use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
-use bitcoin::secp256k1;
+use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
-use chain;
-use chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, Watch, BestBlock};
-use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
-use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
-use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
+use crate::chain;
+use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
+use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
+use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
+use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
// Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
// construct one themselves.
-use ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
-use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
-use ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
-use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, RouteParameters};
-use ln::msgs;
-use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
-use ln::onion_utils;
-use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
-use ln::wire::Encode;
-use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner, Recipient};
-use util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
-use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
-use util::{byte_utils, events};
-use util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
-use util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
-use util::logger::{Level, Logger};
-use util::errors::APIError;
-
-use io;
-use prelude::*;
+use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
+use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
+use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
+#[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
+use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
+use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, RouteParameters};
+use crate::ln::msgs;
+use crate::ln::onion_utils;
+use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
+use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
+use crate::chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, Recipient};
+use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
+use crate::util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
+use crate::util::{byte_utils, events};
+use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
+use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
+use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
+use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
+use crate::util::errors::APIError;
+
+use crate::io;
+use crate::prelude::*;
use core::{cmp, mem};
use core::cell::RefCell;
-use io::Read;
-use sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
+use crate::io::Read;
+use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock};
use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
use core::time::Duration;
use core::ops::Deref;
-#[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
-use std::time::Instant;
-use util::crypto::sign;
-
// We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
//
// Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
payment_hash: PaymentHash,
- pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
+ pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
+ pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
}
Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
}
-pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
- AddHTLC {
- forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
+pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
+ pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
- // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
- // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
- // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
- // HTLCs.
- //
- // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
- prev_short_channel_id: u64,
- prev_htlc_id: u64,
- prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
- },
+ // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
+ // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
+ // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
+ // HTLCs.
+ //
+ // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
+ prev_short_channel_id: u64,
+ prev_htlc_id: u64,
+ prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
+}
+
+pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
+ AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
FailHTLC {
htlc_id: u64,
err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
// Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
- /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
- ///
- /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
- /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
- /// confirmation depth.
- pub(super) short_to_chan_info: HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>,
- /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
- ///
- /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
- /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
- /// and via the classic SCID.
- ///
- /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
- /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
- /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
- pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
/// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
/// failed/claimed by the user.
///
Fulfilled {
session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
+ timer_ticks_without_htlcs: u8,
},
/// When a payer gives up trying to retry a payment, they inform us, letting us generate a
/// `PaymentFailed` event when all HTLCs have irrevocably failed. This avoids a number of race
}
impl PendingOutboundPayment {
- fn is_retryable(&self) -> bool {
- match self {
- PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { .. } => true,
- _ => false,
- }
- }
fn is_fulfilled(&self) -> bool {
match self {
PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => true,
=> session_privs,
});
let payment_hash = self.payment_hash();
- *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, payment_hash };
+ *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, payment_hash, timer_ticks_without_htlcs: 0 };
}
fn mark_abandoned(&mut self) -> Result<(), ()> {
/// concrete type of the KeysManager.
///
/// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
-pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
+pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
/// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
/// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
/// concrete type of the KeysManager.
///
/// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
-pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
+pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
/// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
/// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
/// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
/// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
/// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
-pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
- where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
+//
+// Lock order:
+// The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
+// `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
+// and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
+// Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
+// create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
+//
+// Lock order tree:
+//
+// `total_consistency_lock`
+// |
+// |__`forward_htlcs`
+// |
+// |__`channel_state`
+// | |
+// | |__`id_to_peer`
+// | |
+// | |__`short_to_chan_info`
+// | |
+// | |__`per_peer_state`
+// | |
+// | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
+// | |
+// | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
+// | |
+// | |__`pending_outbound_payments`
+// | |
+// | |__`best_block`
+// | |
+// | |__`pending_events`
+// | |
+// | |__`pending_background_events`
+//
+pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
+ where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
- K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
+ K::Target: KeysInterface,
F::Target: FeeEstimator,
L::Target: Logger,
{
chain_monitor: M,
tx_broadcaster: T,
+ /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
#[cfg(test)]
pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
#[cfg(not(test))]
best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
+ /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
#[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
- pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
+ pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>,
#[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
- channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
+ channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>,
/// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
/// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
/// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
/// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
- /// Locked *after* channel_state.
+ ///
+ /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
/// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
///
/// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
///
- /// Locked *after* channel_state.
+ /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment>>,
+ /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
+ ///
+ /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
+ /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
+ /// and via the classic SCID.
+ ///
+ /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
+ /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
+ ///
+ /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
+ #[cfg(not(test))]
+ forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
+
/// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
/// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
/// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
/// active channel list on load.
+ ///
+ /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
/// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
/// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
/// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
/// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
+ ///
+ /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
+ /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
+ ///
+ /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
+ /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
+ /// confirmation depth.
+ ///
+ /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
+ /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
+ /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
+ ///
+ /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
+ #[cfg(not(test))]
+ short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
+
our_network_key: SecretKey,
our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
/// keeping additional state.
probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
- /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
- /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
- last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
-
/// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
/// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
/// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
/// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
/// new channel.
///
- /// If also holding `channel_state` lock, must lock `channel_state` prior to `per_peer_state`.
+ /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
+ /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
+ /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
/// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
/// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
/// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
/// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
/// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
- /// PersistenceNotifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
+ /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
- persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
+ persistence_notifier: Notifier,
keys_manager: K,
/// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
/// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
- persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
+ persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
should_persist: F,
// We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
_read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
}
impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
- fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
+ fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
}
- fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
+ fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
PersistenceNotifierGuard {
#[allow(dead_code)]
const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
-/// The number of blocks before we consider an outbound payment for expiry if it doesn't have any
-/// pending HTLCs in flight.
-pub(crate) const PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
-
/// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
+/// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
+/// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
+/// [`ChannelManager::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
+pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
+
/// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
/// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
/// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
/// paths than the ones selected).
+ ///
+ /// [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] does *not* need to be called for this payment and
+ /// [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`] will *not* work for this payment.
AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
/// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
/// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
/// in over-/re-payment.
///
/// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
- /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
- /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
+ /// send_payment, and any `Err`s which are not [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] can be
+ /// safely retried via [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`].
///
- /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
- /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
- /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
- /// with the latest update_id.
+ /// Any entries which contain `Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInprogress)` or `Ok(())` MUST NOT be
+ /// retried as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent
+ /// (in the case of `Ok(())`) or will send once a [`MonitorEvent::Completed`] is provided for
+ /// the next-hop channel with the latest update_id.
PartialFailure {
/// The errors themselves, in the same order as the route hops.
results: Vec<Result<(), APIError>>,
}
macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
- ($self: expr, $short_to_chan_info: expr, $channel: expr) => {
+ ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{
+ $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
+ let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
- $short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
+ short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
} else {
// If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
// outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
debug_assert!(alias_removed);
}
- $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
- $short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
- }
+ short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
+ }}
}
/// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
- ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_chan_info: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
+ ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
match $err {
ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
(false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
},
ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
- update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $short_to_chan_info, $channel);
+ update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel);
let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
(true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
}
macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
- ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
+ ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
match $res {
Ok(res) => res,
Err(e) => {
- let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_chan_info, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
+ let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
if drop {
$entry.remove_entry();
}
}
macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
- ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
+ ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
match $res {
Ok(res) => res,
Err(e) => {
- let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_chan_info, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
+ let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
if drop {
$entry.remove_entry();
}
}
macro_rules! remove_channel {
- ($self: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
+ ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
{
let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
- update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel_state.short_to_chan_info, channel);
+ update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, channel);
channel
}
}
}
-macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
- ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_chan_info: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
+macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_res {
+ ($self: ident, $err: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
match $err {
- ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
- log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
- update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $short_to_chan_info, $chan);
+ ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
+ log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
+ update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
// TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
// chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
// will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
// given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
// retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
- $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
+ $chan.force_shutdown(false), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
(res, true)
},
- ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
- log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
+ ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
+ log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update in progress. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
match $action_type {
if !$resend_raa {
debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
}
- $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
+ $chan.monitor_updating_paused($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
(Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
},
+ ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
+ (Ok(()), false)
+ },
}
};
- ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
- let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_chan_info, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
+ ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
+ let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
if drop {
$entry.remove_entry();
}
res
} };
- ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY) => { {
+ ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY) => { {
debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
- handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
+ handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
} };
- ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, NO_UPDATE) => {
- handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
- };
- ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_channel_ready: expr, OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED) => {
- handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, false, $resend_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
+ ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, NO_UPDATE) => {
+ handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
};
- ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
- handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
+ ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_channel_ready: expr, OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED) => {
+ handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, false, $resend_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
};
- ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
- handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
+ ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
+ handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
};
-}
-
-macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
- ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
- return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
+ ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
+ handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
};
- ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
- return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
- }
-}
-
-// Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
-macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
- ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
- match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
- (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
- break e;
- },
- (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
- }
- }
}
macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
- ($short_to_chan_info: expr, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {
+ ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
$pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
msg: $channel_ready_msg,
});
// Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
// we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
- let outbound_alias_insert = $short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
+ let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
+ let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
"SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
- let scid_insert = $short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
+ let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
"SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
}
+ }}
+}
+
+macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
+ ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {
+ if $channel.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
+ {
+ let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
+ pending_events.push(events::Event::ChannelReady {
+ channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
+ user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
+ counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
+ });
+ }
+ $channel.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
+ }
}
}
// Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the channel_ready fly
// before it should be allowed to.
assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
- send_channel_ready!($channel_state.short_to_chan_info, $channel_state.pending_msg_events, $channel_entry.get(), msg);
+ send_channel_ready!($self, $channel_state.pending_msg_events, $channel_entry.get(), msg);
}
if let Some(msg) = $announcement_sigs {
$channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
});
}
+ emit_channel_ready_event!($self, $channel_entry.get_mut());
+
let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
// We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
// only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
// have some commitment updates to send as well.
assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
- if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
- // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
- // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
- // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
- let mut order = $order;
- if $raa.is_none() {
- order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
+ match $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
+ ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
+ e => {
+ // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
+ // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
+ // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
+ let mut order = $order;
+ if $raa.is_none() {
+ order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
+ }
+ break handle_monitor_update_res!($self, e, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
}
- break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
}
}
} }
}
-impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
- where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
+impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
+ where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
- K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
+ K::Target: KeysInterface,
F::Target: FeeEstimator,
L::Target: Logger,
{
channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
by_id: HashMap::new(),
- short_to_chan_info: HashMap::new(),
- forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
}),
outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
+ forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
+ short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap()),
probing_cookie_secret: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
- last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
- persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
+ persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
keys_manager,
}
}
- /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels, as
+ /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
&self.default_configuration
}
Ok(temporary_channel_id)
}
- fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
+ fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
let mut res = Vec::new();
{
let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
}
/// Helper function that issues the channel close events
- fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
+ fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
Some(transaction) => {
// Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
- if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
- let (result, is_permanent) =
- handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_chan_info, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
- if is_permanent {
- remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
- break result;
- }
+ let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
+ let (result, is_permanent) =
+ handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
+ if is_permanent {
+ remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
+ break result;
}
}
});
if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
- let channel = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
+ let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
msg: channel_update
for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
- self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
+ self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
}
let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
- let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id: channel_id };
- self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
+ let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
+ self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
}
if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
// There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
} else {
self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
}
- remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan)
+ remove_channel!(self, chan)
} else {
return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
}
routing,
payment_hash,
incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
- amt_to_forward: amt_msat,
+ incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
+ outgoing_amt_msat: amt_msat,
outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
})
}
- fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
+ fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
{
log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
- return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
+ return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
channel_id: msg.channel_id,
htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
failure_code: $err_code,
- })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
+ }));
}
}
}
//node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
}
-
- let mut channel_state = None;
macro_rules! return_err {
($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
{
log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
- if channel_state.is_none() {
- channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
- }
- return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
+ return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
channel_id: msg.channel_id,
htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
- })), channel_state.unwrap());
+ }));
}
}
}
- let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
+ let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
Ok(res) => res,
Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
},
payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
- amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
+ incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
+ outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
})
}
};
- channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
- if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
+ if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref outgoing_amt_msat, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
// If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
// with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
// short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
- let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_chan_info.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
+ let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
+ let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let forwarding_id_opt = match id_option {
None => { // unknown_next_peer
// Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
// phantom.
- if fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id) {
+ if fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
None
} else {
break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => Some(chan_id.clone()),
};
let chan_update_opt = if let Some(forwarding_id) = forwarding_id_opt {
- let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
+ let chan = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
+ None => {
+ // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and by_id maps have
+ // no consistency guarantees.
+ break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
+ },
+ Some(chan) => chan
+ };
if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
// Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
// should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
}
- if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
+ if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
}
- if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *amt_to_forward, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
+ if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *outgoing_amt_msat, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
}
chan_update_opt
}
}
- (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
+ pending_forward_info
}
/// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
/// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
///
/// May be called with channel_state already locked!
- fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
+ fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
if !chan.should_announce() {
return Err(LightningError {
err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
/// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
/// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
/// May be called with channel_state already locked!
- fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
+ fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
}
- fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
+ fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
}
// Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
- pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
- let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
- let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
-
- let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
- let payment_entry = pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id);
- if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(payment) = &payment_entry {
- if !payment.get().is_retryable() {
- return Err(APIError::RouteError {
- err: "Payment already completed"
- });
- }
- }
-
- let id = match channel_lock.short_to_chan_info.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
+ let id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
};
- macro_rules! insert_outbound_payment {
- () => {
- let payment = payment_entry.or_insert_with(|| PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
- session_privs: HashSet::new(),
- pending_amt_msat: 0,
- pending_fee_msat: Some(0),
- payment_hash: *payment_hash,
- payment_secret: *payment_secret,
- starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
- total_msat: total_value,
- });
- assert!(payment.insert(session_priv_bytes, path));
- }
- }
-
+ let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
match {
payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
}, onion_packet, &self.logger),
- channel_state, chan)
+ chan)
} {
Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
- if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
- maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
- // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
- // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
- // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
- // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
- // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
- insert_outbound_payment!(); // Only do this after possibly break'ing on Perm failure above.
- return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
+ let update_err = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
+ let chan_id = chan.get().channel_id();
+ match (update_err,
+ handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_err, chan,
+ RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true))
+ {
+ (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure, Err(e)) => break Err(e),
+ (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed, Ok(())) => {},
+ (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress, Err(_)) => {
+ // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
+ // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
+ // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
+ // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
+ // which we do in the send_payment check for
+ // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
+ return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
+ },
+ _ => unreachable!(),
}
- insert_outbound_payment!();
- log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan_id));
channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
},
});
},
- None => { insert_outbound_payment!(); },
+ None => { },
}
- } else { unreachable!(); }
+ } else {
+ // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
+ // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the `by_id` map.
+ // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
+ return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
+ }
return Ok(());
};
/// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
/// fields for more info.
///
- /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
- /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
- /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
- /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
- /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
- /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
+ /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
+ /// method will error with an [`APIError::RouteError`]. Note, however, that once a payment
+ /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
+ /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a second payment with the same
+ /// [`PaymentId`].
///
- /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
+ /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
+ /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
+ /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
+ /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
+ /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
+ ///
+ /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
+ /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
///
/// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
/// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
/// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
///
/// In general, a path may raise:
- /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
+ /// * [`APIError::RouteError`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
/// node public key) is specified.
- /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
+ /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
/// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
/// failure).
- /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
+ /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
/// relevant updates.
///
/// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
/// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
/// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
/// payment_secret.
+ ///
/// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
/// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
/// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
- pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
- self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, None, None)
+ ///
+ /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
+ /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
+ pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
+ let onion_session_privs = self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, *payment_secret, payment_id, route)?;
+ self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, payment_id, None, onion_session_privs)
}
- fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: Option<PaymentId>, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
+ self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, route)
+ }
+
+ fn add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
+ let mut onion_session_privs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
+ for _ in 0..route.paths.len() {
+ onion_session_privs.push(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
+ }
+
+ let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
+ match pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError {
+ err: "Payment already in progress"
+ })),
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
+ let payment = entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
+ session_privs: HashSet::new(),
+ pending_amt_msat: 0,
+ pending_fee_msat: Some(0),
+ payment_hash,
+ payment_secret,
+ starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
+ total_msat: route.get_total_amount(),
+ });
+
+ for (path, session_priv_bytes) in route.paths.iter().zip(onion_session_privs.iter()) {
+ assert!(payment.insert(*session_priv_bytes, path));
+ }
+
+ Ok(onion_session_privs)
+ },
+ }
+ }
+
+ fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
if route.paths.len() < 1 {
return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
}
let mut total_value = 0;
let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
- let payment_id = if let Some(id) = payment_id { id } else { PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()) };
'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
let mut results = Vec::new();
- for path in route.paths.iter() {
- results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &route.payment_params, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage));
+ debug_assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), onion_session_privs.len());
+ for (path, session_priv) in route.paths.iter().zip(onion_session_privs.into_iter()) {
+ let mut path_res = self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &route.payment_params, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage, session_priv);
+ match path_res {
+ Ok(_) => {},
+ Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress) => {
+ // While a MonitorUpdateInProgress is an Err(_), the payment is still
+ // considered "in flight" and we shouldn't remove it from the
+ // PendingOutboundPayment set.
+ },
+ Err(_) => {
+ let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
+ if let Some(payment) = pending_outbounds.get_mut(&payment_id) {
+ let removed = payment.remove(&session_priv, Some(path));
+ debug_assert!(removed, "This can't happen as the payment has an entry for this path added by callers");
+ } else {
+ debug_assert!(false, "This can't happen as the payment was added by callers");
+ path_res = Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Internal error: payment disappeared during processing. Please report this bug!".to_owned() });
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ results.push(path_res);
}
let mut has_ok = false;
let mut has_err = false;
for (res, path) in results.iter().zip(route.paths.iter()) {
if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
- if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
- // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
+ if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress) = res {
+ // MonitorUpdateInProgress is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
// PartialFailure.
has_err = true;
has_ok = true;
} else { None },
})
} else if has_err {
- // If we failed to send any paths, we shouldn't have inserted the new PaymentId into
- // our `pending_outbound_payments` map at all.
- debug_assert!(self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().get(&payment_id).is_none());
+ // If we failed to send any paths, we should remove the new PaymentId from the
+ // `pending_outbound_payments` map, as the user isn't expected to `abandon_payment`.
+ let removed = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&payment_id).is_some();
+ debug_assert!(removed, "We should always have a pending payment to remove here");
Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
} else {
- Ok(payment_id)
+ Ok(())
}
}
}
}
+ let mut onion_session_privs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
+ for _ in 0..route.paths.len() {
+ onion_session_privs.push(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
+ }
+
let (total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret) = {
- let outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
- if let Some(payment) = outbounds.get(&payment_id) {
- match payment {
- PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
- total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, ..
- } => {
- let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum();
- if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 {
+ let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
+ match outbounds.get_mut(&payment_id) {
+ Some(payment) => {
+ let res = match payment {
+ PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
+ total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, ..
+ } => {
+ let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum();
+ if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 {
+ return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
+ err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string()
+ }))
+ }
+ (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret)
+ },
+ PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => {
return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
- err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string()
+ err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string()
}))
- }
- (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret)
- },
- PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => {
- return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
- err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string()
- }))
- },
- PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {
- return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
- err: "Payment already completed".to_owned()
- }));
- },
- PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {
- return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
- err: "Payment already abandoned (with some HTLCs still pending)".to_owned()
- }));
- },
- }
- } else {
- return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
- err: format!("Payment with ID {} not found", log_bytes!(payment_id.0)),
- }))
+ },
+ PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {
+ return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
+ err: "Payment already completed".to_owned()
+ }));
+ },
+ PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {
+ return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
+ err: "Payment already abandoned (with some HTLCs still pending)".to_owned()
+ }));
+ },
+ };
+ for (path, session_priv_bytes) in route.paths.iter().zip(onion_session_privs.iter()) {
+ assert!(payment.insert(*session_priv_bytes, path));
+ }
+ res
+ },
+ None =>
+ return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
+ err: format!("Payment with ID {} not found", log_bytes!(payment_id.0)),
+ })),
}
};
- return self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, Some(payment_id), Some(total_msat)).map(|_| ())
+ self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, payment_id, Some(total_msat), onion_session_privs)
}
/// Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur.
/// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
/// never reach the recipient.
///
- /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function.
+ /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
+ /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
///
/// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
/// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
/// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
///
/// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
- pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
+ pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
let preimage = match payment_preimage {
Some(p) => p,
None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
};
let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
- match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), None, None) {
- Ok(payment_id) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
+ let onion_session_privs = self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, None, payment_id, &route)?;
+
+ match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), payment_id, None, onion_session_privs) {
+ Ok(()) => Ok(payment_hash),
Err(e) => Err(e)
}
}
}
let route = Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None };
+ let onion_session_privs = self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, None, payment_id, &route)?;
- match self.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &None, None, Some(payment_id), None) {
- Ok(payment_id) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
+ match self.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &None, None, payment_id, None, onion_session_privs) {
+ Ok(()) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
Err(e) => Err(e)
}
}
/// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
/// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
- fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
+ fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], _counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
) -> Result<(), APIError> {
let (chan, msg) = {
// Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools at the next block. However, the modules
// constituting our Lightning node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if
// the wallet module is in advance on the LDK view, allow one more block of headroom.
- // TODO: updated if/when https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-bitcoin/pull/994 landed and rust-bitcoin bumped.
- if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == 0xffffffff) && funding_transaction.lock_time < 500_000_000 && funding_transaction.lock_time > height + 2 {
+ if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 2 {
return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
});
})
}
- #[allow(dead_code)]
- // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
- // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 100 (our stated public contract on when
- // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
- // message...
- const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::core::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
- #[deny(const_err)]
- #[allow(dead_code)]
- // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
- // smaller than 100:
- const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 100;
-
- /// Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given
- /// arguments, providing them in corresponding events via
- /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed
- /// on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node
- /// announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and
- /// our network addresses.
- ///
- /// `rgb` is a node "color" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this
- /// node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
- ///
- /// `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node
- /// accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly
- /// tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy,
- /// addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses.
- ///
- /// Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 100).
- ///
- /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
- pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
-
- if addresses.len() > 100 {
- panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
- }
-
- // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
- // addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
- addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
-
- let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
- features: NodeFeatures::known(),
- timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
- node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
- rgb, alias, addresses,
- excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
- excess_data: Vec::new(),
- };
- let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
- let node_announce_sig = sign(&self.secp_ctx, &msghash, &self.our_network_key);
-
- let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
-
- let mut announced_chans = false;
- for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
- if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()) {
- channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
- msg,
- update_msg: match self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
- Ok(msg) => msg,
- Err(_) => continue,
- },
- });
- announced_chans = true;
- } else {
- // If the channel is not public or has not yet reached channel_ready, check the
- // next channel. If we don't yet have any public channels, we'll skip the broadcast
- // below as peers may not accept it without channels on chain first.
- }
- }
-
- if announced_chans {
- channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
- msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
- signature: node_announce_sig,
- contents: announcement
- },
- });
- }
- }
-
/// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
///
/// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
{
- let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
+ let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
+ mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
- for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
+ for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
+ let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
if short_chan_id != 0 {
- let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_chan_info.get(&short_chan_id) {
- Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
- None => {
+ macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
+ () => {
for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
match forward_info {
- HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
- routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
- prev_funding_outpoint } => {
- macro_rules! failure_handler {
- ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
- log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
-
- let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
- short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
- outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
- htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
- incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
- phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
- });
-
- let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
- HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
- } else {
- HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
- };
-
- failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
- HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: $err_code, data: $err_data },
- reason
- ));
- continue;
- }
+ HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
+ prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
+ forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
+ routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
+ outgoing_cltv_value, incoming_amt_msat: _
+ }
+ }) => {
+ macro_rules! failure_handler {
+ ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
+ log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
+
+ let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
+ short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
+ outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
+ htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
+ incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
+ phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
+ });
+
+ let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
+ HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
+ } else {
+ HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
+ };
+
+ failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
+ HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: $err_code, data: $err_data },
+ reason
+ ));
+ continue;
}
- macro_rules! fail_forward {
- ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
- {
- failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
- }
+ }
+ macro_rules! fail_forward {
+ ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
+ {
+ failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
}
}
- macro_rules! failed_payment {
- ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
- {
- failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
- }
+ }
+ macro_rules! failed_payment {
+ ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
+ {
+ failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
}
}
- if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
- let phantom_secret_res = self.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::PhantomNode);
- if phantom_secret_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id) {
- let phantom_shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &phantom_secret_res.unwrap()).secret_bytes();
- let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
- Ok(res) => res,
- Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
- let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
- // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
- // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
- // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
- // of the onion.
- failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
- },
- Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
- failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
- },
- };
- match next_hop {
- onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
- match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
- Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
- Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
- }
- },
- _ => panic!(),
- }
- } else {
- fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
+ }
+ if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
+ let phantom_secret_res = self.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::PhantomNode);
+ if phantom_secret_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
+ let phantom_shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &phantom_secret_res.unwrap()).secret_bytes();
+ let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
+ Ok(res) => res,
+ Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
+ let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
+ // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
+ // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
+ // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
+ // of the onion.
+ failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
+ },
+ Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
+ failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
+ },
+ };
+ match next_hop {
+ onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
+ match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
+ Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
+ Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
+ }
+ },
+ _ => panic!(),
}
} else {
fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
}
- },
+ } else {
+ fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
+ }
+ },
HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
// Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
// the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
}
}
}
+ }
+ }
+ let forward_chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
+ Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
+ None => {
+ forwarding_channel_not_found!();
continue;
}
};
- if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
- let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
- let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
- for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
- match forward_info {
- HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
- routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
- onion_packet, ..
- }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
- prev_funding_outpoint } => {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
- let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
- short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
- outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
- htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
- incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
- // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
- phantom_shared_secret: None,
- });
- match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet, &self.logger) {
- Err(e) => {
- if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
- } else {
- panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
- }
- let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
- failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
- HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data },
- HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
- ));
- continue;
+ match channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
+ forwarding_channel_not_found!();
+ continue;
+ },
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
+ let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
+ let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
+ for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
+ match forward_info {
+ HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
+ prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint ,
+ forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
+ incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
+ routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, incoming_amt_msat: _,
},
- Ok(update_add) => {
- match update_add {
- Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
- None => {
- // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
- // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
- // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
- // commitment_signed messages when we can.
- // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
- // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
- // this channel currently :/.
+ }) => {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
+ let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
+ short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
+ outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
+ htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
+ incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
+ // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
+ phantom_shared_secret: None,
+ });
+ match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet, &self.logger) {
+ Err(e) => {
+ if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
+ } else {
+ panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
+ }
+ let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
+ failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
+ HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data },
+ HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
+ ));
+ continue;
+ },
+ Ok(update_add) => {
+ match update_add {
+ Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
+ None => {
+ // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
+ // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
+ // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
+ // commitment_signed messages when we can.
+ // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
+ // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
+ // this channel currently :/.
+ }
}
}
}
- }
- },
- HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
- panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
- },
- HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
- match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
- Err(e) => {
- if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
- } else {
- panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
+ },
+ HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
+ panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
+ },
+ HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
+ match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
+ Err(e) => {
+ if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
+ } else {
+ panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
+ }
+ // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
+ // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
+ // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
+ continue;
+ },
+ Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
+ Ok(None) => {
+ // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
+ // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
+ // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
+ // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
+ // messages when we can.
+ // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
+ // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
+ // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
}
- // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
- // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
- // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
- continue;
- },
- Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
- Ok(None) => {
- // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
- // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
- // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
- // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
- // messages when we can.
- // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
- // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
- // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
}
- }
- },
+ },
+ }
}
- }
- if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
- let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
- Ok(res) => res,
- Err(e) => {
- // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
- // close channel and then send error message to peer.
- let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
- let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
- ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
- panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
- }
- ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
- let mut channel = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan);
- // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
- Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel.channel_id(), channel.get_user_id(), channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
- },
- };
- handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
- continue;
+ if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
+ let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
+ Ok(res) => res,
+ Err(e) => {
+ // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
+ // close channel and then send error message to peer.
+ let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
+ let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
+ ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
+ panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
+ }
+ ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
+ let mut channel = remove_channel!(self, chan);
+ // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
+ Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel.channel_id(), channel.get_user_id(), channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
+ },
+ };
+ handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
+ continue;
+ }
+ };
+ match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
+ ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
+ e => {
+ handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
+ continue;
+ }
}
- };
- if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
- handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
- continue;
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
+ add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
+ node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
+ update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
+ update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
+ update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fee: None,
+ commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
+ },
+ });
}
- log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
- add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
- channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
- node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
- updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
- update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
- update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
- update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fee: None,
- commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
- },
- });
}
- } else {
- unreachable!();
}
} else {
for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
match forward_info {
- HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
- routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
- prev_funding_outpoint } => {
+ HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
+ prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
+ forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
+ routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
+ }
+ }) => {
let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
phantom_shared_secret,
},
- value: amt_to_forward,
+ value: outgoing_amt_msat,
timer_ticks: 0,
- total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { amt_to_forward },
+ total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
cltv_expiry,
onion_payload,
};
e.insert((purpose.clone(), vec![claimable_htlc]));
new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
payment_hash,
- amount_msat: amt_to_forward,
+ amount_msat: outgoing_amt_msat,
purpose,
});
},
}
for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
- self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason, destination);
+ self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason, destination);
}
self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
self.process_background_events();
}
- fn update_channel_fee(&self, short_to_chan_info: &mut HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
+ fn update_channel_fee(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
// If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
Ok(res) => Ok(res),
Err(e) => {
- let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_chan_info, chan, chan_id);
+ let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
if drop { retain_channel = false; }
Err(res)
}
};
let ret_err = match res {
Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
- if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
- let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_chan_info, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
- if drop { retain_channel = false; }
- res
- } else {
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
- node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
- updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
- update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fee: Some(update_fee),
- commitment_signed,
- },
- });
- Ok(())
+ match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
+ ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
+ node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
+ update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fee: Some(update_fee),
+ commitment_signed,
+ },
+ });
+ Ok(())
+ },
+ e => {
+ let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
+ if drop { retain_channel = false; }
+ res
+ }
}
},
Ok(None) => Ok(()),
let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
- let short_to_chan_info = &mut channel_state.short_to_chan_info;
channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
- let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_chan_info, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
+ let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
if err.is_err() {
handle_errors.push(err);
});
}
+ fn remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self) {
+ // If an outbound payment was completed, and no pending HTLCs remain, we should remove it
+ // from the map. However, if we did that immediately when the last payment HTLC is claimed,
+ // this could race the user making a duplicate send_payment call and our idempotency
+ // guarantees would be violated. Instead, we wait a few timer ticks to do the actual
+ // removal. This should be more than sufficient to ensure the idempotency of any
+ // `send_payment` calls that were made at the same time the `PaymentSent` event was being
+ // processed.
+ let mut pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
+ let pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
+ pending_outbound_payments.retain(|payment_id, payment| {
+ if let PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, timer_ticks_without_htlcs, .. } = payment {
+ let mut no_remaining_entries = session_privs.is_empty();
+ if no_remaining_entries {
+ for ev in pending_events.iter() {
+ match ev {
+ events::Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: Some(ev_payment_id), .. } |
+ events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ev_payment_id, .. } |
+ events::Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_id: Some(ev_payment_id), .. } => {
+ if payment_id == ev_payment_id {
+ no_remaining_entries = false;
+ break;
+ }
+ },
+ _ => {},
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if no_remaining_entries {
+ *timer_ticks_without_htlcs += 1;
+ *timer_ticks_without_htlcs <= IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS
+ } else {
+ *timer_ticks_without_htlcs = 0;
+ true
+ }
+ } else { true }
+ });
+ }
+
/// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
///
/// This currently includes:
let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
- let short_to_chan_info = &mut channel_state.short_to_chan_info;
channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
- let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_chan_info, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
+ let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
if err.is_err() {
handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
if !retain_channel { return false; }
if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
- let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_chan_info, chan, chan_id);
+ let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
if needs_close { return false; }
}
for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
- self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone()), &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 23, data: Vec::new() }, receiver );
+ self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone()), &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 23, data: Vec::new() }, receiver );
}
for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
}
+
+ self.remove_stale_resolved_payments();
+
should_persist
});
}
pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
- let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
- let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
+ let removed_source = {
+ let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ channel_state.claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash)
+ };
if let Some((_, mut sources)) = removed_source {
for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
- if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
- self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
+ self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(
HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data },
HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash });
///
/// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
/// forwarding
- fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
+ fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
// We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
// guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
// we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
/// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
/// that we want to return and a channel.
- fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
+ fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
) {
for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
- match htlc_src {
- HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
- let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
- match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
- self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
- },
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
- };
- let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
+ match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
+ self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
+ },
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
+ };
- let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
- self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state, htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data }, receiver)
- },
- HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, payment_params, .. } => {
- let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
- session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
- let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
- if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
- if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) && !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
- let retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
- let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
- Some(RouteParameters {
- payment_params: payment_params_data,
- final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
- final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
- })
- } else { None };
- let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
- pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
- payment_id: Some(payment_id),
- payment_hash,
- rejected_by_dest: false,
- network_update: None,
- all_paths_failed: payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0,
- path: path.clone(),
- short_channel_id: None,
- retry,
- #[cfg(test)]
- error_code: None,
- #[cfg(test)]
- error_data: None,
- });
- if payment.get().abandoned() && payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
- pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
- payment_id,
- payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
- });
- payment.remove();
- }
- }
- } else {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
- }
- },
- };
+ let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
+ self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data }, receiver);
}
}
/// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
- /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
- /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
- /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
- /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
- /// still-available channels.
- fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
+ /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
+ fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason,destination: HTLCDestination) {
+ #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
+ {
+ // Ensure that the `channel_state` lock is not held when calling this function.
+ // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock_order requirement for
+ // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `channel_state` lock, which calling this
+ // function with the `channel_state` locked would.
+ assert!(self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
+ }
+
//TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
//identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
//between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
return;
}
- mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
let mut retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
Some(RouteParameters {
}
} else {
events::Event::ProbeFailed {
- payment_id: payment_id,
+ payment_id,
payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
path: path.clone(),
short_channel_id,
events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
payment_id: Some(payment_id),
payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
- rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
+ payment_failed_permanently: !payment_retryable,
network_update,
all_paths_failed,
path: path.clone(),
// channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
let scid = path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id;
retry.as_mut().map(|r| r.payment_params.previously_failed_channels.push(scid));
- events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
- payment_id: Some(payment_id),
- payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
- rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
- network_update: None,
- all_paths_failed,
- path: path.clone(),
- short_channel_id: Some(scid),
- retry,
+
+ if self.payment_is_probe(payment_hash, &payment_id) {
+ events::Event::ProbeFailed {
+ payment_id,
+ payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
+ path: path.clone(),
+ short_channel_id: Some(scid),
+ }
+ } else {
+ events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
+ payment_id: Some(payment_id),
+ payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
+ payment_failed_permanently: false,
+ network_update: None,
+ all_paths_failed,
+ path: path.clone(),
+ short_channel_id: Some(scid),
+ retry,
#[cfg(test)]
- error_code: Some(*failure_code),
+ error_code: Some(*failure_code),
#[cfg(test)]
- error_data: Some(data.clone()),
+ error_data: Some(data.clone()),
+ }
}
}
};
};
let mut forward_event = None;
- if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
+ let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
+ if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
}
- match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
+ match forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
},
entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
}
}
- mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
+ mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
if let Some(time) = forward_event {
pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
- let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
- let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
+ let removed_source = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
if let Some((payment_purpose, mut sources)) = removed_source {
assert!(!sources.is_empty());
let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
let mut valid_mpp = true;
+ let mut errs = Vec::new();
+ let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
+ let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
for htlc in sources.iter() {
- if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_chan_info.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
+ let chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
+ Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
+ None => {
+ valid_mpp = false;
+ break;
+ }
+ };
+
+ if let None = channel_state.by_id.get(&chan_id) {
valid_mpp = false;
break;
}
+
if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
debug_assert!(false);
expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
return;
}
-
- let mut errs = Vec::new();
- let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
- for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
- if !valid_mpp {
- if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
- let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
- htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
- self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
- self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
- HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
- HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data },
- HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash } );
- } else {
- match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
+ if valid_mpp {
+ for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
+ match self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
// We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
}
}
}
+ mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
+ if !valid_mpp {
+ for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
+ let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
+ htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
+ self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
+ self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(
+ HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
+ HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data },
+ HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash } );
+ }
+ }
if claimed_any_htlcs {
self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
});
}
- // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
- // which were generated.
- channel_state.take();
-
+ // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
}
}
- fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
+ fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
//TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
- let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_chan_info.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
+ let chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
None => {
return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed
match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
- if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
- log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
- "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
- payment_preimage, e);
- return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
- chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
- handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
- Some(htlc_value_msat)
- );
+ match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
+ ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
+ e => {
+ log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
+ "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
+ payment_preimage, e);
+ return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
+ chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
+ Some(htlc_value_msat)
+ );
+ }
}
if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
}
},
Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
- if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
- log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
- "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
- payment_preimage, e);
+ match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
+ ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
+ e => {
+ log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
+ "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
+ payment_preimage, e);
+ },
}
let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
- let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_chan_info, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
+ let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
if drop {
chan.remove_entry();
}
return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
},
}
- } else { unreachable!(); }
+ } else { return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed }
}
fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
}
);
}
- if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
- payment.remove();
- }
}
}
}
}
- fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
+ fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
match source {
HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
}
);
}
-
- if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
- payment.remove();
- }
}
} else {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
// We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
// receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
// event being update_fulfill_htlc).
- if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
+ let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update);
+ if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
+ // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
+ // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
+ // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
+ // again on restart.
log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
- payment_preimage, e);
+ payment_preimage, update_res);
}
// Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
// totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id: funding_txo.to_channel_id() };
- self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2, receiver);
+ self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2, receiver);
}
}
}
};
channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
- let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, channel);
+ let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
}
if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
}
- try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &their_features), channel_state, chan);
+ try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &their_features), chan);
(chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
}
- (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
+ (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
}
};
// Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
// lock before watch_channel
- if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
- match e {
- ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
- // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
- // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
- // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
- // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
- // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
- // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
- // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
- let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
- assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
- return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
- },
- ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
- // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
- // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
- // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
- // until we have persisted our monitor.
- chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, channel_ready.is_some(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
- channel_ready = None; // Don't send the channel_ready now
- },
- }
+ match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
+ ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
+ ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
+ // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
+ // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
+ // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
+ // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
+ // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
+ // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
+ // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
+ let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(false);
+ assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
+ },
+ ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
+ // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
+ // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
+ // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
+ // until we have persisted our monitor.
+ chan.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, channel_ready.is_some(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
+ channel_ready = None; // Don't send the channel_ready now
+ },
}
let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
msg: funding_msg,
});
if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
- send_channel_ready!(channel_state.short_to_chan_info, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
+ send_channel_ready!(self, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
}
e.insert(chan);
}
}
let (monitor, funding_tx, channel_ready) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
Ok(update) => update,
- Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
+ Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan),
};
- if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
- let mut res = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, channel_ready.is_some(), OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED);
- if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
- // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
- // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
- // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
- if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
- shutdown_finish.0.take();
+ match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
+ ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
+ e => {
+ let mut res = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, channel_ready.is_some(), OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED);
+ if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
+ // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
+ // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
+ // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
+ if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
+ shutdown_finish.0.take();
+ }
}
- }
- return res
+ return res
+ },
}
if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
- send_channel_ready!(channel_state.short_to_chan_info, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get(), msg);
+ send_channel_ready!(self, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get(), msg);
}
funding_tx
},
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
}
let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, self.get_our_node_id(),
- self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
+ self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
});
}
}
+
+ emit_channel_ready_event!(self, chan.get_mut());
+
Ok(())
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
}
- let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
+ let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), chan_entry);
dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
// Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
- if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
- let (result, is_permanent) =
- handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_chan_info, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
- if is_permanent {
- remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
- break result;
- }
+ let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
+ let (result, is_permanent) =
+ handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
+ if is_permanent {
+ remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
+ break result;
}
}
};
for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
- self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
+ self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
}
let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
}
- let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
+ let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
// also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
// fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
// watch for old state broadcasts)!
- (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry)))
+ (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
} else { (tx, None) }
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
//encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
//but we should prevent it anyway.
- let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
+ let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
+ let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
}
- let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
+ let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
// If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
// but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
// want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
_ => pending_forward_info
}
};
- try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
+ try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
}
if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
}
- try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
+ try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
}
if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
}
- try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
+ try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), chan);
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
}
}
if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
- try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
+ try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
}
- try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
+ try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), chan);
Ok(())
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
}
let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
- Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
+ Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan),
Err((Some(update), e)) => {
assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
- try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
+ try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan);
unreachable!();
},
Ok(res) => res
};
- if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
- return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
+ let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
+ if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some()) {
+ return Err(e);
}
+
channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
msg: revoke_and_ack,
for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
let mut forward_event = None;
if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
- let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
+ let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
+ if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
}
for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
- match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
+ match forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
}) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
- entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
- prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
+ entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
+ prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
- entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
- prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
+ entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
+ prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, forward_info })));
}
}
}
if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
}
- let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
+ let was_paused_for_mon_update = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
- chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
+ chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
- if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update) {
- if was_frozen_for_monitor {
- assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
- assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
- break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
- } else {
- if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan,
- RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
- raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(), false,
- raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
- raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
- break Err(e);
- } else { unreachable!(); }
- }
+ let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update);
+ if was_paused_for_mon_update {
+ assert!(update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
+ assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
+ assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Existing pending monitor update prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
+ }
+ if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
+ if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan,
+ RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
+ raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(), false,
+ raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
+ raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
+ break Err(e);
+ } else { unreachable!(); }
}
if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
{
for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: channel_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
- self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2, receiver);
+ self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2, receiver);
}
self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
}
- try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
+ try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan);
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
}
channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
- self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), msg), channel_state, chan),
+ self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), msg), chan),
// Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
// so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
/// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
- let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
- let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_chan_info.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
+ let chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
None => {
// It's not a local channel
return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
}
};
+ let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
} else {
log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
- try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
+ try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
}
},
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
}
Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
}
// add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
msg, &self.logger, self.our_network_pubkey.clone(), self.genesis_hash,
- &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), channel_state, chan);
+ &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
let mut channel_update = None;
if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
} else {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
- self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
+ self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
}
},
MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
- let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
+ let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
});
}
},
- MonitorEvent::UpdateCompleted { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
+ MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
},
}
let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
- let short_to_chan_info = &mut channel_state.short_to_chan_info;
let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
));
}
if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
- if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
- has_monitor_update = true;
- let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_chan_info, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, channel_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
- handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
- if close_channel { return false; }
- } else {
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
- node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
- updates: commitment_update,
- });
+ match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
+ ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
+ node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ updates: commitment_update,
+ });
+ },
+ e => {
+ has_monitor_update = true;
+ let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, channel_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
+ handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
+ if close_channel { return false; }
+ },
}
}
true
},
Err(e) => {
- let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_chan_info, chan, channel_id);
+ let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
// ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
!close_channel
let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
- let short_to_chan_info = &mut channel_state.short_to_chan_info;
let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
- update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_chan_info, chan);
+ update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
false
} else { true }
},
Err(e) => {
has_update = true;
- let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_chan_info, chan, channel_id);
+ let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
!close_channel
}
///
/// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
- let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
+ let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
+ let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
loop {
- let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block.height(), &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
+ let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
// Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
- match channel_state.short_to_chan_info.entry(scid_candidate) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => continue,
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return scid_candidate
+ match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
+ Some(_) => continue,
+ None => return scid_candidate
}
}
}
}
}
-impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
- where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
+impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
+ where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
- K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
+ K::Target: KeysInterface,
F::Target: FeeEstimator,
L::Target: Logger,
{
}
}
-impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
+impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
where
- M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
+ M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
- K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
+ K::Target: KeysInterface,
F::Target: FeeEstimator,
L::Target: Logger,
{
///
/// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
/// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
- ///
- /// Pending events are persisted as part of [`ChannelManager`]. While these events are cleared
- /// when processed, an [`EventHandler`] must be able to handle previously seen events when
- /// restarting from an old state.
fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
}
}
-impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
+impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
where
- M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
+ M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
- K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
+ K::Target: KeysInterface,
F::Target: FeeEstimator,
L::Target: Logger,
{
}
}
-impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
+impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
where
- M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
+ M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
- K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
+ K::Target: KeysInterface,
F::Target: FeeEstimator,
L::Target: Logger,
{
}
}
}
- max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
});
-
- let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
- let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
- outbounds.retain(|payment_id, payment| {
- if payment.remaining_parts() != 0 { return true }
- if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { starting_block_height, payment_hash, .. } = payment {
- if *starting_block_height + PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS <= height {
- log_info!(self.logger, "Timing out payment with id {} and hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_id.0), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
- pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
- payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash,
- });
- false
- } else { true }
- } else { true }
- });
}
- fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
+ fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_chan_info.len());
+ let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
- if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
- res.push(funding_txo.txid);
+ if let (Some(funding_txo), block_hash) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
+ res.push((funding_txo.txid, block_hash));
}
}
res
}
}
-impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
+impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
where
- M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
+ M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
- K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
+ K::Target: KeysInterface,
F::Target: FeeEstimator,
L::Target: Logger,
{
/// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
/// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
/// the function.
- fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
+ fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
(&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
// Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
// during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
{
let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
- let short_to_chan_info = &mut channel_state.short_to_chan_info;
let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
let res = f(channel);
}, HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
}
if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
- send_channel_ready!(short_to_chan_info, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
+ send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
if channel.is_usable() {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
}
}
+
+ emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
+
if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
// enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
// un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
// is always consistent.
+ let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
"SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
}
}
} else if let Err(reason) = res {
- update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_chan_info, channel);
+ update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel);
// It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
// reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
- self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason, destination);
+ self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(source, &payment_hash, reason, destination);
}
}
self.persistence_notifier.wait()
}
+ /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when a persistable update is available. Note that
+ /// callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this [`ChannelManager`] and
+ /// should instead register actions to be taken later.
+ pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
+ self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
+ }
+
#[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
- let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
- let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
- let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
- *guard
+ self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
}
/// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
}
}
-impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
- ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
- where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
+impl<M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
+ ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
+ where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
- K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
+ K::Target: KeysInterface,
F::Target: FeeEstimator,
L::Target: Logger,
{
let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
- let short_to_chan_info = &mut channel_state.short_to_chan_info;
log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates. We believe we {} make future connections to this peer.",
log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id), if no_connection_possible { "cannot" } else { "can" });
channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
if chan.is_shutdown() {
- update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_chan_info, chan);
+ update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
return false;
} else {
&events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
&events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
&events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
+ &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
&events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
- &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
&events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
&events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
&events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
}
}
- fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
+ fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) -> Result<(), ()> {
+ if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting with no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
+ return Err(());
+ }
+
log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
- if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
+ let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
if !chan.have_received_message() {
// If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
// peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
});
true
}
- } else { true }
+ } else { true };
+ if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
+ if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()) {
+ if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
+ node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
+ msg, update_msg,
+ });
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ retain
});
//TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
+ Ok(())
}
fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
}
}
-}
-
-/// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
-/// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
-struct PersistenceNotifier {
- /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
- /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
- persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
-}
-impl PersistenceNotifier {
- fn new() -> Self {
- Self {
- persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
- }
+ fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
+ provided_node_features()
}
- fn wait(&self) {
- loop {
- let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
- let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
- if *guard {
- *guard = false;
- return;
- }
- guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
- let result = *guard;
- if result {
- *guard = false;
- return
- }
- }
+ fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
+ provided_init_features()
}
+}
- #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
- fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
- let current_time = Instant::now();
- loop {
- let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
- let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
- if *guard {
- *guard = false;
- return true;
- }
- guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
- // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
- // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
- // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
- // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
- // 1.42.0.
- let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
- let result = *guard;
- if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
- *guard = false;
- return result;
- }
- match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
- None => return result,
- Some(_) => continue
- }
- }
- }
+/// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
+/// [`ChannelManager`].
+pub fn provided_node_features() -> NodeFeatures {
+ provided_init_features().to_context()
+}
- // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
- fn notify(&self) {
- let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
- let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
- *persistence_lock = true;
- mem::drop(persistence_lock);
- cnd.notify_all();
- }
+/// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
+/// [`ChannelManager`].
+///
+/// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
+/// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
+#[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
+pub fn provided_invoice_features() -> InvoiceFeatures {
+ provided_init_features().to_context()
+}
+
+/// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
+/// [`ChannelManager`].
+pub fn provided_channel_features() -> ChannelFeatures {
+ provided_init_features().to_context()
+}
+
+/// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
+/// [`ChannelManager`].
+pub fn provided_init_features() -> InitFeatures {
+ // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
+ // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the ChannelMessageHandler impl for
+ // ErroringMessageHandler.
+ let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
+ features.set_data_loss_protect_optional();
+ features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
+ features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
+ features.set_static_remote_key_required();
+ features.set_payment_secret_required();
+ features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
+ features.set_wumbo_optional();
+ features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
+ features.set_channel_type_optional();
+ features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
+ features.set_zero_conf_optional();
+ features
}
const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
(0, routing, required),
(2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
(4, payment_hash, required),
- (6, amt_to_forward, required),
- (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
+ (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
+ (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
+ (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
});
impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
- let mut prev_hop = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
+ let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
let mut value = 0;
let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
match id {
0 => {
- let mut session_priv: ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
+ let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
let mut payment_id = None;
}
Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
- first_hop_htlc_msat: first_hop_htlc_msat,
+ first_hop_htlc_msat,
path: path.unwrap(),
payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
payment_secret,
}
impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
- fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::io::Error> {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
match self {
HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_params } => {
0u8.write(writer)?;
(1, payment_id_opt, option),
(2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
(3, payment_secret, option),
- (4, path, vec_type),
+ (4, *path, vec_type),
(5, payment_params, option),
});
}
},
;);
+impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
+ (0, forward_info, required),
+ (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
+ (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
+ (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
+});
+
impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
- (0, AddHTLC) => {
- (0, forward_info, required),
- (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
- (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
- (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
- },
(1, FailHTLC) => {
(0, htlc_id, required),
(2, err_packet, required),
- },
-;);
+ };
+ (0, AddHTLC)
+);
impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
(0, payment_secret, required),
(1, Fulfilled) => {
(0, session_privs, required),
(1, payment_hash, option),
+ (3, timer_ticks_without_htlcs, (default_value, 0)),
},
(2, Retryable) => {
(0, session_privs, required),
},
);
-impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
- where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
+impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
+ where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
- K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
+ K::Target: KeysInterface,
F::Target: FeeEstimator,
L::Target: Logger,
{
best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
}
- let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
- for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
- if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
- unfunded_channels += 1;
+ {
+ // Take `channel_state` lock temporarily to avoid creating a lock order that requires
+ // that the `forward_htlcs` lock is taken after `channel_state`
+ let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
+ for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
+ if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
+ unfunded_channels += 1;
+ }
}
- }
- ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
- for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
- if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
- channel.write(writer)?;
+ ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
+ for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
+ if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
+ channel.write(writer)?;
+ }
}
}
- (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
- for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
- short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
- (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
- for forward in pending_forwards {
- forward.write(writer)?;
+ {
+ let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
+ (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
+ for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
+ short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
+ (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
+ for forward in pending_forwards {
+ forward.write(writer)?;
+ }
}
}
+ let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
(channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
for (payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops)) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
}
}
- (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
+ // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
+ // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
+ // likely to be identical.
+ (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
(self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
(pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
// Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
// SipmleArcChannelManager type:
-impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
- ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
- where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
+impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
+ ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, <K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>>)
+ where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
- K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
+ K::Target: KeysInterface,
F::Target: FeeEstimator,
L::Target: Logger,
{
- fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
- let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
+ fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, <K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+ let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
}
}
-impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
- ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
- where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
+impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
+ ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, <K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>)
+ where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
- K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
+ K::Target: KeysInterface,
F::Target: FeeEstimator,
L::Target: Logger,
{
- fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+ fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, <K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
for _ in 0..channel_count {
- let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (&args.keys_manager, best_block_height))?;
+ let mut channel: Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (&args.keys_manager, best_block_height))?;
let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
}
by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
}
+ } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
+ // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
+ // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
+ // safely discard the channel.
+ let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false);
+ channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
+ channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
+ user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
+ reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
+ });
} else {
log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
}
}
- let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
by_id,
- short_to_chan_info,
- forward_htlcs,
claimable_htlcs,
pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
}),
pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
+ forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
+ short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
our_network_pubkey,
secp_ctx,
- last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
- persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
+ persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
logger: args.logger,
for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
- channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
+ channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
}
//TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
use core::time::Duration;
use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
- use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
- use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
- use ln::channelmanager::inbound_payment;
- use ln::features::InitFeatures;
- use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
- use ln::msgs;
- use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
- use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
- use util::errors::APIError;
- use util::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
- use util::test_utils;
- use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
-
- #[cfg(feature = "std")]
- #[test]
- fn test_wait_timeout() {
- use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
- use sync::Arc;
- use core::sync::atomic::AtomicBool;
- use std::thread;
-
- let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
- let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
-
- let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
- let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
- thread::spawn(move || {
- loop {
- let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
- let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
- *persistence_lock = true;
- cnd.notify_all();
-
- if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
- break
- }
- }
- });
-
- // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
- let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
-
- // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
- // available.
- loop {
- if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
- break
- }
- }
-
- exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
-
- // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
- // are available.
- loop {
- if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
- break
- }
- }
- }
+ use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
+ use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
+ use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
+ use crate::ln::msgs;
+ use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
+ use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
+ use crate::util::errors::APIError;
+ use crate::util::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
+ use crate::util::test_utils;
+ use crate::chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
#[test]
fn test_notify_limits() {
assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
- let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
+ let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
// We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
// to connect messages with new values
let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
// First, send a partial MPP payment.
let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
+ let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
+ mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
+
let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
// Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
// indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
- nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
+ let session_privs = nodes[0].node.add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
// Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
- nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
// Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
- nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
).unwrap();
- nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
).unwrap();
- let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
+ let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
// Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
- nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
- nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
- nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
+ nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
- let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
+ let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
let route_params = RouteParameters {
payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
- final_value_msat: 10000,
+ final_value_msat: 10_000,
final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
};
let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
- let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
+ let session_privs = nodes[0].node.add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash, None, PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
- nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
- nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
+ nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
- let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
+ let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
let route_params = RouteParameters {
payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
- final_value_msat: 10000,
+ final_value_msat: 10_000,
final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
};
let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
- let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
+ let session_privs = nodes[0].node.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, Some(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
- let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
- let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
- let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
- let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
+ let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
+ let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
+ let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
+ let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
// Marshall an MPP route.
let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
- match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None).unwrap_err() {
+ match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None, PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap_err() {
PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
_ => panic!("unexpected error")
nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
+ nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel);
let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
+ nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
- nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
+ nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
+ nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
#[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
pub mod bench {
- use chain::Listen;
- use chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
- use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, KeysInterface, InMemorySigner};
- use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
- use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
- use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
- use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
- use routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
- use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
- use util::test_utils;
- use util::config::UserConfig;
- use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
+ use crate::chain::Listen;
+ use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
+ use crate::chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, KeysInterface, InMemorySigner};
+ use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId};
+ use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
+ use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
+ use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
+ use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
+ use crate::util::test_utils;
+ use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
+ use crate::util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
- use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
+ use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
- use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
+ use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
use test::Bencher;
struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
- node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
+ node: &'a ChannelManager<
&'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
&'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
&'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
&'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
- &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
+ &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>,
}
#[cfg(test)]
});
let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
- node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
- node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
+ node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
+ node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
- node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
- node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
+ node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
+ node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
let tx;
if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
- tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
+ tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
}]};
node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
let block = Block {
- header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
+ header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
txdata: vec![tx],
};
Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
_ => panic!(),
}
+ let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
+ match events_a[0] {
+ Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
+ assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
+ let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
+ match events_b[0] {
+ Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
+ assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger_a);
let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id())
- .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
+ .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
let seed = [3u8; 32];
let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42);
let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
- $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
+ $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
$node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
$node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff