis * 9 / 10,
+ self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
- Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis)
+ Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis)
);
}
/// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
- pub fn get_their_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
- self.our_htlc_minimum_msat
+ pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
+ self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
}
pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
self.feerate_per_kw
}
- pub fn get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
- self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number + 1
+ pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
+ self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
}
- pub fn get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
- self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
+ pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
+ self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
}
- pub fn get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
- self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + 2
+ pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
+ self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
}
#[cfg(test)]
- pub fn get_local_keys(&self) -> &ChanSigner {
- &self.local_keys
+ pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
+ &self.holder_signer
}
#[cfg(test)]
ChannelValueStat {
value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
- channel_reserve_msat: self.local_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000,
+ channel_reserve_msat: self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000,
pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
}
res
},
- their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
- their_dust_limit_msat: self.their_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
+ counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
+ counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
}
}
}
pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
- self.channel_outbound
+ self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
}
/// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
/// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
- pub fn get_our_fee_base_msat<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &F) -> u32
+ pub fn get_holder_fee_base_msat<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &F) -> u32
where F::Target: FeeEstimator
{
// For lack of a better metric, we calculate what it would cost to consolidate the new HTLC
// the fee cost of the HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transaction:
let mut res = self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * cmp::max(HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT) / 1000;
- if self.channel_outbound {
+ if self.is_outbound() {
// + the marginal fee increase cost to us in the commitment transaction:
res += self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC / 1000;
}
///
/// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
/// back.
- pub fn block_connected(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[usize]) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage> {
+ pub fn block_connected(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage> {
let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
match htlc_update {
}
});
let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
- if header.bitcoin_hash() != self.last_block_connected {
+ if header.block_hash() != self.last_block_connected {
if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
self.funding_tx_confirmations += 1;
}
}
if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
- for (ref tx, index_in_block) in txn_matched.iter().zip(indexes_of_txn_matched) {
- if tx.txid() == self.funding_txo.unwrap().txid {
- let txo_idx = self.funding_txo.unwrap().index as usize;
+ for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
+ let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
+ if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
+ let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
- if self.channel_outbound {
+ if self.is_outbound() {
// If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
// should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
// tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
data: "funding tx had wrong script/value".to_owned()
});
} else {
- if self.channel_outbound {
+ if self.is_outbound() {
for input in tx.input.iter() {
if input.witness.is_empty() {
// We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
}
}
}
- if height > 0xff_ff_ff || (*index_in_block) > 0xff_ff_ff {
+ if height > 0xff_ff_ff || (index_in_block) > 0xff_ff_ff {
panic!("Block was bogus - either height 16 million or had > 16 million transactions");
}
assert!(txo_idx <= 0xffff); // txo_idx is a (u16 as usize), so this is just listed here for completeness
self.funding_tx_confirmations = 1;
- self.short_channel_id = Some(((height as u64) << (5*8)) |
- ((*index_in_block as u64) << (2*8)) |
- ((txo_idx as u64) << (0*8)));
+ self.short_channel_id = Some(((height as u64) << (5*8)) |
+ ((index_in_block as u64) << (2*8)) |
+ ((txo_idx as u64) << (0*8)));
}
}
}
}
- if header.bitcoin_hash() != self.last_block_connected {
- self.last_block_connected = header.bitcoin_hash();
+ if header.block_hash() != self.last_block_connected {
+ self.last_block_connected = header.block_hash();
self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, header.time);
if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
if self.funding_tx_confirmations == self.minimum_depth as u64 {
// funding_tx_confirmed_in and return.
false
};
- self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(header.bitcoin_hash());
+ self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(self.last_block_connected);
//TODO: Note that this must be a duplicate of the previous commitment point they sent us,
//as otherwise we will have a commitment transaction that they can't revoke (well, kinda,
//a protocol oversight, but I assume I'm just missing something.
if need_commitment_update {
if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
- let next_per_commitment_point = self.local_keys.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
+ let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
return Ok((Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
channel_id: self.channel_id,
- next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
+ next_per_commitment_point,
}), timed_out_htlcs));
} else {
self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = true;
return true;
}
}
- if Some(header.bitcoin_hash()) == self.funding_tx_confirmed_in {
+ self.last_block_connected = header.block_hash();
+ if Some(self.last_block_connected) == self.funding_tx_confirmed_in {
self.funding_tx_confirmations = self.minimum_depth as u64 - 1;
}
- self.last_block_connected = header.bitcoin_hash();
false
}
// something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
- if !self.channel_outbound {
+ if !self.is_outbound() {
panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
}
if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
}
- if self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
+ if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
}
- let first_per_commitment_point = self.local_keys.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
- let local_keys = self.local_keys.pubkeys();
+ let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
+ let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
msgs::OpenChannel {
- chain_hash: chain_hash,
+ chain_hash,
temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
- dust_limit_satoshis: self.our_dust_limit_satoshis,
- max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
- channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_remote_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
- htlc_minimum_msat: self.our_htlc_minimum_msat,
+ dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
+ max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
+ channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
+ htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32,
- to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
+ to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
- funding_pubkey: local_keys.funding_pubkey,
- revocation_basepoint: local_keys.revocation_basepoint,
- payment_point: local_keys.payment_point,
- delayed_payment_basepoint: local_keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
- htlc_basepoint: local_keys.htlc_basepoint,
+ funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
+ revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
+ payment_point: keys.payment_point,
+ delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
+ htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
first_per_commitment_point,
channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(if self.config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey { self.get_closing_scriptpubkey() } else { Builder::new().into_script() })
}
pub fn get_accept_channel(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
- if self.channel_outbound {
+ if self.is_outbound() {
panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
}
if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
}
- if self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
+ if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
}
- let first_per_commitment_point = self.local_keys.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
- let local_keys = self.local_keys.pubkeys();
+ let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
+ let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
msgs::AcceptChannel {
temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
- dust_limit_satoshis: self.our_dust_limit_satoshis,
- max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
- channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_remote_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
- htlc_minimum_msat: self.our_htlc_minimum_msat,
+ dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
+ max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
+ channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
+ htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth,
- to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
+ to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
- funding_pubkey: local_keys.funding_pubkey,
- revocation_basepoint: local_keys.revocation_basepoint,
- payment_point: local_keys.payment_point,
- delayed_payment_basepoint: local_keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
- htlc_basepoint: local_keys.htlc_basepoint,
+ funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
+ revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
+ payment_point: keys.payment_point,
+ delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
+ htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
first_per_commitment_point,
shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(if self.config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey { self.get_closing_scriptpubkey() } else { Builder::new().into_script() })
}
/// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
- let remote_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
- let remote_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, &remote_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
- let pre_remote_keys = PreCalculatedTxCreationKeys::new(remote_keys);
- Ok(self.local_keys.sign_remote_commitment(self.feerate_per_kw, &remote_initial_commitment_tx, &pre_remote_keys, &Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
+ let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
+ let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
+ Ok(self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
.map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
}
/// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
/// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
- if !self.channel_outbound {
+ if !self.is_outbound() {
panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
}
if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
}
if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
- self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
- self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
+ self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
+ self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
}
- self.funding_txo = Some(funding_txo.clone());
- let our_signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
+ self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
+ self.holder_signer.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
+
+ let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
Ok(res) => res,
Err(e) => {
log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
- self.funding_txo = None;
+ self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
return Err(e);
}
};
temporary_channel_id,
funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
- signature: our_signature
+ signature
})
}
/// closing).
/// Note that the "channel must be funded" requirement is stricter than BOLT 7 requires - see
/// https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/468
- pub fn get_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<(msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, Signature), ChannelError> {
+ pub fn get_channel_announcement(&self, node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<(msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, Signature), ChannelError> {
if !self.config.announced_channel {
return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
}
return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement once the channel is closing".to_owned()));
}
- let were_node_one = our_node_id.serialize()[..] < self.their_node_id.serialize()[..];
+ let were_node_one = node_id.serialize()[..] < self.counterparty_node_id.serialize()[..];
let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
- chain_hash: chain_hash,
+ chain_hash,
short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
- node_id_1: if were_node_one { our_node_id } else { self.get_their_node_id() },
- node_id_2: if were_node_one { self.get_their_node_id() } else { our_node_id },
- bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { self.local_keys.pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.their_funding_pubkey().clone() },
- bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.their_funding_pubkey().clone() } else { self.local_keys.pubkeys().funding_pubkey },
+ node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { self.get_counterparty_node_id() },
+ node_id_2: if were_node_one { self.get_counterparty_node_id() } else { node_id },
+ bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() },
+ bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() } else { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey },
excess_data: Vec::new(),
};
- let sig = self.local_keys.sign_channel_announcement(&msg, &self.secp_ctx)
+ let sig = self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement(&msg, &self.secp_ctx)
.map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
Ok((msg, sig))
/// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
- assert_ne!(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
+ assert_ne!(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
// Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
// current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
// set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
// valid, and valid in fuzztarget mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
- let data_loss_protect = if self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
- let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
+ let data_loss_protect = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
+ let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret));
OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
// next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
// receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
- next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number,
+ next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
// We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
// receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
// (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
// the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
- // cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
+ // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
// dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
// overflow here.
- next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
+ next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
data_loss_protect,
}
}
return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
}
- if amount_msat < self.their_htlc_minimum_msat {
- return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value ({})", self.their_htlc_minimum_msat)));
+ if amount_msat < self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value ({})", self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat)));
}
if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
}
let (outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat) = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats();
- if outbound_htlc_count + 1 > self.their_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
- return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.their_max_accepted_htlcs)));
+ if outbound_htlc_count + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs)));
}
// Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
- if htlc_outbound_value_msat + amount_msat > self.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
- return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
+ if htlc_outbound_value_msat + amount_msat > self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
}
- if !self.channel_outbound {
+ if !self.is_outbound() {
// Check that we won't violate the remote channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
-
- let remote_balance_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat;
- let remote_chan_reserve_msat = Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_remote_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
- // 1 additional HTLC corresponding to this HTLC.
- let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(1);
- if remote_balance_msat < remote_chan_reserve_msat + remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
- return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put them under remote channel reserve value".to_owned()));
+ let counterparty_balance_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat;
+ let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
+ let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
+ let counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
+ if counterparty_balance_msat < holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat + counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
}
}
return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds. Amount: {}, pending value to self {}", amount_msat, pending_value_to_self_msat)));
}
- // The `+1` is for the HTLC currently being added to the commitment tx and
- // the `2 *` and `+1` are for the fee spike buffer.
- let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.channel_outbound {
- 2 * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(1 + 1)
+ // `2 *` and extra HTLC are for the fee spike buffer.
+ let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() {
+ let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
+ 2 * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()))
} else { 0 };
- if pending_value_to_self_msat - amount_msat < local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
- return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees. Pending value to self: {}. local_commit_tx_fee {}", pending_value_to_self_msat, local_commit_tx_fee_msat)));
+ if pending_value_to_self_msat - amount_msat < commit_tx_fee_msat {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees. Pending value to self: {}. local_commit_tx_fee {}", pending_value_to_self_msat, commit_tx_fee_msat)));
}
- // Check self.local_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
+ // Check self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
// reserve for the remote to have something to claim if we misbehave)
- let chan_reserve_msat = self.local_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
- if pending_value_to_self_msat - amount_msat - local_commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
- return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us under local channel reserve value ({})", chan_reserve_msat)));
+ let chan_reserve_msat = self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
+ if pending_value_to_self_msat - amount_msat - commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({})", chan_reserve_msat)));
}
// Now update local state:
}
self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
- htlc_id: self.next_local_htlc_id,
+ htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
amount_msat,
payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
cltv_expiry,
let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
channel_id: self.channel_id,
- htlc_id: self.next_local_htlc_id,
+ htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
amount_msat,
payment_hash,
cltv_expiry,
onion_routing_packet,
};
- self.next_local_htlc_id += 1;
+ self.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
Ok(Some(res))
}
}
self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
- let (res, remote_commitment_tx, htlcs) = match self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger) {
- Ok((res, (remote_commitment_tx, mut htlcs))) => {
+ let (res, counterparty_commitment_txid, htlcs) = match self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger) {
+ Ok((res, (counterparty_commitment_tx, mut htlcs))) => {
// Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
let htlcs_no_ref: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
htlcs.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
- (res, remote_commitment_tx, htlcs_no_ref)
+ (res, counterparty_commitment_tx, htlcs_no_ref)
},
Err(e) => return Err(e),
};
self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
- updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo {
- unsigned_commitment_tx: remote_commitment_tx.clone(),
+ updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
+ commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
- commitment_number: self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number,
- their_revocation_point: self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
+ commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
+ their_revocation_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
}]
};
self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
/// Only fails in case of bad keys. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed generation
/// when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
- fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Transaction, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
+ fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee {
- if self.channel_outbound {
+ if self.is_outbound() {
feerate_per_kw = feerate;
}
}
- let remote_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
- let remote_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, &remote_keys, false, true, feerate_per_kw, logger);
+ let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
+ let counterparty_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, feerate_per_kw, logger);
+ let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.0.trust().txid();
let (signature, htlc_signatures);
+ #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
+ {
+ if !self.is_outbound() {
+ let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
+ *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
+ if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
+ let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
+ if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
+ && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
+ && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
+ && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
+ let actual_fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(counterparty_commitment_tx.1);
+ assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
{
- let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(remote_commitment_tx.2.len());
- for &(ref htlc, _) in remote_commitment_tx.2.iter() {
+ let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(counterparty_commitment_tx.2.len());
+ for &(ref htlc, _) in counterparty_commitment_tx.2.iter() {
htlcs.push(htlc);
}
- let pre_remote_keys = PreCalculatedTxCreationKeys::new(remote_keys);
- let res = self.local_keys.sign_remote_commitment(feerate_per_kw, &remote_commitment_tx.0, &pre_remote_keys, &htlcs, &self.secp_ctx)
+ let res = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_commitment_tx.0, &self.secp_ctx)
.map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
signature = res.0;
htlc_signatures = res.1;
- let remote_keys = pre_remote_keys.trust_key_derivation();
- log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} with redeemscript {} -> {}",
- encode::serialize_hex(&remote_commitment_tx.0),
+ log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {}",
+ encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_commitment_tx.0.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
+ &counterparty_commitment_txid,
encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]));
for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {}",
- encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&remote_commitment_tx.0.txid(), feerate_per_kw, self.our_to_self_delay, htlc, &remote_keys.a_delayed_payment_key, &remote_keys.revocation_key)),
- encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, remote_keys)),
- log_bytes!(remote_keys.a_htlc_key.serialize()),
+ encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
+ encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &counterparty_keys)),
+ log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]));
}
}
channel_id: self.channel_id,
signature,
htlc_signatures,
- }, (remote_commitment_tx.0, remote_commitment_tx.2)))
+ }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, counterparty_commitment_tx.2)))
}
/// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and creates a signed commitment transaction
return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
}
- let our_closing_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
+ let closing_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
// From here on out, we may not fail!
if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
Ok((msgs::Shutdown {
channel_id: self.channel_id,
- scriptpubkey: our_closing_script,
+ scriptpubkey: closing_script,
}, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
}
/// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
/// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
/// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
- pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<OutPoint>, ChannelMonitorUpdate, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) {
+ pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) {
assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
// We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
_ => {}
}
}
-
- for _htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
- //TODO: Do something with the remaining HTLCs
- //(we need to have the ChannelManager monitor them so we can claim the inbound HTLCs
- //which correspond)
- }
+ let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
+ // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
+ // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
+ // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
+ // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
+ // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
+ // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
+ // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
+ if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
+ self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
+ Some((funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
+ update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
+ updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
+ }))
+ } else { None }
+ } else { None };
self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
self.update_time_counter += 1;
- self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
- (self.funding_txo.clone(), ChannelMonitorUpdate {
- update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
- updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
- }, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
+ (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
+ }
+}
+
+fn is_unsupported_shutdown_script(their_features: &InitFeatures, script: &Script) -> bool {
+ // We restrain shutdown scripts to standards forms to avoid transactions not propagating on the p2p tx-relay network
+
+ // BOLT 2 says we must only send a scriptpubkey of certain standard forms,
+ // which for a a BIP-141-compliant witness program is at max 42 bytes in length.
+ // So don't let the remote peer feed us some super fee-heavy script.
+ let is_script_too_long = script.len() > 42;
+ if is_script_too_long {
+ return true;
}
+
+ if their_features.supports_shutdown_anysegwit() && script.is_witness_program() && script.as_bytes()[0] != OP_PUSHBYTES_0.into_u8() {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ return !script.is_p2pkh() && !script.is_p2sh() && !script.is_v0_p2wpkh() && !script.is_v0_p2wsh()
}
const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
}
}
-impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Writeable> Writeable for Channel<ChanSigner> {
+impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
// Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
// called but include holding cell updates (and obviously we don't modify self).
self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
(self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
- self.channel_outbound.write(writer)?;
self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
- self.local_keys.write(writer)?;
+ let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
+ self.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
+ assert!(key_data.0.len() < std::usize::MAX);
+ assert!(key_data.0.len() < std::u32::MAX as usize);
+ (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
+ writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
+
self.shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?;
self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
- self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
- self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
+ self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
+ self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
self.pending_update_fee.write(writer)?;
self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
- self.next_local_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
- (self.next_remote_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
+ self.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
+ (self.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
}
- self.funding_txo.write(writer)?;
self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
self.last_block_connected.write(writer)?;
self.funding_tx_confirmations.write(writer)?;
- self.their_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
- self.our_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
- self.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
- self.local_channel_reserve_satoshis.write(writer)?;
- self.their_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
- self.our_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
- self.their_to_self_delay.write(writer)?;
- self.our_to_self_delay.write(writer)?;
- self.their_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
+ self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
+ self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
+ self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
+ self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.write(writer)?;
+ self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
+ self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
+ self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
self.minimum_depth.write(writer)?;
- self.their_pubkeys.write(writer)?;
- self.their_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
+ self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
+ self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
- self.their_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
- self.their_node_id.write(writer)?;
+ self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
+ self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
- self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
+ self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
Ok(())
}
}
-impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable> Readable for Channel<ChanSigner> {
- fn read<R : ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
+impl<'a, Signer: Sign, K: Deref> ReadableArgs<&'a K> for Channel<Signer>
+ where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer> {
+ fn read<R : ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, keys_source: &'a K) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let channel_outbound = Readable::read(reader)?;
let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let local_keys = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut keys_data = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE));
+ while keys_data.len() != keys_len as usize {
+ // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
+ let mut data = [0; 1024];
+ let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.len())];
+ reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
+ keys_data.extend_from_slice(read_slice);
+ }
+ let holder_signer = keys_source.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
+
let shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let cur_local_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
let pending_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let next_local_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let next_remote_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
_ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
};
- let funding_txo = Readable::read(reader)?;
let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
let last_block_connected = Readable::read(reader)?;
let funding_tx_confirmations = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let their_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let our_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let local_channel_reserve_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let their_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let our_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let their_to_self_delay = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let our_to_self_delay = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let their_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
let minimum_depth = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let their_pubkeys = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let their_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let channel_parameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let their_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let their_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let their_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+ secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
+
Ok(Channel {
user_id,
config,
channel_id,
channel_state,
- channel_outbound,
- secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
+ secp_ctx,
channel_value_satoshis,
latest_monitor_update_id,
- local_keys,
+ holder_signer,
shutdown_pubkey,
destination_script,
- cur_local_commitment_transaction_number,
- cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number,
+ cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
+ cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
value_to_self_msat,
pending_inbound_htlcs,
pending_update_fee,
holding_cell_update_fee,
- next_local_htlc_id,
- next_remote_htlc_id,
+ next_holder_htlc_id,
+ next_counterparty_htlc_id,
update_time_counter,
feerate_per_kw,
#[cfg(debug_assertions)]
- max_commitment_tx_output_local: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((0, 0)),
+ holder_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((0, 0)),
#[cfg(debug_assertions)]
- max_commitment_tx_output_remote: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((0, 0)),
+ counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((0, 0)),
last_sent_closing_fee,
- funding_txo,
funding_tx_confirmed_in,
short_channel_id,
last_block_connected,
funding_tx_confirmations,
- their_dust_limit_satoshis,
- our_dust_limit_satoshis,
- their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
- local_channel_reserve_satoshis,
- their_htlc_minimum_msat,
- our_htlc_minimum_msat,
- their_to_self_delay,
- our_to_self_delay,
- their_max_accepted_htlcs,
+ counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
+ holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
+ counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
+ counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
+ counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
+ holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
+ counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
minimum_depth,
- their_pubkeys,
- their_cur_commitment_point,
+ channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
+ counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
- their_prev_commitment_point,
- their_node_id,
+ counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
+ counterparty_node_id,
- their_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
+ counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
commitment_secrets,
network_sync: UpdateStatus::Fresh,
+
+ #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
+ next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
+ #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
+ next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
})
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
- use bitcoin::BitcoinHash;
use bitcoin::util::bip143;
use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
- use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
+ use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut, SigHashType};
use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
use hex;
use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
- use ln::channel::{Channel,ChannelKeys,InboundHTLCOutput,OutboundHTLCOutput,InboundHTLCState,OutboundHTLCState,HTLCOutputInCommitment,TxCreationKeys};
+ use ln::channel::{Channel,Sign,InboundHTLCOutput,OutboundHTLCOutput,InboundHTLCState,OutboundHTLCState,HTLCOutputInCommitment,HTLCCandidate,HTLCInitiator,TxCreationKeys};
use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
use ln::features::InitFeatures;
- use ln::msgs::{OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
+ use ln::msgs::{OptionalField, DataLossProtect, DecodeError};
use ln::chan_utils;
- use ln::chan_utils::{LocalCommitmentTransaction, ChannelPublicKeys};
+ use ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT};
use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
- use chain::keysinterface::{InMemoryChannelKeys, KeysInterface};
+ use chain::keysinterface::{InMemorySigner, KeysInterface};
use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
use util::config::UserConfig;
- use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingChannelKeys;
+ use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
use util::test_utils;
use util::logger::Logger;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message, Signature, All};
}
struct Keys {
- chan_keys: InMemoryChannelKeys,
+ signer: InMemorySigner,
}
impl KeysInterface for Keys {
- type ChanKeySigner = InMemoryChannelKeys;
+ type Signer = InMemorySigner;
fn get_node_secret(&self) -> SecretKey { panic!(); }
fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
- let our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
- Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
+ let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
+ Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
}
fn get_shutdown_pubkey(&self) -> PublicKey {
PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)
}
- fn get_channel_keys(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> InMemoryChannelKeys {
- self.chan_keys.clone()
+ fn get_channel_signer(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> InMemorySigner {
+ self.signer.clone()
}
- fn get_onion_rand(&self) -> (SecretKey, [u8; 32]) { panic!(); }
- fn get_channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
+ fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
+ fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
}
fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
let config = UserConfig::default();
- let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingChannelKeys>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
+ let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
// Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
// same as the old fee.
fee_est.fee_est = 500;
- let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash());
+ let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
}
+ #[test]
+ fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
+ // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
+ // dust limits are used.
+ let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+ let seed = [42; 32];
+ let network = Network::Testnet;
+ let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
+
+ // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
+ // they have different dust limits.
+
+ // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
+ let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
+ let config = UserConfig::default();
+ let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
+
+ // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
+ // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
+ let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
+ assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis, 1560);
+ let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
+ let node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config).unwrap();
+
+ // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
+ let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.get_accept_channel();
+ accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
+ node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config, InitFeatures::known()).unwrap();
+
+ // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
+ let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
+ node_a_chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
+ htlc_id: 0,
+ amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
+ payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
+ cltv_expiry: 300000000,
+ state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
+ });
+
+ node_a_chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
+ htlc_id: 1,
+ amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
+ payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
+ cltv_expiry: 200000000,
+ state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
+ source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
+ path: Vec::new(),
+ session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
+ first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
+ }
+ });
+
+ // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
+ // the dust limit check.
+ let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
+ let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
+ let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = node_a_chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(0);
+ assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
+
+ // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
+ // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
+ node_a_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
+ let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = node_a_chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(3);
+ let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
+ let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
+ assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
+ // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
+ // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
+ // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
+ // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
+ let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 };
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+ let seed = [42; 32];
+ let network = Network::Testnet;
+ let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
+
+ let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
+ let config = UserConfig::default();
+ let mut chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
+
+ let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(0);
+ let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(1);
+
+ // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
+ // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
+ let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
+ let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
+ let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
+ assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
+
+ // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
+ let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
+ let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
+ let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
+ assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
+
+ chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
+
+ // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
+ let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
+ let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
+ let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
+ assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
+
+ // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
+ let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
+ let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
+ let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
+ assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
+ }
+
#[test]
fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
// Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
- // Create Node A's channel
- let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
+ // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
+ let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
let config = UserConfig::default();
- let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingChannelKeys>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
+ let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
// Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
- let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash());
+ let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
- let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingChannelKeys>::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config).unwrap();
+ let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config).unwrap();
// Node B --> Node A: accept channel
let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.get_accept_channel();
let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
- let mut chan_keys = InMemoryChannelKeys::new(
+ let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
&secp_ctx,
SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
// These aren't set in the test vectors:
[0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
10_000_000,
- (0, 0)
+ [0; 32]
);
- assert_eq!(chan_keys.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
+ assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
- let keys_provider = Keys { chan_keys: chan_keys.clone() };
+ let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
- let their_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
+ let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
let mut config = UserConfig::default();
config.channel_options.announced_channel = false;
- let mut chan = Channel::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, their_node_id, 10_000_000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
- chan.their_to_self_delay = 144;
- chan.our_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
+ let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, 10_000_000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
+ chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
- chan.funding_txo = Some(funding_info);
- let their_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
+ let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
};
- chan_keys.on_accept(&their_pubkeys, chan.their_to_self_delay, chan.our_to_self_delay);
+ chan.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
+ CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
+ pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
+ selected_contest_delay: 144
+ });
+ chan.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
+ signer.ready_channel(&chan.channel_transaction_parameters);
- assert_eq!(their_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
+ assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
- assert_eq!(their_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
+ assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
- assert_eq!(their_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
+ assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
- // We can't just use build_local_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
+ // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
// derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
// build_commitment_transaction.
- let delayed_payment_base = &chan.local_keys.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
+ let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
- let htlc_basepoint = &chan.local_keys.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
- let keys = TxCreationKeys::new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &their_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &their_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
-
- chan.their_pubkeys = Some(their_pubkeys);
+ let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
+ let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
- let mut unsigned_tx: (Transaction, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>);
-
- let mut localtx;
macro_rules! test_commitment {
- ( $their_sig_hex: expr, $our_sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, {
- $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $their_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $our_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
+ ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, {
+ $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
} ) => { {
- unsigned_tx = {
+ let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
let mut res = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, chan.feerate_per_kw, &logger);
+
let htlcs = res.2.drain(..)
.filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
.collect();
(res.0, htlcs)
};
+ let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
+ let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
- let their_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($their_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
- let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&unsigned_tx.0).sighash_all(&unsigned_tx.0.input[0], &redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
- secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &their_signature, chan.their_funding_pubkey()).unwrap();
+ let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+ let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis);
+ secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).unwrap();
- let mut per_htlc = Vec::new();
+ let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
+ let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
+ counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
$({
- let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($their_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
- per_htlc.push((unsigned_tx.1[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
+ let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+ per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
+ counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
})*
- assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), per_htlc.len());
+ assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
- localtx = LocalCommitmentTransaction::new_missing_local_sig(unsigned_tx.0.clone(), their_signature.clone(), &chan_keys.pubkeys().funding_pubkey, chan.their_funding_pubkey(), keys.clone(), chan.feerate_per_kw, per_htlc);
- let local_sig = chan_keys.sign_local_commitment(&localtx, &chan.secp_ctx).unwrap();
- assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($our_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), local_sig);
+ let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
+ commitment_tx.clone(),
+ counterparty_signature,
+ counterparty_htlc_sigs,
+ &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
+ chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
+ );
+ let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
- assert_eq!(serialize(&localtx.add_local_sig(&redeemscript, local_sig))[..],
- hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..]);
+ let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
+ let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
+ assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
- let htlc_sigs = chan_keys.sign_local_commitment_htlc_transactions(&localtx, &chan.secp_ctx).unwrap();
- let mut htlc_sig_iter = localtx.per_htlc.iter().zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
+ // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
+ let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
$({
- let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($their_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+ let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
- let ref htlc = unsigned_tx.1[$htlc_idx];
- let htlc_tx = chan.build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.0.txid(), &htlc, true, &keys, chan.feerate_per_kw);
+ let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
+ let htlc_tx = chan.build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, &htlc, true, &keys, chan.feerate_per_kw);
let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
- let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&htlc_tx).sighash_all(&htlc_tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]).unwrap();
- secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.b_htlc_key).unwrap();
+ let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]).unwrap();
+ secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).unwrap();
let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
if !htlc.offered {
assert!(preimage.is_some());
}
- let mut htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
- while (htlc_sig.1).1.is_none() { htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap(); }
- assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx));
+ let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx), "output index");
- let our_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($our_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
- assert_eq!(Some(our_signature), *(htlc_sig.1).1);
- assert_eq!(serialize(&localtx.get_signed_htlc_tx((htlc_sig.1).0, &(htlc_sig.1).1.unwrap(), &preimage, chan.their_to_self_delay))[..],
- hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..]);
+ let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
+ let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
+ let channel_parameters = chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
+ let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
+ assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
+ hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
})*
- loop {
- let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next();
- if htlc_sig.is_none() { break; }
- assert!((htlc_sig.unwrap().1).1.is_none());
- }
+ assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
} }
}
test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
"304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
"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", {});
+
+ // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
+ chan.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
+ chan.feerate_per_kw = 253;
+ chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
+ chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
+ let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
+ htlc_id: 1,
+ amount_msat: 2000000,
+ cltv_expiry: 501,
+ payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
+ state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
+ };
+ out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
+ out
+ });
+ chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
+ chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
+ let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
+ htlc_id: 6,
+ amount_msat: 5000000,
+ cltv_expiry: 506,
+ payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
+ state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
+ source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
+ };
+ out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
+ out
+ });
+ chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
+ let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
+ htlc_id: 5,
+ amount_msat: 5000000,
+ cltv_expiry: 505,
+ payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
+ state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
+ source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
+ };
+ out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
+ out
+ });
+
+ test_commitment!("30440220048705bec5288d28b3f29344b8d124853b1af423a568664d2c6f02c8ea886525022060f998a461052a2476b912db426ea2a06700953a241135c7957f2e79bc222df9",
+ "3045022100c4f1d60b6fca9febc8b39de1a31e84c5f7c4b41c97239ef05f4350aa484c6b5e02200c5134ac8b20eb7a29d0dd4a501f6aa8fefb8489171f4cb408bd2a32324ab03f",
+ "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", {
+
+ { 0,
+ "304502210081cbb94121761d34c189cd4e6a281feea6f585060ad0ba2632e8d6b3c6bb8a6c02201007981bbd16539d63df2805b5568f1f5688cd2a885d04706f50db9b77ba13c6",
+ "304502210090ed76aeb21b53236a598968abc66e2024691d07b62f53ddbeca8f93144af9c602205f873af5a0c10e62690e9aba09740550f194a9dc455ba4c1c23f6cde7704674c",
+ "0200000000010189a326e23addc28323dbadcb4e71c2c17088b6e8fa184103e552f44075dddc34000000000000000000011f070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050048304502210081cbb94121761d34c189cd4e6a281feea6f585060ad0ba2632e8d6b3c6bb8a6c02201007981bbd16539d63df2805b5568f1f5688cd2a885d04706f50db9b77ba13c60148304502210090ed76aeb21b53236a598968abc66e2024691d07b62f53ddbeca8f93144af9c602205f873af5a0c10e62690e9aba09740550f194a9dc455ba4c1c23f6cde7704674c012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac686800000000" },
+ { 1,
+ "304402201d0f09d2bf7bc245a4f17980e1e9164290df16c70c6a2ff1592f5030d6108581022061e744a7dc151b36bf0aff7a4f1812ba90b8b03633bb979a270d19858fd960c5",
+ "30450221009aef000d2e843a4202c1b1a2bf554abc9a7902bf49b2cb0759bc507456b7ebad02204e7c3d193ede2fd2b4cd6b39f51a920e581e35575e357e44d7b699c40ce61d39",
+ "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" },
+ { 2,
+ "30440220010bf035d5823596e50dce2076a4d9f942d8d28031c9c428b901a02b6b8140de02203250e8e4a08bc5b4ecdca4d0eedf98223e02e3ac1c0206b3a7ffdb374aa21e5f",
+ "30440220073de0067b88e425b3018b30366bfeda0ccb703118ccd3d02ead08c0f53511d002203fac50ac0e4cf8a3af0b4b1b12e801650591f748f8ddf1e089c160f10b69e511",
+ "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" }
+ } );
}
#[test]
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff