// licenses.
use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
-use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
-use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
-use bitcoin::util::sighash;
+use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, ScriptBuf, Builder};
+use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
+use bitcoin::sighash;
+use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
use crate::chain::BestBlock;
use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
-use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
+use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, WithChannelMonitor, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
-use crate::sign::{EcdsaChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
+use crate::sign::ecdsa::{EcdsaChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
+use crate::sign::{EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
use crate::events::ClosureReason;
use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
-use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
-use crate::util::logger::Logger;
+use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
+use crate::util::logger::{Logger, Record, WithContext};
use crate::util::errors::APIError;
use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
use crate::io;
use crate::prelude::*;
use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
+use core::convert::TryInto;
use core::ops::Deref;
#[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
use crate::sync::Mutex;
-use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
use crate::sign::type_resolver::ChannelSignerType;
+use super::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint, RevocationBasepoint};
+
#[cfg(test)]
pub struct ChannelValueStat {
pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
state: InboundHTLCState,
}
+#[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
enum OutboundHTLCState {
/// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
/// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
}
#[derive(Clone)]
+#[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
/// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
}
}
+#[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
htlc_id: u64,
amount_msat: u64,
payment_hash: PaymentHash,
state: OutboundHTLCState,
source: HTLCSource,
+ blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
}
/// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
+#[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
// always outbound
onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
// The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
+ blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
},
ClaimHTLC {
payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
}
}
+pub(super) struct WithChannelContext<'a, L: Deref> where L::Target: Logger {
+ pub logger: &'a L,
+ pub peer_id: Option<PublicKey>,
+ pub channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
+}
+
+impl<'a, L: Deref> Logger for WithChannelContext<'a, L> where L::Target: Logger {
+ fn log(&self, mut record: Record) {
+ record.peer_id = self.peer_id;
+ record.channel_id = self.channel_id;
+ self.logger.log(record)
+ }
+}
+
+impl<'a, 'b, L: Deref> WithChannelContext<'a, L>
+where L::Target: Logger {
+ pub(super) fn from<S: Deref>(logger: &'a L, context: &'b ChannelContext<S>) -> Self
+ where S::Target: SignerProvider
+ {
+ WithChannelContext {
+ logger,
+ peer_id: Some(context.counterparty_node_id),
+ channel_id: Some(context.channel_id),
+ }
+ }
+}
+
macro_rules! secp_check {
($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
match $res {
htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
- preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
+ outbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
+ inbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful received HTLCs since last commitment
}
/// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
}
+/// The return value of `signer_maybe_unblocked`
+#[allow(unused)]
+pub(super) struct SignerResumeUpdates {
+ pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
+ pub funding_signed: Option<msgs::FundingSigned>,
+ pub funding_created: Option<msgs::FundingCreated>,
+ pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
+}
+
/// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
/// An unbroadcasted batch funding transaction id. The closure of this channel should be
/// propagated to the remainder of the batch.
pub(crate) unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: Option<Txid>,
+ pub(crate) channel_id: ChannelId,
+ pub(crate) counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
}
/// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
impl<'a, SP: Deref> ChannelPhase<SP> where
SP::Target: SignerProvider,
- <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer: ChannelSigner,
+ <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner: ChannelSigner,
{
pub fn context(&'a self) -> &'a ChannelContext<SP> {
match self {
latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
- holder_signer: ChannelSignerType<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
+ holder_signer: ChannelSignerType<SP>,
shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
- destination_script: Script,
+ destination_script: ScriptBuf,
// Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
// generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
/// This flag is set in such a case. Note that we don't need to persist this as we'll end up
/// setting it again as a side-effect of [`Channel::channel_reestablish`].
signer_pending_commitment_update: bool,
+ /// Similar to [`Self::signer_pending_commitment_update`] but we're waiting to send either a
+ /// [`msgs::FundingCreated`] or [`msgs::FundingSigned`] depending on if this channel is
+ /// outbound or inbound.
+ signer_pending_funding: bool,
// pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
//
#[cfg(not(test))]
closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
+ /// If we remove an HTLC (or fee update), commit, and receive our counterparty's
+ /// `revoke_and_ack`, we remove all knowledge of said HTLC (or fee update). However, the latest
+ /// local commitment transaction that we can broadcast still contains the HTLC (or old fee)
+ /// until we receive a further `commitment_signed`. Thus we are not eligible for initiating the
+ /// `closing_signed` negotiation if we're expecting a counterparty `commitment_signed`.
+ ///
+ /// To ensure we don't send a `closing_signed` too early, we track this state here, waiting
+ /// until we see a `commitment_signed` before doing so.
+ ///
+ /// We don't bother to persist this - we anticipate this state won't last longer than a few
+ /// milliseconds, so any accidental force-closes here should be exceedingly rare.
+ expecting_peer_commitment_signed: bool,
+
/// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
- counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
+ counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ScriptBuf>,
commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
self.outbound_scid_alias
}
+ /// Returns the holder signer for this channel.
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<SP> {
+ return &self.holder_signer
+ }
+
/// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
/// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases
/// or prior to any channel actions during `Channel` initialization.
self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
}
+ /// Returns the height in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
+ pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmation_height(&self) -> Option<u32> {
+ let conf_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height;
+ if conf_height > 0 {
+ Some(conf_height)
+ } else {
+ None
+ }
+ }
+
/// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
match self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure {
MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(multiplier) => {
let feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(
- ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep);
- feerate_per_kw as u64 * multiplier
+ ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep) as u64;
+ feerate_per_kw.saturating_mul(multiplier)
},
MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(limit) => limit,
}
}
}
+ let mut inbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
+
for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
match &htlc.state {
&InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
if generated_by_local {
- if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
+ if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(preimage) = reason {
+ inbound_htlc_preimages.push(preimage);
value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
}
}
}
}
- let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
+
+ let mut outbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
};
if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
- preimages.push(preimage);
+ outbound_htlc_preimages.push(preimage);
}
if include {
htlcs_included,
local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
- preimages
+ inbound_htlc_preimages,
+ outbound_htlc_preimages,
}
}
/// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
/// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
/// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
- pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
+ pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
}
context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
};
let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
- if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 {
+ if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.try_into().unwrap_or(i64::max_value()) {
remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
Some(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
}
let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
- if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 {
+ if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.try_into().unwrap_or(i64::max_value()) {
remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
monitor_update,
dropped_outbound_htlcs,
unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid,
+ channel_id: self.channel_id,
+ counterparty_node_id: self.counterparty_node_id,
+ }
+ }
+
+ /// Only allowed after [`Self::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
+ fn get_funding_created_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::FundingCreated> where L::Target: Logger {
+ let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
+ let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
+ let signature = match &self.holder_signer {
+ // TODO (taproot|arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
+ ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
+ ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
+ .map(|(sig, _)| sig).ok()?
+ },
+ // TODO (taproot|arik)
+ #[cfg(taproot)]
+ _ => todo!()
+ };
+
+ if self.signer_pending_funding {
+ log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature ready for funding_created message: clearing signer_pending_funding");
+ self.signer_pending_funding = false;
+ }
+
+ Some(msgs::FundingCreated {
+ temporary_channel_id: self.temporary_channel_id.unwrap(),
+ funding_txid: self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().txid,
+ funding_output_index: self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().index,
+ signature,
+ #[cfg(taproot)]
+ partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
+ #[cfg(taproot)]
+ next_local_nonce: None,
+ })
+ }
+
+ /// Only allowed after [`Self::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
+ fn get_funding_signed_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (CommitmentTransaction, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>) where L::Target: Logger {
+ let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
+ let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
+
+ let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
+ let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
+ log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
+ &self.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
+
+ match &self.holder_signer {
+ // TODO (arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
+ ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
+ let funding_signed = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
+ .map(|(signature, _)| msgs::FundingSigned {
+ channel_id: self.channel_id(),
+ signature,
+ #[cfg(taproot)]
+ partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
+ })
+ .ok();
+
+ if funding_signed.is_none() {
+ log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature not available for funding_signed message; setting signer_pending_funding");
+ self.signer_pending_funding = true;
+ } else if self.signer_pending_funding {
+ log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature available for funding_signed message; clearing signer_pending_funding");
+ self.signer_pending_funding = false;
+ }
+
+ // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
+ (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed)
+ },
+ // TODO (taproot|arik)
+ #[cfg(taproot)]
+ _ => todo!()
}
}
}
impl<SP: Deref> Channel<SP> where
SP::Target: SignerProvider,
- <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner
+ <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner
{
fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
channel_type: &ChannelTypeFeatures, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L
) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
{
- // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
- // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
- // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
- // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust. This doesn't
- // apply to channels supporting anchor outputs since HTLC transactions are pre-signed with a
- // zero fee, so their fee is no longer considered to determine dust limits.
- if !channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
- let upper_limit =
- fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MaxAllowedNonAnchorChannelRemoteFee) as u64;
- if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
- }
- }
-
let lower_limit_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedAnchorChannelRemoteFee
} else {
}
#[inline]
- fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
+ fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
// The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
// is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
// outside of those situations will fail.
let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
- debug_assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner()));
+ debug_assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).to_byte_array()));
log_debug!(logger, "Claiming inbound HTLC id {} with payment hash {} with preimage {}",
htlc.htlc_id, htlc.payment_hash, payment_preimage_arg);
match htlc.state {
/// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(
&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
- ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, ChannelError>
+ ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>, ChannelError>
where
L::Target: Logger
{
funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
obscure_factor,
holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
-
+ let logger_with_chan_monitor = WithChannelMonitor::from(logger, &channel_monitor);
channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(),
self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
- counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
+ counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), &&logger_with_chan_monitor);
assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
if self.context.is_batch_funding() {
let outcome = match check_preimage {
None => fail_reason.into(),
Some(payment_preimage) => {
- let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
+ let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
}
let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
- log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
+ log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), &self.context.channel_id());
- if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
+ if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()) {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
}
if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
);
- self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
+ self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.outbound_htlc_preimages)
.map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
// Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
};
self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
+ self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = false;
// Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
// build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
match &htlc_update {
&HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
- skimmed_fee_msat, ..
+ skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, ..
} => {
- match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(),
- onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
- {
+ match self.send_htlc(
+ amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(),
+ false, skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, fee_estimator, logger
+ ) {
Ok(_) => update_add_count += 1,
Err(e) => {
match e {
self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
&secret
).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
- }
+ },
+ // TODO (taproot|arik)
+ #[cfg(taproot)]
+ _ => todo!()
};
self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
// Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
+ let expecting_peer_commitment_signed = &mut self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed;
// We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
}
+ *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
false
} else { true }
});
if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
+ *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
}
if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
+ self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
},
FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
}
Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&self.context.channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
- let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
- // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
- // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
- // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
- if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
+ // Check that we won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
+ if !self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
Ok(())
}
+ /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're
+ /// blocked.
+ #[allow(unused)]
+ pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> SignerResumeUpdates where L::Target: Logger {
+ let commitment_update = if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
+ self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
+ } else { None };
+ let funding_signed = if self.context.signer_pending_funding && !self.context.is_outbound() {
+ self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger).1
+ } else { None };
+ let channel_ready = if funding_signed.is_some() {
+ self.check_get_channel_ready(0)
+ } else { None };
+ let funding_created = if self.context.signer_pending_funding && self.context.is_outbound() {
+ self.context.get_funding_created_msg(logger)
+ } else { None };
+
+ log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked with {} commitment_update, {} funding_signed, {} funding_created, and {} channel_ready",
+ if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
+ if funding_signed.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
+ if funding_created.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
+ if channel_ready.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" });
+
+ SignerResumeUpdates {
+ commitment_update,
+ funding_signed,
+ funding_created,
+ channel_ready,
+ }
+ }
+
fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
+ blinding_point: htlc.blinding_point,
});
}
}
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_owned()));
}
+ let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
}
- if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
+ if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > our_commitment_transaction {
macro_rules! log_and_panic {
($err_msg: expr) => {
log_error!(logger, $err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
// Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
// commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
- let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
- if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
- return Err(
- ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
- );
+ if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!(
+ "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
+ msg.next_remote_commitment_number,
+ our_commitment_transaction
+ )));
}
// Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
});
}
- let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
+ let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number == our_commitment_transaction {
// Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
// Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
None
- } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
+ } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == our_commitment_transaction {
if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
None
Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
}
} else {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
+ debug_assert!(false, "All values should have been handled in the four cases above");
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
+ "Peer attempted to reestablish channel expecting a future local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
+ msg.next_remote_commitment_number,
+ our_commitment_transaction
+ )));
};
// We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
})
}
+ } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number < next_counterparty_commitment_number {
+ Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
+ "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
+ msg.next_local_commitment_number,
+ next_counterparty_commitment_number,
+ )))
} else {
- Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
+ Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
+ "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a future remote commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
+ msg.next_local_commitment_number,
+ next_counterparty_commitment_number,
+ )))
}
}
-> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
{
+ // If we're waiting on a monitor persistence, that implies we're also waiting to send some
+ // message to our counterparty (probably a `revoke_and_ack`). In such a case, we shouldn't
+ // initiate `closing_signed` negotiation until we're clear of all pending messages. Note
+ // that closing_negotiation_ready checks this case (as well as a few others).
if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
return Ok((None, None, None));
}
return Ok((None, None, None));
}
+ // If we're waiting on a counterparty `commitment_signed` to clear some updates from our
+ // local commitment transaction, we can't yet initiate `closing_signed` negotiation.
+ if self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed {
+ return Ok((None, None, None));
+ }
+
let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
}),
}), None, None))
- }
+ },
+ // TODO (taproot|arik)
+ #[cfg(taproot)]
+ _ => todo!()
}
}
assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
- return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
+ return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
}
if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
- return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
+ return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
}
} else {
self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
monitor_update: None,
dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
+ channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
+ counterparty_node_id: self.context.counterparty_node_id,
};
let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
monitor_update: None,
dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
+ channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
+ counterparty_node_id: self.context.counterparty_node_id,
};
self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
}),
}), signed_tx, shutdown_result))
- }
+ },
+ // TODO (taproot|arik)
+ #[cfg(taproot)]
+ _ => todo!()
}
}
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
- pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> {
+ pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<SP> {
&self.context.holder_signer
}
return None;
}
+ // If we're still pending the signature on a funding transaction, then we're not ready to send a
+ // channel_ready yet.
+ if self.context.signer_pending_funding {
+ return None;
+ }
+
// Note that we don't include ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as we don't want to send
// channel_ready until the entire batch is ready.
let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
node_signature: our_node_sig,
bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
})
- }
+ },
+ // TODO (taproot|arik)
+ #[cfg(taproot)]
+ _ => todo!()
}
}
bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
contents: announcement,
})
- }
+ },
+ // TODO (taproot|arik)
+ #[cfg(taproot)]
+ _ => todo!()
}
} else {
Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
pub fn queue_add_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
- fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
+ blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
{
self
.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
- skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
+ skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, fee_estimator, logger)
.map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
.map_err(|err| {
if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
fn send_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
- skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
+ skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
+ fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError>
where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
{
source,
onion_routing_packet,
skimmed_fee_msat,
+ blinding_point,
});
return Ok(None);
}
cltv_expiry,
state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
source,
+ blinding_point,
skimmed_fee_msat,
});
cltv_expiry,
onion_routing_packet,
skimmed_fee_msat,
+ blinding_point,
};
self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
htlcs.push(htlc);
}
- let res = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.context.secp_ctx)
- .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
+ let res = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(
+ &commitment_stats.tx,
+ commitment_stats.inbound_htlc_preimages,
+ commitment_stats.outbound_htlc_preimages,
+ &self.context.secp_ctx,
+ ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
signature = res.0;
htlc_signatures = res.1;
log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
- log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
+ log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
}
}
#[cfg(taproot)]
partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
}, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
- }
+ },
+ // TODO (taproot|arik)
+ #[cfg(taproot)]
+ _ => todo!()
}
}
where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
{
let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
- onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger);
+ onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, None, fee_estimator, logger);
if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
match send_res? {
Some(_) => {
monitor_update: None,
dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
+ channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
+ counterparty_node_id: self.context.counterparty_node_id,
};
self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
Some(shutdown_result)
pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
- outbound_scid_alias: u64
+ outbound_scid_alias: u64, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>
) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<SP>, APIError>
where ES::Target: EntropySource,
F::Target: FeeEstimator
}
}
- let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
+ let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) {
Ok(script) => script,
Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
};
- let temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(entropy_source);
+ let temporary_channel_id = temporary_channel_id.unwrap_or_else(|| ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(entropy_source));
Ok(Self {
context: ChannelContext {
monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
+ signer_pending_funding: false,
#[cfg(debug_assertions)]
holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
last_sent_closing_fee: None,
pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
+ expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
closing_fee_limits: None,
target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
})
}
- /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
- fn get_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
- let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
- let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
- match &self.context.holder_signer {
- // TODO (taproot|arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
- ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
- Ok(ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
- .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
- }
- }
- }
-
/// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
/// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
/// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
/// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
/// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
pub fn get_funding_created<L: Deref>(mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, is_batch_funding: bool, logger: &L)
- -> Result<(Channel<SP>, msgs::FundingCreated), (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
+ -> Result<(Channel<SP>, Option<msgs::FundingCreated>), (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
if !self.context.is_outbound() {
panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
}
self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
- let signature = match self.get_funding_created_signature(logger) {
- Ok(res) => res,
- Err(e) => {
- log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
- self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
- return Err((self, e));
- }
- };
-
- let temporary_channel_id = self.context.channel_id;
-
// Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
self.context.is_batch_funding = Some(()).filter(|_| is_batch_funding);
+ let funding_created = self.context.get_funding_created_msg(logger);
+ if funding_created.is_none() {
+ if !self.context.signer_pending_funding {
+ log_trace!(logger, "funding_created awaiting signer; setting signer_pending_funding");
+ self.context.signer_pending_funding = true;
+ }
+ }
+
let channel = Channel {
context: self.context,
};
- Ok((channel, msgs::FundingCreated {
- temporary_channel_id,
- funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
- funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
- signature,
- #[cfg(taproot)]
- partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
- #[cfg(taproot)]
- next_local_nonce: None,
- }))
+ Ok((channel, funding_created))
}
fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
- revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
+ revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
payment_point: keys.payment_point,
- delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
- htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
+ delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
+ htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
first_per_commitment_point,
channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
- revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
+ revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.revocation_basepoint),
payment_point: msg.payment_point,
- delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
- htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
+ delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.delayed_payment_basepoint),
+ htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.htlc_basepoint)
};
self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
F::Target: FeeEstimator,
L::Target: Logger,
{
+ let logger = WithContext::from(logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.temporary_channel_id));
let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
// First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
- revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
+ revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.revocation_basepoint),
payment_point: msg.payment_point,
- delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
- htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
+ delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.delayed_payment_basepoint),
+ htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.htlc_basepoint)
};
if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
}
- Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
+ Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, &&logger)?;
let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
}
}
- let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
+ let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) {
Ok(script) => script,
Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
};
monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
+ signer_pending_funding: false,
#[cfg(debug_assertions)]
holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
last_sent_closing_fee: None,
pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
+ expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
closing_fee_limits: None,
target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
- revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
+ revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
payment_point: keys.payment_point,
- delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
- htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
+ delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
+ htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
first_per_commitment_point,
shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
self.generate_accept_channel_message()
}
- fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(CommitmentTransaction, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
+ fn check_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<CommitmentTransaction, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
- {
- let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
- let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
- let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
- // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
- log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
- log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
- encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
- encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
- secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
- }
+ let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
+ let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
+ let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
+ // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
+ log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
+ log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
+ encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
+ encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
+ secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
- let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
- let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
-
- let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
- let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
- log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
- &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
-
- match &self.context.holder_signer {
- // TODO (arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
- ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
- let counterparty_signature = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
- .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
-
- // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
- Ok((counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
- }
- }
+ Ok(initial_commitment_tx)
}
pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(
mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
- ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>), (Self, ChannelError)>
+ ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>), (Self, ChannelError)>
where
L::Target: Logger
{
let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
// This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
- // funding_created_signature may fail.
+ // check_funding_created_signature may fail.
self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
- let (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
+ let initial_commitment_tx = match self.check_funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
Ok(res) => res,
Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
Err(e) => {
// The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
// to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
- panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
+ panic!("unexpected error type from check_funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
}
};
// Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
+ self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
+ self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
+ self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
+ self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
+
+ let (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed) = self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger);
+
let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
obscure_factor,
holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
-
+ let logger_with_chan_monitor = WithChannelMonitor::from(logger, &channel_monitor);
channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust().txid(), Vec::new(),
- self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
+ self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), self.context.feerate_per_kw,
counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
- counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
+ counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), &&logger_with_chan_monitor);
- self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
- self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
- self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
- self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
-
- log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
+ log_info!(logger, "{} funding_signed for peer for channel {}",
+ if funding_signed.is_some() { "Generated" } else { "Waiting for signature on" }, &self.context.channel_id());
// Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
// `ChannelMonitor`.
let mut channel = Channel {
context: self.context,
};
- let channel_id = channel.context.channel_id.clone();
let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
- Ok((channel, msgs::FundingSigned {
- channel_id,
- signature,
- #[cfg(taproot)]
- partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
- }, channel_monitor))
+ Ok((channel, funding_signed, channel_monitor))
}
}
const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
-const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
+const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
(0, FailRelay),
self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
- let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
- // TODO (taproot|arik): Introduce serialization distinction for non-ECDSA signers.
- self.context.holder_signer.as_ecdsa().expect("Only ECDSA signers may be serialized").write(&mut key_data)?;
- assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
- assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
- (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
- writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
-
// Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
// deserialized from that format.
match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
+ let mut pending_outbound_blinding_points: Vec<Option<PublicKey>> = Vec::new();
(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
} else if !pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None);
}
+ pending_outbound_blinding_points.push(htlc.blinding_point);
}
let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
+ let mut holding_cell_blinding_points: Vec<Option<PublicKey>> = Vec::new();
(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
for (idx, update) in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().enumerate() {
match update {
&HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
- skimmed_fee_msat,
+ blinding_point, skimmed_fee_msat,
} => {
0u8.write(writer)?;
amount_msat.write(writer)?;
}
holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
} else if !holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
+
+ holding_cell_blinding_points.push(blinding_point);
},
&HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
1u8.write(writer)?;
(35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
(37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
(38, self.context.is_batch_funding, option),
+ (39, pending_outbound_blinding_points, optional_vec),
+ (41, holding_cell_blinding_points, optional_vec),
});
Ok(())
_ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
},
skimmed_fee_msat: None,
+ blinding_point: None,
});
}
source: Readable::read(reader)?,
onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
skimmed_fee_msat: None,
+ blinding_point: None,
},
1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
let mut is_batch_funding: Option<()> = None;
+ let mut pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PublicKey>>> = None;
+ let mut holding_cell_blinding_points_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PublicKey>>> = None;
+
read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
(0, announcement_sigs, option),
(1, minimum_depth, option),
(35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
(37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
(38, is_batch_funding, option),
+ (39, pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt, optional_vec),
+ (41, holding_cell_blinding_points_opt, optional_vec),
});
let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
// We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
}
+ if let Some(blinding_pts) = pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt {
+ let mut iter = blinding_pts.into_iter();
+ for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
+ htlc.blinding_point = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
+ }
+ // We expect all blinding points to be consumed above
+ if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
+ }
+ if let Some(blinding_pts) = holding_cell_blinding_points_opt {
+ let mut iter = blinding_pts.into_iter();
+ for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
+ if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut blinding_point, .. } = htlc {
+ *blinding_point = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
+ }
+ }
+ // We expect all blinding points to be consumed above
+ if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
+ }
Ok(Channel {
context: ChannelContext {
monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
+ signer_pending_funding: false,
pending_update_fee,
holding_cell_update_fee,
last_sent_closing_fee: None,
pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
+ expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
closing_fee_limits: None,
target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
mod tests {
use std::cmp;
use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
- use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
+ use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{ScriptBuf, Builder};
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
- use hex;
- use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
+ use crate::ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
+ use crate::ln::channel_keys::{RevocationKey, RevocationBasepoint};
use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
- use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelState, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, commit_tx_fee_msat};
+ use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelState, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK, commit_tx_fee_msat};
use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
- use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
+ use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, NodeFeatures};
+ use crate::ln::msgs;
use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
- use crate::ln::chan_utils;
- use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
+ use crate::ln::chan_utils::{self, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
use crate::chain::BestBlock;
use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
- use crate::routing::router::Path;
+ use crate::routing::router::{Path, RouteHop};
use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
use crate::util::errors::APIError;
+ use crate::util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
use crate::util::test_utils;
use crate::util::test_utils::{OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey, TestKeysInterface};
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
+ use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
- use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
- use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
+ use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
+ use bitcoin::address::{WitnessProgram, WitnessVersion};
use crate::prelude::*;
struct TestFeeEstimator {
"MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
}
- #[test]
- fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
- // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
- // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
- let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
- let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
- assert!(Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::check_remote_fee(
- &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), &bounded_fee_estimator,
- u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
- }
-
struct Keys {
signer: InMemorySigner,
}
}
impl SignerProvider for Keys {
- type Signer = InMemorySigner;
+ type EcdsaSigner = InMemorySigner;
+ #[cfg(taproot)]
+ type TaprootSigner = InMemorySigner;
fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
self.signer.channel_keys_id()
}
- fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
+ fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::EcdsaSigner {
self.signer.clone()
}
- fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
+ fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::EcdsaSigner, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
- fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Result<Script, ()> {
+ fn get_destination_script(&self, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Result<ScriptBuf, ()> {
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
- let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+ let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
- Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script())
+ Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(channel_monitor_claim_key_hash).into_script())
}
fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
- let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+ let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
}
}
#[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
- PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
+ PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
}
#[test]
fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
- let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
- ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
+ let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script = ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(
+ &WitnessProgram::new(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap(),
+ ).unwrap();
let seed = [42; 32];
let network = Network::Testnet;
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
let config = UserConfig::default();
- match OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
+ match OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None) {
Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
},
let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
let config = UserConfig::default();
- let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
+ let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
// Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
// same as the old fee.
// Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
let config = UserConfig::default();
- let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
+ let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
// Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
// Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
// Node A --> Node B: funding created
let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
- let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
+ let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
}]};
let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
- let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
+ let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
// Node B --> Node A: funding signed
- let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
+ let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
// Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
htlc_id: 0,
amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
- payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
+ payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).to_byte_array()),
cltv_expiry: 300000000,
state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
});
node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
htlc_id: 1,
amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
- payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
+ payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).to_byte_array()),
cltv_expiry: 200000000,
state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
- session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
+ session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
},
skimmed_fee_msat: None,
+ blinding_point: None,
});
// Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
let config = UserConfig::default();
- let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
+ let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.get_channel_type());
let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.get_channel_type());
// Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
let config = UserConfig::default();
- let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
+ let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
// Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
// Node A --> Node B: funding created
let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
- let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
+ let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
}]};
let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
- let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
+ let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
// Node B --> Node A: funding signed
- let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
+ let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
// Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
// Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
// Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
// which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
- let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
+ let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
// Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
- let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
+ let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
// Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
// if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
- let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
+ let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
// Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
// (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
// than 100.
- let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
+ let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
- let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
+ let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
// Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
let config = UserConfig::default();
- let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
+ let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
// Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
// Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
// Node A --> Node B: funding created
let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
- let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
+ let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
}]};
let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
- let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
+ let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
// Node B --> Node A: funding signed
- let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
+ let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
// Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
let update = ChannelUpdate {
assert!(!node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
}
+ #[test]
+ fn blinding_point_ser() {
+ // Ensure that channel blinding points are (de)serialized properly.
+ let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+ let seed = [42; 32];
+ let network = Network::Testnet;
+ let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
+
+ let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
+ let config = UserConfig::default();
+ let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config);
+ let outbound_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
+ let mut chan = Channel { context: outbound_chan.context };
+
+ let dummy_htlc_source = HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
+ path: Path {
+ hops: vec![RouteHop {
+ pubkey: test_utils::pubkey(2), channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
+ node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(), short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0,
+ cltv_expiry_delta: 0, maybe_announced_channel: false,
+ }],
+ blinded_tail: None
+ },
+ session_priv: test_utils::privkey(42),
+ first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
+ payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
+ };
+ let dummy_outbound_output = OutboundHTLCOutput {
+ htlc_id: 0,
+ amount_msat: 0,
+ payment_hash: PaymentHash([43; 32]),
+ cltv_expiry: 0,
+ state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
+ source: dummy_htlc_source.clone(),
+ skimmed_fee_msat: None,
+ blinding_point: None,
+ };
+ let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = vec![dummy_outbound_output.clone(); 10];
+ for (idx, htlc) in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut().enumerate() {
+ if idx % 2 == 0 {
+ htlc.blinding_point = Some(test_utils::pubkey(42 + idx as u8));
+ }
+ }
+ chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs = pending_outbound_htlcs.clone();
+
+ let dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
+ amount_msat: 0,
+ cltv_expiry: 0,
+ payment_hash: PaymentHash([43; 32]),
+ source: dummy_htlc_source.clone(),
+ onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket {
+ version: 0,
+ public_key: Ok(test_utils::pubkey(1)),
+ hop_data: [0; 20*65],
+ hmac: [0; 32]
+ },
+ skimmed_fee_msat: None,
+ blinding_point: None,
+ };
+ let dummy_holding_cell_claim_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
+ payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage([42; 32]),
+ htlc_id: 0,
+ };
+ let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(10);
+ for i in 0..10 {
+ if i % 3 == 0 {
+ holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc.clone());
+ } else if i % 3 == 1 {
+ holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_claim_htlc.clone());
+ } else {
+ let mut dummy_add = dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc.clone();
+ if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut blinding_point, .. } = &mut dummy_add {
+ *blinding_point = Some(test_utils::pubkey(42 + i));
+ } else { panic!() }
+ holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_add);
+ }
+ }
+ chan.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates = holding_cell_htlc_updates.clone();
+
+ // Encode and decode the channel and ensure that the HTLCs within are the same.
+ let encoded_chan = chan.encode();
+ let mut s = crate::io::Cursor::new(&encoded_chan);
+ let mut reader = crate::util::ser::FixedLengthReader::new(&mut s, encoded_chan.len() as u64);
+ let features = channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config);
+ let decoded_chan = Channel::read(&mut reader, (&&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, 0, &features)).unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(decoded_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs, pending_outbound_htlcs);
+ assert_eq!(decoded_chan.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates, holding_cell_htlc_updates);
+ }
+
#[cfg(feature = "_test_vectors")]
#[test]
fn outbound_commitment_test() {
- use bitcoin::util::sighash;
+ use bitcoin::sighash;
use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
- use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
+ use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
- use crate::sign::{ChannelDerivationParameters, HTLCDescriptor, EcdsaChannelSigner};
+ use crate::sign::{ChannelDerivationParameters, HTLCDescriptor, ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner};
use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
+ use crate::ln::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint};
use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
use crate::util::logger::Logger;
use crate::sync::Arc;
+ use core::str::FromStr;
+ use hex::DisplayHex;
// Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
&secp_ctx,
- SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
- SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
- SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
- SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
- SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
+ SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
+ SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
+ SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
+ SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
+ SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
// These aren't set in the test vectors:
[0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
);
assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
- hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
+ <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
let mut config = UserConfig::default();
config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
- let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&Keys>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
+ let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&Keys>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
- let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
+ let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_str("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
- revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
+ revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()),
payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
- delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
- htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
+ delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13")),
+ htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"))
};
chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
- hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
+ <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
- hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
+ <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
- assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
- hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
+ assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key().serialize()[..],
+ <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
// We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
// derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
// build_commitment_transaction.
let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
- let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+ let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
- let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+ let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
- log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
+ log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction).as_hex());
assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
$({
- let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+ let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
})*
chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
);
let holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
- assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
+ assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
- assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
+ assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
// ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
let mut htlc_counterparty_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.iter();
$({
log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
- let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+ let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
let mut htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
- assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
+ assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
if !htlc.offered {
for i in 0..5 {
- let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
+ let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).to_byte_array());
if out == htlc.payment_hash {
preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
}
let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
assert_eq!(htlc.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
- let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+ let signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
assert_eq!(signature, htlc_holder_sig, "htlc sig");
let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
htlc_tx.input[0].witness = trusted_tx.build_htlc_input_witness($htlc_idx, htlc_counterparty_sig, &htlc_holder_sig, &preimage);
- log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&htlc_tx)));
- assert_eq!(serialize(&htlc_tx)[..], hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
+ log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", serialize(&htlc_tx).as_hex());
+ assert_eq!(serialize(&htlc_tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
})*
assert!(htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().is_none());
} }
payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
};
- out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
+ out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
out
});
chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
};
- out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
+ out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
out
});
chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
skimmed_fee_msat: None,
+ blinding_point: None,
};
- out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
+ out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
out
});
chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
skimmed_fee_msat: None,
+ blinding_point: None,
};
- out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
+ out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
out
});
chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
};
- out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
+ out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
out
});
payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
};
- out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
+ out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
out
});
chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
skimmed_fee_msat: None,
+ blinding_point: None,
};
- out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
+ out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
out
});
chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
skimmed_fee_msat: None,
+ blinding_point: None,
};
- out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
+ out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
out
});
// Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
let mut seed = [0; 32];
- seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
+ seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
- hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
+ <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
- seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
+ seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
- hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
+ <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
- hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
+ <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
- hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
+ <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
- seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
+ seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
- hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
+ <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
}
#[test]
// Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
- let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
- let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+ let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+ let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
- assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
+ assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
- assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
-
- assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
- hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
+ assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
- SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
+ SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
- assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
- hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
+ assert_eq!(RevocationKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &RevocationBasepoint::from(base_point), &per_commitment_point).to_public_key().serialize()[..],
+ <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
- SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
+ SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
}
#[test]
let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
let config = UserConfig::default();
let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
- node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
+ node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
&fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
&channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
- &config, 0, 42
+ &config, 0, 42, None
).unwrap();
assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
&fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
- &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
+ &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
+ None
).unwrap();
let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
&fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
- &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
+ &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
+ None
).unwrap();
// Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
// B as it's not supported by LDK.
let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
&fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
- &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
+ &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
+ None
).unwrap();
let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
// LDK.
let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
&fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
- 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
+ 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None
).unwrap();
let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
&config,
0,
42,
+ None
).unwrap();
let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
let tx = Transaction {
version: 1,
- lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
+ lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
input: Vec::new(),
output: vec
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff