// You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
// licenses.
-use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn, TxOut, Transaction, SigHashType};
use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
use bitcoin::util::bip143;
use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
-use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
+use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
+use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
use bitcoin::secp256k1;
+use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures};
use ln::msgs;
use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
-use ln::channelmanager::{PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailReason, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
-use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, HolderCommitmentTransaction, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, PreCalculatedTxCreationKeys};
+use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailReason, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
+use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor};
use ln::chan_utils;
use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER};
use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
-use chain::keysinterface::{ChannelKeys, KeysInterface};
+use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface};
use util::transaction_utils;
-use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable, Writer};
+use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
use util::logger::Logger;
use util::errors::APIError;
use util::config::{UserConfig,ChannelConfig};
+use util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
-use std;
-use std::default::Default;
-use std::{cmp,mem,fmt};
-use std::ops::Deref;
+use prelude::*;
+use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
+use core::ops::Deref;
+#[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
+use std::sync::Mutex;
use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
+use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0;
#[cfg(test)]
pub struct ChannelValueStat {
/// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
/// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
/// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
+ ///
/// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
/// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
/// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
/// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
/// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
- /// ChannelMonitor::would_broadcast_at_height) so we actually remove the HTLC from our own
- /// local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
- /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info will not include this HTLC.
+ /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
+ /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
+ /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
}
const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
-const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
-
-/// Liveness is called to fluctuate given peer disconnecton/monitor failures/closing.
-/// If channel is public, network should have a liveness view announced by us on a
-/// best-effort, which means we may filter out some status transitions to avoid spam.
-/// See further timer_chan_freshness_every_min.
-#[derive(PartialEq)]
-enum UpdateStatus {
- /// Status has been gossiped.
- Fresh,
- /// Status has been changed.
- DisabledMarked,
- /// Status has been marked to be gossiped at next flush
+pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
+
+/// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
+/// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
+/// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
+/// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
+/// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
+#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
+pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
+ /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
+ Enabled,
+ /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
DisabledStaged,
+ /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
+ EnabledStaged,
+ /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
+ Disabled,
+}
+
+/// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
+enum HTLCInitiator {
+ LocalOffered,
+ RemoteOffered,
+}
+
+/// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
+struct HTLCCandidate {
+ amount_msat: u64,
+ origin: HTLCInitiator,
+}
+
+impl HTLCCandidate {
+ fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
+ Self {
+ amount_msat,
+ origin,
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
+pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
+ /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
+ pub fee_base_msat: u32,
+ /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
+ pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
+ /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
+ /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
+ /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
+ pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
}
// TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
//
// Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client.
// Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
-pub(super) struct Channel<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
+pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: Sign> {
config: ChannelConfig,
user_id: u64,
channel_id: [u8; 32],
channel_state: u32,
- channel_outbound: bool,
secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
channel_value_satoshis: u64,
latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
- #[cfg(not(test))]
- holder_keys: ChanSigner,
- #[cfg(test)]
- pub(super) holder_keys: ChanSigner,
+ holder_signer: Signer,
shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
destination_script: Script,
last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u32, u64, Signature)>, // (feerate, fee, holder_sig)
- funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
-
- /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction reached our CONF_TARGET. We use this
- /// to detect unconfirmation after a serialize-unserialize roundtrip where we may not see a full
- /// series of block_connected/block_disconnected calls. Obviously this is not a guarantee as we
- /// could miss the funding_tx_confirmed_in block as well, but it serves as a useful fallback.
+ /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
+ funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
- /// Used to deduplicate block_connected callbacks, also used to verify consistency during
- /// ChannelManager deserialization (hence pub(super))
- pub(super) last_block_connected: BlockHash,
- funding_tx_confirmations: u64,
counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
#[cfg(test)]
// get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sats: u64): u64
counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
- counterparty_selected_contest_delay: u16,
- holder_selected_contest_delay: u16,
#[cfg(test)]
pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
#[cfg(not(test))]
//implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
minimum_depth: u32,
- counterparty_pubkeys: Option<ChannelPublicKeys>,
+ counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
- counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
+ pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
+ funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
+ counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
- network_sync: UpdateStatus,
+ channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
+
+ /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
+ /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
+ announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
+
+ // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
+ // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
+ // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
+ // `build_commitment_transaction`.
+ #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
+ next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
+ #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
+ next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
+
+ /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
+ /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
+ /// funding_locked *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
+ /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the funding_locked
+ /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
+ ///
+ /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
+ pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::FundingLocked>,
+}
+
+#[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
+struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
+ fee: u64,
+ total_pending_htlcs: usize,
+ next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
+ next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
+ feerate: u32,
}
pub const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50; //TODO
-/// Confirmation count threshold at which we close a channel. Ideally we'd keep the channel around
-/// on ice until the funding transaction gets more confirmations, but the LN protocol doesn't
-/// really allow for this, so instead we're stuck closing it out at that point.
-const UNCONF_THRESHOLD: u32 = 6;
const SPENDING_INPUT_FOR_A_OUTPUT_WEIGHT: u64 = 79; // prevout: 36, nSequence: 4, script len: 1, witness lengths: (3+1)/4, sig: 73/4, if-selector: 1, redeemScript: (6 ops + 2*33 pubkeys + 1*2 delay)/4
-const B_OUTPUT_PLUS_SPENDING_INPUT_WEIGHT: u64 = 104; // prevout: 40, nSequence: 4, script len: 1, witness lengths: 3/4, sig: 73/4, pubkey: 33/4, output: 31 (TODO: Wrong? Useless?)
#[cfg(not(test))]
const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
/// it's 2^24.
pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1 << 24;
+/// Maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed. 2 * standard dust threshold on p2wsh output
+/// Scales up on Bitcoin Core's proceeding policy with dust outputs. A typical p2wsh output is 43
+/// bytes to which Core's `GetDustThreshold()` sums up a minimal spend of 67 bytes (even if
+/// a p2wsh witnessScript might be *effectively* smaller), `dustRelayFee` is set to 3000sat/kb, thus
+/// 110 * 3000 / 1000 = 330. Per-protocol rules, all time-sensitive outputs are p2wsh, a value of
+/// 330 sats is the lower bound desired to ensure good propagation of transactions. We give a bit
+/// of margin to our counterparty and pick up 660 satoshis as an accepted `dust_limit_satoshis`
+/// upper bound to avoid negotiation conflicts with other implementations.
+pub const MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 2 * 330;
+
+/// A typical p2wsh output is 43 bytes to which Core's `GetDustThreshold()` sums up a minimal
+/// spend of 67 bytes (even if a p2wsh witnessScript might be *effectively* smaller), `dustRelayFee`
+/// is set to 3000sat/kb, thus 110 * 3000 / 1000 = 330. Per-protocol rules, all time-sensitive outputs
+/// are p2wsh, a value of 330 sats is the lower bound desired to ensure good propagation of transactions.
+pub const MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 330;
+
/// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
/// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
/// channel_id in ChannelManager.
};
}
-impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> Channel<ChanSigner> {
+impl<Signer: Sign> Channel<Signer> {
// Convert constants + channel value to limits:
fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
channel_value_satoshis * 1000 / 10 //TODO
cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000)) //TODO
}
- fn derive_holder_dust_limit_satoshis(at_open_background_feerate: u32) -> u64 {
- cmp::max(at_open_background_feerate as u64 * B_OUTPUT_PLUS_SPENDING_INPUT_WEIGHT / 1000, 546) //TODO
- }
-
// Constructors:
- pub fn new_outbound<K: Deref, F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel<ChanSigner>, APIError>
- where K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
+ pub fn new_outbound<K: Deref, F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
+ where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
F::Target: FeeEstimator,
{
let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay;
- let chan_keys = keys_provider.get_channel_keys(false, channel_value_satoshis);
+ let holder_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(false, channel_value_satoshis);
+ let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
if channel_value_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, channel_value_satoshis)});
if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
}
- let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
- if Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis) < Channel::<ChanSigner>::derive_holder_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate) {
- return Err(APIError::FeeRateTooHigh{err: format!("Not enough reserve above dust limit can be found at current fee rate({})", background_feerate), feerate: background_feerate});
+ let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis);
+ if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
+ return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
}
let feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
+ let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+ secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
+
Ok(Channel {
user_id,
config: config.channel_options.clone(),
channel_id: keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes(),
channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
- channel_outbound: true,
- secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
+ secp_ctx,
channel_value_satoshis,
latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
- holder_keys: chan_keys,
+ holder_signer,
shutdown_pubkey: keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(),
destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
last_sent_closing_fee: None,
- funding_txo: None,
funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
+ funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
short_channel_id: None,
- last_block_connected: Default::default(),
- funding_tx_confirmations: 0,
feerate_per_kw: feerate,
counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
- holder_dust_limit_satoshis: Channel::<ChanSigner>::derive_holder_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate),
+ holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: 0,
counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
- counterparty_selected_contest_delay: 0,
- holder_selected_contest_delay,
counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
minimum_depth: 0, // Filled in in accept_channel
- counterparty_pubkeys: None,
- counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
+ counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
+
+ channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
+ holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
+ holder_selected_contest_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
+ is_outbound_from_holder: true,
+ counterparty_parameters: None,
+ funding_outpoint: None
+ },
+ funding_transaction: None,
+ counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
counterparty_node_id,
commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
- network_sync: UpdateStatus::Fresh,
+ channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
+
+ announcement_sigs: None,
+
+ #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
+ next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
+ #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
+ next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
+
+ workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
})
}
/// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
/// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
- pub fn new_from_req<K: Deref, F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel<ChanSigner>, ChannelError>
- where K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
+ pub fn new_from_req<K: Deref, F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
+ where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
F::Target: FeeEstimator
{
- let mut chan_keys = keys_provider.get_channel_keys(true, msg.funding_satoshis);
+ let holder_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(true, msg.funding_satoshis);
+ let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
};
- chan_keys.on_accept(&counterparty_pubkeys, msg.to_self_delay, config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay);
let mut local_config = (*config).channel_options.clone();
if config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
}
- Channel::<ChanSigner>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
+ Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
}
- if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > 483 {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than 483", msg.max_accepted_htlcs)));
+ if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
}
// Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
}
- if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis)));
+ if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
}
- if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the user specified limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis)));
+ if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
}
// Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
- let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Channel::<ChanSigner>::derive_holder_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate);
- let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis);
- if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, holder_dust_limit_satoshis)));
+ let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis);
+ if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
}
- if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, holder_dust_limit_satoshis)));
+ if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
}
if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
&OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
- // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. We enforce it while receiving shutdown msg
- if script.is_p2pkh() || script.is_p2sh() || script.is_v0_p2wsh() || script.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
- Some(script.clone())
// Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
- } else if script.len() == 0 {
+ if script.len() == 0 {
None
// Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. Fail the channel
- } else {
+ } else if is_unsupported_shutdown_script(&their_features, script) {
return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. script: ({})", script.to_bytes().to_hex())));
+ } else {
+ Some(script.clone())
}
},
// Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
}
} else { None };
+ let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+ secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
+
let chan = Channel {
user_id,
config: local_config,
channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
- channel_outbound: false,
- secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
+ secp_ctx,
latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
- holder_keys: chan_keys,
+ holder_signer,
shutdown_pubkey: keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(),
destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
last_sent_closing_fee: None,
- funding_txo: None,
funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
+ funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
short_channel_id: None,
- last_block_connected: Default::default(),
- funding_tx_confirmations: 0,
feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
- holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
+ holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: msg.channel_reserve_satoshis,
counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
- counterparty_selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
- holder_selected_contest_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
minimum_depth: config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth,
- counterparty_pubkeys: Some(counterparty_pubkeys),
- counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
+ counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
+
+ channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
+ holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
+ holder_selected_contest_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
+ is_outbound_from_holder: false,
+ counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
+ selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
+ pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
+ }),
+ funding_outpoint: None
+ },
+ funding_transaction: None,
+ counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
counterparty_node_id,
commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
- network_sync: UpdateStatus::Fresh,
- };
+ channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
- Ok(chan)
- }
-
- // Utilities to build transactions:
+ announcement_sigs: None,
- fn get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self) -> u64 {
- let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
+ #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
+ next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
+ #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
+ next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
- let counterparty_payment_point = &self.counterparty_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap().payment_point.serialize();
- if self.channel_outbound {
- sha.input(&self.holder_keys.pubkeys().payment_point.serialize());
- sha.input(counterparty_payment_point);
- } else {
- sha.input(counterparty_payment_point);
- sha.input(&self.holder_keys.pubkeys().payment_point.serialize());
- }
- let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
+ workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
+ };
- ((res[26] as u64) << 5*8) |
- ((res[27] as u64) << 4*8) |
- ((res[28] as u64) << 3*8) |
- ((res[29] as u64) << 2*8) |
- ((res[30] as u64) << 1*8) |
- ((res[31] as u64) << 0*8)
+ Ok(chan)
}
/// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
/// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
/// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
/// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
- /// Returns (the transaction built, the number of HTLC outputs which were present in the
+ /// Returns (the transaction info, the number of HTLC outputs which were present in the
/// transaction, the list of HTLCs which were not ignored when building the transaction).
/// Note that below-dust HTLCs are included in the third return value, but not the second, and
/// sources are provided only for outbound HTLCs in the third return value.
#[inline]
- fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> (Transaction, usize, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
- let obscured_commitment_transaction_number = self.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor() ^ (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number);
-
- let txins = {
- let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
- ins.push(TxIn {
- previous_output: self.funding_txo.unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
- script_sig: Script::new(),
- sequence: ((0x80 as u32) << 8*3) | ((obscured_commitment_transaction_number >> 3*8) as u32),
- witness: Vec::new(),
- });
- ins
- };
-
- let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, Option<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)> = Vec::with_capacity(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() + 2);
+ fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> (CommitmentTransaction, usize, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
+ let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
+ let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
- log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...", commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number), self.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
+ log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
+ commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
+ get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
+ log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
- txouts.push((TxOut {
- script_pubkey: chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc_in_tx, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh(),
- value: $htlc.amount_msat / 1000
- }, Some((htlc_in_tx, $source))));
+ included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
} else {
log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
- txouts.push((TxOut { // "received HTLC output"
- script_pubkey: chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc_in_tx, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh(),
- value: $htlc.amount_msat / 1000
- }, Some((htlc_in_tx, $source))));
+ included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
} else {
log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
};
debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
- debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) as i64);
+ debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) as i64);
broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
}
- let total_fee = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (txouts.len() as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
- let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.channel_outbound {
+ let total_fee = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (included_non_dust_htlcs.len() as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
+ let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
(value_to_self_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
} else {
(value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64)
};
- let value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
- let value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
+ let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
+ let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
- txouts.push((TxOut {
- script_pubkey: chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&keys.revocation_key,
- if local { self.counterparty_selected_contest_delay } else { self.holder_selected_contest_delay },
- &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key).to_v0_p2wsh(),
- value: value_to_a as u64
- }, None));
+ } else {
+ value_to_a = 0;
}
if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
- let static_payment_pk = if local {
- self.counterparty_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap().payment_point
- } else {
- self.holder_keys.pubkeys().payment_point
- }.serialize();
- txouts.push((TxOut {
- script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0)
- .push_slice(&WPubkeyHash::hash(&static_payment_pk)[..])
- .into_script(),
- value: value_to_b as u64
- }, None));
- }
-
- transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts, |a, b| {
- if let &Some(ref a_htlc) = a {
- if let &Some(ref b_htlc) = b {
- a_htlc.0.cltv_expiry.cmp(&b_htlc.0.cltv_expiry)
- // Note that due to hash collisions, we have to have a fallback comparison
- // here for fuzztarget mode (otherwise at least chanmon_fail_consistency
- // may fail)!
- .then(a_htlc.0.payment_hash.0.cmp(&b_htlc.0.payment_hash.0))
- // For non-HTLC outputs, if they're copying our SPK we don't really care if we
- // close the channel due to mismatches - they're doing something dumb:
- } else { cmp::Ordering::Equal }
- } else { cmp::Ordering::Equal }
- });
-
- let mut outputs: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::with_capacity(txouts.len());
- let mut htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(txouts.len() + included_dust_htlcs.len());
- for (idx, mut out) in txouts.drain(..).enumerate() {
- outputs.push(out.0);
- if let Some((mut htlc, source_option)) = out.1.take() {
- htlc.transaction_output_index = Some(idx as u32);
- htlcs_included.push((htlc, source_option));
- }
+ } else {
+ value_to_b = 0;
}
- let non_dust_htlc_count = htlcs_included.len();
+
+ let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
+
+ let channel_parameters =
+ if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
+ else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
+ let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
+ value_to_a as u64,
+ value_to_b as u64,
+ keys.clone(),
+ feerate_per_kw,
+ &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
+ &channel_parameters
+ );
+ let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
+ // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
+ htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
- (Transaction {
- version: 2,
- lock_time: ((0x20 as u32) << 8*3) | ((obscured_commitment_transaction_number & 0xffffffu64) as u32),
- input: txins,
- output: outputs,
- }, non_dust_htlc_count, htlcs_included)
+ (tx, num_nondust_htlcs, htlcs_included)
}
#[inline]
let txins = {
let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
ins.push(TxIn {
- previous_output: self.funding_txo.unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
+ previous_output: self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
script_sig: Script::new(),
sequence: 0xffffffff,
witness: Vec::new(),
let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, ())> = Vec::new();
let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
- let value_to_self: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.channel_outbound { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
- let value_to_remote: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.channel_outbound { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
+ let value_to_self: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
+ let value_to_remote: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
if value_to_self < 0 {
- assert!(self.channel_outbound);
+ assert!(self.is_outbound());
total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_self) as u64;
} else if value_to_remote < 0 {
- assert!(!self.channel_outbound);
+ assert!(!self.is_outbound());
total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_remote) as u64;
}
}, total_fee_satoshis)
}
+ fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
+ self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
+ }
+
#[inline]
/// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
/// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
/// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
/// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
- let per_commitment_point = self.holder_keys.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
- let delayed_payment_base = &self.holder_keys.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
- let htlc_basepoint = &self.holder_keys.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
- let counterparty_pubkeys = self.counterparty_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap();
+ let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
+ let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
+ let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
+ let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint), "Local tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
}
fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
//TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
//may see payments to it!
- let revocation_basepoint = &self.holder_keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
- let htlc_basepoint = &self.holder_keys.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
- let counterparty_pubkeys = self.counterparty_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap();
+ let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
+ let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
+ let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint), "Remote tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
}
/// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
/// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
- make_funding_redeemscript(&self.holder_keys.pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
+ make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
}
/// Builds the htlc-success or htlc-timeout transaction which spends a given HTLC output
/// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
/// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
fn build_htlc_transaction(&self, prev_hash: &Txid, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, local: bool, keys: &TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Transaction {
- chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(prev_hash, feerate_per_kw, if local { self.counterparty_selected_contest_delay } else { self.holder_selected_contest_delay }, htlc, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key)
+ chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(prev_hash, feerate_per_kw, if local { self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay() } else { self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay() }, htlc, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key)
}
/// Per HTLC, only one get_update_fail_htlc or get_update_fulfill_htlc call may be made.
// on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
// these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
- let mut pending_idx = std::usize::MAX;
+ let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
break;
}
}
- if pending_idx == std::usize::MAX {
+ if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
}
_ => {}
}
}
- log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell! Current state: {}", self.channel_state);
+ log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), self.channel_state);
self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
});
debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
return Ok((None, Some(monitor_update)));
}
- log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
+ log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
}
///
/// Note that it is still possible to hit these assertions in case we find a preimage on-chain
/// but then have a reorg which settles on an HTLC-failure on chain.
- pub fn get_update_fail_htlc(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> {
+ pub fn get_update_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
}
// on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
// these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
- let mut pending_idx = std::usize::MAX;
+ let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
match htlc.state {
pending_idx = idx;
}
}
- if pending_idx == std::usize::MAX {
+ if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
}
_ => {}
}
}
+ log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
err_packet,
return Ok(None);
}
+ log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
{
let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, config: &UserConfig, their_features: InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
// Check sanity of message fields:
- if !self.channel_outbound {
+ if !self.is_outbound() {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
}
if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis)));
}
- if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.channel_reserve_satoshis {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve ({}) and dust_limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
- }
if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? channel_reserve_satoshis was ({}). dust_limit is ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)));
}
- let remote_reserve = Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
+ let remote_reserve = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > remote_reserve {
return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, remote_reserve)));
}
if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
}
- if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > 483 {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than 483", msg.max_accepted_htlcs)));
+ if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
}
// Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
}
- if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis)));
+ if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
}
- if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the user specified limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis)));
+ if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
}
if msg.minimum_depth > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_minimum_depth {
return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
}
+ if msg.minimum_depth == 0 {
+ // Note that if this changes we should update the serialization minimum version to
+ // indicate to older clients that they don't understand some features of the current
+ // channel.
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum confirmation depth must be at least 1".to_owned()));
+ }
let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
&OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
- // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. We enforce it while receiving shutdown msg
- if script.is_p2pkh() || script.is_p2sh() || script.is_v0_p2wsh() || script.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
- Some(script.clone())
// Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
- } else if script.len() == 0 {
+ if script.len() == 0 {
None
// Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. Fail the channel
+ } else if is_unsupported_shutdown_script(&their_features, script) {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. script: ({})", script.to_bytes().to_hex())));
} else {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. scriptpubkey: ({})", script.to_bytes().to_hex())));
+ Some(script.clone())
}
},
// Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.channel_reserve_satoshis;
self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
- self.counterparty_selected_contest_delay = msg.to_self_delay;
self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
self.minimum_depth = msg.minimum_depth;
htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
};
- self.holder_keys.on_accept(&counterparty_pubkeys, msg.to_self_delay, self.holder_selected_contest_delay);
- self.counterparty_pubkeys = Some(counterparty_pubkeys);
+ self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
+ selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
+ pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
+ });
self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
Ok(())
}
- fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Transaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
+ fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
- let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&initial_commitment_tx).signature_hash(0, &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]);
-
- // They sign the "our" commitment transaction...
- log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_tx), log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script));
- secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
-
- let tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new_missing_holder_sig(initial_commitment_tx, sig.clone(), &self.holder_keys.pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey(), keys, self.feerate_per_kw, Vec::new());
+ {
+ let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
+ let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
+ let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
+ // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
+ log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
+ log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
+ encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
+ encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
+ secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
+ }
let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
- let pre_remote_keys = PreCalculatedTxCreationKeys::new(counterparty_keys);
- let counterparty_signature = self.holder_keys.sign_counterparty_commitment(self.feerate_per_kw, &counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, &pre_remote_keys, &Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
+
+ let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
+ let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
+ log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
+ log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
+
+ let counterparty_signature = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
.map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
// We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
- Ok((counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, tx, counterparty_signature))
+ Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
}
fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
- &self.counterparty_pubkeys.as_ref().expect("funding_pubkey() only allowed after accept_channel").funding_pubkey
+ &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
}
- pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
- if self.channel_outbound {
+ pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
+ if self.is_outbound() {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
}
if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
}
- let funding_txo = OutPoint{ txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
- self.funding_txo = Some(funding_txo.clone());
+ let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
+ self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
+ // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
+ // funding_created_signature may fail.
+ self.holder_signer.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
- let (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
+ let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
Ok(res) => res,
+ Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
+ self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
+ },
Err(e) => {
- self.funding_txo = None;
- return Err(e);
+ // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
+ // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
+ panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
}
};
+ let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
+ initial_commitment_tx,
+ msg.signature,
+ Vec::new(),
+ &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
+ self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
+ );
+
// Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
- let counterparty_pubkeys = self.counterparty_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap();
let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
- macro_rules! create_monitor {
- () => { {
- let mut channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.holder_keys.clone(),
- &self.shutdown_pubkey, self.holder_selected_contest_delay,
- &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
- &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
- self.counterparty_selected_contest_delay, funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
- self.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(),
- initial_commitment_tx.clone());
-
- channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx_info(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
- channel_monitor
- } }
- }
+ let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
+ let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
+ &self.shutdown_pubkey, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
+ &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
+ &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
+ funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
+ obscure_factor,
+ holder_commitment_tx, best_block);
- let channel_monitor = create_monitor!();
+ channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
+ log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
+
Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
channel_id: self.channel_id,
signature
/// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
/// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
- pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
- if !self.channel_outbound {
+ pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<(ChannelMonitor<Signer>, Transaction), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
+ if !self.is_outbound() {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
}
if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
+ let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
+ let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
- let holder_keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
- let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_keys, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
- let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&initial_commitment_tx).signature_hash(0, &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]);
+ log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
+ log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
- let counterparty_funding_pubkey = &self.counterparty_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap().funding_pubkey;
-
- // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
- if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, counterparty_funding_pubkey) {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
+ let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
+ let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
+ {
+ let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
+ let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
+ let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
+ // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
+ if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
+ }
}
- let counterparty_pubkeys = self.counterparty_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap();
+ let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
+ initial_commitment_tx,
+ msg.signature,
+ Vec::new(),
+ &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
+ self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
+ );
+
+
let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
- let funding_txo = self.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap();
+ let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
- macro_rules! create_monitor {
- () => { {
- let commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new_missing_holder_sig(initial_commitment_tx.clone(), msg.signature.clone(), &self.holder_keys.pubkeys().funding_pubkey, counterparty_funding_pubkey, holder_keys.clone(), self.feerate_per_kw, Vec::new());
- let mut channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.holder_keys.clone(),
- &self.shutdown_pubkey, self.holder_selected_contest_delay,
- &self.destination_script, (funding_txo.clone(), funding_txo_script.clone()),
- &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
- self.counterparty_selected_contest_delay, funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
- self.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(),
- commitment_tx);
-
- channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx_info(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
-
- channel_monitor
- } }
- }
+ let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
+ let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
+ &self.shutdown_pubkey, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
+ &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
+ &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
+ funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
+ obscure_factor,
+ holder_commitment_tx, best_block);
- let channel_monitor = create_monitor!();
+ channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
- Ok(channel_monitor)
+ log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
+
+ Ok((channel_monitor, self.funding_transaction.as_ref().cloned().unwrap()))
}
- pub fn funding_locked(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
+ pub fn funding_locked<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent funding_locked when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
+ self.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
+ return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent funding_locked when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
}
let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
+
+ log_info!(logger, "Received funding_locked from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
+
Ok(())
}
(COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * self.feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
}
- // Get the commitment tx fee for the local (i.e our) next commitment transaction
- // based on the number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next
- // commitment tx. `addl_htcs` is an optional parameter allowing the caller
- // to add a number of additional HTLCs to the calculation. Note that dust
- // HTLCs are excluded.
- fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, addl_htlcs: usize) -> u64 {
- assert!(self.channel_outbound);
+ // Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
+ // number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx, plus an additional
+ // HTLC if `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs
+ // are excluded.
+ fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
+ assert!(self.is_outbound());
+
+ let real_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
+ let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
+
+ let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
+ if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
+ match htlc.origin {
+ HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
+ if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
+ addl_htlcs += 1;
+ }
+ },
+ HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
+ if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
+ addl_htlcs += 1;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ let mut included_htlcs = 0;
+ for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
+ if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
+ continue
+ }
+ // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
+ // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
+ included_htlcs += 1;
+ }
- let mut their_acked_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len();
for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
- if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
+ if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
continue
}
match htlc.state {
- OutboundHTLCState::Committed => their_acked_htlcs += 1,
- OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => their_acked_htlcs += 1,
- OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => their_acked_htlcs += 1,
+ OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
+ OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
+ OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
+ // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
+ // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
+ // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
_ => {},
}
}
for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
match htlc {
- &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { .. } => their_acked_htlcs += 1,
- _ => {},
+ &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
+ if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
+ continue
+ }
+ included_htlcs += 1
+ },
+ _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
+ // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
}
}
- self.commit_tx_fee_msat(their_acked_htlcs + addl_htlcs)
+ let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
+ let res = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs);
+ #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
+ {
+ let mut fee = res;
+ if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
+ fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs - 1);
+ }
+ let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
+ + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
+ let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
+ fee,
+ total_pending_htlcs,
+ next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
+ HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
+ HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
+ },
+ next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
+ HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
+ HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
+ },
+ feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
+ };
+ *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
+ }
+ res
}
- // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction
- // based on the number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their
- // next commitment tx. `addl_htcs` is an optional parameter allowing the caller
- // to add a number of additional HTLCs to the calculation. Note that dust HTLCs
- // are excluded.
- fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, addl_htlcs: usize) -> u64 {
- assert!(!self.channel_outbound);
+ // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
+ // pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx, plus an additional HTLC if
+ // `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs are
+ // excluded.
+ fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
+ assert!(!self.is_outbound());
+
+ let real_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
+ let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
+
+ let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
+ if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
+ match htlc.origin {
+ HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
+ if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
+ addl_htlcs += 1;
+ }
+ },
+ HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
+ if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
+ addl_htlcs += 1;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
+ // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
+ // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
+ let mut included_htlcs = 0;
+ for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
+ if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
+ continue
+ }
+ included_htlcs += 1;
+ }
- // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next
- // commitment_signed, all inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be
- // included) and only committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
- let mut their_acked_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len();
for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
- if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis {
+ if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
continue
}
- // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next
- // commitment_signed, i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
+ // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
+ // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
match htlc.state {
- OutboundHTLCState::Committed => their_acked_htlcs += 1,
- OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => their_acked_htlcs += 1,
+ OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
+ OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
+ OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
_ => {},
}
}
- self.commit_tx_fee_msat(their_acked_htlcs + addl_htlcs)
+ let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
+ let res = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs);
+ #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
+ {
+ let mut fee = res;
+ if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
+ fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs - 1);
+ }
+ let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
+ let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
+ fee,
+ total_pending_htlcs,
+ next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
+ HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
+ HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
+ },
+ next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
+ HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
+ HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
+ },
+ feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
+ };
+ *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
+ }
+ res
}
pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
if inbound_htlc_count + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", OUR_MAX_HTLCS)));
}
- let holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis);
+ let holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis);
if htlc_inbound_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
}
// Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
// feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
- let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.channel_outbound { 0 } else {
- // +1 for this HTLC.
- self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(1)
+ let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
+ let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
+ self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
};
if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
};
let chan_reserve_msat =
- Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) * 1000;
+ Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) * 1000;
if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
}
- if !self.channel_outbound {
- // `+1` for this HTLC, `2 *` and `+1` fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from the
- // spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the receiver's side,
- // only on the sender's.
- // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output fees,
- // we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep the extra +1
- // as we should still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of
- // being sensitive to fee spikes.
- let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(1 + 1);
+ if !self.is_outbound() {
+ // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
+ // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
+ // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
+ // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
+ // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
+ // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
+ // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
+ // sensitive to fee spikes.
+ let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
+ let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - chan_reserve_msat < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
// Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
// the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
- log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation");
+ log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
}
} else {
// Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
-
- // +1 for this HTLC.
- let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(1);
+ let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
+ let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
}
let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
let mut update_fee = false;
- let feerate_per_kw = if !self.channel_outbound && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
+ let feerate_per_kw = if !self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
update_fee = true;
self.pending_update_fee.unwrap()
} else {
self.feerate_per_kw
};
- let mut commitment_tx = {
- let mut commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, feerate_per_kw, logger);
- let htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_tx.2.drain(..).map(|htlc| (htlc.0, htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
- (commitment_tx.0, commitment_tx.1, htlcs_cloned)
+ let (num_htlcs, mut htlcs_cloned, commitment_tx, commitment_txid) = {
+ let commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, feerate_per_kw, logger);
+ let commitment_txid = {
+ let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.0.trust();
+ let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
+ let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
+
+ log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
+ log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
+ log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
+ log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
+ if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
+ return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
+ }
+ bitcoin_tx.txid
+ };
+ let htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_tx.2.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
+ (commitment_tx.1, htlcs_cloned, commitment_tx.0, commitment_txid)
};
- let commitment_txid = commitment_tx.0.txid();
- let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&commitment_tx.0).signature_hash(0, &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]);
- log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_tx.0), log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script));
- if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
- return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
- }
+ let total_fee = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (num_htlcs as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
//If channel fee was updated by funder confirm funder can afford the new fee rate when applied to the current local commitment transaction
if update_fee {
- let num_htlcs = commitment_tx.1;
- let total_fee = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (num_htlcs as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
-
- let counterparty_reserve_we_require = Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
+ let counterparty_reserve_we_require = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
if self.channel_value_satoshis - self.value_to_self_msat / 1000 < total_fee + counterparty_reserve_we_require {
return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned())));
}
}
+ #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
+ {
+ if self.is_outbound() {
+ let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
+ *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
+ if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
+ let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
+ + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
+ if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
+ && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
+ && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
+ && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
+ assert_eq!(total_fee, info.fee / 1000);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
- if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_tx.1 {
- return Err((None, ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_tx.1))));
+ if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != num_htlcs {
+ return Err((None, ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), num_htlcs))));
}
- // TODO: Merge these two, sadly they are currently both required to be passed separately to
- // ChannelMonitor:
- let mut htlcs_without_source = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_tx.2.len());
- let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_tx.2.len());
- for (idx, (htlc, source)) in commitment_tx.2.drain(..).enumerate() {
+ // TODO: Sadly, we pass HTLCs twice to ChannelMonitor: once via the HolderCommitmentTransaction and once via the update
+ let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
+ for (idx, (htlc, source)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
let htlc_tx = self.build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, &htlc, true, &keys, feerate_per_kw);
let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]);
- log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript));
+ log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
+ log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
+ encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
}
- htlcs_without_source.push((htlc.clone(), Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx])));
htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source));
} else {
- htlcs_without_source.push((htlc.clone(), None));
htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source));
}
}
- let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_keys.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
- let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_keys.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1);
+ let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
+ commitment_tx,
+ msg.signature,
+ msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
+ &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
+ self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
+ );
+
+ let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
+ let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1);
// Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
let mut need_commitment = false;
- if !self.channel_outbound {
+ if !self.is_outbound() {
if let Some(fee_update) = self.pending_update_fee {
self.feerate_per_kw = fee_update;
// We later use the presence of pending_update_fee to indicate we should generate a
}
}
- let counterparty_funding_pubkey = self.counterparty_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap().funding_pubkey;
-
self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
- commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction::new_missing_holder_sig(commitment_tx.0, msg.signature.clone(), &self.holder_keys.pubkeys().funding_pubkey, &counterparty_funding_pubkey, keys, self.feerate_per_kw, htlcs_without_source),
+ commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs
}]
};
Some(forward_info.clone())
} else { None };
if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
+ log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
+ log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
need_commitment = true;
}
if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
Some(fail_reason.take())
} else { None } {
+ log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
+ log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(fail_reason);
need_commitment = true;
}
self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
}
+ log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
+ log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
// TODO: Call maybe_propose_first_closing_signed on restoration (or call it here and
// re-send the message on restoration)
return Err((Some(monitor_update), ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA".to_owned())));
(None, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator))
} else { (None, None) };
+ log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
+ log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if commitment_signed.is_some() { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
+
Ok((msgs::RevokeAndACK {
channel_id: self.channel_id,
per_commitment_secret,
}, commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update))
}
+ /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
+ /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
+ /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
+ pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
+ if self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 &&
+ (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == 0 {
+ self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
+ } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
+ }
+
/// Used to fulfill holding_cell_htlcs when we get a remote ack (or implicitly get it by them
/// fulfilling or failing the last pending HTLC)
fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
- log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(), if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" });
+ log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
+ if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
Err(e) => {
match e {
ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
- log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
+ log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
+ log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
// If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
// be failed backwards. Failing to send here
// indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
}
},
&HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
- match self.get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone()) {
+ match self.get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), logger) {
Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap()),
Err(e) => {
if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
+ log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
+ log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
+ update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
+
Ok((Some((msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
update_add_htlcs,
update_fulfill_htlcs,
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
}
+ #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
+ {
+ *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
+ *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
+ }
+
self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
.map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
- log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA...");
+ log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
});
for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
- log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
true
} else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
- log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
true
} else { false };
if swap {
mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
+ log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
require_commitment = true;
} else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
match forward_info {
PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
+ log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
require_commitment = true;
match fail_msg {
HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
}
},
PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
+ log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
}
}
self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
- if self.channel_outbound {
+ if self.is_outbound() {
if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee.take() {
self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
}
}
self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
+ log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
return Ok((None, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), None, monitor_update, Vec::new()))
}
self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
+ log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
+ log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
Ok((Some(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
commitment_signed
}), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
} else {
+ log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
Ok((None, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
}
}
/// further details on the optionness of the return value.
/// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
fn send_update_fee(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> {
- if !self.channel_outbound {
+ if !self.is_outbound() {
panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
}
if !self.is_usable() {
}
}
- /// Removes any uncommitted HTLCs, to be used on peer disconnection, including any pending
- /// HTLCs that we intended to add but haven't as we were waiting on a remote revoke.
- /// Returns the set of PendingHTLCStatuses from remote uncommitted HTLCs (which we're
- /// implicitly dropping) and the payment_hashes of HTLCs we tried to add but are dropping.
+ /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
+ /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
+ /// resent.
/// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
/// completed.
- pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> where L::Target: Logger {
- let mut outbound_drops = Vec::new();
-
+ pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
- return outbound_drops;
+ return;
}
// Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
// will be retransmitted.
}
}
- self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
- match htlc_update {
- // Note that currently on channel reestablish we assert that there are
- // no holding cell HTLC update_adds, so if in the future we stop
- // dropping added HTLCs here and failing them backwards, then there will
- // need to be corresponding changes made in the Channel's re-establish
- // logic.
- &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
- outbound_drops.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
- false
- },
- &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {..} | &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {..} => true,
- }
- });
self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
- log_debug!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops and {} waiting-to-locally-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", outbound_drops.len(), inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
- outbound_drops
+ log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
}
/// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update failed to be stored by the client and further
/// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
/// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
/// to the remote side.
- pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, bool, Option<msgs::FundingLocked>) where L::Target: Logger {
+ pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, Option<Transaction>, Option<msgs::FundingLocked>) where L::Target: Logger {
assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
- let needs_broadcast_safe = self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) != 0 && self.channel_outbound;
+ let funding_broadcastable = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) != 0 && self.is_outbound() {
+ self.funding_transaction.take()
+ } else { None };
- // Because we will never generate a FundingBroadcastSafe event when we're in
- // MonitorUpdateFailed, if we assume the user only broadcast the funding transaction when
- // they received the FundingBroadcastSafe event, we can only ever hit
- // monitor_pending_funding_locked when we're an inbound channel which failed to persist the
- // monitor on funding_created, and we even got the funding transaction confirmed before the
- // monitor was persisted.
+ // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateFailed (and
+ // we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for us to
+ // do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_funding_locked when we're an inbound
+ // channel which failed to persist the monitor on funding_created, and we got the funding
+ // transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted.
let funding_locked = if self.monitor_pending_funding_locked {
- assert!(!self.channel_outbound, "Funding transaction broadcast without FundingBroadcastSafe!");
+ assert!(!self.is_outbound(), "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = false;
- let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_keys.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
+ let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
channel_id: self.channel_id(),
next_per_commitment_point,
if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
- return (None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, forwards, failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked);
+ return (None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, forwards, failures, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked);
}
let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
let order = self.resend_order.clone();
- log_trace!(logger, "Restored monitor updating resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
- if needs_broadcast_safe { "a funding broadcast safe, " } else { "" },
- if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
- if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
+ log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
+ log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
+ if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
- (raa, commitment_update, order, forwards, failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked)
+ (raa, commitment_update, order, forwards, failures, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked)
}
pub fn update_fee<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
where F::Target: FeeEstimator
{
- if self.channel_outbound {
+ if self.is_outbound() {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
}
if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
}
- Channel::<ChanSigner>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
+ Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
self.pending_update_fee = Some(msg.feerate_per_kw);
self.update_time_counter += 1;
Ok(())
}
fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
- let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_keys.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
- let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_keys.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
+ let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
+ let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
msgs::RevokeAndACK {
channel_id: self.channel_id,
per_commitment_secret,
}
}
- log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update with {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
- update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
+ log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
+ log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
update_fee: None,
/// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
/// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
- pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Option<msgs::Shutdown>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
+ pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::Shutdown>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
// While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
// almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
match msg.data_loss_protect {
OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss) => {
- let expected_point = self.holder_keys.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
+ let expected_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&data_loss.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
.map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent funding_locked yet".to_owned()));
}
// Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
- return Ok((None, None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, shutdown_msg));
+ return Ok((None, None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, Vec::new(), shutdown_msg));
}
// We have OurFundingLocked set!
- let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_keys.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
+ let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
return Ok((Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
channel_id: self.channel_id(),
next_per_commitment_point,
- }), None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, shutdown_msg));
+ }), None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, Vec::new(), shutdown_msg));
}
let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
let resend_funding_locked = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
// We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateFailed resending FundingLocked
- let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_keys.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
+ let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
channel_id: self.channel_id(),
next_per_commitment_point,
}
if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == 0 {
- // Note that if in the future we no longer drop holding cell update_adds on peer
- // disconnect, this logic will need to be updated.
- for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
- if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { .. } = htlc_update {
- debug_assert!(false, "There shouldn't be any add-HTLCs in the holding cell now because they should have been dropped on peer disconnect. Panic here because said HTLCs won't be handled correctly.");
- }
- }
-
// We're up-to-date and not waiting on a remote revoke (if we are our
// channel_reestablish should result in them sending a revoke_and_ack), but we may
// have received some updates while we were disconnected. Free the holding cell
Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => return Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)),
Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) | Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_)) => panic!("Got non-channel-failing result from free_holding_cell_htlcs"),
Ok((Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail)) => {
- // If in the future we no longer drop holding cell update_adds on peer
- // disconnect, we may be handed some HTLCs to fail backwards here.
- assert!(htlcs_to_fail.is_empty());
- return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(commitment_update), Some(monitor_update), self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
+ return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(commitment_update), Some(monitor_update), self.resend_order.clone(), htlcs_to_fail, shutdown_msg));
},
Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail)) => {
- // If in the future we no longer drop holding cell update_adds on peer
- // disconnect, we may be handed some HTLCs to fail backwards here.
- assert!(htlcs_to_fail.is_empty());
- return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
+ return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), htlcs_to_fail, shutdown_msg));
},
}
} else {
- return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
+ return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), Vec::new(), shutdown_msg));
}
} else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
if required_revoke.is_some() {
if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
- return Ok((resend_funding_locked, None, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
+ return Ok((resend_funding_locked, None, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), Vec::new(), shutdown_msg));
}
- return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)), None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
+ return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)), None, self.resend_order.clone(), Vec::new(), shutdown_msg));
} else {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()));
}
fn maybe_propose_first_closing_signed<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F) -> Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>
where F::Target: FeeEstimator
{
- if !self.channel_outbound || !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() ||
+ if !self.is_outbound() || !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() ||
self.channel_state & (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK ||
self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
return None;
let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(proposed_total_fee_satoshis, false);
- let sig = self.holder_keys
+ let sig = self.holder_signer
.sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
.ok();
assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= tx_weight);
})
}
- pub fn shutdown<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
+ pub fn shutdown<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
where F::Target: FeeEstimator
{
if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
}
assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
- // BOLT 2 says we must only send a scriptpubkey of certain standard forms, which are up to
- // 34 bytes in length, so don't let the remote peer feed us some super fee-heavy script.
- if self.channel_outbound && msg.scriptpubkey.len() > 34 {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got counterparty shutdown_scriptpubkey ({}) of absurd length from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
- }
-
- //Check counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey form as BOLT says we must
- if !msg.scriptpubkey.is_p2pkh() && !msg.scriptpubkey.is_p2sh() && !msg.scriptpubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() && !msg.scriptpubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
+ if is_unsupported_shutdown_script(&their_features, &msg.scriptpubkey) {
return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
}
tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
- let funding_key = self.holder_keys.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
+ let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
}
let mut sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&closing_tx).signature_hash(0, &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]);
- let counterparty_funding_pubkey = &self.counterparty_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap().funding_pubkey;
-
- match self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, counterparty_funding_pubkey) {
+ match self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
Ok(_) => {},
Err(_e) => {
// The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
($new_feerate: expr) => {
let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
let (closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction($new_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000, false);
- let sig = self.holder_keys
+ let sig = self.holder_signer
.sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
.map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= tx_weight);
}
let mut min_feerate = 253;
- if self.channel_outbound {
+ if self.is_outbound() {
let max_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
if (msg.fee_satoshis as u64) > max_feerate as u64 * closing_tx_max_weight / 1000 {
if let Some((last_feerate, _, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
propose_new_feerate!(min_feerate);
}
- let sig = self.holder_keys
+ let sig = self.holder_signer
.sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
.map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
/// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
/// get_outbound_funding_created.
pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
- self.funding_txo
+ self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
+ }
+
+ fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
+ self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
+ }
+
+ fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
+ &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
+ }
+
+ fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
+ self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().selected_contest_delay
+ }
+
+ fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
+ &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
}
/// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
// Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
// to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
// channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
- self.channel_value_satoshis * 9 / 10,
+ self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
- Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis)
+ Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis)
);
}
self.config.fee_proportional_millionths
}
+ pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
+ cmp::max(self.config.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
+ }
+
#[cfg(test)]
pub fn get_feerate(&self) -> u32 {
self.feerate_per_kw
}
#[cfg(test)]
- pub fn get_keys(&self) -> &ChanSigner {
- &self.holder_keys
+ pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
+ &self.holder_signer
}
#[cfg(test)]
}
pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
- self.channel_outbound
+ self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
}
/// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
// the fee cost of the HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transaction:
let mut res = self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * cmp::max(HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT) / 1000;
- if self.channel_outbound {
+ if self.is_outbound() {
// + the marginal fee increase cost to us in the commitment transaction:
res += self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC / 1000;
}
/// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
/// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
- self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0)
+ self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
}
/// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
} else { false }
}
- pub fn to_disabled_staged(&mut self) {
- self.network_sync = UpdateStatus::DisabledStaged;
+ pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
+ self.channel_update_status
}
- pub fn to_disabled_marked(&mut self) {
- self.network_sync = UpdateStatus::DisabledMarked;
+ pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
+ self.channel_update_status = status;
}
- pub fn to_fresh(&mut self) {
- self.network_sync = UpdateStatus::Fresh;
- }
+ fn check_get_funding_locked(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::FundingLocked> {
+ if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
+ return None;
+ }
+
+ let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
+ if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
+ self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
+ }
+
+ if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth as i64 {
+ return None;
+ }
- pub fn is_disabled_staged(&self) -> bool {
- self.network_sync == UpdateStatus::DisabledStaged
+ let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
+ let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
+ self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32;
+ true
+ } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) {
+ self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
+ self.update_time_counter += 1;
+ true
+ } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
+ // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
+ false
+ } else if self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 {
+ panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent?: {}", self.channel_state);
+ } else {
+ // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
+ false
+ };
+
+ if need_commitment_update {
+ if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
+ let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
+ return Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
+ channel_id: self.channel_id,
+ next_per_commitment_point,
+ });
+ } else {
+ self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = true;
+ }
+ }
+ None
}
- pub fn is_disabled_marked(&self) -> bool {
- self.network_sync == UpdateStatus::DisabledMarked
+ /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
+ /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
+ /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
+ pub fn transactions_confirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData, logger: &L)
+ -> Result<Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, msgs::ErrorMessage> where L::Target: Logger {
+ let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
+ for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
+ if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
+ // If we haven't yet sent a funding_locked, but are in FundingSent (ignoring
+ // whether they've sent a funding_locked or not), check if we should send one.
+ if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
+ if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
+ let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
+ if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
+ tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
+ if self.is_outbound() {
+ // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
+ // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
+ // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
+ // probability in fuzztarget mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
+ // channel and move on.
+ #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
+ panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
+ }
+ self.update_time_counter += 1;
+ return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
+ channel_id: self.channel_id(),
+ data: "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index".to_owned()
+ });
+ } else {
+ if self.is_outbound() {
+ for input in tx.input.iter() {
+ if input.witness.is_empty() {
+ // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
+ // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
+ #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
+ panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
+ self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
+ self.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
+ Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
+ Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for funding_locked here and
+ // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
+ // may have already happened for this block).
+ if let Some(funding_locked) = self.check_get_funding_locked(height) {
+ log_info!(logger, "Sending a funding_locked to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
+ return Ok(Some(funding_locked));
+ }
+ }
+ for inp in tx.input.iter() {
+ if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
+ log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
+ return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
+ channel_id: self.channel_id(),
+ data: "Commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.".to_owned()
+ });
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ Ok(None)
}
- /// When we receive a new block, we (a) check whether the block contains the funding
- /// transaction (which would start us counting blocks until we send the funding_signed), and
- /// (b) check the height of the block against outbound holding cell HTLCs in case we need to
- /// give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything else (e.g. commitment
- /// transaction broadcasts, channel closure detection, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
+ /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
+ /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
+ /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
/// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
///
/// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
/// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
/// post-shutdown.
- /// Only returns an ErrorAction of DisconnectPeer, if Err.
///
/// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
/// back.
- pub fn block_connected(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage> {
+ pub fn best_block_updated<L: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, logger: &L)
+ -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage> where L::Target: Logger {
let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
+ let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER;
self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
match htlc_update {
&HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
- if *cltv_expiry <= height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
+ if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
false
} else { true }
_ => true
}
});
- let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
- if header.block_hash() != self.last_block_connected {
- if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
- self.funding_tx_confirmations += 1;
- }
+
+ self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
+
+ if let Some(funding_locked) = self.check_get_funding_locked(height) {
+ log_info!(logger, "Sending a funding_locked to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
+ return Ok((Some(funding_locked), timed_out_htlcs));
}
- if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
- for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
- if tx.txid() == self.funding_txo.unwrap().txid {
- let txo_idx = self.funding_txo.unwrap().index as usize;
- if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
- tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
- if self.channel_outbound {
- // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
- // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
- // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
- // probability in fuzztarget mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
- // channel and move on.
- #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
- panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
- }
- self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
- self.update_time_counter += 1;
- return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
- channel_id: self.channel_id(),
- data: "funding tx had wrong script/value".to_owned()
- });
- } else {
- if self.channel_outbound {
- for input in tx.input.iter() {
- if input.witness.is_empty() {
- // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
- // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
- #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
- panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
- }
- }
- }
- if height > 0xff_ff_ff || (index_in_block) > 0xff_ff_ff {
- panic!("Block was bogus - either height 16 million or had > 16 million transactions");
- }
- assert!(txo_idx <= 0xffff); // txo_idx is a (u16 as usize), so this is just listed here for completeness
- self.funding_tx_confirmations = 1;
- self.short_channel_id = Some(((height as u64) << (5*8)) |
- ((index_in_block as u64) << (2*8)) |
- ((txo_idx as u64) << (0*8)));
- }
- }
+
+ let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
+ if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 ||
+ (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32 {
+ let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
+ if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
+ // Note that check_get_funding_locked may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
+ // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
+ // indicate we've already sent a funding_locked
+ funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
}
- }
- if header.block_hash() != self.last_block_connected {
- self.last_block_connected = header.block_hash();
- self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, header.time);
- if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
- if self.funding_tx_confirmations == self.minimum_depth as u64 {
- let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
- self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32;
- true
- } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) {
- self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
- self.update_time_counter += 1;
- true
- } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
- // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update
- // funding_tx_confirmed_in and return.
- false
- } else if self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 {
- panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent?: {}", self.channel_state);
- } else {
- // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update
- // funding_tx_confirmed_in and return.
- false
- };
- self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(self.last_block_connected);
-
- //TODO: Note that this must be a duplicate of the previous commitment point they sent us,
- //as otherwise we will have a commitment transaction that they can't revoke (well, kinda,
- //they can by sending two revoke_and_acks back-to-back, but not really). This appears to be
- //a protocol oversight, but I assume I'm just missing something.
- if need_commitment_update {
- if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
- let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_keys.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
- return Ok((Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
- channel_id: self.channel_id,
- next_per_commitment_point,
- }), timed_out_htlcs));
- } else {
- self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = true;
- return Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs));
- }
- }
- }
+
+ // If we've sent funding_locked (or have both sent and received funding_locked), and
+ // the funding transaction's confirmation count has dipped below minimum_depth / 2,
+ // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
+ // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
+ if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth as i64 / 2 {
+ return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
+ channel_id: self.channel_id(),
+ data: format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.", self.minimum_depth, funding_tx_confirmations),
+ });
}
}
+
Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs))
}
- /// Called by channelmanager based on chain blocks being disconnected.
- /// Returns true if we need to close the channel now due to funding transaction
- /// unconfirmation/reorg.
- pub fn block_disconnected(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader) -> bool {
- if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
- self.funding_tx_confirmations -= 1;
- if self.funding_tx_confirmations == UNCONF_THRESHOLD as u64 {
- return true;
+ /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
+ /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
+ /// before the channel has reached funding_locked and we can just wait for more blocks.
+ pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), msgs::ErrorMessage> where L::Target: Logger {
+ if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
+ // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
+ // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
+ let reorg_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
+ // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
+ // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
+ // time we saw and it will be ignored.
+ let best_time = self.update_time_counter;
+ match self.best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, logger) {
+ Ok((funding_locked, timed_out_htlcs)) => {
+ assert!(funding_locked.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
+ assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
+ Ok(())
+ },
+ Err(e) => Err(e)
}
+ } else {
+ // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
+ Ok(())
}
- self.last_block_connected = header.block_hash();
- if Some(self.last_block_connected) == self.funding_tx_confirmed_in {
- self.funding_tx_confirmations = self.minimum_depth as u64 - 1;
- }
- false
}
// Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
// something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
- if !self.channel_outbound {
+ if !self.is_outbound() {
panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
}
if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
}
- let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_keys.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
- let keys = self.holder_keys.pubkeys();
+ let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
+ let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
msgs::OpenChannel {
chain_hash,
funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
- max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
- channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
+ max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
+ channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32,
- to_self_delay: self.holder_selected_contest_delay,
+ to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
}
pub fn get_accept_channel(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
- if self.channel_outbound {
+ if self.is_outbound() {
panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
}
if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
}
- let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_keys.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
- let keys = self.holder_keys.pubkeys();
+ let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
+ let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
msgs::AcceptChannel {
temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
- max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
- channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
+ max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
+ channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth,
- to_self_delay: self.holder_selected_contest_delay,
+ to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
- let pre_remote_keys = PreCalculatedTxCreationKeys::new(counterparty_keys);
- Ok(self.holder_keys.sign_counterparty_commitment(self.feerate_per_kw, &counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, &pre_remote_keys, &Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
+ Ok(self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
.map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
}
/// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
/// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
/// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
- pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
- if !self.channel_outbound {
+ pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
+ if !self.is_outbound() {
panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
}
if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
}
- self.funding_txo = Some(funding_txo.clone());
+ self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
+ self.holder_signer.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
+
let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
Ok(res) => res,
Err(e) => {
log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
- self.funding_txo = None;
+ self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
return Err(e);
}
};
self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
+ self.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
temporary_channel_id,
/// closing).
/// Note that the "channel must be funded" requirement is stricter than BOLT 7 requires - see
/// https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/468
+ ///
+ /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
pub fn get_channel_announcement(&self, node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<(msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, Signature), ChannelError> {
if !self.config.announced_channel {
return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { self.get_counterparty_node_id() },
node_id_2: if were_node_one { self.get_counterparty_node_id() } else { node_id },
- bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { self.holder_keys.pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() },
- bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() } else { self.holder_keys.pubkeys().funding_pubkey },
+ bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() },
+ bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() } else { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey },
excess_data: Vec::new(),
};
- let sig = self.holder_keys.sign_channel_announcement(&msg, &self.secp_ctx)
+ let sig = self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement(&msg, &self.secp_ctx)
.map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
Ok((msg, sig))
}
+ /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
+ /// available.
+ fn sign_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_secret: &SecretKey, our_node_id: PublicKey, msghash: secp256k1::Message, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, our_bitcoin_sig: Signature) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
+ if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.announcement_sigs {
+ let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
+
+ let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, our_node_secret);
+ Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
+ node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
+ node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
+ bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
+ bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
+ contents: announcement,
+ })
+ } else {
+ Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
+ }
+ }
+
+ /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
+ /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
+ /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
+ pub fn announcement_signatures(&mut self, our_node_secret: &SecretKey, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
+ let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = self.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), chain_hash)?;
+
+ let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
+
+ if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
+ "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
+ &announcement, self.get_counterparty_node_id())));
+ }
+ if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
+ "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
+ &announcement, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
+ }
+
+ self.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
+
+ self.sign_channel_announcement(our_node_secret, our_node_id, msghash, announcement, our_bitcoin_sig)
+ }
+
+ /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
+ /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
+ pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_secret: &SecretKey, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> {
+ let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match self.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), chain_hash) {
+ Ok(res) => res,
+ Err(_) => return None,
+ };
+ let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
+ match self.sign_channel_announcement(our_node_secret, our_node_id, msghash, announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) {
+ Ok(res) => Some(res),
+ Err(_) => None,
+ }
+ }
+
/// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
/// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
let data_loss_protect = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
- log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret));
+ log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey
})
} else {
- log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret");
+ log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
your_last_per_commitment_secret: [0;32],
my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
/// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
/// send_htlc_and_commit instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
- /// This returns an option instead of a pure UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we are
- /// waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack during which time we cannot add new
- /// HTLCs on the wire or we wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed.
- /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
+ ///
+ /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
+ /// the wire:
+ /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
+ /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
+ /// awaiting ACK.
+ /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateFailed, we cannot commit to a new state as we
+ /// may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to regenerate
+ /// them.
+ ///
+ /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to calling any other methods on this Channel!
+ ///
/// If an Err is returned, it's a ChannelError::Ignore!
pub fn send_htlc(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> {
if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value ({})", self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat)));
}
- if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
+ if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
// Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
// incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
// the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
// disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
// end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
// IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
- return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected/frozen for channel monitor update".to_owned()));
+ return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
}
let (outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat) = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats();
return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
}
- if !self.channel_outbound {
+ if !self.is_outbound() {
// Check that we won't violate the remote channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
-
let counterparty_balance_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat;
- let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
- // 1 additional HTLC corresponding to this HTLC.
- let counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(1);
+ let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
+ let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
+ let counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
if counterparty_balance_msat < holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat + counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat {
return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
}
return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds. Amount: {}, pending value to self {}", amount_msat, pending_value_to_self_msat)));
}
- // The `+1` is for the HTLC currently being added to the commitment tx and
- // the `2 *` and `+1` are for the fee spike buffer.
- let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.channel_outbound {
- 2 * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(1 + 1)
+ // `2 *` and extra HTLC are for the fee spike buffer.
+ let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() {
+ let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
+ 2 * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()))
} else { 0 };
if pending_value_to_self_msat - amount_msat < commit_tx_fee_msat {
return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees. Pending value to self: {}. local_commit_tx_fee {}", pending_value_to_self_msat, commit_tx_fee_msat)));
}
// Now update local state:
- if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
+ if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
amount_msat,
payment_hash,
}
self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
- let (res, counterparty_commitment_tx, htlcs) = match self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger) {
+ let (res, counterparty_commitment_txid, htlcs) = match self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger) {
Ok((res, (counterparty_commitment_tx, mut htlcs))) => {
// Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
let htlcs_no_ref: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
- unsigned_commitment_tx: counterparty_commitment_tx.clone(),
+ commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
their_revocation_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
/// Only fails in case of bad keys. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed generation
/// when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
- fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Transaction, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
+ fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee {
- if self.channel_outbound {
+ if self.is_outbound() {
feerate_per_kw = feerate;
}
}
let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
let counterparty_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, feerate_per_kw, logger);
+ let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.0.trust().txid();
let (signature, htlc_signatures);
+ #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
+ {
+ if !self.is_outbound() {
+ let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
+ *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
+ if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
+ let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
+ if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
+ && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
+ && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
+ && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
+ let actual_fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(counterparty_commitment_tx.1);
+ assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
{
let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(counterparty_commitment_tx.2.len());
for &(ref htlc, _) in counterparty_commitment_tx.2.iter() {
htlcs.push(htlc);
}
- let pre_remote_keys = PreCalculatedTxCreationKeys::new(counterparty_keys);
- let res = self.holder_keys.sign_counterparty_commitment(feerate_per_kw, &counterparty_commitment_tx.0, &pre_remote_keys, &htlcs, &self.secp_ctx)
+ let res = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_commitment_tx.0, &self.secp_ctx)
.map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
signature = res.0;
htlc_signatures = res.1;
- let counterparty_keys = pre_remote_keys.trust_key_derivation();
- log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} with redeemscript {} -> {}",
- encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_commitment_tx.0),
- encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
- log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]));
+ log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
+ encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_commitment_tx.0.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
+ &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
+ log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
- log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {}",
- encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_tx.0.txid(), feerate_per_kw, self.holder_selected_contest_delay, htlc, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
- encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, counterparty_keys)),
+ log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
+ encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
+ encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &counterparty_keys)),
log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
- log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]));
+ log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
}
}
channel_id: self.channel_id,
signature,
htlc_signatures,
- }, (counterparty_commitment_tx.0, counterparty_commitment_tx.2)))
+ }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, counterparty_commitment_tx.2)))
}
/// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and creates a signed commitment transaction
}
}
+ /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
+ pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
+ self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
+ }
+
+ pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
+ let usable_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
+ if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= usable_channel_value_msat {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
+ }
+ self.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
+ fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
+ fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
+ cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
+ });
+
+ Ok(())
+ }
+
/// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
/// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError> {
/// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
/// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
/// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
- pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<OutPoint>, ChannelMonitorUpdate, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) {
+ pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) {
+ // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
+ // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
+ // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
+ // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
// We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
_ => {}
}
}
+ let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
+ // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
+ // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
+ // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
+ // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
+ // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
+ // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
+ // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
+ if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
+ self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
+ Some((funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
+ update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
+ updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
+ }))
+ } else { None }
+ } else { None };
self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
self.update_time_counter += 1;
- self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
- (self.funding_txo.clone(), ChannelMonitorUpdate {
- update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
- updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
- }, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
+ (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
+ }
+}
+
+fn is_unsupported_shutdown_script(their_features: &InitFeatures, script: &Script) -> bool {
+ // We restrain shutdown scripts to standards forms to avoid transactions not propagating on the p2p tx-relay network
+
+ // BOLT 2 says we must only send a scriptpubkey of certain standard forms,
+ // which for a a BIP-141-compliant witness program is at max 42 bytes in length.
+ // So don't let the remote peer feed us some super fee-heavy script.
+ let is_script_too_long = script.len() > 42;
+ if is_script_too_long {
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ if their_features.supports_shutdown_anysegwit() && script.is_witness_program() && script.as_bytes()[0] != OP_PUSHBYTES_0.into_u8() {
+ return false;
}
+
+ return !script.is_p2pkh() && !script.is_p2sh() && !script.is_v0_p2wpkh() && !script.is_v0_p2wsh()
}
const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
-impl Writeable for InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
+impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
+ (0, FailRelay),
+ (1, FailMalformed),
+ (2, Fulfill),
+);
+
+impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+ // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
+ // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
+ // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
match self {
- &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref error_packet) => {
- 0u8.write(writer)?;
- error_packet.write(writer)?;
- },
- &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref onion_hash, ref err_code)) => {
- 1u8.write(writer)?;
- onion_hash.write(writer)?;
- err_code.write(writer)?;
- },
- &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
- 2u8.write(writer)?;
- payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
- },
+ ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
+ ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged => 0u8.write(writer)?,
+ ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged => 1u8.write(writer)?,
+ ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
}
Ok(())
}
}
-impl Readable for InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
+impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
- 0 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(Readable::read(reader)?),
- 1 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
- 2 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(Readable::read(reader)?),
+ 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
+ 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
_ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
})
}
}
-impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Writeable> Writeable for Channel<ChanSigner> {
+impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
// Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
- // called but include holding cell updates (and obviously we don't modify self).
+ // called.
- writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
- writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
+ write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
self.user_id.write(writer)?;
self.config.write(writer)?;
self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
(self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
- self.channel_outbound.write(writer)?;
self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
- self.holder_keys.write(writer)?;
+ let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
+ self.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
+ assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
+ assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
+ (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
+ writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
+
self.shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?;
self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
&OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
1u8.write(writer)?;
},
- &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref fail_reason) => {
- 2u8.write(writer)?;
- fail_reason.write(writer)?;
+ &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
+ // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
+ // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
+ 1u8.write(writer)?;
},
&OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref fail_reason) => {
3u8.write(writer)?;
None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
}
- self.funding_txo.write(writer)?;
self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
+ self.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
- self.last_block_connected.write(writer)?;
- self.funding_tx_confirmations.write(writer)?;
-
self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.write(writer)?;
self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
- self.counterparty_selected_contest_delay.write(writer)?;
- self.holder_selected_contest_delay.write(writer)?;
self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
self.minimum_depth.write(writer)?;
- self.counterparty_pubkeys.write(writer)?;
- self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
+ match &self.counterparty_forwarding_info {
+ Some(info) => {
+ 1u8.write(writer)?;
+ info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
+ info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
+ info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
+ },
+ None => 0u8.write(writer)?
+ }
+
+ self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
+ self.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
+ self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
+
+ self.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
+
+ write_tlv_fields!(writer, {(0, self.announcement_sigs, option)});
+
Ok(())
}
}
-impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable> Readable for Channel<ChanSigner> {
- fn read<R : ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
- let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
- return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
- }
+const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
+impl<'a, Signer: Sign, K: Deref> ReadableArgs<&'a K> for Channel<Signer>
+ where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer> {
+ fn read<R : ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, keys_source: &'a K) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+ let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
let user_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
let config: ChannelConfig = Readable::read(reader)?;
let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let channel_outbound = Readable::read(reader)?;
let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let holder_keys = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut keys_data = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE));
+ while keys_data.len() != keys_len as usize {
+ // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
+ let mut data = [0; 1024];
+ let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.len())];
+ reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
+ keys_data.extend_from_slice(read_slice);
+ }
+ let holder_signer = keys_source.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
+
let shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
_ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
};
- let funding_txo = Readable::read(reader)?;
let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let last_block_connected = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let funding_tx_confirmations = Readable::read(reader)?;
-
let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
let counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let counterparty_selected_contest_delay = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let holder_selected_contest_delay = Readable::read(reader)?;
let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
let minimum_depth = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let counterparty_pubkeys = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
+ 0 => None,
+ 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
+ fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ }),
+ _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+ };
+
+ let channel_parameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
+
let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
+
+ let mut announcement_sigs = None;
+ read_tlv_fields!(reader, {(0, announcement_sigs, option)});
+
+ let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+ secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
+
Ok(Channel {
user_id,
config,
channel_id,
channel_state,
- channel_outbound,
- secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
+ secp_ctx,
channel_value_satoshis,
latest_monitor_update_id,
- holder_keys,
+ holder_signer,
shutdown_pubkey,
destination_script,
last_sent_closing_fee,
- funding_txo,
funding_tx_confirmed_in,
+ funding_tx_confirmation_height,
short_channel_id,
- last_block_connected,
- funding_tx_confirmations,
counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
- counterparty_selected_contest_delay,
- holder_selected_contest_delay,
counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
minimum_depth,
- counterparty_pubkeys,
- counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
+ counterparty_forwarding_info,
+
+ channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
+ funding_transaction,
+ counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
counterparty_node_id,
commitment_secrets,
- network_sync: UpdateStatus::Fresh,
+ channel_update_status,
+
+ announcement_sigs,
+
+ #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
+ next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
+ #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
+ next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
+
+ workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
})
}
}
use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
use hex;
- use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
- use ln::channel::{Channel,ChannelKeys,InboundHTLCOutput,OutboundHTLCOutput,InboundHTLCState,OutboundHTLCState,HTLCOutputInCommitment,TxCreationKeys};
+ use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
+ use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, HTLCSource};
+ use ln::channel::{Channel,InboundHTLCOutput,OutboundHTLCOutput,InboundHTLCState,OutboundHTLCState,HTLCOutputInCommitment,HTLCCandidate,HTLCInitiator,TxCreationKeys};
use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
use ln::features::InitFeatures;
- use ln::msgs::{OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
+ use ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DataLossProtect, DecodeError, OptionalField, UnsignedChannelUpdate};
use ln::chan_utils;
- use ln::chan_utils::{HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelPublicKeys};
+ use ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT};
use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
- use chain::keysinterface::{InMemoryChannelKeys, KeysInterface};
+ use chain::keysinterface::{InMemorySigner, KeysInterface, BaseSign};
use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
use util::config::UserConfig;
- use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingChannelKeys;
+ use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
use util::test_utils;
use util::logger::Logger;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message, Signature, All};
+ use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
+ use bitcoin::secp256k1::recovery::RecoverableSignature;
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, WPubkeyHash};
use std::sync::Arc;
+ use prelude::*;
struct TestFeeEstimator {
fee_est: u32
}
struct Keys {
- chan_keys: InMemoryChannelKeys,
+ signer: InMemorySigner,
}
impl KeysInterface for Keys {
- type ChanKeySigner = InMemoryChannelKeys;
+ type Signer = InMemorySigner;
fn get_node_secret(&self) -> SecretKey { panic!(); }
fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)
}
- fn get_channel_keys(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> InMemoryChannelKeys {
- self.chan_keys.clone()
+ fn get_channel_signer(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> InMemorySigner {
+ self.signer.clone()
}
fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
+ fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
+ fn sign_invoice(&self, _invoice_preimage: Vec<u8>) -> Result<RecoverableSignature, ()> { panic!(); }
}
fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
let config = UserConfig::default();
- let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingChannelKeys>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
+ let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
// Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
// same as the old fee.
assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
}
+ #[test]
+ fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
+ // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
+ // dust limits are used.
+ let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+ let seed = [42; 32];
+ let network = Network::Testnet;
+ let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
+
+ // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
+ // they have different dust limits.
+
+ // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
+ let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
+ let config = UserConfig::default();
+ let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
+
+ // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
+ // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
+ let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
+ let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
+ let node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config).unwrap();
+
+ // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
+ let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.get_accept_channel();
+ accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
+ node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config, InitFeatures::known()).unwrap();
+ node_a_chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
+
+ // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
+ let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
+ node_a_chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
+ htlc_id: 0,
+ amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
+ payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
+ cltv_expiry: 300000000,
+ state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
+ });
+
+ node_a_chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
+ htlc_id: 1,
+ amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
+ payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
+ cltv_expiry: 200000000,
+ state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
+ source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
+ path: Vec::new(),
+ session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
+ first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
+ }
+ });
+
+ // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
+ // the dust limit check.
+ let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
+ let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
+ let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = node_a_chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(0);
+ assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
+
+ // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
+ // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
+ node_a_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
+ let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = node_a_chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(3);
+ let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
+ let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
+ assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
+ // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
+ // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
+ // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
+ // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
+ let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 };
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+ let seed = [42; 32];
+ let network = Network::Testnet;
+ let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
+
+ let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
+ let config = UserConfig::default();
+ let mut chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
+
+ let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(0);
+ let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(1);
+
+ // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
+ // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
+ let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
+ let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
+ let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
+ assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
+
+ // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
+ let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
+ let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
+ let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
+ assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
+
+ chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
+
+ // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
+ let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
+ let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
+ let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
+ assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
+
+ // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
+ let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
+ let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
+ let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
+ assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
+ }
+
#[test]
fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
let seed = [42; 32];
let network = Network::Testnet;
+ let best_block = BestBlock::from_genesis(network);
+ let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
// Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
// Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
let config = UserConfig::default();
- let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingChannelKeys>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
+ let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
// Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
- let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
+ let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
- let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingChannelKeys>::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config).unwrap();
+ let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config).unwrap();
// Node B --> Node A: accept channel
let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.get_accept_channel();
value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
}]};
let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
- let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
- let (funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, &&logger).unwrap();
+ let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
+ let (funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&logger).unwrap();
// Node B --> Node A: funding signed
- let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, &&logger);
+ let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&logger);
// Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
// Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
}
}
+ #[test]
+ fn channel_update() {
+ let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+ let seed = [42; 32];
+ let network = Network::Testnet;
+ let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
+ let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
+
+ // Create a channel.
+ let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
+ let config = UserConfig::default();
+ let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
+ assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info.is_none());
+ assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1); // the default
+ assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info().is_none());
+
+ // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
+ let update = ChannelUpdate {
+ contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
+ chain_hash,
+ short_channel_id: 0,
+ timestamp: 0,
+ flags: 0,
+ cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
+ htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
+ htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Absent,
+ fee_base_msat: 110,
+ fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
+ excess_data: Vec::new(),
+ },
+ signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
+ };
+ node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
+
+ // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
+ // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
+ assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
+ match node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
+ Some(info) => {
+ assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
+ assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
+ assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
+ },
+ None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
+ }
+ }
+
#[test]
fn outbound_commitment_test() {
// Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix C:
let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
- let mut chan_keys = InMemoryChannelKeys::new(
+ let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
&secp_ctx,
SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
// These aren't set in the test vectors:
[0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
10_000_000,
- (0, 0)
+ [0; 32]
);
- assert_eq!(chan_keys.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
+ assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
- let keys_provider = Keys { chan_keys: chan_keys.clone() };
+ let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
let mut config = UserConfig::default();
config.channel_options.announced_channel = false;
- let mut chan = Channel::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, 10_000_000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
- chan.counterparty_selected_contest_delay = 144;
+ let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, 10_000_000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
- chan.funding_txo = Some(funding_info);
let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
};
- chan_keys.on_accept(&counterparty_pubkeys, chan.counterparty_selected_contest_delay, chan.holder_selected_contest_delay);
+ chan.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
+ CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
+ pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
+ selected_contest_delay: 144
+ });
+ chan.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
+ signer.ready_channel(&chan.channel_transaction_parameters);
assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
// We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
// derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
// build_commitment_transaction.
- let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_keys.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
+ let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
- let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_keys.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
+ let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
- chan.counterparty_pubkeys = Some(counterparty_pubkeys);
-
- let mut unsigned_tx: (Transaction, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>);
-
- let mut holdertx;
macro_rules! test_commitment {
( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, {
$( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
} ) => { {
- unsigned_tx = {
+ let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
let mut res = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, chan.feerate_per_kw, &logger);
+
let htlcs = res.2.drain(..)
.filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
.collect();
(res.0, htlcs)
};
+ let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
+ let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
- let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&unsigned_tx.0).signature_hash(0, &redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]).unwrap();
+ let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis);
secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).unwrap();
- let mut per_htlc = Vec::new();
+ let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
+ let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
+ counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
$({
let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
- per_htlc.push((unsigned_tx.1[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
+ per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
+ counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
})*
- assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), per_htlc.len());
+ assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
- holdertx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new_missing_holder_sig(unsigned_tx.0.clone(), counterparty_signature.clone(), &chan_keys.pubkeys().funding_pubkey, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey(), keys.clone(), chan.feerate_per_kw, per_htlc);
- let holder_sig = chan_keys.sign_holder_commitment(&holdertx, &chan.secp_ctx).unwrap();
- assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig);
+ let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
+ commitment_tx.clone(),
+ counterparty_signature,
+ counterparty_htlc_sigs,
+ &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
+ chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
+ );
+ let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
- assert_eq!(serialize(&holdertx.add_holder_sig(&redeemscript, holder_sig))[..],
- hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..]);
+ let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
+ let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
+ assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
- let htlc_sigs = chan_keys.sign_holder_commitment_htlc_transactions(&holdertx, &chan.secp_ctx).unwrap();
- let mut htlc_sig_iter = holdertx.per_htlc.iter().zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
+ // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
+ let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
$({
let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
- let ref htlc = unsigned_tx.1[$htlc_idx];
- let htlc_tx = chan.build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.0.txid(), &htlc, true, &keys, chan.feerate_per_kw);
+ let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
+ let htlc_tx = chan.build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, &htlc, true, &keys, chan.feerate_per_kw);
let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]).unwrap();
secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).unwrap();
assert!(preimage.is_some());
}
- let mut htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
- while (htlc_sig.1).1.is_none() { htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap(); }
- assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx));
+ let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx), "output index");
let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
- assert_eq!(Some(signature), *(htlc_sig.1).1);
- assert_eq!(serialize(&holdertx.get_signed_htlc_tx((htlc_sig.1).0, &(htlc_sig.1).1.unwrap(), &preimage, chan.counterparty_selected_contest_delay))[..],
- hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..]);
+ assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
+ let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
+ let channel_parameters = chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
+ let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
+ assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
+ hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
})*
- loop {
- let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next();
- if htlc_sig.is_none() { break; }
- assert!((htlc_sig.unwrap().1).1.is_none());
- }
+ assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
} }
}
test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
"304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
"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", {});
+
+ // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
+ chan.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
+ chan.feerate_per_kw = 253;
+ chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
+ chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
+ let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
+ htlc_id: 1,
+ amount_msat: 2000000,
+ cltv_expiry: 501,
+ payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
+ state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
+ };
+ out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
+ out
+ });
+ chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
+ chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
+ let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
+ htlc_id: 6,
+ amount_msat: 5000000,
+ cltv_expiry: 506,
+ payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
+ state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
+ source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
+ };
+ out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
+ out
+ });
+ chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
+ let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
+ htlc_id: 5,
+ amount_msat: 5000000,
+ cltv_expiry: 505,
+ payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
+ state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
+ source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
+ };
+ out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
+ out
+ });
+
+ test_commitment!("30440220048705bec5288d28b3f29344b8d124853b1af423a568664d2c6f02c8ea886525022060f998a461052a2476b912db426ea2a06700953a241135c7957f2e79bc222df9",
+ "3045022100c4f1d60b6fca9febc8b39de1a31e84c5f7c4b41c97239ef05f4350aa484c6b5e02200c5134ac8b20eb7a29d0dd4a501f6aa8fefb8489171f4cb408bd2a32324ab03f",
+ "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", {
+
+ { 0,
+ "304502210081cbb94121761d34c189cd4e6a281feea6f585060ad0ba2632e8d6b3c6bb8a6c02201007981bbd16539d63df2805b5568f1f5688cd2a885d04706f50db9b77ba13c6",
+ "304502210090ed76aeb21b53236a598968abc66e2024691d07b62f53ddbeca8f93144af9c602205f873af5a0c10e62690e9aba09740550f194a9dc455ba4c1c23f6cde7704674c",
+ "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" },
+ { 1,
+ "304402201d0f09d2bf7bc245a4f17980e1e9164290df16c70c6a2ff1592f5030d6108581022061e744a7dc151b36bf0aff7a4f1812ba90b8b03633bb979a270d19858fd960c5",
+ "30450221009aef000d2e843a4202c1b1a2bf554abc9a7902bf49b2cb0759bc507456b7ebad02204e7c3d193ede2fd2b4cd6b39f51a920e581e35575e357e44d7b699c40ce61d39",
+ "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" },
+ { 2,
+ "30440220010bf035d5823596e50dce2076a4d9f942d8d28031c9c428b901a02b6b8140de02203250e8e4a08bc5b4ecdca4d0eedf98223e02e3ac1c0206b3a7ffdb374aa21e5f",
+ "30440220073de0067b88e425b3018b30366bfeda0ccb703118ccd3d02ead08c0f53511d002203fac50ac0e4cf8a3af0b4b1b12e801650591f748f8ddf1e089c160f10b69e511",
+ "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" }
+ } );
}
#[test]
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff