// Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
// construct one themselves.
use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
-use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel};
+use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel};
use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
#[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
-use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
+use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
-use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, Router};
+use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
use crate::ln::msgs;
use crate::ln::onion_utils;
use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
#[cfg(test)]
use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
-use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment};
+use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs};
use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, ChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
+ /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
+ custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
},
ReceiveKeysend {
/// This was added in 0.0.116 and will break deserialization on downgrades.
payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
+ /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
+ custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
},
}
}
}
-struct ReceiveError {
+struct InboundOnionErr {
err_code: u16,
err_data: Vec<u8>,
msg: &'static str,
pub enum FailureCode {
/// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
/// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
- TemporaryNodeFailure = 0x2000 | 2,
+ TemporaryNodeFailure,
/// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
/// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
- RequiredNodeFeatureMissing = 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
+ RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
/// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
/// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
/// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
/// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
- IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails = 0x4000 | 15,
+ IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
+ /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
+ /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
+ ///
+ /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
+ /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
+ InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
+}
+
+impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
+ fn into(self) -> u16 {
+ match self {
+ FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
+ FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
+ FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
+ FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
+ }
+ }
}
/// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
err: msgs::LightningError,
chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
+ channel_capacity: Option<u64>,
}
impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
#[inline]
},
chan_id: None,
shutdown_finish: None,
+ channel_capacity: None,
}
}
#[inline]
fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
- Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
+ Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None, channel_capacity: None }
}
#[inline]
- fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
+ fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, channel_capacity: u64) -> Self {
Self {
err: LightningError {
err: err.clone(),
},
chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
+ channel_capacity: Some(channel_capacity)
}
}
#[inline]
},
chan_id: None,
shutdown_finish: None,
+ channel_capacity: None,
}
}
}
/// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
/// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
enum BackgroundEvent {
- /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel. This is only separated from
- /// [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the maybe-non-closing variant needs a public
- /// key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the channel has been force-closed we do not
- /// need the counterparty node_id.
+ /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
+ /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
+ /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
+ /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
///
/// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
/// are regenerated on startup.
- ClosingMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
+ ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
/// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
/// channel to continue normal operation.
///
/// In general this should be used rather than
- /// [`Self::ClosingMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
+ /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
/// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
/// error the other variant is acceptable.
///
funding_txo: OutPoint,
update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
},
+ /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
+ /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
+ /// on a channel.
+ MonitorUpdatesComplete {
+ counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
+ channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ },
}
#[derive(Debug)]
/// been assigned a `channel_id`, the entry in this map is removed and one is created in
/// `channel_by_id`.
pub(super) inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], InboundV1Channel<Signer>>,
+ /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
+ ///
+ /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
+ /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
+ /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
+ /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
+ pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], InboundChannelRequest>,
/// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
latest_features: InitFeatures,
/// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
&& self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
}
- // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including pending channels.
+ // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
self.channel_by_id.len() +
self.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.len() +
- self.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.len()
+ self.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.len() +
+ self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
}
// Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> bool {
self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
self.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
- self.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
+ self.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
+ self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
}
}
+/// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
+/// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
+pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
+ /// The original OpenChannel message.
+ pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
+ /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
+ pub ticks_remaining: i32,
+}
+
+/// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
+/// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
+const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
+
/// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
/// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
///
/// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
///
/// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
-pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e DefaultRouter<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L, &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters, ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>, &'g L>;
+pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
+ ChannelManager<
+ &'a M,
+ &'b T,
+ &'c KeysManager,
+ &'c KeysManager,
+ &'c KeysManager,
+ &'d F,
+ &'e DefaultRouter<
+ &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
+ &'g L,
+ &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
+ ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
+ ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
+ >,
+ &'g L
+ >;
macro_rules! define_test_pub_trait { ($vis: vis) => {
/// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`] used in testing.
}
/// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
+///
+/// Balances of a channel are available through [`ChainMonitor::get_claimable_balances`] and
+/// [`ChannelMonitor::get_claimable_balances`], calculated with respect to the corresponding on-chain
+/// transactions.
+///
+/// [`ChainMonitor::get_claimable_balances`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor::get_claimable_balances
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
pub struct ChannelDetails {
/// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
///
/// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
- /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
- /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
- /// 0.0.113.
+ /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
+ /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
+ /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
+ /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel. This may be zero for objects
+ /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
+ ///
+ /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
+ /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
+ /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
pub user_channel_id: u128,
/// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
/// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
///
/// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
- /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
- /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
- /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
- ///
- /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
- /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
- /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
- /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
- ///
- /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
- pub balance_msat: u64,
/// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
/// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
/// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
/// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
///
- /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
- ///
/// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
/// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
/// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
/// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
/// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
///
- /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
- /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
+ /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`] and
+ /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
/// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
/// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
///
/// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
pub is_channel_ready: bool,
+ /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
+ /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
+ pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
/// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
/// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
///
self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
}
- fn from_channel_context<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner>(context: &ChannelContext<Signer>,
- best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures) -> Self {
-
- let balance = context.get_available_balances();
+ fn from_channel_context<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, F: Deref>(
+ context: &ChannelContext<Signer>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
+ fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
+ ) -> Self
+ where F::Target: FeeEstimator
+ {
+ let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
ChannelDetails {
channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
- balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
config: Some(context.config()),
+ channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
}
}
}
+#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
+/// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
+/// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
+/// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
+/// the channel will be removed shortly.
+/// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
+/// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
+pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
+ /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
+ NotShuttingDown,
+ /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
+ ShutdownInitiated,
+ /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
+ /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
+ ResolvingHTLCs,
+ /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
+ NegotiatingClosingFee,
+ /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
+ /// to drop the channel.
+ ShutdownComplete,
+}
+
/// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
/// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
#[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
match $internal {
Ok(msg) => Ok(msg),
- Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
+ Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish, channel_capacity }) => {
let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
$self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
channel_id, user_channel_id,
- reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
+ reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() },
+ counterparty_node_id: Some($counterparty_node_id),
+ channel_capacity_sats: channel_capacity,
}, None));
}
}
update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$channel.context);
let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
(true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.context.get_user_id(),
- shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
+ shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok(), $channel.context.get_value_satoshis()))
},
}
};
- ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_context: expr, $channel_id: expr, PREFUNDED) => {
+ ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_context: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED) => {
match $err {
- // We should only ever have `ChannelError::Close` when prefunded channels error.
+ // We should only ever have `ChannelError::Close` when unfunded channels error.
// In any case, just close the channel.
ChannelError::Warn(msg) | ChannelError::Ignore(msg) | ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
- log_error!($self.logger, "Closing prefunded channel {} due to an error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
+ log_error!($self.logger, "Closing unfunded channel {} due to an error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$channel_context);
let shutdown_res = $channel_context.force_shutdown(false);
(true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel_context.get_user_id(),
- shutdown_res, None))
+ shutdown_res, None, $channel_context.get_value_satoshis()))
},
}
}
match $res {
Ok(res) => res,
Err(e) => {
- let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut().context, $entry.key(), PREFUNDED);
+ let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut().context, $entry.key(), UNFUNDED);
if drop {
$entry.remove_entry();
}
let res = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(
"ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.context.channel_id(),
$chan.context.get_user_id(), $chan.context.force_shutdown(false),
- $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok()));
+ $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok(), $chan.context.get_value_satoshis()));
$remove;
res
},
let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
pending_events.drain(..num_events);
processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
+ // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
+ // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
$self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
}
{
/// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
///
+ /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
+ ///
/// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
/// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
///
/// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
/// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
/// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
- pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
+ pub fn new(
+ fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
+ node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
+ current_timestamp: u32,
+ ) -> Self {
let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
- highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
+ highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
+ // Only `Channels` in the channel_by_id map can be considered funded.
for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
- peer_state.latest_features.clone());
+ peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
res.push(details);
}
}
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
- peer_state.latest_features.clone());
+ peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
res.push(details);
}
for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter() {
let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
- peer_state.latest_features.clone());
+ peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
res.push(details);
}
for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter() {
let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
- peer_state.latest_features.clone());
+ peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
res.push(details);
}
}
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
+ let chan_context_to_details = |context| {
+ ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
+ };
return peer_state.channel_by_id
.iter()
- .map(|(_, channel)|
- ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height, features.clone()))
+ .map(|(_, channel)| &channel.context)
+ .chain(peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, channel)| &channel.context))
+ .chain(peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, channel)| &channel.context))
+ .map(chan_context_to_details)
.collect();
}
vec![]
pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
channel_id: context.channel_id(),
user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
- reason: closure_reason
+ reason: closure_reason,
+ counterparty_node_id: Some(context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
+ channel_capacity_sats: Some(context.get_value_satoshis()),
}, None));
}
let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
- let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
+ {
+ let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
- let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
- .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
+ let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
+ .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
- let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
- let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
- match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
- let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().context.get_funding_txo();
- let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
- let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut()
- .get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
- failed_htlcs = htlcs;
+ let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
+ let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
- // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
- // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
- // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
- peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
- node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
- msg: shutdown_msg,
- });
+ match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
+ let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().context.get_funding_txo();
+ let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
+ let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut()
+ .get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
+ failed_htlcs = htlcs;
- // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
- if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
- break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
- peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry).map(|_| ());
- }
+ // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
+ // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
+ // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
+ peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
+ node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
+ msg: shutdown_msg,
+ });
- if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
- let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
- if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
- peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
- msg: channel_update
- });
+ // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
+ if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
+ break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
+ peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry).map(|_| ());
}
- self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
- }
- break Ok(());
- },
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id) })
+
+ if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
+ let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
+ if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
+ peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
+ msg: channel_update
+ });
+ }
+ self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
+ }
+ break Ok(());
+ },
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (),
+ }
}
+ // If we reach this point, it means that the channel_id either refers to an unfunded channel or
+ // it does not exist for this peer. Either way, we can attempt to force-close it.
+ //
+ // An appropriate error will be returned for non-existence of the channel if that's the case.
+ return self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, false).map(|_| ())
+ // TODO(dunxen): This is still not ideal as we're doing some extra lookups.
+ // Fix this with https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/2422
};
for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, closure_reason);
let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan);
self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
- // Prefunded channel has no update
+ // Unfunded channel has no update
(None, chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
} else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, closure_reason);
let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan);
self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
- // Prefunded channel has no update
+ // Unfunded channel has no update
(None, chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
+ } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
+ log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
+ // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
+ // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
+ // events anyway.
+ (None, *peer_node_id)
} else {
return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
}
}
}
+ fn construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(
+ &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, hop_hmac: [u8; 32],
+ new_packet_bytes: [u8; onion_utils::ONION_DATA_LEN], shared_secret: [u8; 32],
+ next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
+ ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
+ debug_assert!(next_packet_pubkey_opt.is_some());
+ let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
+ version: 0,
+ public_key: next_packet_pubkey_opt.unwrap_or(Err(secp256k1::Error::InvalidPublicKey)),
+ hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
+ hmac: hop_hmac,
+ };
+
+ let (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value) = match hop_data {
+ msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value } =>
+ (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value),
+ msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. } =>
+ return Err(InboundOnionErr {
+ msg: "Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node",
+ err_code: 0x4000 | 22,
+ err_data: Vec::new(),
+ }),
+ };
+
+ Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
+ routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
+ onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
+ short_channel_id,
+ },
+ payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
+ incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
+ incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
+ outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward,
+ outgoing_cltv_value,
+ skimmed_fee_msat: None,
+ })
+ }
+
fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(
- &self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32], payment_hash: PaymentHash,
+ &self, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, shared_secret: [u8; 32], payment_hash: PaymentHash,
amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>, allow_underpay: bool,
counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
- ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError> {
+ ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
+ let (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, onion_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata) = match hop_data {
+ msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
+ payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata, ..
+ } =>
+ (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata),
+ _ =>
+ return Err(InboundOnionErr {
+ err_code: 0x4000|22,
+ err_data: Vec::new(),
+ msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
+ }),
+ };
// final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
- if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
- return Err(ReceiveError {
+ if outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
+ return Err(InboundOnionErr {
msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
err_code: 18,
err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
// payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
// channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
- if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
+ if (outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
- return Err(ReceiveError {
+ return Err(InboundOnionErr {
err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
});
}
- if (!allow_underpay && hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat) ||
- (allow_underpay && hop_data.amt_to_forward >
+ if (!allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat > amt_msat) ||
+ (allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat >
amt_msat.saturating_add(counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)))
{
- return Err(ReceiveError {
+ return Err(InboundOnionErr {
err_code: 19,
err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
});
}
- let routing = match hop_data.format {
- msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
- return Err(ReceiveError {
+ let routing = if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
+ // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
+ // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
+ // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
+ // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
+ // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
+ let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
+ if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
+ return Err(InboundOnionErr {
err_code: 0x4000|22,
err_data: Vec::new(),
- msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
+ msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
});
- },
- msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage, payment_metadata } => {
- if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
- // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
- // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
- // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
- // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
- // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
- let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
- if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
- return Err(ReceiveError {
- err_code: 0x4000|22,
- err_data: Vec::new(),
- msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
- });
- }
- if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && payment_data.is_some() {
- return Err(ReceiveError {
- err_code: 0x4000|22,
- err_data: Vec::new(),
- msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
- });
- }
- PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
- payment_data,
- payment_preimage,
- payment_metadata,
- incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
- }
- } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
- PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
- payment_data: data,
- payment_metadata,
- incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
- phantom_shared_secret,
- }
- } else {
- return Err(ReceiveError {
- err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
- err_data: Vec::new(),
- msg: "We require payment_secrets",
- });
- }
- },
+ }
+ if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && payment_data.is_some() {
+ return Err(InboundOnionErr {
+ err_code: 0x4000|22,
+ err_data: Vec::new(),
+ msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
+ });
+ }
+ PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
+ payment_data,
+ payment_preimage,
+ payment_metadata,
+ incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
+ custom_tlvs,
+ }
+ } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
+ PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
+ payment_data: data,
+ payment_metadata,
+ incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
+ phantom_shared_secret,
+ custom_tlvs,
+ }
+ } else {
+ return Err(InboundOnionErr {
+ err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
+ err_data: Vec::new(),
+ msg: "We require payment_secrets",
+ });
};
Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
routing,
payment_hash,
incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
- outgoing_amt_msat: hop_data.amt_to_forward,
- outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
+ outgoing_amt_msat: onion_amt_msat,
+ outgoing_cltv_value,
skimmed_fee_msat: counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
})
}
};
let (outgoing_scid, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, next_packet_pk_opt) = match next_hop {
onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
- next_hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData {
- format: msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id }, amt_to_forward,
- outgoing_cltv_value,
+ next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward {
+ short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value
}, ..
} => {
let next_pk = onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx,
// We'll do receive checks in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] so we have access to the
// inbound channel's state.
onion_utils::Hop::Receive { .. } => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
- onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
- next_hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData { format: msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. }, .. }, ..
- } => {
+ onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. }, .. } => {
return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0; 0]);
}
};
// delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
},
- Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
+ Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
}
},
onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
- debug_assert!(next_packet_pubkey_opt.is_some());
- let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
- version: 0,
- public_key: next_packet_pubkey_opt.unwrap_or(Err(secp256k1::Error::InvalidPublicKey)),
- hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
- hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
- };
-
- let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
- msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
- msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
- return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
- },
- };
-
- PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
- routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
- onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
- short_channel_id,
- },
- payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
- incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
- incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
- outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
- outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
- skimmed_fee_msat: None,
- })
+ match self.construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
+ new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
+ Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
+ Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
+ }
}
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
- self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv_bytes)
+ self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
+ path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
+ session_priv_bytes
+ })
}
- fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ let SendAlongPathArgs {
+ path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
+ session_priv_bytes
+ } = args;
// The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
payment_id,
- }, onion_packet, None, &self.logger);
+ }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
match break_chan_entry!(self, send_res, chan) {
Some(monitor_update) => {
match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
/// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
/// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
///
+ /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
/// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
/// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
/// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
self.pending_outbound_payments
- .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
- |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
- self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
+ .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
+ &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
+ |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
}
/// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
.send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
&self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
&self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
- &self.pending_events,
- |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
- self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
+ &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
}
#[cfg(test)]
pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
- self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
- |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
- self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
+ self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
+ keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
+ best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
}
#[cfg(test)]
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
- &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
- |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
- self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
+ &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
}
/// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
|| self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
- &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
- |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
- self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
+ &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
}
/// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
- self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
- |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
- self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
+ self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
+ &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
+ |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
}
/// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
Some(chan) => {
let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
- let funding_res = chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
+ let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
.map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
let user_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
- (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None))
+ let channel_capacity = chan.context.get_value_satoshis();
+ (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, channel_capacity))
} else { unreachable!(); });
match funding_res {
Ok((chan, funding_msg)) => (chan, funding_msg),
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
for channel_id in channel_ids {
- if !peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) {
+ if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
});
- }
+ };
}
for channel_id in channel_ids {
- let channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
- let mut config = channel.context.config();
- config.apply(config_update);
- if !channel.context.update_config(&config) {
+ if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
+ let mut config = channel.context.config();
+ config.apply(config_update);
+ if !channel.context.update_config(&config) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
+ peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
+ } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
+ peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
+ node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ msg,
+ });
+ }
continue;
}
- if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
- peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
- } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
- peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
- node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
- msg,
+
+ let context = if let Some(channel) = peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
+ &mut channel.context
+ } else if let Some(channel) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
+ &mut channel.context
+ } else {
+ // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
+ debug_assert!(false);
+ return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
+ err: format!(
+ "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
+ log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
});
- }
+ };
+ let mut config = context.config();
+ config.apply(config_update);
+ // We update the config, but we MUST NOT broadcast a `channel_update` before `channel_ready`
+ // which would be the case for pending inbound/outbound channels.
+ context.update_config(&config);
}
Ok(())
}
outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None)
{
Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
- Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
+ Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
}
},
_ => panic!(),
});
if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
- onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, &self.logger)
+ onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, &self.fee_estimator,
+ &self.logger)
{
if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
}
}) => {
let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
- PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
+ PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret, custom_tlvs } => {
let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
- let onion_fields =
- RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret), payment_metadata };
+ let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
+ payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
(incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
},
- PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry } => {
+ PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs } => {
let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
- payment_metadata
+ payment_metadata,
+ custom_tlvs,
};
(incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
payment_data, None, onion_fields)
let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
|| self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
- &self.pending_events, &self.logger,
- |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
- self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv));
+ &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
for event in background_events.drain(..) {
match event {
- BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
+ BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
// The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
// monitor updating completing.
let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
}
let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
},
+ BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
+ let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
+ if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
+ let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
+ let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
+ if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
+ handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
+ } else {
+ let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
+ .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
+ mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
+ mem::drop(per_peer_state);
+ self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
+ }
+ }
+ },
}
}
NotifyOption::DoPersist
log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
- chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.logger);
+ chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
NotifyOption::DoPersist
}
PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
let mut should_persist = self.process_background_events();
- let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
+ let normal_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
+ let min_mempool_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum);
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
+ let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
+ min_mempool_feerate
+ } else {
+ normal_feerate
+ };
let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
}
/// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
/// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
/// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
+ /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
///
/// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
/// estimate fetches.
PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
let mut should_persist = self.process_background_events();
- let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
+ let normal_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
+ let min_mempool_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum);
let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
+ let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
+ min_mempool_feerate
+ } else {
+ normal_feerate
+ };
let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
true
});
+
+ let process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
+ chan_id: &[u8; 32],
+ chan_context: &mut ChannelContext<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
+ unfunded_chan_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
+ pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
+ | {
+ chan_context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
+ if unfunded_chan_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
+ log_error!(self.logger,
+ "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner",
+ log_bytes!(&chan_id[..]));
+ update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan_context);
+ self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
+ self.finish_force_close_channel(chan_context.force_shutdown(false));
+ pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
+ node_id: counterparty_node_id,
+ action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
+ msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
+ channel_id: *chan_id,
+ data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
+ },
+ },
+ });
+ false
+ } else {
+ true
+ }
+ };
+ peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| process_unfunded_channel_tick(
+ chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context, pending_msg_events));
+ peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| process_unfunded_channel_tick(
+ chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context, pending_msg_events));
+
+ for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
+ if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
+ log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", log_bytes!(&chan_id[..]));
+ peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
+ events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
+ node_id: counterparty_node_id,
+ action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
+ msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
+ },
+ }
+ );
+ }
+ }
+ peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
+
if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
}
/// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
match failure_code {
- FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
- FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
+ FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
+ FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
- HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code as u16, htlc_msat_height_data)
+ HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
+ },
+ FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
+ let fail_data = match data {
+ Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
+ None => Vec::new(),
+ };
+ HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
}
}
}
/// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
/// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
///
+ /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
+ /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
+ /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
+ ///
/// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
/// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
/// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
/// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
/// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
/// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
+ /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
+ self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
+ }
+
+ /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
+ /// even type numbers.
+ ///
+ /// # Note
+ ///
+ /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
+ /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
+ ///
+ /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
+ pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
+ self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
+ }
+
+ fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
}
+
+ if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
+ if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
+ log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
+ log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
+ claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
+ mem::drop(claimable_payments);
+ for htlc in payment.htlcs {
+ let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
+ let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
+ let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
+ self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
+ }
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+
payment.htlcs
} else { return; }
};
// If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
// haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
// event.
- // Note that while its safe to use `ClosingMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
+ // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
// channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
// completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
// way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
// upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
// complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
- BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
+ BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update,
)));
}
if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
- let mut channel = {
- match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()){
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
- }
- };
+ let channel =
+ if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
+ chan
+ } else {
+ let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
+ .remove(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
+ mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
+ mem::drop(per_peer_state);
+ self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
+ return;
+ };
let remaining_in_flight =
if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
pending.len()
} else { 0 };
log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
- highest_applied_update_id, channel.get().context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
+ highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
remaining_in_flight);
- if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
+ if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
return;
}
- handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel.get_mut());
+ handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
}
/// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
- match peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
- if !channel.get().is_awaiting_accept() {
- return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
+
+ // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
+ // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
+ // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
+ // succeed.
+ let mut channel = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
+ Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
+ let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
+ InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
+ counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
+ &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
+ &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|e| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.to_string() })
+ }
+ _ => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() })
+ }?;
+
+ if accept_0conf {
+ // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
+ debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
+ } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
+ let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
+ node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
+ msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
}
- if accept_0conf {
- channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
- } else if channel.get().context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
- let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
- node_id: channel.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
- action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
- msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
- }
- };
- peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
- let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
- return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
- } else {
- // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
- // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
- // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
- if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
- let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
- node_id: channel.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
- action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
- msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
- }
- };
- peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
- let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
- return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
+ };
+ peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
+ return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
+ } else {
+ // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
+ // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
+ // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
+ if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
+ let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
+ node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
+ msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
}
- }
-
- peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
- node_id: channel.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
- msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
- });
- }
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
- return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) });
+ };
+ peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
+ return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
}
}
+
+ // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
+ let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
+ channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
+
+ peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
+ node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
+ });
+
+ peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), channel);
+
Ok(())
}
num_unfunded_channels += 1;
}
}
- num_unfunded_channels
+ num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
}
fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
}
- let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
- random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
- let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
- let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
-
// Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
// about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
// channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
}
+ let channel_id = msg.temporary_channel_id;
+ let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
+ if channel_exists {
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
+ }
+
+ // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
+ if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
+ let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
+ pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
+ temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
+ counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
+ funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
+ push_msat: msg.push_msat,
+ channel_type: msg.channel_type.clone().unwrap(),
+ }, None));
+ peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
+ open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
+ ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
+ });
+ return Ok(());
+ }
+
+ // Otherwise create the channel right now.
+ let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
+ random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
+ let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
- &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
+ &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
{
Err(e) => {
- self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
},
Ok(res) => res
};
- let channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
- let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
- if channel_exists {
- self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
- return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
- } else {
- if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
- let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
- if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
- return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
- }
- if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
- return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
- }
- peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
- node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
- msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
- });
- } else {
- let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
- pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
- temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
- counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
- funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
- push_msat: msg.push_msat,
- channel_type: channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
- }, None));
- }
- peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, channel);
+
+ let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
+ if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
+ }
+ if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
}
+
+ let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
+ channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
+
+ peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
+ node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
+ msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
+ });
+ peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, channel);
Ok(())
}
let user_id = inbound_chan.context.get_user_id();
let shutdown_res = inbound_chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(format!("{}", err),
- msg.temporary_channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None));
+ msg.temporary_channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, inbound_chan.context.get_value_satoshis()));
},
}
},
})?;
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
- match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
-
- if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
- log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
- log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
- if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
- }
+ // TODO(dunxen): Fix this duplication when we switch to a single map with enums as per
+ // https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/2422
+ if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
+ log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", log_bytes!(&msg.channel_id[..]));
+ self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_entry.get().context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel);
+ let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
+ self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
+ return Ok(());
+ } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
+ log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", log_bytes!(&msg.channel_id[..]));
+ self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_entry.get().context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel);
+ let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
+ self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
+ return Ok(());
+ } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
+ if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
+ log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
+ log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
+ if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
+ }
- let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().context.get_funding_txo();
- let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self,
- chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
- dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
+ let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().context.get_funding_txo();
+ let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self,
+ chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
+ dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
- if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
- // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
- // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
- // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
- peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
- node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
- msg,
- });
- }
+ if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
+ // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
+ // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
+ // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
+ peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
+ node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
+ msg,
+ });
+ }
- // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
- if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
- break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
- peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry).map(|_| ());
- }
- break Ok(());
- },
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
+ // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
+ if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
+ break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
+ peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry).map(|_| ());
+ }
+ break Ok(());
+ } else {
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
}
};
for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
_ => pending_forward_info
}
};
- try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
+ try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), chan);
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
}
}
}
- // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued.
fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
- let forward_ev_exists = pending_events.iter()
- .find(|(ev, _)| if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false })
- .is_some();
- if !forward_ev_exists {
- pending_events.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
- time_forwardable:
- Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
+ let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
+ let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
+ if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
+ ).count();
+ // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
+ // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
+ // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
+ // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
+ // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
+ // real by taking more time.
+ if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
+ pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
+ time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
}, None));
}
}
match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
let funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo();
- let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
+ let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), chan);
let res = if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan).map(|_| ())
let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
- chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger);
+ chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
}
provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
}
- /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
+ /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
/// [`ChannelManager`].
///
/// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
/// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
#[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
- pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> InvoiceFeatures {
+ pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
}
self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
false
});
+ // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
+ // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
+ peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
match msg {
// V1 Channel Establishment
channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
+ inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
- for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
+ if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
- peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
- let retain = if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
- if !chan.context.have_received_message() {
- // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
- // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
- // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
- // drop it.
- false
- } else {
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
- node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
- msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
- });
- true
- }
- } else { true };
- if retain && chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
- if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.default_configuration) {
- if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
- node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
- msg, update_msg,
- });
- }
- }
- }
- retain
+
+ // Since unfunded channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer, and they're not persisted
+ // (so won't be recovered after a crash) we don't need to bother closing unfunded channels and
+ // clearing their maps here. Instead we can just send queue channel_reestablish messages for
+ // channels in the channel_by_id map.
+ peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().for_each(|(_, chan)| {
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
+ node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
+ });
});
}
//TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
+ match &msg.data as &str {
+ "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
+ "link failed to shutdown" =>
+ {
+ // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
+ // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
+ // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
+ // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
+ // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
+ // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
+ // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
+ if msg.channel_id != [0; 32] {
+ let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
+ let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
+ if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
+ let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
+ if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
+ if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
+ peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
+ node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
+ msg,
+ });
+ }
+ peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
+ node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
+ action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
+ msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
+ channel_id: msg.channel_id,
+ data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
+ },
+ log_level: Level::Trace,
+ }
+ });
+ }
+ }
+ return;
+ }
+ _ => {}
+ }
+
if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = {
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
+ // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
+ // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
+ peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned()
.chain(peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.keys().cloned())
.chain(peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.keys().cloned()).collect()
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
if let Some(chan) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
- if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
+ if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
msg,
/// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
/// [`ChannelManager`].
pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
- provided_init_features(config).to_context()
+ let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
+ node_features.set_keysend_optional();
+ node_features
}
-/// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
+/// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
/// [`ChannelManager`].
///
/// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
/// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
#[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
-pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InvoiceFeatures {
+pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
provided_init_features(config).to_context()
}
(10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
(12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
(14, user_channel_id_low, required),
- (16, self.balance_msat, required),
+ (16, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required), // Forwards compatibility for removed balance_msat field.
(18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
(19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
(20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
(35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
(37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
(39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
+ (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
});
Ok(())
}
(10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
(12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
(14, user_channel_id_low, required),
- (16, balance_msat, required),
+ (16, _balance_msat, option), // Backwards compatibility for removed balance_msat field.
(18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
// Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
// filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
(35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
(37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
(39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
+ (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
});
// `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
+ let _balance_msat: Option<u64> = _balance_msat;
+
Ok(Self {
inbound_scid_alias,
channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
unspendable_punishment_reserve,
user_channel_id,
- balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
+ channel_shutdown_state,
})
}
}
impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
- (2, channels, vec_type),
+ (2, channels, required_vec),
(4, phantom_scid, required),
(6, real_node_pubkey, required),
});
(1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
(2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
(3, payment_metadata, option),
+ (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
},
(2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
(0, payment_preimage, required),
(2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
(3, payment_metadata, option),
(4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
+ (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
},
;);
0 => {
let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
- let mut path_hops: Option<Vec<RouteHop>> = Some(Vec::new());
+ let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
let mut payment_id = None;
let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
(0, session_priv, required),
(1, payment_id, option),
(2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
- (4, path_hops, vec_type),
+ (4, path_hops, required_vec),
(5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
(6, blinded_tail, option),
});
// instead.
payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
}
- let path = Path { hops: path_hops.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?, blinded_tail };
+ let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
if path.hops.len() == 0 {
return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
}
(1, payment_id_opt, option),
(2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
// 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
- (4, path.hops, vec_type),
+ (4, path.hops, required_vec),
(5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
(6, path.blinded_tail, option),
});
(6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
(7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
(8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
- (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
+ (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
(10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
(11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
(13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
}
}
+impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
+ (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
+ (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
+ (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
+ (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
+ (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
+);
+
/// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
///
/// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
- reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
+ reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
+ counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
+ channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
}, None));
for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
let mut found_htlc = false;
channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
+ counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
+ channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
}, None));
} else {
log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
};
- close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
+ close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
}
}
channel_by_id,
outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
+ inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
(6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
(7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
(8, events_override, option),
- (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
+ (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
(10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
(11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
(13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
update: update.clone(),
});
}
+ if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
+ // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
+ // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
+ // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
+ pending_background_events.push(
+ BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
+ counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
+ channel_id: $funding_txo.to_channel_id(),
+ });
+ }
if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
log_error!(args.logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
+ custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
total_msat: path_amt,
blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
.entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
.or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
+ } else {
+ // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
+ // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
+ // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
+ // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
+ // anymore.
}
}
}
nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
{
// Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
}
let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
- check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
}
fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
let extra_fee_msat = 10;
- let hop_data = msgs::OnionHopData {
- amt_to_forward: 100,
+ let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
+ amt_msat: 100,
outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
- format: msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode {
- keysend_preimage: None,
- payment_metadata: None,
- payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
- payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
- }),
- }
+ payment_metadata: None,
+ keysend_preimage: None,
+ payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
+ payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
+ }),
+ custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
};
// Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
// intended amount, we fail the payment.
- if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::ReceiveError { err_code, .. }) =
+ if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundOnionErr { err_code, .. }) =
node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat))
{
} else { panic!(); }
// If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
- let hop_data = msgs::OnionHopData { // This is the same hop_data as above, OnionHopData doesn't implement Clone
- amt_to_forward: 100,
+ let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
+ amt_msat: 100,
outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
- format: msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode {
- keysend_preimage: None,
- payment_metadata: None,
- payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
- payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
- }),
- }
+ payment_metadata: None,
+ keysend_preimage: None,
+ payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
+ payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
+ }),
+ custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
};
assert!(node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat)).is_ok());
let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
- check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
+ // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
+ // not have generated any events.
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
}
#[test]
MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
_ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
}
+
+ // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
+ // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
+ let bad_channel_id = [10; 32];
+ let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
+ let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
+ assert!(
+ matches!(
+ nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
+ forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
+ ..Default::default()
+ }),
+ Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
+ )
+ );
+ // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
}
}
use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
use crate::util::test_utils;
- use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
+ use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
// Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
// calls per node.
let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
+ let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
+ config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
network,
best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
- });
+ }, genesis_block.header.time);
let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
network,
best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
- });
+ }, genesis_block.header.time);
let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff