// You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
// licenses.
-use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
-use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
-use bitcoin::util::sighash;
+use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
+use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, ScriptBuf, Builder};
+use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
+use bitcoin::sighash;
+use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
-use crate::sign::{EcdsaChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
+use crate::sign::ecdsa::{EcdsaChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
+use crate::sign::{EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
use crate::events::ClosureReason;
use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
-use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
-use crate::util::logger::Logger;
+use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
+use crate::util::logger::{Logger, Record, WithContext};
use crate::util::errors::APIError;
use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
use crate::io;
use crate::prelude::*;
use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
+use core::convert::TryInto;
use core::ops::Deref;
#[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
use crate::sync::Mutex;
-use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
use crate::sign::type_resolver::ChannelSignerType;
+use super::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint, RevocationBasepoint};
+
#[cfg(test)]
pub struct ChannelValueStat {
pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
}
pub struct AvailableBalances {
+ /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
+ pub balance_msat: u64,
/// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
/// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
state: InboundHTLCState,
}
+#[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
enum OutboundHTLCState {
/// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
/// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
}
#[derive(Clone)]
+#[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
/// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
}
}
+#[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
htlc_id: u64,
amount_msat: u64,
payment_hash: PaymentHash,
state: OutboundHTLCState,
source: HTLCSource,
+ blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
}
/// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
+#[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
// always outbound
onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
// The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
+ blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
},
ClaimHTLC {
payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
htlc_id: u64,
err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
},
+ FailMalformedHTLC {
+ htlc_id: u64,
+ failure_code: u16,
+ sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
+ },
}
-/// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
-/// We first move through init with `OurInitSent` -> `TheirInitSent` -> `FundingCreated` -> `FundingSent`.
-/// `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` then get set on `FundingSent`, and when both are set we
-/// move on to `ChannelReady`.
-/// Note that `PeerDisconnected` can be set on both `ChannelReady` and `FundingSent`.
-/// `ChannelReady` can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
-/// move on to `ShutdownComplete`, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
+macro_rules! define_state_flags {
+ ($flag_type_doc: expr, $flag_type: ident, [$(($flag_doc: expr, $flag: ident, $value: expr, $get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident)),+], $extra_flags: expr) => {
+ #[doc = $flag_type_doc]
+ #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, PartialOrd, Eq)]
+ struct $flag_type(u32);
+
+ impl $flag_type {
+ $(
+ #[doc = $flag_doc]
+ const $flag: $flag_type = $flag_type($value);
+ )*
+
+ /// All flags that apply to the specified [`ChannelState`] variant.
+ #[allow(unused)]
+ const ALL: $flag_type = Self($(Self::$flag.0 | )* $extra_flags);
+
+ #[allow(unused)]
+ fn new() -> Self { Self(0) }
+
+ #[allow(unused)]
+ fn from_u32(flags: u32) -> Result<Self, ()> {
+ if flags & !Self::ALL.0 != 0 {
+ Err(())
+ } else {
+ Ok($flag_type(flags))
+ }
+ }
+
+ #[allow(unused)]
+ fn is_empty(&self) -> bool { self.0 == 0 }
+ #[allow(unused)]
+ fn is_set(&self, flag: Self) -> bool { *self & flag == flag }
+ #[allow(unused)]
+ fn set(&mut self, flag: Self) { *self |= flag }
+ #[allow(unused)]
+ fn clear(&mut self, flag: Self) -> Self { self.0 &= !flag.0; *self }
+ }
+
+ $(
+ define_state_flags!($flag_type, Self::$flag, $get, $set, $clear);
+ )*
+
+ impl core::ops::BitOr for $flag_type {
+ type Output = Self;
+ fn bitor(self, rhs: Self) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 | rhs.0) }
+ }
+ impl core::ops::BitOrAssign for $flag_type {
+ fn bitor_assign(&mut self, rhs: Self) { self.0 |= rhs.0; }
+ }
+ impl core::ops::BitAnd for $flag_type {
+ type Output = Self;
+ fn bitand(self, rhs: Self) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 & rhs.0) }
+ }
+ impl core::ops::BitAndAssign for $flag_type {
+ fn bitand_assign(&mut self, rhs: Self) { self.0 &= rhs.0; }
+ }
+ };
+ ($flag_type_doc: expr, $flag_type: ident, $flags: tt) => {
+ define_state_flags!($flag_type_doc, $flag_type, $flags, 0);
+ };
+ ($flag_type: ident, $flag: expr, $get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident) => {
+ impl $flag_type {
+ #[allow(unused)]
+ fn $get(&self) -> bool { self.is_set($flag_type::new() | $flag) }
+ #[allow(unused)]
+ fn $set(&mut self) { self.set($flag_type::new() | $flag) }
+ #[allow(unused)]
+ fn $clear(&mut self) -> Self { self.clear($flag_type::new() | $flag) }
+ }
+ };
+ ($flag_type_doc: expr, FUNDED_STATE, $flag_type: ident, $flags: tt) => {
+ define_state_flags!($flag_type_doc, $flag_type, $flags, FundedStateFlags::ALL.0);
+
+ define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED,
+ is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected);
+ define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS,
+ is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress);
+ define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
+ is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent);
+ define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
+ is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent);
+
+ impl core::ops::BitOr<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
+ type Output = Self;
+ fn bitor(self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 | rhs.0) }
+ }
+ impl core::ops::BitOrAssign<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
+ fn bitor_assign(&mut self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) { self.0 |= rhs.0; }
+ }
+ impl core::ops::BitAnd<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
+ type Output = Self;
+ fn bitand(self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 & rhs.0) }
+ }
+ impl core::ops::BitAndAssign<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
+ fn bitand_assign(&mut self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) { self.0 &= rhs.0; }
+ }
+ impl PartialEq<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
+ fn eq(&self, other: &FundedStateFlags) -> bool { self.0 == other.0 }
+ }
+ impl From<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
+ fn from(flags: FundedStateFlags) -> Self { Self(flags.0) }
+ }
+ };
+}
+
+/// We declare all the states/flags here together to help determine which bits are still available
+/// to choose.
+mod state_flags {
+ pub const OUR_INIT_SENT: u32 = 1 << 0;
+ pub const THEIR_INIT_SENT: u32 = 1 << 1;
+ pub const FUNDING_NEGOTIATED: u32 = 1 << 2;
+ pub const AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 3;
+ pub const THEIR_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 4;
+ pub const OUR_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 5;
+ pub const CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 6;
+ pub const PEER_DISCONNECTED: u32 = 1 << 7;
+ pub const MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS: u32 = 1 << 8;
+ pub const AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE: u32 = 1 << 9;
+ pub const REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT: u32 = 1 << 10;
+ pub const LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT: u32 = 1 << 11;
+ pub const SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE: u32 = 1 << 12;
+ pub const WAITING_FOR_BATCH: u32 = 1 << 13;
+}
+
+define_state_flags!(
+ "Flags that apply to all [`ChannelState`] variants in which the channel is funded.",
+ FundedStateFlags, [
+ ("Indicates the remote side is considered \"disconnected\" and no updates are allowed \
+ until after we've done a `channel_reestablish` dance.", PEER_DISCONNECTED, state_flags::PEER_DISCONNECTED,
+ is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected),
+ ("Indicates the user has told us a `ChannelMonitor` update is pending async persistence \
+ somewhere and we should pause sending any outbound messages until they've managed to \
+ complete it.", MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS, state_flags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS,
+ is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress),
+ ("Indicates we received a `shutdown` message from the remote end. If set, they may not add \
+ any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected to respond with our own `shutdown` \
+ message when possible.", REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT, state_flags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
+ is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent),
+ ("Indicates we sent a `shutdown` message. At this point, we may not add any new HTLCs to \
+ the channel.", LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT, state_flags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
+ is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent)
+ ]
+);
+
+define_state_flags!(
+ "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding`].",
+ NegotiatingFundingFlags, [
+ ("Indicates we have (or are prepared to) send our `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message.",
+ OUR_INIT_SENT, state_flags::OUR_INIT_SENT, is_our_init_sent, set_our_init_sent, clear_our_init_sent),
+ ("Indicates we have received their `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message.",
+ THEIR_INIT_SENT, state_flags::THEIR_INIT_SENT, is_their_init_sent, set_their_init_sent, clear_their_init_sent)
+ ]
+);
+
+define_state_flags!(
+ "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady`].",
+ FUNDED_STATE, AwaitingChannelReadyFlags, [
+ ("Indicates they sent us a `channel_ready` message. Once both `THEIR_CHANNEL_READY` and \
+ `OUR_CHANNEL_READY` are set, our state moves on to `ChannelReady`.",
+ THEIR_CHANNEL_READY, state_flags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY,
+ is_their_channel_ready, set_their_channel_ready, clear_their_channel_ready),
+ ("Indicates we sent them a `channel_ready` message. Once both `THEIR_CHANNEL_READY` and \
+ `OUR_CHANNEL_READY` are set, our state moves on to `ChannelReady`.",
+ OUR_CHANNEL_READY, state_flags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY,
+ is_our_channel_ready, set_our_channel_ready, clear_our_channel_ready),
+ ("Indicates the channel was funded in a batch and the broadcast of the funding transaction \
+ is being held until all channels in the batch have received `funding_signed` and have \
+ their monitors persisted.", WAITING_FOR_BATCH, state_flags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH,
+ is_waiting_for_batch, set_waiting_for_batch, clear_waiting_for_batch)
+ ]
+);
+
+define_state_flags!(
+ "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::ChannelReady`].",
+ FUNDED_STATE, ChannelReadyFlags, [
+ ("Indicates that we have sent a `commitment_signed` but are awaiting the responding \
+ `revoke_and_ack` message. During this period, we can't generate new `commitment_signed` \
+ messages as we'd be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their `revoke_and_ack` \
+ implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent later.",
+ AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE, state_flags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE,
+ is_awaiting_remote_revoke, set_awaiting_remote_revoke, clear_awaiting_remote_revoke)
+ ]
+);
+
+// Note that the order of this enum is implicitly defined by where each variant is placed. Take this
+// into account when introducing new states and update `test_channel_state_order` accordingly.
+#[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, PartialOrd, Eq)]
enum ChannelState {
- /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
- OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
- /// Implies we have received their `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message
- TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
- /// We have sent `funding_created` and are awaiting a `funding_signed` to advance to `FundingSent`.
- /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate `funding_signed`
- /// upon receipt of `funding_created`, so simply skip this state.
- FundingCreated = 4,
- /// Set when we have received/sent `funding_created` and `funding_signed` and are thus now waiting
- /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The `ChannelReady` flags are set to indicate when we
- /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
- FundingSent = 8,
- /// Flag which can be set on `FundingSent` to indicate they sent us a `channel_ready` message.
- /// Once both `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` are set, state moves on to `ChannelReady`.
- TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
- /// Flag which can be set on `FundingSent` to indicate we sent them a `channel_ready` message.
- /// Once both `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` are set, state moves on to `ChannelReady`.
- OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
- ChannelReady = 64,
- /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` and `FundingSent` indicating remote side is considered
- /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a `channel_reestablish`
- /// dance.
- PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
- /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady`, FundingCreated, and `FundingSent` indicating the user has
- /// told us a `ChannelMonitor` update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
- /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
- MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
- /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
- /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
- /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
- /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
- /// later.
- /// Flag is set on `ChannelReady`.
- AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
- /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` or `FundingSent` after receiving a shutdown message from
- /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
- /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
- RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
- /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` or `FundingSent` after sending a shutdown message. At this
- /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
- LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
- /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
- /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
- ShutdownComplete = 4096,
- /// Flag which is set on `FundingSent` to indicate this channel is funded in a batch and the
- /// broadcasting of the funding transaction is being held until all channels in the batch
- /// have received funding_signed and have their monitors persisted.
- WaitingForBatch = 1 << 13,
+ /// We are negotiating the parameters required for the channel prior to funding it.
+ NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags),
+ /// We have sent `funding_created` and are awaiting a `funding_signed` to advance to
+ /// `AwaitingChannelReady`. Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate
+ /// `funding_signed` upon receipt of `funding_created`, so simply skip this state.
+ FundingNegotiated,
+ /// We've received/sent `funding_created` and `funding_signed` and are thus now waiting on the
+ /// funding transaction to confirm.
+ AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags),
+ /// Both we and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed and the channel is
+ /// now operational.
+ ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags),
+ /// We've successfully negotiated a `closing_signed` dance. At this point, the `ChannelManager`
+ /// is about to drop us, but we store this anyway.
+ ShutdownComplete,
+}
+
+macro_rules! impl_state_flag {
+ ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, [$($state: ident),+]) => {
+ #[allow(unused)]
+ fn $get(&self) -> bool {
+ match self {
+ $(
+ ChannelState::$state(flags) => flags.$get(),
+ )*
+ _ => false,
+ }
+ }
+ #[allow(unused)]
+ fn $set(&mut self) {
+ match self {
+ $(
+ ChannelState::$state(flags) => flags.$set(),
+ )*
+ _ => debug_assert!(false, "Attempted to set flag on unexpected ChannelState"),
+ }
+ }
+ #[allow(unused)]
+ fn $clear(&mut self) {
+ match self {
+ $(
+ ChannelState::$state(flags) => { let _ = flags.$clear(); },
+ )*
+ _ => debug_assert!(false, "Attempted to clear flag on unexpected ChannelState"),
+ }
+ }
+ };
+ ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, FUNDED_STATES) => {
+ impl_state_flag!($get, $set, $clear, [AwaitingChannelReady, ChannelReady]);
+ };
+ ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, $state: ident) => {
+ impl_state_flag!($get, $set, $clear, [$state]);
+ };
+}
+
+impl ChannelState {
+ fn from_u32(state: u32) -> Result<Self, ()> {
+ match state {
+ state_flags::FUNDING_NEGOTIATED => Ok(ChannelState::FundingNegotiated),
+ state_flags::SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE => Ok(ChannelState::ShutdownComplete),
+ val => {
+ if val & state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY == state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY {
+ AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::from_u32(val & !state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY)
+ .map(|flags| ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags))
+ } else if val & state_flags::CHANNEL_READY == state_flags::CHANNEL_READY {
+ ChannelReadyFlags::from_u32(val & !state_flags::CHANNEL_READY)
+ .map(|flags| ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags))
+ } else if let Ok(flags) = NegotiatingFundingFlags::from_u32(val) {
+ Ok(ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags))
+ } else {
+ Err(())
+ }
+ },
+ }
+ }
+
+ fn to_u32(&self) -> u32 {
+ match self {
+ ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags) => flags.0,
+ ChannelState::FundingNegotiated => state_flags::FUNDING_NEGOTIATED,
+ ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY | flags.0,
+ ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) => state_flags::CHANNEL_READY | flags.0,
+ ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => state_flags::SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE,
+ }
+ }
+
+ fn is_pre_funded_state(&self) -> bool {
+ matches!(self, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(_)|ChannelState::FundingNegotiated)
+ }
+
+ fn is_both_sides_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
+ self.is_local_shutdown_sent() && self.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
+ }
+
+ fn with_funded_state_flags_mask(&self) -> FundedStateFlags {
+ match self {
+ ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => FundedStateFlags((*flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL).0),
+ ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) => FundedStateFlags((*flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL).0),
+ _ => FundedStateFlags::new(),
+ }
+ }
+
+ fn can_generate_new_commitment(&self) -> bool {
+ match self {
+ ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) =>
+ !flags.is_set(ChannelReadyFlags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE) &&
+ !flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS.into()) &&
+ !flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED.into()),
+ _ => {
+ debug_assert!(false, "Can only generate new commitment within ChannelReady");
+ false
+ },
+ }
+ }
+
+ impl_state_flag!(is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected, FUNDED_STATES);
+ impl_state_flag!(is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress, FUNDED_STATES);
+ impl_state_flag!(is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent, FUNDED_STATES);
+ impl_state_flag!(is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent, FUNDED_STATES);
+ impl_state_flag!(is_our_channel_ready, set_our_channel_ready, clear_our_channel_ready, AwaitingChannelReady);
+ impl_state_flag!(is_their_channel_ready, set_their_channel_ready, clear_their_channel_ready, AwaitingChannelReady);
+ impl_state_flag!(is_waiting_for_batch, set_waiting_for_batch, clear_waiting_for_batch, AwaitingChannelReady);
+ impl_state_flag!(is_awaiting_remote_revoke, set_awaiting_remote_revoke, clear_awaiting_remote_revoke, ChannelReady);
}
-const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 =
- ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 |
- ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
-const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 =
- BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK |
- ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 |
- ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
-const STATE_FLAGS: u32 =
- MULTI_STATE_FLAGS |
- ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 |
- ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 |
- ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
- ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32;
pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
}
}
+pub(super) struct WithChannelContext<'a, L: Deref> where L::Target: Logger {
+ pub logger: &'a L,
+ pub peer_id: Option<PublicKey>,
+ pub channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
+}
+
+impl<'a, L: Deref> Logger for WithChannelContext<'a, L> where L::Target: Logger {
+ fn log(&self, mut record: Record) {
+ record.peer_id = self.peer_id;
+ record.channel_id = self.channel_id;
+ self.logger.log(record)
+ }
+}
+
+impl<'a, 'b, L: Deref> WithChannelContext<'a, L>
+where L::Target: Logger {
+ pub(super) fn from<S: Deref>(logger: &'a L, context: &'b ChannelContext<S>) -> Self
+ where S::Target: SignerProvider
+ {
+ WithChannelContext {
+ logger,
+ peer_id: Some(context.counterparty_node_id),
+ channel_id: Some(context.channel_id),
+ }
+ }
+}
+
macro_rules! secp_check {
($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
match $res {
total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
- local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
- remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
- preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
+ local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees *not* considering dust limits
+ remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees *not* considering dust limits
+ outbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
+ inbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful received HTLCs since last commitment
}
/// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
}
+/// The return value of `signer_maybe_unblocked`
+#[allow(unused)]
+pub(super) struct SignerResumeUpdates {
+ pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
+ pub funding_signed: Option<msgs::FundingSigned>,
+ pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
+}
+
/// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
}
-/// The return type of `force_shutdown`
-///
-/// Contains a tuple with the following:
-/// - An optional (counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]) tuple
-/// - A list of HTLCs to fail back in the form of the (source, payment hash, and this channel's
-/// counterparty_node_id and channel_id).
-/// - An optional transaction id identifying a corresponding batch funding transaction.
-pub(crate) type ShutdownResult = (
- Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
- Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, ChannelId)>,
- Option<Txid>
-);
+/// The result of a shutdown that should be handled.
+#[must_use]
+pub(crate) struct ShutdownResult {
+ pub(crate) closure_reason: ClosureReason,
+ /// A channel monitor update to apply.
+ pub(crate) monitor_update: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelId, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
+ /// A list of dropped outbound HTLCs that can safely be failed backwards immediately.
+ pub(crate) dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, ChannelId)>,
+ /// An unbroadcasted batch funding transaction id. The closure of this channel should be
+ /// propagated to the remainder of the batch.
+ pub(crate) unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: Option<Txid>,
+ pub(crate) channel_id: ChannelId,
+ pub(crate) user_channel_id: u128,
+ pub(crate) channel_capacity_satoshis: u64,
+ pub(crate) counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
+ pub(crate) unbroadcasted_funding_tx: Option<Transaction>,
+ pub(crate) channel_funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
+}
/// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
/// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
impl<'a, SP: Deref> ChannelPhase<SP> where
SP::Target: SignerProvider,
- <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer: ChannelSigner,
+ <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner: ChannelSigner,
{
pub fn context(&'a self) -> &'a ChannelContext<SP> {
match self {
/// The temporary channel ID used during channel setup. Value kept even after transitioning to a final channel ID.
/// Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
- channel_state: u32,
+ channel_state: ChannelState,
// When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
// our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
- holder_signer: ChannelSignerType<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
+ holder_signer: ChannelSignerType<SP>,
shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
- destination_script: Script,
+ destination_script: ScriptBuf,
// Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
// generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
- value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
+ value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, fees, and anchor outputs
pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
+ /// If we went to send a commitment update (ie some messages then [`msgs::CommitmentSigned`])
+ /// but our signer (initially) refused to give us a signature, we should retry at some point in
+ /// the future when the signer indicates it may have a signature for us.
+ ///
+ /// This flag is set in such a case. Note that we don't need to persist this as we'll end up
+ /// setting it again as a side-effect of [`Channel::channel_reestablish`].
+ signer_pending_commitment_update: bool,
+ /// Similar to [`Self::signer_pending_commitment_update`] but we're waiting to send either a
+ /// [`msgs::FundingCreated`] or [`msgs::FundingSigned`] depending on if this channel is
+ /// outbound or inbound.
+ signer_pending_funding: bool,
+
// pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
//
// Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
#[cfg(not(test))]
closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
+ /// If we remove an HTLC (or fee update), commit, and receive our counterparty's
+ /// `revoke_and_ack`, we remove all knowledge of said HTLC (or fee update). However, the latest
+ /// local commitment transaction that we can broadcast still contains the HTLC (or old fee)
+ /// until we receive a further `commitment_signed`. Thus we are not eligible for initiating the
+ /// `closing_signed` negotiation if we're expecting a counterparty `commitment_signed`.
+ ///
+ /// To ensure we don't send a `closing_signed` too early, we track this state here, waiting
+ /// until we see a `commitment_signed` before doing so.
+ ///
+ /// We don't bother to persist this - we anticipate this state won't last longer than a few
+ /// milliseconds, so any accidental force-closes here should be exceedingly rare.
+ expecting_peer_commitment_signed: bool,
+
/// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
- counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
+ counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ScriptBuf>,
commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
/// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
- self.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
+ self.channel_state > ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT)
}
/// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
/// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
- let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
- (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
+ matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) &&
+ !self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() &&
+ !self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() &&
+ !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
}
/// shutdown state returns the state of the channel in its various stages of shutdown
pub fn shutdown_state(&self) -> ChannelShutdownState {
- if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
- return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownComplete;
- }
- if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 && self.channel_state & (ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == 0 {
- return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated;
- }
- if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
- return ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs;
- }
- if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
- return ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee;
+ match self.channel_state {
+ ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_) =>
+ if self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() && !self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
+ ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated
+ } else if (self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() || self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()) && !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
+ ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs
+ } else if (self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() || self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()) && self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
+ ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee
+ } else {
+ ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown
+ },
+ ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownComplete,
+ _ => ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown,
}
- return ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown;
}
fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
+ let is_ready_to_close = match self.channel_state {
+ ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) =>
+ flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL == FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT | FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
+ ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) =>
+ flags == FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT | FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
+ _ => false,
+ };
self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
- self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
- self.pending_update_fee.is_none() &&
- self.channel_state &
- (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK |
- ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
- ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 |
- ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK
+ self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
+ self.pending_update_fee.is_none() &&
+ is_ready_to_close
}
/// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
/// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
/// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
- self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
+ self.is_usable() && !self.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected()
}
// Public utilities:
self.outbound_scid_alias
}
+ /// Returns the holder signer for this channel.
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<SP> {
+ return &self.holder_signer
+ }
+
/// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
/// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases
/// or prior to any channel actions during `Channel` initialization.
self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
}
+ /// Returns the height in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
+ pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmation_height(&self) -> Option<u32> {
+ let conf_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height;
+ if conf_height > 0 {
+ Some(conf_height)
+ } else {
+ None
+ }
+ }
+
/// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
match self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure {
MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(multiplier) => {
let feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(
- ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority);
- feerate_per_kw as u64 * multiplier
+ ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep) as u64;
+ feerate_per_kw.saturating_mul(multiplier)
},
MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(limit) => limit,
}
/// Returns true if funding_signed was sent/received and the
/// funding transaction has been broadcast if necessary.
pub fn is_funding_broadcast(&self) -> bool {
- self.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 &&
- self.channel_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 == 0
+ !self.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() &&
+ !matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH))
}
/// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
}
}
+ let mut inbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
+
for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
match &htlc.state {
&InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
if generated_by_local {
- if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
+ if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(preimage) = reason {
+ inbound_htlc_preimages.push(preimage);
value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
}
}
}
}
- let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
+
+ let mut outbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
};
if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
- preimages.push(preimage);
+ outbound_htlc_preimages.push(preimage);
}
if include {
}
}
- let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
+ let value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
// Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
// AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
// "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
// everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
- let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
+ let value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
#[cfg(debug_assertions)]
htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
- // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
- value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
- value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
-
CommitmentStats {
tx,
feerate_per_kw,
htlcs_included,
local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
- preimages
+ inbound_htlc_preimages,
+ outbound_htlc_preimages,
}
}
/// will sign and send to our counterparty.
/// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
- //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
- //may see payments to it!
let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
/// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
/// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
/// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
- pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
+ pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
}
if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
}
- cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
+ let feerate_plus_quarter = feerate_per_kw.checked_mul(1250).map(|v| v / 1000);
+ cmp::max(2530, feerate_plus_quarter.unwrap_or(u32::max_value()))
}
/// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
let inbound_stats = context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
let outbound_stats = context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
+ let mut balance_msat = context.value_to_self_msat;
+ for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
+ if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
+ balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
+ }
+ }
+ balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
+
let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
.saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
.saturating_sub(
let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
+ let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
+ ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
+ } else {
+ 0
+ };
if context.is_outbound() {
// We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
// can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
}
let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
- let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
+ let mut max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
- let min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
+ let mut min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
+ if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
+ max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
+ min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
+ }
// We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
// value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
// match the value to right-below-dust.
- let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = (available_capacity_msat as i64) - (max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64);
+ let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = available_capacity_msat as i64 -
+ max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64 - anchor_outputs_value_msat as i64;
if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
.saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
- if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
+ if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
// If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
// we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
};
let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
- if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 {
+ if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.try_into().unwrap_or(i64::max_value()) {
remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
Some(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
}
let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
- if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 {
+ if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.try_into().unwrap_or(i64::max_value()) {
remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
outbound_capacity_msat,
next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
+ balance_msat,
}
}
res
}
- fn if_unbroadcasted_funding<F, O>(&self, f: F) -> Option<O>
- where F: Fn() -> Option<O> {
- if self.channel_state & ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 != 0 ||
- self.channel_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 != 0 {
- f()
- } else {
- None
+ fn if_unbroadcasted_funding<F, O>(&self, f: F) -> Option<O> where F: Fn() -> Option<O> {
+ match self.channel_state {
+ ChannelState::FundingNegotiated => f(),
+ ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) =>
+ if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH) ||
+ flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS.into())
+ {
+ f()
+ } else {
+ None
+ },
+ _ => None,
}
}
/// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
/// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
/// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
- pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> ShutdownResult {
+ pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool, closure_reason: ClosureReason) -> ShutdownResult {
// Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
// called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
// being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
// be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
- assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
+ assert!(!matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
// We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
// return them to fail the payment.
}
}
let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
- // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
+ // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < AwaitingChannelReady),
// returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
// we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
// Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
// funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
// monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
// See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
- if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
+ if !self.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
- Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
+ Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, self.channel_id(), ChannelMonitorUpdate {
update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
+ counterparty_node_id: Some(self.counterparty_node_id),
updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
+ channel_id: Some(self.channel_id()),
}))
} else { None }
} else { None };
let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = self.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
+ let unbroadcasted_funding_tx = self.unbroadcasted_funding();
- self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
+ self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
self.update_time_counter += 1;
- (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs, unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid)
+ ShutdownResult {
+ closure_reason,
+ monitor_update,
+ dropped_outbound_htlcs,
+ unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid,
+ channel_id: self.channel_id,
+ user_channel_id: self.user_id,
+ channel_capacity_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
+ counterparty_node_id: self.counterparty_node_id,
+ unbroadcasted_funding_tx,
+ channel_funding_txo: self.get_funding_txo(),
+ }
+ }
+
+ /// Only allowed after [`Self::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
+ fn get_funding_signed_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (CommitmentTransaction, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>) where L::Target: Logger {
+ let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
+ let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
+
+ let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
+ let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
+ log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
+ &self.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
+
+ match &self.holder_signer {
+ // TODO (arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
+ ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
+ let funding_signed = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
+ .map(|(signature, _)| msgs::FundingSigned {
+ channel_id: self.channel_id(),
+ signature,
+ #[cfg(taproot)]
+ partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
+ })
+ .ok();
+
+ if funding_signed.is_none() {
+ #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
+ panic!("Failed to get signature for funding_signed");
+ }
+ #[cfg(async_signing)] {
+ log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature not available for funding_signed message; setting signer_pending_funding");
+ self.signer_pending_funding = true;
+ }
+ } else if self.signer_pending_funding {
+ log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature available for funding_signed message; clearing signer_pending_funding");
+ self.signer_pending_funding = false;
+ }
+
+ // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
+ (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed)
+ },
+ // TODO (taproot|arik)
+ #[cfg(taproot)]
+ _ => todo!()
+ }
}
}
// Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
// Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
-fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
+pub(crate) fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
// Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
// since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
(commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
feerate: u32,
}
+/// Contents of a wire message that fails an HTLC backwards. Useful for [`Channel::fail_htlc`] to
+/// fail with either [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`] or [`msgs::UpdateFailHTLC`] as needed.
+trait FailHTLCContents {
+ type Message: FailHTLCMessageName;
+ fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message;
+ fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState;
+ fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK;
+}
+impl FailHTLCContents for msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
+ type Message = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC;
+ fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message {
+ msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { htlc_id, channel_id, reason: self }
+ }
+ fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState {
+ InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(self))
+ }
+ fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
+ HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet: self }
+ }
+}
+impl FailHTLCContents for ([u8; 32], u16) {
+ type Message = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC;
+ fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message {
+ msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
+ htlc_id,
+ channel_id,
+ sha256_of_onion: self.0,
+ failure_code: self.1
+ }
+ }
+ fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState {
+ InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed(self))
+ }
+ fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
+ HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
+ htlc_id,
+ sha256_of_onion: self.0,
+ failure_code: self.1
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+trait FailHTLCMessageName {
+ fn name() -> &'static str;
+}
+impl FailHTLCMessageName for msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
+ fn name() -> &'static str {
+ "update_fail_htlc"
+ }
+}
+impl FailHTLCMessageName for msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
+ fn name() -> &'static str {
+ "update_fail_malformed_htlc"
+ }
+}
+
impl<SP: Deref> Channel<SP> where
SP::Target: SignerProvider,
- <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner
+ <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner
{
fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
channel_type: &ChannelTypeFeatures, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L
) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
{
- // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
- // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
- // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
- // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust. This doesn't
- // apply to channels supporting anchor outputs since HTLC transactions are pre-signed with a
- // zero fee, so their fee is no longer considered to determine dust limits.
- if !channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
- let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
- fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
- if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
- }
- }
-
- // We can afford to use a lower bound with anchors than previously since we can now bump
- // fees when broadcasting our commitment. However, we must still make sure we meet the
- // minimum mempool feerate, until package relay is deployed, such that we can ensure the
- // commitment transaction propagates throughout node mempools on its own.
let lower_limit_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
- ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum
+ ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedAnchorChannelRemoteFee
} else {
- ConfirmationTarget::Background
+ ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedNonAnchorChannelRemoteFee
};
let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(lower_limit_conf_target);
- // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
- // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
- // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
- // sat/kw before the comparison here.
- if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
+ if feerate_per_kw < lower_limit {
if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
log_warn!(logger,
return Ok(());
}
}
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
}
Ok(())
}
#[inline]
- fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
+ fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
// The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
// is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
// outside of those situations will fail.
where L::Target: Logger {
// Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
// (see equivalent if condition there).
- assert!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
+ assert!(!self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment());
let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
// caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
// incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
// either.
- if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
+ if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
}
- assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
// ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
// on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
- debug_assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner()));
+ debug_assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).to_byte_array()));
log_debug!(logger, "Claiming inbound HTLC id {} with payment hash {} with preimage {}",
htlc.htlc_id, htlc.payment_hash, payment_preimage_arg);
match htlc.state {
self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
+ counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
}],
+ channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
};
- if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
+ if !self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment() {
// Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
// `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
// `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
}
},
- &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
+ &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } |
+ &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } =>
+ {
if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
// TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
_ => {}
}
}
- log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", &self.context.channel_id(), self.context.channel_state);
+ log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", &self.context.channel_id(), self.context.channel_state.to_u32());
self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
});
.map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
}
+ /// Used for failing back with [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`]. For now, this is used when we
+ /// want to fail blinded HTLCs where we are not the intro node.
+ ///
+ /// See [`Self::queue_fail_htlc`] for more info.
+ pub fn queue_fail_malformed_htlc<L: Deref>(
+ &mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, failure_code: u16, sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32], logger: &L
+ ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
+ self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, (sha256_of_onion, failure_code), true, logger)
+ .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
+ }
+
/// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
/// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
/// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
/// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
/// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
/// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
- fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
- -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
- if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
+ fn fail_htlc<L: Deref, E: FailHTLCContents + Clone>(
+ &mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_contents: E, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
+ logger: &L
+ ) -> Result<Option<E::Message>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
+ if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
}
- assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
// ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
// on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
return Ok(None);
}
- if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
+ if !self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment() {
debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
force_holding_cell = true;
}
return Ok(None);
}
},
- &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
+ &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } |
+ &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } =>
+ {
if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
}
}
log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
- self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
- htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
- err_packet,
- });
+ self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(err_contents.to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(htlc_id_arg));
return Ok(None);
}
- log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
+ log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with {} message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg,
+ E::Message::name(), &self.context.channel_id());
{
let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
- htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
+ htlc.state = err_contents.clone().to_inbound_htlc_state();
}
- Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
- channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
- htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
- reason: err_packet
- }))
+ Ok(Some(err_contents.to_message(htlc_id_arg, self.context.channel_id())))
}
// Message handlers:
-
- /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
- /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
- pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(
- &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
- ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, ChannelError>
- where
- L::Target: Logger
- {
- if !self.context.is_outbound() {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
- }
- if self.context.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
- }
- if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
- self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
- self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
- panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
- }
-
- let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
-
- let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
- let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
- let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
- let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
-
- log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
- &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
-
- let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
- let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
- {
- let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
- let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
- let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
- // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
- if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
- }
- }
-
- let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
- initial_commitment_tx,
- msg.signature,
- Vec::new(),
- &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
- self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
- );
-
- self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
- .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
-
-
- let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
- let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
- let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
- let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
- let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
- let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
- monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
- let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
- shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
- &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
- &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
- funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
- obscure_factor,
- holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
-
- channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
- counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(),
- self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
- self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
- counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
- counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
- counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
-
- assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
- if self.context.is_batch_funding() {
- self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32;
- } else {
- self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
- }
- self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
- self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
-
- log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
-
- let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
- self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
- Ok(channel_monitor)
- }
-
/// Updates the state of the channel to indicate that all channels in the batch have received
/// funding_signed and persisted their monitors.
/// The funding transaction is consequently allowed to be broadcast, and the channel can be
/// treated as a non-batch channel going forward.
pub fn set_batch_ready(&mut self) {
self.context.is_batch_funding = None;
- self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32);
+ self.context.channel_state.clear_waiting_for_batch();
+ }
+
+ /// Unsets the existing funding information.
+ ///
+ /// This must only be used if the channel has not yet completed funding and has not been used.
+ ///
+ /// Further, the channel must be immediately shut down after this with a call to
+ /// [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`].
+ pub fn unset_funding_info(&mut self, temporary_channel_id: ChannelId) {
+ debug_assert!(matches!(
+ self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)
+ ));
+ self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
+ self.context.channel_id = temporary_channel_id;
}
/// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
/// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
/// reply with.
pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
- &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
+ &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
where
NS::Target: NodeSigner,
L::Target: Logger
{
- if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
+ if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
}
}
}
- let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
-
// Our channel_ready shouldn't have been sent if we are waiting for other channels in the
// batch, but we can receive channel_ready messages.
- debug_assert!(
- non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 == 0 ||
- non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 == 0
- );
- if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
- self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
- } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
- self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
- self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
- } else if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
- // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
- (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
- (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
- {
+ let mut check_reconnection = false;
+ match &self.context.channel_state {
+ ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => {
+ let flags = flags.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into());
+ debug_assert!(!flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY) || !flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
+ if flags.clone().clear(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH) == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY {
+ // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs.
+ check_reconnection = true;
+ } else if flags.clone().clear(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH).is_empty() {
+ self.context.channel_state.set_their_channel_ready();
+ } else if flags == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY {
+ self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady(self.context.channel_state.with_funded_state_flags_mask().into());
+ self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
+ } else {
+ // We're in `WAITING_FOR_BATCH`, so we should wait until we're ready.
+ debug_assert!(flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
+ }
+ }
+ // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs.
+ ChannelState::ChannelReady(_) => check_reconnection = true,
+ _ => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned())),
+ }
+ if check_reconnection {
// They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
// required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
let expected_point =
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
}
return Ok(None);
- } else {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
}
self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
- Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
+ Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
}
pub fn update_add_htlc<F, FE: Deref, L: Deref>(
where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus,
FE::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
{
+ if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
+ }
// We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
- let local_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
- if local_sent_shutdown {
+ if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
}
// If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
- let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
- if remote_sent_shutdown {
+ if self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
}
- if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
+ if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
}
if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
}
+
// Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
// the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
// something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
// Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
// feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
- let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
- let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
- self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
- };
- if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
- };
-
- if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
+ {
+ let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
+ let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
+ self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
+ };
+ let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
+ ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
+ } else {
+ 0
+ };
+ if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
+ };
+ if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(remote_commit_tx_fee_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
+ }
}
+ let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
+ ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
+ } else {
+ 0
+ };
if !self.context.is_outbound() {
- // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
- // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
- // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
- // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
- // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
- // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
- // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
- // sensitive to fee spikes.
+ // `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
+ // the spec because the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the receiver's
+ // side, only on the sender's. Note that with anchor outputs we are no longer as
+ // sensitive to fee spikes, so we need to account for them.
let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
- let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
- if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
+ let mut remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
+ if !self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
+ remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
+ }
+ if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
// Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
// the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", &self.context.channel_id());
// Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
- if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
+ if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
}
}
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
}
- if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
+ if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
}
let outcome = match check_preimage {
None => fail_reason.into(),
Some(payment_preimage) => {
- let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
+ let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
}
Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
}
- pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
- if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
+ pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64, Option<u64>), ChannelError> {
+ if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
}
- if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
+ if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
}
- self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
+ self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat, htlc.skimmed_fee_msat))
}
pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
- if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
+ if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
}
- if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
+ if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
}
}
pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
- if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
+ if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
}
- if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
+ if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
}
pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
where L::Target: Logger
{
- if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
+ if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
}
- if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
+ if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
}
- if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
+ if self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
}
let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
- log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
+ log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), &self.context.channel_id());
- if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
+ if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()) {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
}
if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
);
- self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
+ self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.outbound_htlc_preimages)
.map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
// Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
+ counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
claimed_htlcs,
nondust_htlc_sources,
- }]
+ }],
+ channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
};
self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
+ self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = false;
// Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
// build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
- if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
+ if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
// In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
// to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
- if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
+ if need_commitment && !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
// If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
- // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
- // includes the right HTLCs.
+ // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that
+ // get_last_commitment_update_for_send includes the right HTLCs.
self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
// build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
}
- let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
+ let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
// If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
// we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
// free_holding_cell_htlcs().
) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
{
- if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
- (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
+ if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) && self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment() {
self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger)
} else { (None, Vec::new()) }
}
) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
{
- assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
+ assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress());
if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, &self.context.channel_id());
let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
+ counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
updates: Vec::new(),
+ channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
};
let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
// the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
// handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
// to rebalance channels.
- match &htlc_update {
+ let fail_htlc_res = match &htlc_update {
&HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
- skimmed_fee_msat, ..
+ skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, ..
} => {
- match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(),
- onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
- {
+ match self.send_htlc(
+ amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(),
+ false, skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, fee_estimator, logger
+ ) {
Ok(_) => update_add_count += 1,
Err(e) => {
match e {
}
}
}
+ None
},
&HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
// If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
{ monitor_update } else { unreachable!() };
update_fulfill_count += 1;
monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
+ None
},
&HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
- match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
- Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
- // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
- // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
- // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
- // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
- // for a full revocation before failing.
- debug_assert!(update_fail_msg_option.is_some());
- update_fail_count += 1;
- },
- Err(e) => {
- if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
- else {
- panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
- }
- }
- }
+ Some(self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger)
+ .map(|fail_msg_opt| fail_msg_opt.map(|_| ())))
},
+ &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
+ Some(self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, (sha256_of_onion, failure_code), false, logger)
+ .map(|fail_msg_opt| fail_msg_opt.map(|_| ())))
+ }
+ };
+ if let Some(res) = fail_htlc_res {
+ match res {
+ Ok(fail_msg_opt) => {
+ // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
+ // `queue_fail_{malformed_}htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
+ // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
+ // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
+ // for a full revocation before failing.
+ debug_assert!(fail_msg_opt.is_some());
+ update_fail_count += 1;
+ },
+ Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) => {},
+ Err(_) => {
+ panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
+ },
+ }
}
}
if update_add_count == 0 && update_fulfill_count == 0 && update_fail_count == 0 && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
{
- if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
+ if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
}
- if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
+ if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
}
- if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
+ if self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
}
}
}
- if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
+ if !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
// Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
// haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
// take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
&secret
).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
- }
+ },
+ // TODO (taproot|arik)
+ #[cfg(taproot)]
+ _ => todo!()
};
self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
+ counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
}],
+ channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
};
// Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
// (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
// OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
// channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
- self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
+ self.context.channel_state.clear_awaiting_remote_revoke();
self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
// Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
+ let expecting_peer_commitment_signed = &mut self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed;
// We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
}
+ *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
false
} else { true }
});
if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
+ *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
}
if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
+ self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
},
FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
}
}
- if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
+ if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
// We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
// cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
if require_commitment {
self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
- // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
- // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
- // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
+ // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call
+ // get_last_commitment_update_for_send(), which does not update state, but we're
+ // definitely now awaiting a remote revoke before we can step forward any more, so
+ // set it here.
let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
// build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
// strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
return None;
}
- if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
+ if self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() || self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
force_holding_cell = true;
}
/// completed.
/// May return `Err(())`, which implies [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`] should be called immediately.
pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()> where L::Target: Logger {
- assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
- if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
- return Err(());
+ assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
+ if self.context.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
+ return Err(())
}
- if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
+ if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
// While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
// redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
return Ok(());
self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
- self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
+ self.context.channel_state.set_peer_disconnected();
log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, &self.context.channel_id());
Ok(())
}
self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
- self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
+ self.context.channel_state.set_monitor_update_in_progress();
}
/// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
/// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
/// to the remote side.
pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
- &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
+ &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
where
L::Target: Logger,
NS::Target: NodeSigner
{
- assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
- self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
+ assert!(self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress());
+ self.context.channel_state.clear_monitor_update_in_progress();
- // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
+ // If we're past (or at) the AwaitingChannelReady stage on an outbound channel, try to
// (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
// first received the funding_signed.
let mut funding_broadcastable =
- if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 && self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 == 0 {
+ if self.context.is_outbound() &&
+ (matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if !flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH)) ||
+ matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)))
+ {
self.context.funding_transaction.take()
} else { None };
// That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
// minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
- if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
+ if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
funding_broadcastable = None;
}
})
} else { None };
- let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
+ let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
- if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
+ if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
} else { None };
let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
- self.mark_awaiting_response();
- Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
+ self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
} else { None };
+ if commitment_update.is_some() {
+ self.mark_awaiting_response();
+ }
self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
if self.context.is_outbound() {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
}
- if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
+ if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
}
Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&self.context.channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
- let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
- // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
- // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
- // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
- if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
+ // Check that we won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
+ if !self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
Ok(())
}
+ /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're
+ /// blocked.
+ #[cfg(async_signing)]
+ pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> SignerResumeUpdates where L::Target: Logger {
+ let commitment_update = if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
+ self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
+ } else { None };
+ let funding_signed = if self.context.signer_pending_funding && !self.context.is_outbound() {
+ self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger).1
+ } else { None };
+ let channel_ready = if funding_signed.is_some() {
+ self.check_get_channel_ready(0)
+ } else { None };
+
+ log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked with {} commitment_update, {} funding_signed and {} channel_ready",
+ if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
+ if funding_signed.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
+ if channel_ready.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" });
+
+ SignerResumeUpdates {
+ commitment_update,
+ funding_signed,
+ channel_ready,
+ }
+ }
+
fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
}
}
- fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
+ /// Gets the last commitment update for immediate sending to our peer.
+ fn get_last_commitment_update_for_send<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ()> where L::Target: Logger {
let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
+ blinding_point: htlc.blinding_point,
});
}
}
})
} else { None };
- log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
+ log_trace!(logger, "Regenerating latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
&self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
- msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
+ let commitment_signed = if let Ok(update) = self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).map(|(cu, _)| cu) {
+ if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
+ log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update generated: clearing signer_pending_commitment_update");
+ self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = false;
+ }
+ update
+ } else {
+ #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
+ panic!("Failed to get signature for new commitment state");
+ }
+ #[cfg(async_signing)] {
+ if !self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
+ log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update awaiting signer: setting signer_pending_commitment_update");
+ self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = true;
+ }
+ return Err(());
+ }
+ };
+ Ok(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
- commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
- }
+ commitment_signed,
+ })
}
/// Gets the `Shutdown` message we should send our peer on reconnect, if any.
pub fn get_outbound_shutdown(&self) -> Option<msgs::Shutdown> {
- if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
+ if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
Some(msgs::Shutdown {
channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
/// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
- genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
+ chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
where
L::Target: Logger,
NS::Target: NodeSigner
{
- if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
+ if !self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
// While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
// almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
// just close here instead of trying to recover.
if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish (usually an lnd node with lost state asking us to force-close for them)".to_owned()));
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_owned()));
}
+ let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
}
- if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
+ if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > our_commitment_transaction {
macro_rules! log_and_panic {
($err_msg: expr) => {
log_error!(logger, $err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
// Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
// commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
- let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
- if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
- return Err(
- ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
- );
+ if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!(
+ "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
+ msg.next_remote_commitment_number,
+ our_commitment_transaction
+ )));
}
// Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
// remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
- self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
+ self.context.channel_state.clear_peer_disconnected();
self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
let shutdown_msg = self.get_outbound_shutdown();
- let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
+ let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
- if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
+ if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)) {
// If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
- if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
- self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
+ if !self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready() ||
+ self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
}
});
}
- let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
+ let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number == our_commitment_transaction {
// Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
// Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
None
- } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
- if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
+ } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == our_commitment_transaction {
+ if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
None
} else {
Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
}
} else {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
+ debug_assert!(false, "All values should have been handled in the four cases above");
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
+ "Peer attempted to reestablish channel expecting a future local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
+ msg.next_remote_commitment_number,
+ our_commitment_transaction
+ )));
};
// We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
// revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
// AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
// the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
- let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 != 0;
+ let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke();
if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
self.mark_awaiting_response();
}
log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
}
- if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
+ if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
Ok(ReestablishResponses {
channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
Ok(ReestablishResponses {
channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
raa: required_revoke,
- commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
+ commitment_update: self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok(),
order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
})
}
+ } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number < next_counterparty_commitment_number {
+ Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
+ "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
+ msg.next_local_commitment_number,
+ next_counterparty_commitment_number,
+ )))
} else {
- Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
+ Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
+ "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a future remote commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
+ msg.next_local_commitment_number,
+ next_counterparty_commitment_number,
+ )))
}
}
// Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
// force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
// If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
- let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
- let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
+ let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum);
+ // Use NonAnchorChannelFee because this should be an estimate for a channel close
+ // that we don't expect to need fee bumping
+ let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
// The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
- -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
+ -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
{
+ // If we're waiting on a monitor persistence, that implies we're also waiting to send some
+ // message to our counterparty (probably a `revoke_and_ack`). In such a case, we shouldn't
+ // initiate `closing_signed` negotiation until we're clear of all pending messages. Note
+ // that closing_negotiation_ready checks this case (as well as a few others).
if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
- return Ok((None, None));
+ return Ok((None, None, None));
}
if !self.context.is_outbound() {
if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
}
- return Ok((None, None));
+ return Ok((None, None, None));
+ }
+
+ // If we're waiting on a counterparty `commitment_signed` to clear some updates from our
+ // local commitment transaction, we can't yet initiate `closing_signed` negotiation.
+ if self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed {
+ return Ok((None, None, None));
}
let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
}),
- }), None))
- }
+ }), None, None))
+ },
+ // TODO (taproot|arik)
+ #[cfg(taproot)]
+ _ => todo!()
}
}
&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
{
- if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
+ if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
}
- if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
+ if self.context.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
// Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
// are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
// can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
}
}
- assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
+ assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
- return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
+ return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
}
if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
- return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
+ return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
}
} else {
self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
// If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
// immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
// any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
- let send_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
+ let send_shutdown = !self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent();
let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
Some(_) => false,
// From here on out, we may not fail!
- self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
+ self.context.channel_state.set_remote_shutdown_sent();
self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
+ counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
}],
+ channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
};
self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
}
});
- self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
+ self.context.channel_state.set_local_shutdown_sent();
self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
- -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
+ -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
where F::Target: FeeEstimator
{
- if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
+ if !self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
}
- if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
+ if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
}
if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
}
- if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
+ if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
- return Ok((None, None));
+ return Ok((None, None, None));
}
let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
+ let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
+ closure_reason: ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure,
+ monitor_update: None,
+ dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
+ channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
+ user_channel_id: self.context.user_id,
+ channel_capacity_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
+ counterparty_node_id: self.context.counterparty_node_id,
+ unbroadcasted_funding_tx: self.context.unbroadcasted_funding(),
+ channel_funding_txo: self.context.get_funding_txo(),
+ };
let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
- self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
+ self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
- return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
+ return Ok((None, Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result)));
}
}
let sig = ecdsa
.sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
.map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
-
- let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
- self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
+ let (signed_tx, shutdown_result) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
+ let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
+ closure_reason: ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure,
+ monitor_update: None,
+ dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
+ channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
+ user_channel_id: self.context.user_id,
+ channel_capacity_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
+ counterparty_node_id: self.context.counterparty_node_id,
+ unbroadcasted_funding_tx: self.context.unbroadcasted_funding(),
+ channel_funding_txo: self.context.get_funding_txo(),
+ };
+ self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
- Some(tx)
- } else { None };
+ (Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result))
+ } else {
+ (None, None)
+ };
self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
}),
- }), signed_tx))
- }
+ }), signed_tx, shutdown_result))
+ },
+ // TODO (taproot|arik)
+ #[cfg(taproot)]
+ _ => todo!()
}
}
}
}
pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
- self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
+ self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() { 1 } else { 0 }
}
pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
}
#[cfg(test)]
- pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> {
+ pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<SP> {
&self.context.holder_signer
}
/// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
/// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
- (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
+ self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress()
}
/// Gets the latest [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] ID which has been released and is in-flight.
/// advanced state.
pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
- if self.context.channel_state &
- !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 | ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32)
- == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
+ if matches!(
+ self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags)
+ if flags.clone().clear(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY | FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED | FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS | AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH).is_empty()
+ ) {
// If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
- // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
+ // AwaitingChannelReady set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
return true;
}
if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
- // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
+ // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond AwaitingChannelReady immediately even while
// waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
// transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
// funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
/// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
- (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
+ matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY)) ||
+ matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_))
}
/// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
- (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
+ self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
}
/// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
- (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
+ self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent()
}
/// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
/// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
/// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
- if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
- assert!(self.context.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
- true
- } else { false }
+ matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete)
}
pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
return None;
}
+ // If we're still pending the signature on a funding transaction, then we're not ready to send a
+ // channel_ready yet.
+ if self.context.signer_pending_funding {
+ return None;
+ }
+
// Note that we don't include ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as we don't want to send
// channel_ready until the entire batch is ready.
- let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
- let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
- self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
+ let need_commitment_update = if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into()).is_empty()) {
+ self.context.channel_state.set_our_channel_ready();
true
- } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
- self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
+ } else if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into()) == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY) {
+ self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady(self.context.channel_state.with_funded_state_flags_mask().into());
self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
true
- } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
+ } else if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into()) == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY) {
// We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
false
} else {
- if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
+ if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 &&
+ self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new())
+ {
// We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
// funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
// an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
// however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
#[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
- panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
+ panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-AwaitingChannelReady: {}.\n\
Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
- self.context.channel_state);
+ self.context.channel_state.to_u32());
}
// We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
false
};
if need_commitment_update {
- if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
- if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
+ if !self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
+ if !self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
let next_per_commitment_point =
self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
/// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
&mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
- genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
+ chain_hash: ChainHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
where
NS::Target: NodeSigner,
L::Target: Logger
{
+ let mut msgs = (None, None);
if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
// Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
// may have already happened for this block).
if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
- let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger);
- return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
+ let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger);
+ msgs = (Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs);
}
}
for inp in tx.input.iter() {
}
}
}
- Ok((None, None))
+ Ok(msgs)
}
/// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
/// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
/// back.
pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
- &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
+ &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, chain_hash: ChainHash,
node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
where
NS::Target: NodeSigner,
L::Target: Logger
{
- self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
+ self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
}
fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
&mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
- genesis_node_signer: Option<(BlockHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
+ chain_node_signer: Option<(ChainHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
where
NS::Target: NodeSigner,
self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
- let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
- self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
+ let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
+ self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
} else { None };
log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
}
- let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
- if non_shutdown_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
- (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
+ if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) ||
+ self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready() {
let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
// Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", &self.context.channel_id);
// If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
- assert!(non_shutdown_state & !STATE_FLAGS <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
- assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
+ assert!(self.context.channel_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new()));
+ assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready());
return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
}
- let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
- self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
+ let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
+ self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
} else { None };
Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
}
// larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
// time we saw and it will be ignored.
let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
- match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(BlockHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
+ match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(ChainHash, &&dyn NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
///
/// [`ChannelReady`]: crate::ln::msgs::ChannelReady
fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
- &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
+ &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
}
fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
- &mut self, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
+ &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
where
return None;
}
- if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
+ if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
return None;
}
}
log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
- let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config) {
+ let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
Ok(a) => a,
Err(e) => {
log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
node_signature: our_node_sig,
bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
})
- }
+ },
+ // TODO (taproot|arik)
+ #[cfg(taproot)]
+ _ => todo!()
}
}
bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
contents: announcement,
})
- }
+ },
+ // TODO (taproot|arik)
+ #[cfg(taproot)]
+ _ => todo!()
}
} else {
Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
/// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
/// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
- &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32,
+ &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32,
msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
/// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
/// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
- &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
+ &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
return None;
/// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
/// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
- assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
+ assert!(self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected());
assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
// Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
// current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
// (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
// the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
// cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
- // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
+ // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached AwaitingChannelReady so we can't
// overflow here.
next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
pub fn queue_add_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
- fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
+ blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
{
self
.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
- skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
+ skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, fee_estimator, logger)
.map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
.map_err(|err| {
if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
fn send_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
- skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
+ skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
+ fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError>
where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
{
- if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
+ if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) ||
+ self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() ||
+ self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
+ {
return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
}
let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
}
- if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
+ if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
// Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
// incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
// the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
}
- let need_holding_cell = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0;
+ let need_holding_cell = !self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment();
log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC with hash {} for {} msat {}",
payment_hash, amount_msat,
if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
source,
onion_routing_packet,
skimmed_fee_msat,
+ blinding_point,
});
return Ok(None);
}
cltv_expiry,
state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
source,
+ blinding_point,
skimmed_fee_msat,
});
cltv_expiry,
onion_routing_packet,
skimmed_fee_msat,
+ blinding_point,
};
self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
+ counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
feerate_per_kw: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw()),
to_broadcaster_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat()),
to_countersignatory_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat()),
- }]
+ }],
+ channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
};
- self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
+ self.context.channel_state.set_awaiting_remote_revoke();
monitor_update
}
htlcs.push(htlc);
}
- let res = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.context.secp_ctx)
- .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
+ let res = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(
+ &commitment_stats.tx,
+ commitment_stats.inbound_htlc_preimages,
+ commitment_stats.outbound_htlc_preimages,
+ &self.context.secp_ctx,
+ ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
signature = res.0;
htlc_signatures = res.1;
log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
- log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
+ log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
}
}
#[cfg(taproot)]
partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
}, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
- }
+ },
+ // TODO (taproot|arik)
+ #[cfg(taproot)]
+ _ => todo!()
}
}
where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
{
let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
- onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger);
+ onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, None, fee_estimator, logger);
if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
match send_res? {
Some(_) => {
}
}
- pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
- self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
+ /// Applies the `ChannelUpdate` and returns a boolean indicating whether a change actually
+ /// happened.
+ pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, ChannelError> {
+ let new_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
});
+ let did_change = self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info != new_forwarding_info;
+ if did_change {
+ self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = new_forwarding_info;
+ }
- Ok(())
+ Ok(did_change)
}
/// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
/// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
- ///
- /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
- /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
-> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
}
}
- if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
- if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
- return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
- }
- else if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
- return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
- }
+ if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
+ return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
+ }
+ else if self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
+ return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
}
if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
}
- assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
- if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
+ assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
+ if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() || self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
}
- // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
- // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
- let mut chan_closed = false;
- if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
- chan_closed = true;
- }
-
let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
Some(_) => false,
- None if !chan_closed => {
+ None => {
// use override shutdown script if provided
let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
Some(script) => script,
self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
true
},
- None => false,
};
// From here on out, we may not fail!
self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
- if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
- self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
- } else {
- self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
- }
+ self.context.channel_state.set_local_shutdown_sent();
self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
+ counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
}],
+ channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
};
self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
- outbound_scid_alias: u64
+ outbound_scid_alias: u64, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>
) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<SP>, APIError>
where ES::Target: EntropySource,
F::Target: FeeEstimator
let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
- let commitment_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
- ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum
+ let (commitment_conf_target, anchor_outputs_value_msat) = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
+ (ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee, ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000)
} else {
- ConfirmationTarget::Normal
+ (ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee, 0)
};
let commitment_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(commitment_conf_target);
let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(commitment_feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type);
- if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
+ if value_to_self_msat.saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < commitment_tx_fee {
return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
}
}
}
- let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
+ let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) {
Ok(script) => script,
Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
};
- let temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(entropy_source);
+ let temporary_channel_id = temporary_channel_id.unwrap_or_else(|| ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(entropy_source));
Ok(Self {
context: ChannelContext {
channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
- channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
+ channel_state: ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT),
announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
secp_ctx,
channel_value_satoshis,
monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
+ signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
+ signer_pending_funding: false,
+
#[cfg(debug_assertions)]
holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
#[cfg(debug_assertions)]
last_sent_closing_fee: None,
pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
+ expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
closing_fee_limits: None,
target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
})
}
- /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
- fn get_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
+ /// Only allowed after [`ChannelContext::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
+ fn get_funding_created_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::FundingCreated> where L::Target: Logger {
let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
- match &self.context.holder_signer {
+ let signature = match &self.context.holder_signer {
// TODO (taproot|arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
- Ok(ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
- .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
- }
+ ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
+ .map(|(sig, _)| sig).ok()?
+ },
+ // TODO (taproot|arik)
+ #[cfg(taproot)]
+ _ => todo!()
+ };
+
+ if self.context.signer_pending_funding {
+ log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature ready for funding_created message: clearing signer_pending_funding");
+ self.context.signer_pending_funding = false;
}
+
+ Some(msgs::FundingCreated {
+ temporary_channel_id: self.context.temporary_channel_id.unwrap(),
+ funding_txid: self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().txid,
+ funding_output_index: self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().index,
+ signature,
+ #[cfg(taproot)]
+ partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
+ #[cfg(taproot)]
+ next_local_nonce: None,
+ })
}
/// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
/// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
/// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
/// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
- pub fn get_funding_created<L: Deref>(mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, is_batch_funding: bool, logger: &L)
- -> Result<(Channel<SP>, msgs::FundingCreated), (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
+ pub fn get_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, is_batch_funding: bool, logger: &L)
+ -> Result<Option<msgs::FundingCreated>, (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
if !self.context.is_outbound() {
panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
}
- if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
+ if !matches!(
+ self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
+ if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
+ ) {
panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
}
if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
- }
-
- self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
- self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
-
- let signature = match self.get_funding_created_signature(logger) {
- Ok(res) => res,
- Err(e) => {
- log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
- self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
- return Err((self, e));
- }
- };
+ }
- let temporary_channel_id = self.context.channel_id;
+ self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
+ self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
// Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
- self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
- self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
+ self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingNegotiated;
+ self.context.channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo);
// If the funding transaction is a coinbase transaction, we need to set the minimum depth to 100.
// We can skip this if it is a zero-conf channel.
self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
self.context.is_batch_funding = Some(()).filter(|_| is_batch_funding);
- let channel = Channel {
- context: self.context,
- };
+ let funding_created = self.get_funding_created_msg(logger);
+ if funding_created.is_none() {
+ #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
+ panic!("Failed to get signature for new funding creation");
+ }
+ #[cfg(async_signing)] {
+ if !self.context.signer_pending_funding {
+ log_trace!(logger, "funding_created awaiting signer; setting signer_pending_funding");
+ self.context.signer_pending_funding = true;
+ }
+ }
+ }
- Ok((channel, msgs::FundingCreated {
- temporary_channel_id,
- funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
- funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
- signature,
- #[cfg(taproot)]
- partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
- #[cfg(taproot)]
- next_local_nonce: None,
- }))
+ Ok(funding_created)
}
fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
/// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
/// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
- &mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
+ &mut self, chain_hash: ChainHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()>
where
F::Target: FeeEstimator
{
- if !self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
+ if !self.context.is_outbound() ||
+ !matches!(
+ self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
+ if flags == NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT
+ )
+ {
+ return Err(());
+ }
if self.context.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
// We've exhausted our options
return Err(());
// whatever reason.
if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
self.context.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
- self.context.feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
+ self.context.feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
assert!(!self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx());
} else if self.context.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
self.context.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
}
- pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
+ pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: ChainHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
if !self.context.is_outbound() {
panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
}
- if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
+ if self.context.have_received_message() {
panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
}
to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
- revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
+ revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
payment_point: keys.payment_point,
- delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
- htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
+ delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
+ htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
first_per_commitment_point,
channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
if !self.context.is_outbound() {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
}
- if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
+ if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags) if flags == NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT) {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
}
if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
- revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
+ revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.revocation_basepoint),
payment_point: msg.payment_point,
- delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
- htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
+ delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.delayed_payment_basepoint),
+ htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.htlc_basepoint)
};
self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
- self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
+ self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(
+ NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT
+ );
self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
Ok(())
}
+
+ /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
+ /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
+ pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(
+ mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
+ ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>), (OutboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError)>
+ where
+ L::Target: Logger
+ {
+ if !self.context.is_outbound() {
+ return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned())));
+ }
+ if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::FundingNegotiated) {
+ return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned())));
+ }
+ if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
+ self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
+ self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
+ panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
+ }
+
+ let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
+
+ let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
+ let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
+ let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
+ let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
+
+ log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
+ &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
+
+ let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
+ let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
+ {
+ let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
+ let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
+ let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
+ // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
+ if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
+ return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned())));
+ }
+ }
+
+ let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
+ initial_commitment_tx,
+ msg.signature,
+ Vec::new(),
+ &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
+ self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
+ );
+
+ let validated =
+ self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new());
+ if validated.is_err() {
+ return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
+ }
+
+ let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
+ let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
+ let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
+ let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
+ let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
+ let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
+ monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
+ let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
+ shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
+ &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
+ &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
+ funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
+ obscure_factor,
+ holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id, self.context.channel_id());
+ channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
+ counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(),
+ self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
+ self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
+ counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
+ counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
+ counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
+
+ assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress()); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
+ if self.context.is_batch_funding() {
+ self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH);
+ } else {
+ self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new());
+ }
+ self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
+ self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
+
+ log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
+
+ let mut channel = Channel { context: self.context };
+
+ let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
+ channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
+ Ok((channel, channel_monitor))
+ }
+
+ /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're
+ /// blocked.
+ #[cfg(async_signing)]
+ pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::FundingCreated> where L::Target: Logger {
+ if self.context.signer_pending_funding && self.context.is_outbound() {
+ log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked a funding_created");
+ self.get_funding_created_msg(logger)
+ } else { None }
+ }
}
/// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
}
+/// Fetches the [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] that will be used for a channel built from a given
+/// [`msgs::OpenChannel`].
+pub(super) fn channel_type_from_open_channel(
+ msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, their_features: &InitFeatures,
+ our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures
+) -> Result<ChannelTypeFeatures, ChannelError> {
+ if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
+ if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
+ }
+
+ // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
+ // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
+ // `static_remote_key`.
+ if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
+ }
+ // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
+ if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
+ }
+ let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
+ if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
+ }
+ Ok(channel_type.clone())
+ } else {
+ let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
+ if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
+ }
+ Ok(channel_type)
+ }
+}
+
impl<SP: Deref> InboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
/// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
/// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
F::Target: FeeEstimator,
L::Target: Logger,
{
+ let logger = WithContext::from(logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.temporary_channel_id));
let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
// First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
// support this channel type.
- let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
- if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
- }
-
- // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
- // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
- // `static_remote_key`.
- if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
- }
- // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
- if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
- }
- if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
- }
- channel_type.clone()
- } else {
- let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
- if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
- }
- channel_type
- };
+ let channel_type = channel_type_from_open_channel(msg, their_features, our_supported_features)?;
let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
- revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
+ revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.revocation_basepoint),
payment_point: msg.payment_point,
- delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
- htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
+ delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.delayed_payment_basepoint),
+ htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.htlc_basepoint)
};
if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
}
- Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
+ Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, &&logger)?;
let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
// check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
// for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
+ let anchor_outputs_value = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
+ ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2
+ } else {
+ 0
+ };
let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000;
- if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
+ if (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value) < commitment_tx_fee {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value), commitment_tx_fee)));
}
- let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
+ let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value;
// While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
// want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
}
}
- let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
+ let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) {
Ok(script) => script,
Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
};
temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
- channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
+ channel_state: ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(
+ NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT
+ ),
announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
secp_ctx,
monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
+ signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
+ signer_pending_funding: false,
+
#[cfg(debug_assertions)]
holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
#[cfg(debug_assertions)]
last_sent_closing_fee: None,
pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
+ expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
closing_fee_limits: None,
target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
if self.context.is_outbound() {
panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
}
- if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
+ if !matches!(
+ self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
+ if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
+ ) {
panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
}
if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
- revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
+ revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
payment_point: keys.payment_point,
- delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
- htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
+ delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
+ htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
first_per_commitment_point,
shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
self.generate_accept_channel_message()
}
- fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(CommitmentTransaction, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
+ fn check_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<CommitmentTransaction, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
- {
- let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
- let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
- let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
- // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
- log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
- log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
- encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
- encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
- secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
- }
-
- let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
- let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
-
- let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
- let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
- log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
- &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
-
- match &self.context.holder_signer {
- // TODO (arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
- ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
- let counterparty_signature = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
- .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
+ let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
+ let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
+ let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
+ // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
+ log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
+ log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
+ encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
+ encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
+ secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
- // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
- Ok((counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
- }
- }
+ Ok(initial_commitment_tx)
}
pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(
mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
- ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>), (Self, ChannelError)>
+ ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>), (Self, ChannelError)>
where
L::Target: Logger
{
if self.context.is_outbound() {
return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
}
- if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
+ if !matches!(
+ self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
+ if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
+ ) {
// BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
// remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
// channel.
let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
// This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
- // funding_created_signature may fail.
+ // check_funding_created_signature may fail.
self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
- let (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
+ let initial_commitment_tx = match self.check_funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
Ok(res) => res,
Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
Err(e) => {
// The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
// to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
- panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
+ panic!("unexpected error type from check_funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
}
};
// Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
+ self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new());
+ self.context.channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo);
+ self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
+ self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
+
+ let (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed) = self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger);
+
let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
obscure_factor,
- holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
-
+ holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id, self.context.channel_id());
channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust().txid(), Vec::new(),
- self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
+ self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), self.context.feerate_per_kw,
counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
- self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
- self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
- self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
- self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
-
- log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
+ log_info!(logger, "{} funding_signed for peer for channel {}",
+ if funding_signed.is_some() { "Generated" } else { "Waiting for signature on" }, &self.context.channel_id());
// Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
// `ChannelMonitor`.
let mut channel = Channel {
context: self.context,
};
- let channel_id = channel.context.channel_id.clone();
let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
- Ok((channel, msgs::FundingSigned {
- channel_id,
- signature,
- #[cfg(taproot)]
- partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
- }, channel_monitor))
+ Ok((channel, funding_signed, channel_monitor))
}
}
const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
-const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
+const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
(0, FailRelay),
writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
- (self.context.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
+ {
+ let mut channel_state = self.context.channel_state;
+ if matches!(channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
+ channel_state.set_peer_disconnected();
+ } else {
+ debug_assert!(false, "Pre-funded/shutdown channels should not be written");
+ }
+ channel_state.to_u32().write(writer)?;
+ }
self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
- let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
- // TODO (taproot|arik): Introduce serialization distinction for non-ECDSA signers.
- self.context.holder_signer.as_ecdsa().expect("Only ECDSA signers may be serialized").write(&mut key_data)?;
- assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
- assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
- (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
- writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
-
// Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
// deserialized from that format.
match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
+ let mut pending_outbound_blinding_points: Vec<Option<PublicKey>> = Vec::new();
(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
- for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
+ for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
reason.write(writer)?;
}
}
- if let Some(skimmed_fee) = htlc.skimmed_fee_msat {
- if pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
- for _ in 0..idx { pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
- }
- pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
- } else if !pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
- pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None);
- }
+ pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(htlc.skimmed_fee_msat);
+ pending_outbound_blinding_points.push(htlc.blinding_point);
}
let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
+ let mut holding_cell_blinding_points: Vec<Option<PublicKey>> = Vec::new();
+ // Vec of (htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion)
+ let mut malformed_htlcs: Vec<(u64, u16, [u8; 32])> = Vec::new();
(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
- for (idx, update) in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().enumerate() {
+ for update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
match update {
&HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
- skimmed_fee_msat,
+ blinding_point, skimmed_fee_msat,
} => {
0u8.write(writer)?;
amount_msat.write(writer)?;
source.write(writer)?;
onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
- if let Some(skimmed_fee) = skimmed_fee_msat {
- if holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
- for _ in 0..idx { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
- }
- holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
- } else if !holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
+ holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(skimmed_fee_msat);
+ holding_cell_blinding_points.push(blinding_point);
},
&HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
1u8.write(writer)?;
htlc_id.write(writer)?;
err_packet.write(writer)?;
}
+ &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
+ htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion
+ } => {
+ // We don't want to break downgrading by adding a new variant, so write a dummy
+ // `::FailHTLC` variant and write the real malformed error as an optional TLV.
+ malformed_htlcs.push((htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion));
+
+ let dummy_err_packet = msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new() };
+ 2u8.write(writer)?;
+ htlc_id.write(writer)?;
+ dummy_err_packet.write(writer)?;
+ }
}
}
(35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
(37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
(38, self.context.is_batch_funding, option),
+ (39, pending_outbound_blinding_points, optional_vec),
+ (41, holding_cell_blinding_points, optional_vec),
+ (43, malformed_htlcs, optional_vec), // Added in 0.0.119
});
Ok(())
}
let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let channel_state = ChannelState::from_u32(Readable::read(reader)?).map_err(|_| DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
_ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
},
skimmed_fee_msat: None,
+ blinding_point: None,
});
}
source: Readable::read(reader)?,
onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
skimmed_fee_msat: None,
+ blinding_point: None,
},
1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
let mut is_batch_funding: Option<()> = None;
+ let mut pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PublicKey>>> = None;
+ let mut holding_cell_blinding_points_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PublicKey>>> = None;
+
+ let mut malformed_htlcs: Option<Vec<(u64, u16, [u8; 32])>> = None;
+
read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
(0, announcement_sigs, option),
(1, minimum_depth, option),
(35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
(37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
(38, is_batch_funding, option),
+ (39, pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt, optional_vec),
+ (41, holding_cell_blinding_points_opt, optional_vec),
+ (43, malformed_htlcs, optional_vec), // Added in 0.0.119
});
let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
// If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
// required channel parameters.
- let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
- if non_shutdown_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
+ if channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingNegotiated {
holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
}
(channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
// We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
}
+ if let Some(blinding_pts) = pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt {
+ let mut iter = blinding_pts.into_iter();
+ for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
+ htlc.blinding_point = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
+ }
+ // We expect all blinding points to be consumed above
+ if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
+ }
+ if let Some(blinding_pts) = holding_cell_blinding_points_opt {
+ let mut iter = blinding_pts.into_iter();
+ for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
+ if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut blinding_point, .. } = htlc {
+ *blinding_point = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
+ }
+ }
+ // We expect all blinding points to be consumed above
+ if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
+ }
+
+ if let Some(malformed_htlcs) = malformed_htlcs {
+ for (malformed_htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion) in malformed_htlcs {
+ let htlc_idx = holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().position(|htlc| {
+ if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } = htlc {
+ let matches = *htlc_id == malformed_htlc_id;
+ if matches { debug_assert!(err_packet.data.is_empty()) }
+ matches
+ } else { false }
+ }).ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
+ let malformed_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
+ htlc_id: malformed_htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion
+ };
+ let _ = core::mem::replace(&mut holding_cell_htlc_updates[htlc_idx], malformed_htlc);
+ }
+ }
Ok(Channel {
context: ChannelContext {
monitor_pending_failures,
monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
+ signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
+ signer_pending_funding: false,
+
pending_update_fee,
holding_cell_update_fee,
next_holder_htlc_id,
last_sent_closing_fee: None,
pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
+ expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
closing_fee_limits: None,
target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use std::cmp;
- use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
+ use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
+ use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{ScriptBuf, Builder};
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
- use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
- use hex;
- use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
+ use crate::ln::onion_utils::INVALID_ONION_BLINDING;
+ use crate::ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
+ use crate::ln::channel_keys::{RevocationKey, RevocationBasepoint};
use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
- use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelState, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, commit_tx_fee_msat};
+ use crate::ln::channel::{AwaitingChannelReadyFlags, Channel, ChannelState, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK, commit_tx_fee_msat};
use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
- use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
+ use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, NodeFeatures};
+ use crate::ln::msgs;
use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
- use crate::ln::chan_utils;
- use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
+ use crate::ln::chan_utils::{self, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
use crate::chain::BestBlock;
use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
- use crate::routing::router::Path;
+ use crate::routing::router::{Path, RouteHop};
use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
use crate::util::errors::APIError;
+ use crate::util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
use crate::util::test_utils;
use crate::util::test_utils::{OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey, TestKeysInterface};
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
+ use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
- use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
- use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
+ use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
+ use bitcoin::address::{WitnessProgram, WitnessVersion};
use crate::prelude::*;
+ #[test]
+ fn test_channel_state_order() {
+ use crate::ln::channel::NegotiatingFundingFlags;
+ use crate::ln::channel::AwaitingChannelReadyFlags;
+ use crate::ln::channel::ChannelReadyFlags;
+
+ assert!(ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::new()) < ChannelState::FundingNegotiated);
+ assert!(ChannelState::FundingNegotiated < ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new()));
+ assert!(ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new()) < ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new()));
+ assert!(ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new()) < ChannelState::ShutdownComplete);
+ }
+
struct TestFeeEstimator {
fee_est: u32
}
"MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
}
- #[test]
- fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
- // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
- // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
- let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
- let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
- assert!(Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::check_remote_fee(
- &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), &bounded_fee_estimator,
- u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
- }
-
struct Keys {
signer: InMemorySigner,
}
}
impl SignerProvider for Keys {
- type Signer = InMemorySigner;
+ type EcdsaSigner = InMemorySigner;
+ #[cfg(taproot)]
+ type TaprootSigner = InMemorySigner;
fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
self.signer.channel_keys_id()
}
- fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
+ fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::EcdsaSigner {
self.signer.clone()
}
- fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
+ fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::EcdsaSigner, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
- fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Result<Script, ()> {
+ fn get_destination_script(&self, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Result<ScriptBuf, ()> {
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
- let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+ let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
- Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script())
+ Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(channel_monitor_claim_key_hash).into_script())
}
fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
- let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+ let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
}
}
#[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
- PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
+ PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
}
#[test]
fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
- let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
- ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
+ let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script = ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(
+ &WitnessProgram::new(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap(),
+ ).unwrap();
let seed = [42; 32];
let network = Network::Testnet;
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
let config = UserConfig::default();
- match OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
+ match OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None) {
Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
},
let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
let config = UserConfig::default();
- let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
+ let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
// Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
// same as the old fee.
fee_est.fee_est = 500;
- let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
+ let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
}
// Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
let config = UserConfig::default();
- let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
+ let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
// Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
// Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
- let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
+ let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
// Node A --> Node B: funding created
let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
- let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
+ let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
}]};
let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
- let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
- let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
+ let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
+ let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
// Node B --> Node A: funding signed
- let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
+ let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
+ let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
// Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
htlc_id: 0,
amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
- payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
+ payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).to_byte_array()),
cltv_expiry: 300000000,
state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
});
node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
htlc_id: 1,
amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
- payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
+ payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).to_byte_array()),
cltv_expiry: 200000000,
state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
- session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
+ session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
},
skimmed_fee_msat: None,
+ blinding_point: None,
});
// Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
let config = UserConfig::default();
- let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
+ let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.get_channel_type());
let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.get_channel_type());
let seed = [42; 32];
let network = Network::Testnet;
let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
- let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
+ let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
// Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
// Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
let config = UserConfig::default();
- let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
+ let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
// Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
// Node A --> Node B: funding created
let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
- let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
+ let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
}]};
let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
- let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
- let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
+ let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
+ let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
// Node B --> Node A: funding signed
- let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
+ let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
+ let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
// Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
// Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
// Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
// which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
- let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
+ let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
// Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
- let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
+ let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
- let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
+ let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
// Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
// Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
// if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
- let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
+ let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
// Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
// (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
// than 100.
- let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
+ let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
- let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
+ let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
- let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
+ let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
let seed = [42; 32];
let network = Network::Testnet;
let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
- let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
+ let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
// Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
let config = UserConfig::default();
- let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
+ let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
// Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
// Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
- let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
+ let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
// Node A --> Node B: funding created
let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
- let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
+ let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
}]};
let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
- let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
- let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
+ let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
+ let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
// Node B --> Node A: funding signed
- let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
+ let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
+ let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
// Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
let update = ChannelUpdate {
},
signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
};
- node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
+ assert!(node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
// The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
// change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
},
None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
}
+
+ assert!(!node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn blinding_point_skimmed_fee_malformed_ser() {
+ // Ensure that channel blinding points, skimmed fees, and malformed HTLCs are (de)serialized
+ // properly.
+ let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
+ let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+ let seed = [42; 32];
+ let network = Network::Testnet;
+ let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
+ let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
+
+ let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
+ let config = UserConfig::default();
+ let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config);
+ let mut outbound_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
+ &feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None
+ ).unwrap();
+ let inbound_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
+ &feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
+ &features, &outbound_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network)), 7, &config, 0, &&logger, false
+ ).unwrap();
+ outbound_chan.accept_channel(&inbound_chan.get_accept_channel_message(), &config.channel_handshake_limits, &features).unwrap();
+ let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
+ value: 10000000, script_pubkey: outbound_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript(),
+ }]};
+ let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
+ let funding_created = outbound_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap().unwrap();
+ let mut chan = match inbound_chan.funding_created(&funding_created, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger) {
+ Ok((chan, _, _)) => chan,
+ Err((_, e)) => panic!("{}", e),
+ };
+
+ let dummy_htlc_source = HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
+ path: Path {
+ hops: vec![RouteHop {
+ pubkey: test_utils::pubkey(2), channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
+ node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(), short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0,
+ cltv_expiry_delta: 0, maybe_announced_channel: false,
+ }],
+ blinded_tail: None
+ },
+ session_priv: test_utils::privkey(42),
+ first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
+ payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
+ };
+ let dummy_outbound_output = OutboundHTLCOutput {
+ htlc_id: 0,
+ amount_msat: 0,
+ payment_hash: PaymentHash([43; 32]),
+ cltv_expiry: 0,
+ state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
+ source: dummy_htlc_source.clone(),
+ skimmed_fee_msat: None,
+ blinding_point: None,
+ };
+ let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = vec![dummy_outbound_output.clone(); 10];
+ for (idx, htlc) in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut().enumerate() {
+ if idx % 2 == 0 {
+ htlc.blinding_point = Some(test_utils::pubkey(42 + idx as u8));
+ }
+ if idx % 3 == 0 {
+ htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = Some(1);
+ }
+ }
+ chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs = pending_outbound_htlcs.clone();
+
+ let dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
+ amount_msat: 0,
+ cltv_expiry: 0,
+ payment_hash: PaymentHash([43; 32]),
+ source: dummy_htlc_source.clone(),
+ onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket {
+ version: 0,
+ public_key: Ok(test_utils::pubkey(1)),
+ hop_data: [0; 20*65],
+ hmac: [0; 32]
+ },
+ skimmed_fee_msat: None,
+ blinding_point: None,
+ };
+ let dummy_holding_cell_claim_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
+ payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage([42; 32]),
+ htlc_id: 0,
+ };
+ let dummy_holding_cell_failed_htlc = |htlc_id| HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
+ htlc_id, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: vec![42] }
+ };
+ let dummy_holding_cell_malformed_htlc = |htlc_id| HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
+ htlc_id, failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
+ };
+ let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(12);
+ for i in 0..12 {
+ if i % 5 == 0 {
+ holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc.clone());
+ } else if i % 5 == 1 {
+ holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_claim_htlc.clone());
+ } else if i % 5 == 2 {
+ let mut dummy_add = dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc.clone();
+ if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
+ ref mut blinding_point, ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, ..
+ } = &mut dummy_add {
+ *blinding_point = Some(test_utils::pubkey(42 + i));
+ *skimmed_fee_msat = Some(42);
+ } else { panic!() }
+ holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_add);
+ } else if i % 5 == 3 {
+ holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_malformed_htlc(i as u64));
+ } else {
+ holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_failed_htlc(i as u64));
+ }
+ }
+ chan.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates = holding_cell_htlc_updates.clone();
+
+ // Encode and decode the channel and ensure that the HTLCs within are the same.
+ let encoded_chan = chan.encode();
+ let mut s = crate::io::Cursor::new(&encoded_chan);
+ let mut reader = crate::util::ser::FixedLengthReader::new(&mut s, encoded_chan.len() as u64);
+ let features = channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config);
+ let decoded_chan = Channel::read(&mut reader, (&&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, 0, &features)).unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(decoded_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs, pending_outbound_htlcs);
+ assert_eq!(decoded_chan.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates, holding_cell_htlc_updates);
}
- #[cfg(feature = "_test_vectors")]
+ #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
#[test]
fn outbound_commitment_test() {
- use bitcoin::util::sighash;
+ use bitcoin::sighash;
use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
- use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
+ use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
- use crate::sign::EcdsaChannelSigner;
+ use crate::sign::{ChannelDerivationParameters, HTLCDescriptor, ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner};
use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
+ use crate::ln::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint};
use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
use crate::util::logger::Logger;
use crate::sync::Arc;
+ use core::str::FromStr;
+ use hex::DisplayHex;
// Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
- let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
+ let logger : Arc<dyn Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
&secp_ctx,
- SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
- SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
- SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
- SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
- SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
+ SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
+ SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
+ SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
+ SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
+ SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
// These aren't set in the test vectors:
[0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
);
assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
- hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
+ <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
let mut config = UserConfig::default();
config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
- let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&Keys>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
+ let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&Keys>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
- let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
+ let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_str("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
- revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
+ revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()),
payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
- delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
- htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
+ delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13")),
+ htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"))
};
chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
- hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
+ <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
- hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
+ <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
- assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
- hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
+ assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key().serialize()[..],
+ <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
// We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
// derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
// build_commitment_transaction.
let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
- let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+ let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
- let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+ let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
- log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
+ log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction).as_hex());
assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
$({
- let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+ let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
})*
&chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
);
- let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
- assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
+ let holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
- assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
+ assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
// ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
- let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
+ let mut htlc_counterparty_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.iter();
$({
log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
- let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+ let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
- let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
+ let mut htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
- assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
+ assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
if !htlc.offered {
for i in 0..5 {
- let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
+ let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).to_byte_array());
if out == htlc.payment_hash {
preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
}
assert!(preimage.is_some());
}
- let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
+ let htlc_counterparty_sig = htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
+ let htlc_holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, 0, &HTLCDescriptor {
+ channel_derivation_parameters: ChannelDerivationParameters {
+ value_satoshis: chan.context.channel_value_satoshis,
+ keys_id: chan.context.channel_keys_id,
+ transaction_parameters: chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.clone(),
+ },
+ commitment_txid: trusted_tx.txid(),
+ per_commitment_number: trusted_tx.commitment_number(),
+ per_commitment_point: trusted_tx.per_commitment_point(),
+ feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
+ htlc: htlc.clone(),
+ preimage: preimage.clone(),
+ counterparty_sig: *htlc_counterparty_sig,
+ }, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
- assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
+ assert_eq!(htlc.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
- let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
- assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
- let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
- let channel_parameters = chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
+ let signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(signature, htlc_holder_sig, "htlc sig");
let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
- log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
- assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
- hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
+ htlc_tx.input[0].witness = trusted_tx.build_htlc_input_witness($htlc_idx, htlc_counterparty_sig, &htlc_holder_sig, &preimage);
+ log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", serialize(&htlc_tx).as_hex());
+ assert_eq!(serialize(&htlc_tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
})*
- assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
+ assert!(htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().is_none());
} }
}
payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
};
- out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
+ out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
out
});
chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
};
- out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
+ out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
out
});
chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
skimmed_fee_msat: None,
+ blinding_point: None,
};
- out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
+ out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
out
});
chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
skimmed_fee_msat: None,
+ blinding_point: None,
};
- out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
+ out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
out
});
chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
};
- out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
+ out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
out
});
payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
};
- out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
+ out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
out
});
chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
skimmed_fee_msat: None,
+ blinding_point: None,
};
- out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
+ out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
out
});
chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
skimmed_fee_msat: None,
+ blinding_point: None,
};
- out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
+ out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
out
});
// Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
let mut seed = [0; 32];
- seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
+ seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
- hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
+ <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
- seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
+ seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
- hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
+ <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
- hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
+ <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
- hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
+ <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
- seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
+ seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
- hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
+ <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
}
#[test]
// Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
- let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
- let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+ let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+ let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
- assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
+ assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
- assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
-
- assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
- hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
+ assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
- SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
+ SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
- assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
- hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
+ assert_eq!(RevocationKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &RevocationBasepoint::from(base_point), &per_commitment_point).to_public_key().serialize()[..],
+ <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
- SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
+ SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
}
#[test]
let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
let config = UserConfig::default();
let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
- node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
+ node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
- let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
+ let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
&fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
&channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
- &config, 0, 42
+ &config, 0, 42, None
).unwrap();
assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
&fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
- &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
+ &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
+ None
).unwrap();
- let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
+ let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
&fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
&fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
- &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
+ &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
+ None
).unwrap();
// Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
- let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
+ let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
// Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
// B as it's not supported by LDK.
let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
&fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
- &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
+ &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
+ None
).unwrap();
- let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
+ let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
// LDK.
let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
&fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
- 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
+ 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None
).unwrap();
- let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
+ let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
&fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
let seed = [42; 32];
let network = Network::Testnet;
let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
- let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
+ let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
let mut config = UserConfig::default();
&config,
0,
42,
+ None
).unwrap();
- let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
+ let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
&feeest,
let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
let tx = Transaction {
version: 1,
- lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
+ lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
input: Vec::new(),
output: vec![
TxOut {
},
]};
let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
- let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(
- tx.clone(),
- funding_outpoint,
- true,
- &&logger,
+ let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(
+ tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, true, &&logger,
).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(
- &funding_created_msg,
+ &funding_created_msg.unwrap(),
best_block,
&&keys_provider,
&&logger,
// Receive funding_signed, but the channel will be configured to hold sending channel_ready and
// broadcasting the funding transaction until the batch is ready.
- let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(
- &funding_signed_msg,
- best_block,
- &&keys_provider,
- &&logger,
- ).unwrap();
+ let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(
+ &funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger,
+ );
+ let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
let node_a_updates = node_a_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
&&logger,
&&keys_provider,
// as the funding transaction depends on all channels in the batch becoming ready.
assert!(node_a_updates.channel_ready.is_none());
assert!(node_a_updates.funding_broadcastable.is_none());
- assert_eq!(
- node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
- ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 |
- ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32,
- );
+ assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
// It is possible to receive a 0conf channel_ready from the remote node.
node_a_chan.channel_ready(
).unwrap();
assert_eq!(
node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
- ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 |
- ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 |
- ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32,
+ ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH | AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY)
);
// Clear the ChannelState::WaitingForBatch only when called by ChannelManager.
node_a_chan.set_batch_ready();
- assert_eq!(
- node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
- ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 |
- ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32,
- );
+ assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY));
assert!(node_a_chan.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some());
}
}
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff