use crate::ln::msgs;
use crate::ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
-use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
+use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
use crate::ln::chan_utils;
use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
#[derive(Clone)]
enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
+ /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
Failure(HTLCFailReason),
}
// If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
// the current one.
self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
+ } else if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
+ // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
+ // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
+ debug_assert!(self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
+ self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
} else {
// If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
// their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
}
- // TODO: Sadly, we pass HTLCs twice to ChannelMonitor: once via the HolderCommitmentTransaction and once via the update
+ // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
+ // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
+ // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
+ // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
+ // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
+ // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
+ #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
+ let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
+ #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
+ use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
+ // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
+ let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
+ separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
+ }
+
+ let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
- for (idx, (htlc, source)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
+ for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, self.opt_anchors(),
if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
}
- htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source));
+ if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
+ htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
+ }
} else {
- htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source));
+ htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
}
+ if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
+ if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
+ nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
+ }
+ }
+ debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
}
let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
}
}
- self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
- let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
- update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
- updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
- commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
- htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs
- }]
- };
-
for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
Some(forward_info.clone())
need_commitment = true;
}
}
+ let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
// Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
+ if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
+ // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
+ // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
+ // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
+ // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
+ // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
+ // claim anyway.
+ claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
+ }
htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
need_commitment = true;
}
}
+ self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
+ let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
+ update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
+ updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
+ commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
+ htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
+ claimed_htlcs,
+ nondust_htlc_sources,
+ }]
+ };
+
self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
// Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
// build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff