use crate::chain;
use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
-use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
+use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, WithChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
use crate::events;
use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
// Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
// construct one themselves.
use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
-use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel};
+use crate::ln::channel::{self, Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, WithChannelContext};
use crate::ln::features::{Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
#[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
-use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
-use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
-use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
-use crate::ln::onion_payment::{check_incoming_htlc_cltv, create_recv_pending_htlc_info, create_fwd_pending_htlc_info, decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion, InboundOnionErr, NextPacketDetails};
+use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
+use crate::ln::onion_payment::{check_incoming_htlc_cltv, create_recv_pending_htlc_info, create_fwd_pending_htlc_info, decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion, InboundHTLCErr, NextPacketDetails};
use crate::ln::msgs;
use crate::ln::onion_utils;
-use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
+use crate::ln::onion_utils::{HTLCFailReason, INVALID_ONION_BLINDING};
use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
#[cfg(test)]
use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
use crate::offers::offer::{DerivedMetadata, Offer, OfferBuilder};
use crate::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
use crate::offers::refund::{Refund, RefundBuilder};
-use crate::onion_message::{Destination, OffersMessage, OffersMessageHandler, PendingOnionMessage, new_pending_onion_message};
-use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider};
+use crate::onion_message::messenger::{Destination, MessageRouter, PendingOnionMessage, new_pending_onion_message};
+use crate::onion_message::offers::{OffersMessage, OffersMessageHandler};
+use crate::sign::{EntropySource, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider};
use crate::sign::ecdsa::WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner;
use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
-use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
+use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger, WithContext};
use crate::util::errors::APIError;
+#[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
+use {
+ crate::routing::router::DefaultRouter,
+ crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph,
+ crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters},
+ crate::sign::KeysManager,
+};
use alloc::collections::{btree_map, BTreeMap};
// Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
// our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
-/// Routing info for an inbound HTLC onion.
+/// Information about where a received HTLC('s onion) has indicated the HTLC should go.
#[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
+#[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
pub enum PendingHTLCRouting {
- /// A forwarded HTLC.
+ /// An HTLC which should be forwarded on to another node.
Forward {
- /// BOLT 4 onion packet.
+ /// The onion which should be included in the forwarded HTLC, telling the next hop what to
+ /// do with the HTLC.
onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
- /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
- /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
+ /// The short channel ID of the channel which we were instructed to forward this HTLC to.
+ ///
+ /// This could be a real on-chain SCID, an SCID alias, or some other SCID which has meaning
+ /// to the receiving node, such as one returned from
+ /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] or [`ChannelManager::get_phantom_scid`].
short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
/// Set if this HTLC is being forwarded within a blinded path.
blinded: Option<BlindedForward>,
},
- /// An HTLC paid to an invoice (supposedly) generated by us.
- /// At this point, we have not checked that the invoice being paid was actually generated by us,
- /// but rather it's claiming to pay an invoice of ours.
+ /// The onion indicates that this is a payment for an invoice (supposedly) generated by us.
+ ///
+ /// Note that at this point, we have not checked that the invoice being paid was actually
+ /// generated by us, but rather it's claiming to pay an invoice of ours.
Receive {
- /// Payment secret and total msat received.
+ /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and (potential) proof that this
+ /// is a payment for an invoice we generated. This proof of payment is is also used for
+ /// linking MPP parts of a larger payment.
payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
- /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`] for more info.
+ /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
+ ///
+ /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
+ /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
+ /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
/// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
+ ///
/// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
- /// Shared secret derived using a phantom node secret key. If this field is Some, the
- /// payment was sent to a phantom node (one hop beyond the current node), but can be
- /// settled by this node.
+ /// If the onion had forwarding instructions to one of our phantom node SCIDs, this will
+ /// provide the onion shared secret used to decrypt the next level of forwarding
+ /// instructions.
phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
- /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
+ /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
+ ///
+ /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
+ /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
+ /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
+ /// Set if this HTLC is the final hop in a multi-hop blinded path.
+ requires_blinded_error: bool,
},
- /// Incoming keysend (sender provided the preimage in a TLV).
+ /// The onion indicates that this is for payment to us but which contains the preimage for
+ /// claiming included, and is unrelated to any invoice we'd previously generated (aka a
+ /// "keysend" or "spontaneous" payment).
ReceiveKeysend {
- /// This was added in 0.0.116 and will break deserialization on downgrades.
+ /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and possibly a token to
+ /// associate MPP parts of a larger payment.
+ ///
+ /// This will only be filled in if receiving MPP keysend payments is enabled, and it being
+ /// present will cause deserialization to fail on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.116.
payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
/// Preimage for this onion payment. This preimage is provided by the sender and will be
/// used to settle the spontaneous payment.
payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
- /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`] for more info.
+ /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
+ ///
+ /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately bubble back up as
+ /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
/// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
+ ///
/// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
- /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
+ /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
+ ///
+ /// For HTLCs received by LDK, these will ultimately bubble back up as
+ /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
},
}
/// Information used to forward or fail this HTLC that is being forwarded within a blinded path.
-#[derive(Clone, Copy, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
+#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct BlindedForward {
/// The `blinding_point` that was set in the inbound [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC`], or in the inbound
/// onion payload if we're the introduction node. Useful for calculating the next hop's
/// [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC::blinding_point`].
pub inbound_blinding_point: PublicKey,
- // Another field will be added here when we support forwarding as a non-intro node.
+ /// If needed, this determines how this HTLC should be failed backwards, based on whether we are
+ /// the introduction node.
+ pub failure: BlindedFailure,
}
impl PendingHTLCRouting {
// Used to override the onion failure code and data if the HTLC is blinded.
fn blinded_failure(&self) -> Option<BlindedFailure> {
- // TODO: needs update when we support receiving to multi-hop blinded paths
- if let Self::Forward { blinded: Some(_), .. } = self {
- Some(BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode)
- } else {
- None
+ match self {
+ Self::Forward { blinded: Some(BlindedForward { failure, .. }), .. } => Some(*failure),
+ Self::Receive { requires_blinded_error: true, .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode),
+ _ => None,
}
}
}
-/// Full details of an incoming HTLC, including routing info.
+/// Information about an incoming HTLC, including the [`PendingHTLCRouting`] describing where it
+/// should go next.
#[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
+#[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
pub struct PendingHTLCInfo {
/// Further routing details based on whether the HTLC is being forwarded or received.
pub routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
- /// Shared secret from the previous hop.
- /// Used encrypt failure packets in the event that the HTLC needs to be failed backwards.
+ /// The onion shared secret we build with the sender used to decrypt the onion.
+ ///
+ /// This is later used to encrypt failure packets in the event that the HTLC is failed.
pub incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
/// Hash of the payment preimage, to lock the payment until the receiver releases the preimage.
pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
- /// Amount offered by this HTLC.
- pub incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
- /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
- /// may overshoot this in either case)
+ /// Amount received in the incoming HTLC.
+ ///
+ /// This field was added in LDK 0.0.113 and will be `None` for objects written by prior
+ /// versions.
+ pub incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>,
+ /// The amount the sender indicated should be forwarded on to the next hop or amount the sender
+ /// intended for us to receive for received payments.
+ ///
+ /// If the received amount is less than this for received payments, an intermediary hop has
+ /// attempted to steal some of our funds and we should fail the HTLC (the sender should retry
+ /// it along another path).
+ ///
+ /// Because nodes can take less than their required fees, and because senders may wish to
+ /// improve their own privacy, this amount may be less than [`Self::incoming_amt_msat`] for
+ /// received payments. In such cases, recipients must handle this HTLC as if it had received
+ /// [`Self::outgoing_amt_msat`].
pub outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
- /// Outgoing timelock expiration blockheight.
+ /// The CLTV the sender has indicated we should set on the forwarded HTLC (or has indicated
+ /// should have been set on the received HTLC for received payments).
pub outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
- /// The fee being skimmed off the top of this HTLC. If this is a forward, it'll be the fee we are
- /// skimming. If we're receiving this HTLC, it's the fee that our counterparty skimmed.
+ /// The fee taken for this HTLC in addition to the standard protocol HTLC fees.
+ ///
+ /// If this is a payment for forwarding, this is the fee we are taking before forwarding the
+ /// HTLC.
+ ///
+ /// If this is a received payment, this is the fee that our counterparty took.
+ ///
+ /// This is used to allow LSPs to take fees as a part of payments, without the sender having to
+ /// shoulder them.
pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
}
Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
}
+#[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
prev_user_channel_id: u128,
}
+#[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
FailHTLC {
htlc_id: u64,
err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
},
+ FailMalformedHTLC {
+ htlc_id: u64,
+ failure_code: u16,
+ sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
+ },
}
-// Used for failing blinded HTLCs backwards correctly.
-#[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
-enum BlindedFailure {
+/// Whether this blinded HTLC is being failed backwards by the introduction node or a blinded node,
+/// which determines the failure message that should be used.
+#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub enum BlindedFailure {
+ /// This HTLC is being failed backwards by the introduction node, and thus should be failed with
+ /// [`msgs::UpdateFailHTLC`] and error code `0x8000|0x4000|24`.
FromIntroductionNode,
- // Another variant will be added here for non-intro nodes.
+ /// This HTLC is being failed backwards by a blinded node within the path, and thus should be
+ /// failed with [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`] and error code `0x8000|0x4000|24`.
+ FromBlindedNode,
}
/// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
err: msgs::LightningError,
- chan_id: Option<(ChannelId, u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
+ closes_channel: bool,
shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
- channel_capacity: Option<u64>,
}
impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
#[inline]
},
},
},
- chan_id: None,
+ closes_channel: false,
shutdown_finish: None,
- channel_capacity: None,
}
}
#[inline]
fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
- Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None, channel_capacity: None }
+ Self { err, closes_channel: false, shutdown_finish: None }
}
#[inline]
- fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, channel_capacity: u64) -> Self {
+ fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
let err_msg = msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: err.clone() };
let action = if shutdown_res.monitor_update.is_some() {
// We have a closing `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, which means the channel was funded and we
};
Self {
err: LightningError { err, action },
- chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
+ closes_channel: true,
shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
- channel_capacity: Some(channel_capacity)
}
}
#[inline]
},
},
},
- chan_id: None,
+ closes_channel: false,
shutdown_finish: None,
- channel_capacity: None,
}
}
fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
- self.chan_id.is_some()
+ self.closes_channel
}
}
// |
// |__`peer_state`
// |
-// |__`id_to_peer`
+// |__`outpoint_to_peer`
// |
// |__`short_to_chan_info`
// |
/// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
- /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
- ///
- /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
- /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
- /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
+ /// Channel funding outpoint -> `counterparty_node_id`.
///
/// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
/// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
/// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
///
/// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
- id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<ChannelId, PublicKey>>,
+ #[cfg(not(test))]
+ outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ pub(crate) outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
/// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
///
// then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
// failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
// LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
-#[deny(const_err)]
#[allow(dead_code)]
const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
// Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
-#[deny(const_err)]
#[allow(dead_code)]
const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
match $internal {
Ok(msg) => Ok(msg),
- Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish, channel_capacity }) => {
+ Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish, .. }) => {
let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
+ let counterparty_node_id = shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id;
+ let channel_id = shutdown_res.channel_id;
+ let logger = WithContext::from(
+ &$self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_id),
+ );
+ log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel: {}", err.err);
+
$self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
if let Some(update) = update_option {
msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
msg: update
});
}
- if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
- $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
- channel_id, user_channel_id,
- reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() },
- counterparty_node_id: Some($counterparty_node_id),
- channel_capacity_sats: channel_capacity,
- }, None));
- }
+ } else {
+ log_error!($self.logger, "Got non-closing error: {}", err.err);
}
- log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
} else {
msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
},
}
} };
- ($self: ident, $internal: expr) => {
- match $internal {
- Ok(res) => Ok(res),
- Err((chan, msg_handle_err)) => {
- let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
- handle_error!($self, Err(msg_handle_err), counterparty_node_id).map_err(|err| (chan, err))
- },
- }
- };
}
macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
- $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.channel_id());
+ if let Some(outpoint) = $channel_context.get_funding_txo() {
+ $self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&outpoint);
+ }
let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
(false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
},
ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
- log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$channel.context);
+ log_error!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
- let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
- let user_id = $channel.context.get_user_id();
- let channel_capacity_satoshis = $channel.context.get_value_satoshis();
-
- (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, user_id,
- shutdown_res, $channel_update, channel_capacity_satoshis))
+ let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: msg.clone() };
+ let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason);
+ let err =
+ MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $channel_update);
+ (true, err)
},
}
};
macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
- let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
+ let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&&logger,
&$self.node_signer, $self.chain_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
$self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
match $update_res {
ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
- log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err_str);
+ log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
panic!("{}", err_str);
},
ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
- log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
+ log_debug!(logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
&$chan.context.channel_id());
false
},
forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
- id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
+ outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
// Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
// Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
- // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
+ // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
// of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
// unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
// the same channel.
pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
// Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
// Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
- // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
+ // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
// of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
// unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
// the same channel.
.collect()
}
- /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
- fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, context: &ChannelContext<SP>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
- let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
- match context.unbroadcasted_funding() {
- Some(transaction) => {
- pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
- channel_id: context.channel_id(), transaction
- }, None));
- },
- None => {},
- }
- pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
- channel_id: context.channel_id(),
- user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
- reason: closure_reason,
- counterparty_node_id: Some(context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
- channel_capacity_sats: Some(context.get_value_satoshis()),
- }, None));
- }
-
fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
- let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
- let shutdown_result;
- loop {
+ let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
+ let mut shutdown_result = None;
+
+ {
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
- let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs, local_shutdown_result) =
+ let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) =
chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
failed_htlcs = htlcs;
- shutdown_result = local_shutdown_result;
- debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
// We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
// here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
- break;
}
-
- if chan.is_shutdown() {
- if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
- if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
- peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
- msg: channel_update
- });
- }
- self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
- }
- }
- break;
+ } else {
+ let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
+ shutdown_result = Some(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
}
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
- // If we reach this point, it means that the channel_id either refers to an unfunded channel or
- // it does not exist for this peer. Either way, we can attempt to force-close it.
- //
- // An appropriate error will be returned for non-existence of the channel if that's the case.
- mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
- mem::drop(per_peer_state);
- return self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, false).map(|_| ())
+ return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
+ err: format!(
+ "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
+ channel_id, counterparty_node_id,
+ )
+ });
},
}
}
debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
}
- log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.len());
+ let logger = WithContext::from(
+ &self.logger, Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id), Some(shutdown_res.channel_id),
+ );
+
+ log_debug!(logger, "Finishing closure of channel due to {} with {} HTLCs to fail",
+ shutdown_res.closure_reason, shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.len());
for htlc_source in shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
if let Some(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id) {
update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
- self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context(), ClosureReason::FundingBatchClosure);
- shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
+ shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::FundingBatchClosure));
}
}
has_uncompleted_channel = Some(has_uncompleted_channel.map_or(!state, |v| v || !state));
"Closing a batch where all channels have completed initial monitor update",
);
}
+
+ {
+ let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
+ pending_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
+ channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id,
+ user_channel_id: shutdown_res.user_channel_id,
+ reason: shutdown_res.closure_reason,
+ counterparty_node_id: Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id),
+ channel_capacity_sats: Some(shutdown_res.channel_capacity_satoshis),
+ channel_funding_txo: shutdown_res.channel_funding_txo,
+ }, None));
+
+ if let Some(transaction) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_funding_tx {
+ pending_events.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
+ channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id, transaction
+ }, None));
+ }
+ }
for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
}
} else {
ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
};
+ let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*peer_node_id), Some(*channel_id));
if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
- log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
- self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_phase_entry.get().context(), closure_reason);
+ log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
mem::drop(peer_state);
mem::drop(per_peer_state);
match chan_phase {
ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
- self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast));
+ self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast, closure_reason));
(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
},
ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
- self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
+ self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
// Unfunded channel has no update
(None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
},
}
} else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
- log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
+ log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
// N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
// don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
// events anyway.
}
fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
- &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC
+ &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey,
) -> Result<
(onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg
> {
msg, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx
)?;
+ let is_intro_node_forward = match next_hop {
+ onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
+ next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedForward {
+ intro_node_blinding_point: Some(_), ..
+ }, ..
+ } => true,
+ _ => false,
+ };
+
macro_rules! return_err {
($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
{
- log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
+ log_info!(
+ WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id)),
+ "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg
+ );
+ // If `msg.blinding_point` is set, we must always fail with malformed.
+ if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
+ return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
+ channel_id: msg.channel_id,
+ htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
+ sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
+ failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
+ }));
+ }
+
+ let (err_code, err_data) = if is_intro_node_forward {
+ (INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, &[0; 32][..])
+ } else { ($err_code, $data) };
return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
channel_id: msg.channel_id,
htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
- reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
+ reason: HTLCFailReason::reason(err_code, err_data.to_vec())
.get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
}));
}
}
fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
- &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, shared_secret: [u8; 32], decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop,
- allow_underpay: bool, next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
+ &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
+ decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop, allow_underpay: bool,
+ next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>,
) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
macro_rules! return_err {
($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
{
- log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
+ let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
+ log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
+ if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
+ return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
+ msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
+ channel_id: msg.channel_id,
+ htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
+ sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
+ failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
+ }
+ ))
+ }
return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
channel_id: msg.channel_id,
htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
// delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
},
- Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
+ Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
}
},
onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
match create_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
- Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
+ Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
}
}
}
if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
}
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
+ log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
}
/// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
/// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
+ log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
Some(id) => id,
}
fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
+ log_trace!(logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
} = args;
// The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
-
- log_trace!(self.logger,
- "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
- payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
let (onion_packet, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::create_payment_onion(
&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height,
payment_hash, keysend_preimage, prng_seed
- )?;
+ ).map_err(|e| {
+ let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
+ log_error!(logger, "Failed to build an onion for path for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
+ e
+ })?;
let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
- None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
+ None => {
+ let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
+ log_error!(logger, "Failed to find first-hop for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
+ return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()})
+ },
Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
};
+ let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(id));
+ log_trace!(logger,
+ "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
+ payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
+
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
.ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
}
let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
path: path.clone(),
session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
payment_id,
- }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
+ }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
Some(monitor_update) => {
match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
}
return Ok(());
};
-
match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
Err(e) => {
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
- let (chan, msg_opt) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
- Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) => {
- let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
+ let funding_txo;
+ let (mut chan, msg_opt) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
+ Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(mut chan)) => {
+ funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
- let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &self.logger)
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
+ let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &&logger)
.map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
- let user_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
- let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
- let channel_capacity = chan.context.get_value_satoshis();
- (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, channel_capacity))
+ let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: msg.clone() };
+ let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false, reason);
+ (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, None))
} else { unreachable!(); });
match funding_res {
- Ok((chan, funding_msg)) => (chan, funding_msg),
+ Ok(funding_msg) => (chan, funding_msg),
Err((chan, err)) => {
mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
mem::drop(per_peer_state);
-
let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
- let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
- if id_to_peer.insert(chan.context.channel_id(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
- panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
+ let mut outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
+ match outpoint_to_peer.entry(funding_txo) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()); },
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(o) => {
+ let err = format!(
+ "An existing channel using outpoint {} is open with peer {}",
+ funding_txo, o.get()
+ );
+ mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer);
+ mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
+ mem::drop(per_peer_state);
+ let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.clone() };
+ self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
+ return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err });
+ }
}
- e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
+ e.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan));
}
}
Ok(())
.and_then(|mut peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id))
.map(|mut chan| {
update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
- self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context(), ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: e.clone() });
- shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
+ let closure_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: e.clone() };
+ shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
});
}
}
+ mem::drop(funding_batch_states);
for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
}
None => {
let error = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id);
- log_error!(self.logger, "{} when attempting to forward intercepted HTLC", error);
+ let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(next_node_id), Some(*next_hop_channel_id));
+ log_error!(logger, "{} when attempting to forward intercepted HTLC", error);
return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
err: error
})
for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
if short_chan_id != 0 {
+ let mut forwarding_counterparty = None;
macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
() => {
for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
}) => {
macro_rules! failure_handler {
($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
- log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
+ let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, forwarding_counterparty, Some(prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()));
+ log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
- payment_hash, &self.node_signer
+ payment_hash, None, &self.node_signer
) {
Ok(res) => res,
Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
{
Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
- Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
+ Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
}
},
_ => panic!(),
fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
}
},
- HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
+ HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
// Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
// the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
// trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
continue;
}
};
+ forwarding_counterparty = Some(counterparty_node_id);
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
- match forward_info {
+ let queue_fail_htlc_res = match forward_info {
HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
}, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
},
}) => {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
+ log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
// Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
phantom_shared_secret: None,
- blinded_failure: blinded.map(|_| BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode),
+ blinded_failure: blinded.map(|b| b.failure),
});
let next_blinding_point = blinded.and_then(|b| {
let encrypted_tlvs_ss = self.node_signer.ecdh(
if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, next_blinding_point, &self.fee_estimator,
- &self.logger)
+ &&logger)
{
if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
+ log_trace!(logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
} else {
panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
}
));
continue;
}
+ None
},
HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
},
HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
- if let Err(e) = chan.queue_fail_htlc(
- htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
- ) {
- if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
- } else {
- panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
- }
- // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
- // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
- // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
- continue;
- }
+ log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
+ Some((chan.queue_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &&logger), htlc_id))
},
+ HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
+ log_trace!(logger, "Failing malformed HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
+ let res = chan.queue_fail_malformed_htlc(
+ htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion, &&logger
+ );
+ Some((res, htlc_id))
+ },
+ };
+ if let Some((queue_fail_htlc_res, htlc_id)) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
+ if let Err(e) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
+ if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
+ log_trace!(logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
+ } else {
+ panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_{{malformed_}}htlc() were not met");
+ }
+ // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
+ // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
+ // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
+ continue;
+ }
}
}
} else {
}) => {
let blinded_failure = routing.blinded_failure();
let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
- PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret, custom_tlvs } => {
+ PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
+ payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret,
+ custom_tlvs, requires_blinded_error: _
+ } => {
let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
phantom_shared_secret,
- blinded_failure: None,
+ blinded_failure,
}), payment_hash,
HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
},
};
},
- HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
+ HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
}
}
fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
+
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
+
// If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
if new_feerate != chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
+ log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
}
return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
}
if !chan.context.is_live() {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
+ log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
}
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
+ log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
&chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
- chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
+ chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
NotifyOption::DoPersist
}
| {
context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
- log_error!(self.logger,
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
+ log_error!(logger,
"Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
- self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
- shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false));
+ shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
node_id: counterparty_node_id,
action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
- log_debug!(self.logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
+ log_debug!(logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
node_id: counterparty_node_id,
for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
- log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
+ let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(*chan_id));
+ log_error!(logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
node_id: counterparty_node_id,
&self.pending_events, &self.logger)
{ self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
},
- HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint, .. }) => {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", &payment_hash, onion_error);
- let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
+ HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
+ ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret,
+ ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint, ref blinded_failure, ..
+ }) => {
+ log_trace!(
+ WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(outpoint.to_channel_id())),
+ "Failing {}HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us: {:?}",
+ if blinded_failure.is_some() { "blinded " } else { "" }, &payment_hash, onion_error
+ );
+ let failure = match blinded_failure {
+ Some(BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode) => {
+ let blinded_onion_error = HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32]);
+ let err_packet = blinded_onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
+ incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
+ );
+ HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
+ },
+ Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode) => {
+ HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC {
+ htlc_id: *htlc_id,
+ failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
+ sha256_of_onion: [0; 32]
+ }
+ },
+ None => {
+ let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
+ incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
+ );
+ HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
+ }
+ };
let mut push_forward_ev = false;
let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
}
match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
- entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
+ entry.get_mut().push(failure);
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
- entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
+ entry.insert(vec!(failure));
}
}
mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
}
if valid_mpp {
for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
+ let prev_hop_chan_id = htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
|_, definitely_duplicate| {
if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
// We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
// HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
- log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
+ let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop_chan_id));
+ log_error!(logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
} else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
}
}
if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
- let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
+ let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
match fulfill_res {
UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } => {
if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat), false) {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
+ log_trace!(logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
chan_id, action);
peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
}
};
mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Completing monitor update completion action for channel {} as claim was redundant: {:?}",
+ log_trace!(logger, "Completing monitor update completion action for channel {} as claim was redundant: {:?}",
chan_id, action);
let (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker) =
if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
}
let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
+ counterparty_node_id: None,
updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
payment_preimage,
}],
// with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
// channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
// again on restart.
- log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
+ log_error!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id())), "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
payment_preimage, update_res);
}
} else {
pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
-> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
+ log_trace!(logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
&channel.context.channel_id(),
if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
}
if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
- log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
+ log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
}
Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
None => {
// TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
- // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
- let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
- match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
+ // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
+ let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
+ match outpoint_to_peer.get(&funding_txo) {
Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
None => return,
}
pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
pending.len()
} else { 0 };
- log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
+ log_trace!(logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
remaining_in_flight);
if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
}
fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+
+ let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(*temporary_channel_id));
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
let peers_without_funded_channels =
self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
- .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
+ .ok_or_else(|| {
+ let err_str = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
+ log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
+
+ APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: err_str }
+ })?;
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
&unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
- &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|e| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.to_string() })
+ &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|e| {
+ let err_str = e.to_string();
+ log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
+
+ APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: err_str }
+ })
+ }
+ _ => {
+ let err_str = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned();
+ log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
+
+ Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str })
}
- _ => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() })
}?;
if accept_0conf {
}
};
peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
- return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
+ let err_str = "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned();
+ log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
+
+ return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
} else {
// If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
// with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
}
};
peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
- return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
+ let err_str = "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned();
+ log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
+
+ return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
}
}
// If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
+ let channel_type = channel::channel_type_from_open_channel(
+ &msg, &peer_state.latest_features, &self.channel_type_features()
+ ).map_err(|e|
+ MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id)
+ )?;
let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
push_msat: msg.push_msat,
- channel_type: msg.channel_type.clone().unwrap(),
+ channel_type,
}, None));
peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
- let (chan, funding_msg_opt, monitor) =
+ let (mut chan, funding_msg_opt, monitor) =
match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
- match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger) {
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &inbound_chan.context);
+ match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger) {
Ok(res) => res,
- Err((mut inbound_chan, err)) => {
+ Err((inbound_chan, err)) => {
// We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
// above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
// concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
- update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &inbound_chan.context);
- let user_id = inbound_chan.context.get_user_id();
- let shutdown_res = inbound_chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
- return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(format!("{}", err),
- msg.temporary_channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, inbound_chan.context.get_value_satoshis()));
+ debug_assert!(matches!(err, ChannelError::Close(_)));
+ // Really we should be returning the channel_id the peer expects based
+ // on their funding info here, but they're horribly confused anyway, so
+ // there's not a lot we can do to save them.
+ return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan), &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
},
}
},
- Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(_)) | Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) => {
- return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
+ Some(mut phase) => {
+ let err_msg = format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
+ let err = ChannelError::Close(err_msg);
+ return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut phase, &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
},
None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
};
- match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
+ let funded_channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
+
+ macro_rules! fail_chan { ($err: expr) => { {
+ // Note that at this point we've filled in the funding outpoint on our
+ // channel, but its actually in conflict with another channel. Thus, if
+ // we call `convert_chan_phase_err` immediately (thus calling
+ // `update_maps_on_chan_removal`), we'll remove the existing channel
+ // from `outpoint_to_peer`. Thus, we must first unset the funding outpoint
+ // on the channel.
+ let err = ChannelError::Close($err.to_owned());
+ chan.unset_funding_info(msg.temporary_channel_id);
+ return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, chan, &funded_channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL).1);
+ } } }
+
+ match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funded_channel_id) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
- Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
- "Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(),
- chan.context.channel_id()
- ))
+ fail_chan!("Already had channel with the new channel_id");
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
- let mut id_to_peer_lock = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
- match id_to_peer_lock.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
+ let mut outpoint_to_peer_lock = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
+ match outpoint_to_peer_lock.entry(monitor.get_funding_txo().0) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
- return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
- "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
- chan.context.channel_id()))
+ fail_chan!("The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible");
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
- mem::drop(id_to_peer_lock);
+ mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer_lock);
// There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
// hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
}
Ok(())
} else {
- log_error!(self.logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
- let channel_id = match funding_msg_opt {
- Some(msg) => msg.channel_id,
- None => chan.context.channel_id(),
- };
- return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
- "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
- channel_id));
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
+ log_error!(logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
+ fail_chan!("Duplicate funding outpoint");
}
}
}
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
- match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
- ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => {
- let monitor = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
- chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
- if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
- handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
- Ok(())
- } else {
- try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned())), chan_phase_entry)
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
+ if matches!(chan_phase_entry.get(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) {
+ let chan = if let ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) = chan_phase_entry.remove() { chan } else { unreachable!() };
+ let logger = WithContext::from(
+ &self.logger,
+ Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
+ Some(chan.context.channel_id())
+ );
+ let res =
+ chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger);
+ match res {
+ Ok((mut chan, monitor)) => {
+ if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
+ // We really should be able to insert here without doing a second
+ // lookup, but sadly rust stdlib doesn't currently allow keeping
+ // the original Entry around with the value removed.
+ let mut chan = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id).or_insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
+ if let ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) = &mut chan {
+ handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
+ } else { unreachable!(); }
+ Ok(())
+ } else {
+ let e = ChannelError::Close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned());
+ // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no
+ // updates should be made on it. Previously, full_stack_target
+ // found an (unreachable) panic when the monitor update contained
+ // within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
+ chan.unset_funding_info(msg.channel_id);
+ return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::Funded(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
+ }
+ },
+ Err((chan, e)) => {
+ debug_assert!(matches!(e, ChannelError::Close(_)),
+ "We don't have a channel anymore, so the error better have expected close");
+ // We've already removed this outbound channel from the map in
+ // `PeerState` above so at this point we just need to clean up any
+ // lingering entries concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
+ return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
}
- },
- _ => {
- return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
- },
+ }
+ } else {
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
}
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
- self.chain_hash, &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
+ self.chain_hash, &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
+ log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
msg: announcement_sigs,
// counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
// channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
// announcement_signatures.
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
+ log_trace!(logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
match phase {
ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
if !chan.received_shutdown() {
- log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
+ log_info!(logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
msg.channel_id,
if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
}
},
ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
let context = phase.context_mut();
- log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
- self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel);
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
+ log_error!(logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
- finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
+ finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel));
},
}
} else {
}
};
if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
- log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
+ let channel_id = chan_option.as_ref().map(|channel| channel.context().channel_id());
+ log_info!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id), "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
}
if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
msg: update
});
}
- self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
}
mem::drop(per_peer_state);
if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
// Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
// closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
- let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
+ let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg, counterparty_node_id);
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
.ok_or_else(|| {
if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
- self.construct_pending_htlc_status(msg, shared_secret, next_hop,
- chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt),
+ self.construct_pending_htlc_status(
+ msg, counterparty_node_id, shared_secret, next_hop,
+ chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt,
+ ),
Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
};
let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<SP>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
+ if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
+ return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
+ msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
+ channel_id: msg.channel_id,
+ htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
+ sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
+ failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
+ }
+ ))
+ }
// If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
// but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
// want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
match pending_forward_info {
- PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
- let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
+ PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
+ ref incoming_shared_secret, ref routing, ..
+ }) => {
+ let reason = if routing.blinded_failure().is_some() {
+ HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32])
+ } else if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
} else {
_ => pending_forward_info
}
};
- try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
+ try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
} else {
return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
"Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
- log_trace!(self.logger,
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
+ log_trace!(logger,
"Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
msg.channel_id);
peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
- let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
+ let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
},
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
- log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
+ let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()));
+ log_info!(logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
*counterparty_node_id)
} else { false };
let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
- chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
+ chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
.expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
- try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
+ try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
} else {
return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
"Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
} else {
- log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id);
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
+ log_debug!(logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id);
let did_change = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
// If nothing changed after applying their update, we don't need to bother
// persisting.
msg.channel_id
)
})?;
+ let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
// freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
// add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
- msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash,
+ msg, &&logger, &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash,
&self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
let mut channel_update = None;
if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
}
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
- log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending bogus ChannelReestablish for unknown channel {} to force channel closure",
- log_bytes!(msg.channel_id.0));
+ log_debug!(logger, "Sending bogus ChannelReestablish for unknown channel {} to force channel closure",
+ msg.channel_id);
// Unfortunately, lnd doesn't force close on errors
// (https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/blob/abb1e3463f3a83bbb843d5c399869dbe930ad94f/htlcswitch/link.go#L2119).
// One of the few ways to get an lnd counterparty to force close is by
for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
match monitor_event {
MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
+ let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, counterparty_node_id, Some(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()));
if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
+ log_trace!(logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, false, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint);
} else {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
+ log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
None => {
// TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
- // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
- let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
- id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
+ // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
+ let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
+ outpoint_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint).cloned()
}
};
if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
- failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
+ failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
msg: update
});
}
- self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
- chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
+ chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context));
if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
}
/// attempted in every channel, or in the specifically provided channel.
///
/// [`ChannelSigner`]: crate::sign::ChannelSigner
- #[cfg(test)] // This is only implemented for one signer method, and should be private until we
- // actually finish implementing it fully.
+ #[cfg(async_signing)]
pub fn signer_unblocked(&self, channel_opt: Option<(PublicKey, ChannelId)>) {
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
let unblock_chan = |phase: &mut ChannelPhase<SP>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>| {
let node_id = phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id();
- if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
- let msgs = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger);
- if let Some(updates) = msgs.commitment_update {
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
- node_id,
- updates,
- });
- }
- if let Some(msg) = msgs.funding_signed {
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
- node_id,
- msg,
- });
- }
- if let Some(msg) = msgs.funding_created {
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
- node_id,
- msg,
- });
+ match phase {
+ ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
+ let msgs = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger);
+ if let Some(updates) = msgs.commitment_update {
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
+ node_id,
+ updates,
+ });
+ }
+ if let Some(msg) = msgs.funding_signed {
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
+ node_id,
+ msg,
+ });
+ }
+ if let Some(msg) = msgs.channel_ready {
+ send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
+ }
}
- if let Some(msg) = msgs.channel_ready {
- send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
+ ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
+ if let Some(msg) = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger) {
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
+ node_id,
+ msg,
+ });
+ }
}
+ ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {},
}
};
peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
match phase {
ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
- match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
+ match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &&logger) {
Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt, shutdown_result_opt)) => {
if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
has_update = true;
});
}
- self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
-
- log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
+ log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
false
///
/// # Privacy
///
- /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the offer with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the
- /// introduction node and a derived signing pubkey for recipient privacy. As such, currently,
- /// the node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction
- /// node in order to send the [`InvoiceRequest`].
+ /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the offer.
+ /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
+ /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
+ /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
+ /// order to send the [`InvoiceRequest`].
+ ///
+ /// Also, uses a derived signing pubkey in the offer for recipient privacy.
///
/// # Limitations
///
/// Requires a direct connection to the introduction node in the responding [`InvoiceRequest`]'s
/// reply path.
///
+ /// # Errors
+ ///
+ /// Errors if the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the offer.
+ ///
/// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
///
/// [`Offer`]: crate::offers::offer::Offer
/// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
pub fn create_offer_builder(
&self, description: String
- ) -> OfferBuilder<DerivedMetadata, secp256k1::All> {
+ ) -> Result<OfferBuilder<DerivedMetadata, secp256k1::All>, Bolt12SemanticError> {
let node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
- let path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
- OfferBuilder::deriving_signing_pubkey(description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx)
+ let path = self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
+ let builder = OfferBuilder::deriving_signing_pubkey(
+ description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx
+ )
.chain_hash(self.chain_hash)
- .path(path)
+ .path(path);
+
+ Ok(builder)
}
/// Creates a [`RefundBuilder`] such that the [`Refund`] it builds is recognized by the
///
/// # Privacy
///
- /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the refund with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as
- /// the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
- /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
- /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
+ /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the refund.
+ /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
+ /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
+ /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
+ /// order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
+ ///
+ /// Also, uses a derived payer id in the refund for payer privacy.
///
/// # Limitations
///
///
/// # Errors
///
- /// Errors if a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link
- /// or if `amount_msats` is invalid.
+ /// Errors if:
+ /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
+ /// - `amount_msats` is invalid, or
+ /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the refund.
///
/// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
///
/// [`Refund`]: crate::offers::refund::Refund
/// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
/// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
+ /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
pub fn create_refund_builder(
&self, description: String, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration,
payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
- let path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
+ let path = self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
let builder = RefundBuilder::deriving_payer_id(
description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, amount_msats, payment_id
)?
///
/// # Errors
///
- /// Errors if a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link
- /// or if the provided parameters are invalid for the offer.
+ /// Errors if:
+ /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
+ /// - the provided parameters are invalid for the offer,
+ /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded reply path for the invoice
+ /// request.
///
/// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
/// [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::quantity
None => builder,
Some(payer_note) => builder.payer_note(payer_note),
};
-
let invoice_request = builder.build_and_sign()?;
- let reply_path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
+ let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
let expiration = StaleExpiration::TimerTicks(1);
self.pending_outbound_payments
/// node meeting the aforementioned criteria, but there's no guarantee that they will be
/// received and no retries will be made.
///
+ /// # Errors
+ ///
+ /// Errors if the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded payment path or reply
+ /// path for the invoice.
+ ///
/// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
pub fn request_refund_payment(&self, refund: &Refund) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
match self.create_inbound_payment(Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None) {
Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
- let payment_paths = vec![
- self.create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(payment_secret),
- ];
+ let payment_paths = self.create_blinded_payment_paths(amount_msats, payment_secret)
+ .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
+
#[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys(
payment_paths, payment_hash, expanded_key, entropy
payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at, expanded_key, entropy
)?;
let invoice = builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)?;
- let reply_path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
+ let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path()
+ .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
if refund.paths().is_empty() {
inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
}
- /// Creates a one-hop blinded path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction
- /// node.
- fn create_one_hop_blinded_path(&self) -> BlindedPath {
+ /// Creates a blinded path by delegating to [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`].
+ ///
+ /// Errors if the `MessageRouter` errors or returns an empty `Vec`.
+ fn create_blinded_path(&self) -> Result<BlindedPath, ()> {
+ let recipient = self.get_our_node_id();
let entropy_source = self.entropy_source.deref();
let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
- BlindedPath::one_hop_for_message(self.get_our_node_id(), entropy_source, secp_ctx).unwrap()
+
+ let peers = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap()
+ .iter()
+ .filter(|(_, peer)| peer.lock().unwrap().latest_features.supports_onion_messages())
+ .map(|(node_id, _)| *node_id)
+ .collect::<Vec<_>>();
+
+ self.router
+ .create_blinded_paths(recipient, peers, entropy_source, secp_ctx)
+ .and_then(|paths| paths.into_iter().next().ok_or(()))
}
- /// Creates a one-hop blinded path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction
- /// node.
- fn create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(
- &self, payment_secret: PaymentSecret
- ) -> (BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath) {
+ /// Creates multi-hop blinded payment paths for the given `amount_msats` by delegating to
+ /// [`Router::create_blinded_payment_paths`].
+ fn create_blinded_payment_paths(
+ &self, amount_msats: u64, payment_secret: PaymentSecret
+ ) -> Result<Vec<(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)>, ()> {
let entropy_source = self.entropy_source.deref();
let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
+ let first_hops = self.list_usable_channels();
let payee_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
- let max_cltv_expiry = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
+ let max_cltv_expiry = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY
+ + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
let payee_tlvs = ReceiveTlvs {
payment_secret,
payment_constraints: PaymentConstraints {
htlc_minimum_msat: 1,
},
};
- // TODO: Err for overflow?
- BlindedPath::one_hop_for_payment(
- payee_node_id, payee_tlvs, entropy_source, secp_ctx
- ).unwrap()
+ self.router.create_blinded_payment_paths(
+ payee_node_id, first_hops, payee_tlvs, amount_msats, entropy_source, secp_ctx
+ )
}
/// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
/// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
/// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
+ let logger = WithContext::from(
+ &self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
+ );
loop {
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
-
if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
// Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
// Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
// blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
// update(s) when those blockers complete.
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
+ log_trace!(logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
break;
}
if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
- log_debug!(self.logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
+ log_debug!(logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
continue;
}
} else {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
+ log_trace!(logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
}
}
}
} else {
- log_debug!(self.logger,
+ log_debug!(logger,
"Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
}
*best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
}
- self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
+ self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
}
}
let _persistence_guard =
PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
- self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
+ self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context))
.map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
if height < last_best_block_height {
let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
- self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
+ self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
}
}
self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
*self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
- self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
+ self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
macro_rules! max_time {
($timestamp: expr) => {
self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
- channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
+ channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
} else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
} else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
});
timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
}
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
if channel.context.is_usable() {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
+ log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
});
}
} else {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
+ log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
}
}
}
if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
+ log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
msg: announcement_sigs,
update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
// It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
// reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
- failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true));
+ let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
+ failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
msg: update
});
}
- let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
- self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, reason);
pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
+ let logger = WithContext::from(
+ &self.logger, None, Some(htlc.prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
+ );
+ log_trace!(logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
false
} else { true }
});
let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
let remove_peer = {
- log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
- log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
+ log_debug!(
+ WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None),
+ "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
+ log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id)
+ );
if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
let context = match phase {
ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
- if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger).is_ok() {
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
+ if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok() {
// We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
return true;
}
};
// Clean up for removal.
update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
- self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
- failed_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false));
+ failed_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer));
false
});
// Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
}
fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
+ let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None);
if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
- log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
+ log_debug!(logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
return Err(());
}
}
}
- log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
+ log_debug!(logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(|(_, phase)|
- if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else {
- // Since unfunded channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer, and they're not persisted
- // (so won't be recovered after a crash), they shouldn't exist here and we would never need to
- // worry about closing and removing them.
- debug_assert!(false);
- None
- }
+ if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
).for_each(|chan| {
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
- msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
+ msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger),
});
});
}
}
fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
-
match &msg.data as &str {
"cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
"link failed to shutdown" =>
// We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
// repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
- let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
- let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
- if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
- let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
- if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
- if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
- peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
- node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
- msg,
- });
- }
- peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
- node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
- action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
- msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
- channel_id: msg.channel_id,
- data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
- },
- log_level: Level::Trace,
+ PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
+ self,
+ || -> NotifyOption {
+ let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
+ let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
+ if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
+ let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
+ if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
+ if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
+ peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
+ node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
+ msg,
+ });
+ }
+ peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
+ node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
+ action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
+ msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
+ channel_id: msg.channel_id,
+ data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
+ },
+ log_level: Level::Trace,
+ }
+ });
+ // This can happen in a fairly tight loop, so we absolutely cannot trigger
+ // a `ChannelManager` write here.
+ return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
}
- });
- }
+ NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents
+ }
+ );
}
return;
}
_ => {}
}
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
+
if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let amount_msats = match InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::amount_msats(
&invoice_request
) {
- Ok(amount_msats) => Some(amount_msats),
+ Ok(amount_msats) => amount_msats,
Err(error) => return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
};
let invoice_request = match invoice_request.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
},
};
- let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
- match self.create_inbound_payment(amount_msats, relative_expiry, None) {
- Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) if invoice_request.keys.is_some() => {
- let payment_paths = vec![
- self.create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(payment_secret),
- ];
- #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
- let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys(
- payment_paths, payment_hash
- );
- #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
- let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
- self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
- );
- #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
- let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
- payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
- );
- match builder.and_then(|b| b.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)) {
- Ok(invoice) => Some(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
- Err(error) => Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
- }
- },
- Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
- let payment_paths = vec![
- self.create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(payment_secret),
- ];
- #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
- let builder = invoice_request.respond_with(payment_paths, payment_hash);
- #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
- let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
- self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
- );
- #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
- let builder = invoice_request.respond_with_no_std(
- payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
- );
- let response = builder.and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build())
- .map_err(|e| OffersMessage::InvoiceError(e.into()))
- .and_then(|invoice|
- match invoice.sign(|invoice| self.node_signer.sign_bolt12_invoice(invoice)) {
- Ok(invoice) => Ok(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
- Err(SignError::Signing(())) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
- InvoiceError::from_string("Failed signing invoice".to_string())
- )),
- Err(SignError::Verification(_)) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
- InvoiceError::from_string("Failed invoice signature verification".to_string())
- )),
- });
- match response {
- Ok(invoice) => Some(invoice),
- Err(error) => Some(error),
- }
+ let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
+ let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = match self.create_inbound_payment(
+ Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None
+ ) {
+ Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => (payment_hash, payment_secret),
+ Err(()) => {
+ let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount;
+ return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
},
+ };
+
+ let payment_paths = match self.create_blinded_payment_paths(
+ amount_msats, payment_secret
+ ) {
+ Ok(payment_paths) => payment_paths,
Err(()) => {
- Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount.into()))
+ let error = Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths;
+ return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
},
+ };
+
+ #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
+ let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
+ self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
+ );
+
+ if invoice_request.keys.is_some() {
+ #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
+ let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys(
+ payment_paths, payment_hash
+ );
+ #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
+ let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
+ payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
+ );
+ match builder.and_then(|b| b.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)) {
+ Ok(invoice) => Some(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
+ Err(error) => Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
+ }
+ } else {
+ #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
+ let builder = invoice_request.respond_with(payment_paths, payment_hash);
+ #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
+ let builder = invoice_request.respond_with_no_std(
+ payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
+ );
+ let response = builder.and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build())
+ .map_err(|e| OffersMessage::InvoiceError(e.into()))
+ .and_then(|invoice|
+ match invoice.sign(|invoice| self.node_signer.sign_bolt12_invoice(invoice)) {
+ Ok(invoice) => Ok(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
+ Err(SignError::Signing(())) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
+ InvoiceError::from_string("Failed signing invoice".to_string())
+ )),
+ Err(SignError::Verification(_)) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
+ InvoiceError::from_string("Failed invoice signature verification".to_string())
+ )),
+ });
+ match response {
+ Ok(invoice) => Some(invoice),
+ Err(error) => Some(error),
+ }
}
},
OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice) => {
features.set_channel_type_optional();
features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
features.set_zero_conf_optional();
+ features.set_route_blinding_optional();
if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
}
impl_writeable_tlv_based!(BlindedForward, {
(0, inbound_blinding_point, required),
+ (1, failure, (default_value, BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode)),
});
impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
(2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
(3, payment_metadata, option),
(5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
+ (7, requires_blinded_error, (default_value, false)),
},
(2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
(0, payment_preimage, required),
);
impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(BlindedFailure,
- (0, FromIntroductionNode) => {}, ;
+ (0, FromIntroductionNode) => {},
+ (2, FromBlindedNode) => {}, ;
);
impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
(6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
});
-impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
- (1, FailHTLC) => {
- (0, htlc_id, required),
- (2, err_packet, required),
- };
- (0, AddHTLC)
-);
+impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
+ const FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID: u8 = 1;
+ match self {
+ Self::AddHTLC(info) => {
+ 0u8.write(w)?;
+ info.write(w)?;
+ },
+ Self::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
+ FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
+ write_tlv_fields!(w, {
+ (0, htlc_id, required),
+ (2, err_packet, required),
+ });
+ },
+ Self::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
+ // Since this variant was added in 0.0.119, write this as `::FailHTLC` with an empty error
+ // packet so older versions have something to fail back with, but serialize the real data as
+ // optional TLVs for the benefit of newer versions.
+ FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
+ let dummy_err_packet = msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new() };
+ write_tlv_fields!(w, {
+ (0, htlc_id, required),
+ (1, failure_code, required),
+ (2, dummy_err_packet, required),
+ (3, sha256_of_onion, required),
+ });
+ },
+ }
+ Ok(())
+ }
+}
+
+impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo {
+ fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+ let id: u8 = Readable::read(r)?;
+ Ok(match id {
+ 0 => Self::AddHTLC(Readable::read(r)?),
+ 1 => {
+ _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(r, {
+ (0, htlc_id, required),
+ (1, malformed_htlc_failure_code, option),
+ (2, err_packet, required),
+ (3, sha256_of_onion, option),
+ });
+ if let Some(failure_code) = malformed_htlc_failure_code {
+ Self::FailMalformedHTLC {
+ htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
+ failure_code,
+ sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?,
+ }
+ } else {
+ Self::FailHTLC {
+ htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
+ err_packet: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(err_packet, required),
+ }
+ }
+ },
+ _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+ })
+ }
+}
impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
(0, payment_secret, required),
let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
- let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
+ let mut outpoint_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
&args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
))?;
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
// But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
- log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
- log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
+ log_error!(logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
+ log_error!(logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
- log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
+ log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
&channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
}
if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
- log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
+ log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
&channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
}
if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
- log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
+ log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
&channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
}
if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
- log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
+ log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
&channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
}
- let mut shutdown_result = channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
+ let mut shutdown_result = channel.context.force_shutdown(true, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
if shutdown_result.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid.is_some() {
return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
}
reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
+ channel_funding_txo: channel.context.get_funding_txo(),
}, None));
for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
let mut found_htlc = false;
// claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
// the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
// backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
- log_info!(args.logger,
+ log_info!(logger,
"Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
&channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
}
}
} else {
- log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
+ log_info!(logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
&channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
monitor.get_latest_update_id());
if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
}
- if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() {
- id_to_peer.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
+ if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
+ outpoint_to_peer.insert(funding_txo, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
}
match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
// If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
// was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
// safely discard the channel.
- let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false);
+ let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
+ channel_funding_txo: channel.context.get_funding_txo(),
}, None));
} else {
- log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
- log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
- log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
- log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
- log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
+ log_error!(logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
+ log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
+ log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
+ log_error!(logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
+ log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
}
}
- for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
+ for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
- log_info!(args.logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
+ let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
+ log_info!(logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
&funding_txo.to_channel_id());
let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
+ counterparty_node_id: None,
updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
};
close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
- $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
+ $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $logger: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
) => { {
let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
$chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
- log_trace!(args.logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
+ log_trace!($logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$funding_txo.to_channel_id());
max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
pending_background_events.push(
});
}
if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
- log_error!(args.logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
+ log_error!($logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
}
max_in_flight_update_id
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
+
// Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
// discarded.
let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
- funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, ""));
+ funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, ""));
}
}
if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
// If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
- log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
- log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
+ log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
+ log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
- log_error!(args.logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
- log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
- log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
- log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
- log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
+ log_error!(logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
+ log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
+ log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
+ log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
+ log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
}
} else {
if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
+ let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(counterparty_id), Some(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
// Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
// still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
});
let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
- funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, "closed ");
+ funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, "closed ");
} else {
- log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
- log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.",
+ log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
+ log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.",
&funding_txo.to_channel_id());
- log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
- log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
- log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
- log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
+ log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
+ log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
+ log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
+ log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
}
}
// We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
// 0.0.102+
for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
- let counterparty_opt = id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
+ let counterparty_opt = outpoint_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0);
if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
+ let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
if path.hops.is_empty() {
- log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
+ log_error!(logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
}
match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
- log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
- if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), &htlc.payment_hash);
+ log_info!(logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
+ if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), htlc.payment_hash);
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
starting_block_height: best_block_height,
remaining_max_total_routing_fee_msat: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
});
- log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
+ log_info!(logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
}
}
forwards.retain(|forward| {
if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
- log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
+ log_info!(logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
&htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
false
} else { true }
});
pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
- log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
+ log_info!(logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
&htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
};
pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
- path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &args.logger);
+ path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &&logger);
pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
}
},
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
let mut outbound_scid_alias;
loop {
} else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
// Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
// channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
- log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
+ log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
}
if chan.context.is_usable() {
if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
// Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
// channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
- log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
+ log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
}
}
// without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
// restart.
let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
- if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
+ if let Some(peer_node_id) = outpoint_to_peer.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
- channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
+ channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
}
}
if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
- for (_, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
+ for (channel_id, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
+ let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), Some(*channel_id));
for action in actions.iter() {
if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
} = action {
if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
- log_trace!(args.logger,
+ log_trace!(logger,
"Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id());
blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
}
peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
} else {
- log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
+ log_error!(WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), None), "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
}
}
forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
- id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
+ outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(outpoint_to_peer),
short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
use crate::ln::ChannelId;
- use crate::ln::channelmanager::{create_recv_pending_htlc_info, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
+ use crate::ln::channelmanager::{create_recv_pending_htlc_info, HTLCForwardInfo, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
+ use crate::prelude::*;
use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
use crate::util::errors::APIError;
+ use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
use crate::util::test_utils;
use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
use crate::sign::EntropySource;
}
#[test]
- fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
- // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
+ fn test_outpoint_to_peer_coverage() {
+ // Test that the `ChannelManager:outpoint_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
// a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
// the channel is successfully closed.
let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
- let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
+ let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().to_byte_array());
{
- // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
+ // Ensure that the `outpoint_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
// funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
- assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
- assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
+ assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
}
nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
{
- // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
+ // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
// as it has the funding transaction.
- let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
+ let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
- assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
+ assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
}
- assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
+ assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
{
- let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
+ let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
- assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
+ assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
}
expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
{
- // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
- // as it has the funding transaction.
- let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
+ // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as
+ // soon as it has the funding transaction.
+ let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
- assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
+ assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
}
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
{
- // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
+ // Assert that the channel is kept in the `outpoint_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
// channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
// fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
// party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
- let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
+ let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
- assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
+ assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
}
{
// At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
// `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
// from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
- // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
- let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
+ // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map.
+ let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
- assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
+ assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
}
nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
// `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
// therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
// closing transaction).
- // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
+ // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map as it can be
// fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
- assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
- // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
+ // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
// doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
- let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
+ let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
- assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
+ assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
}
let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
{
- // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
+ // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `outpoint_to_peer` map once
// they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
- assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
+ assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
}
let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
let extra_fee_msat = 10;
let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
- amt_msat: 100,
- outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
+ sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
+ cltv_expiry_height: 42,
payment_metadata: None,
keysend_preimage: None,
payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
// Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
// intended amount, we fail the payment.
let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
- if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundOnionErr { err_code, .. }) =
+ if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundHTLCErr { err_code, .. }) =
create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
// If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
- amt_msat: 100,
- outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
+ sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
+ cltv_expiry_height: 42,
payment_metadata: None,
keysend_preimage: None,
payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
let result = create_recv_pending_htlc_info(msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
- amt_msat: 100,
- outgoing_cltv_value: 22,
+ sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
+ cltv_expiry_height: 22,
payment_metadata: None,
keysend_preimage: None,
payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
}
}
+
+ #[test]
+ fn test_malformed_forward_htlcs_ser() {
+ // Ensure that `HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC`s are (de)serialized properly.
+ let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
+ let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
+ let persister;
+ let chain_monitor;
+ let chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
+ let deserialized_chanmgr;
+ let mut nodes = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &chanmgrs);
+
+ let dummy_failed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
+ HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: vec![42] }, }
+ };
+ let dummy_malformed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
+ HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code: 0x4000, sha256_of_onion: [0; 32] }
+ };
+
+ let dummy_htlcs_1: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
+ if htlc_id % 2 == 0 {
+ dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
+ } else {
+ dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
+ }
+ }).collect();
+
+ let dummy_htlcs_2: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
+ if htlc_id % 2 == 1 {
+ dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
+ } else {
+ dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
+ }
+ }).collect();
+
+
+ let (scid_1, scid_2) = (42, 43);
+ let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
+ forward_htlcs.insert(scid_1, dummy_htlcs_1.clone());
+ forward_htlcs.insert(scid_2, dummy_htlcs_2.clone());
+
+ let mut chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
+ *chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = forward_htlcs.clone();
+ core::mem::drop(chanmgr_fwd_htlcs);
+
+ reload_node!(nodes[0], nodes[0].node.encode(), &[], persister, chain_monitor, deserialized_chanmgr);
+
+ let mut deserialized_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
+ for scid in [scid_1, scid_2].iter() {
+ let deserialized_htlcs = deserialized_fwd_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(forward_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap(), deserialized_htlcs);
+ }
+ assert!(deserialized_fwd_htlcs.is_empty());
+ core::mem::drop(deserialized_fwd_htlcs);
+
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
+ }
}
#[cfg(ldk_bench)]