use bitcoin::secp256k1;
use chain;
-use chain::{Confirm, Watch, BestBlock};
+use chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, Watch, BestBlock};
use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
-use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
+use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
// Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
// construct one themselves.
use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
-use routing::router::{Route, RouteHop};
+use routing::router::{Payee, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, RouteParameters};
use ln::msgs;
use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
use ln::onion_utils;
-use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, OptionalField};
+use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT, OptionalField};
use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
use util::config::UserConfig;
use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
use util::{byte_utils, events};
use util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
-use util::logger::{Logger, Level};
+use util::logger::{Level, Logger};
use util::errors::APIError;
use io;
use sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
use core::time::Duration;
-#[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
-use std::time::Instant;
use core::ops::Deref;
+#[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
+use std::time::Instant;
+
+mod inbound_payment {
+ use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
+ use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
+ use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
+ use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
+ use chain::keysinterface::{KeyMaterial, KeysInterface, Sign};
+ use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
+ use ln::msgs;
+ use ln::msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
+ use util::chacha20::ChaCha20;
+ use util::logger::Logger;
+
+ use core::convert::TryInto;
+ use core::ops::Deref;
+
+ const IV_LEN: usize = 16;
+ const METADATA_LEN: usize = 16;
+ const METADATA_KEY_LEN: usize = 32;
+ const AMT_MSAT_LEN: usize = 8;
+ // Used to shift the payment type bits to take up the top 3 bits of the metadata bytes, or to
+ // retrieve said payment type bits.
+ const METHOD_TYPE_OFFSET: usize = 5;
+
+ /// A set of keys that were HKDF-expanded from an initial call to
+ /// [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`].
+ ///
+ /// [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`]: crate::chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material
+ pub(super) struct ExpandedKey {
+ /// The key used to encrypt the bytes containing the payment metadata (i.e. the amount and
+ /// expiry, included for payment verification on decryption).
+ metadata_key: [u8; 32],
+ /// The key used to authenticate an LDK-provided payment hash and metadata as previously
+ /// registered with LDK.
+ ldk_pmt_hash_key: [u8; 32],
+ /// The key used to authenticate a user-provided payment hash and metadata as previously
+ /// registered with LDK.
+ user_pmt_hash_key: [u8; 32],
+ }
+
+ impl ExpandedKey {
+ pub(super) fn new(key_material: &KeyMaterial) -> ExpandedKey {
+ hkdf_extract_expand(&vec![0], &key_material)
+ }
+ }
+
+ enum Method {
+ LdkPaymentHash = 0,
+ UserPaymentHash = 1,
+ }
+
+ impl Method {
+ fn from_bits(bits: u8) -> Result<Method, u8> {
+ match bits {
+ bits if bits == Method::LdkPaymentHash as u8 => Ok(Method::LdkPaymentHash),
+ bits if bits == Method::UserPaymentHash as u8 => Ok(Method::UserPaymentHash),
+ unknown => Err(unknown),
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ pub(super) fn create<Signer: Sign, K: Deref>(keys: &ExpandedKey, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, keys_manager: &K, highest_seen_timestamp: u64) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()>
+ where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>
+ {
+ let metadata_bytes = construct_metadata_bytes(min_value_msat, Method::LdkPaymentHash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, highest_seen_timestamp)?;
+
+ let mut iv_bytes = [0 as u8; IV_LEN];
+ let rand_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
+ iv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&rand_bytes[..IV_LEN]);
+
+ let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.ldk_pmt_hash_key);
+ hmac.input(&iv_bytes);
+ hmac.input(&metadata_bytes);
+ let payment_preimage_bytes = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
+
+ let ldk_pmt_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_bytes).into_inner());
+ let payment_secret = construct_payment_secret(&iv_bytes, &metadata_bytes, &keys.metadata_key);
+ Ok((ldk_pmt_hash, payment_secret))
+ }
+
+ pub(super) fn create_from_hash(keys: &ExpandedKey, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, payment_hash: PaymentHash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, highest_seen_timestamp: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
+ let metadata_bytes = construct_metadata_bytes(min_value_msat, Method::UserPaymentHash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, highest_seen_timestamp)?;
+
+ let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.user_pmt_hash_key);
+ hmac.input(&metadata_bytes);
+ hmac.input(&payment_hash.0);
+ let hmac_bytes = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
+
+ let mut iv_bytes = [0 as u8; IV_LEN];
+ iv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&hmac_bytes[..IV_LEN]);
+
+ Ok(construct_payment_secret(&iv_bytes, &metadata_bytes, &keys.metadata_key))
+ }
+
+ fn construct_metadata_bytes(min_value_msat: Option<u64>, payment_type: Method, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, highest_seen_timestamp: u64) -> Result<[u8; METADATA_LEN], ()> {
+ if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
+ return Err(());
+ }
+
+ let mut min_amt_msat_bytes: [u8; AMT_MSAT_LEN] = match min_value_msat {
+ Some(amt) => amt.to_be_bytes(),
+ None => [0; AMT_MSAT_LEN],
+ };
+ min_amt_msat_bytes[0] |= (payment_type as u8) << METHOD_TYPE_OFFSET;
+
+ // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time - it's updated when
+ // we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in a header. It should never be more
+ // than two hours in the future. Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we
+ // absolutely never fail a payment too early.
+ // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date timestamps.
+ let expiry_bytes = (highest_seen_timestamp + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200).to_be_bytes();
+
+ let mut metadata_bytes: [u8; METADATA_LEN] = [0; METADATA_LEN];
+ metadata_bytes[..AMT_MSAT_LEN].copy_from_slice(&min_amt_msat_bytes);
+ metadata_bytes[AMT_MSAT_LEN..].copy_from_slice(&expiry_bytes);
+
+ Ok(metadata_bytes)
+ }
+
+ fn construct_payment_secret(iv_bytes: &[u8; IV_LEN], metadata_bytes: &[u8; METADATA_LEN], metadata_key: &[u8; METADATA_KEY_LEN]) -> PaymentSecret {
+ let mut payment_secret_bytes: [u8; 32] = [0; 32];
+ let (iv_slice, encrypted_metadata_slice) = payment_secret_bytes.split_at_mut(IV_LEN);
+ iv_slice.copy_from_slice(iv_bytes);
+
+ let chacha_block = ChaCha20::get_single_block(metadata_key, iv_bytes);
+ for i in 0..METADATA_LEN {
+ encrypted_metadata_slice[i] = chacha_block[i] ^ metadata_bytes[i];
+ }
+ PaymentSecret(payment_secret_bytes)
+ }
+
+ /// Check that an inbound payment's `payment_data` field is sane.
+ ///
+ /// LDK does not store any data for pending inbound payments. Instead, we construct our payment
+ /// secret (and, if supplied by LDK, our payment preimage) to include encrypted metadata about the
+ /// payment.
+ ///
+ /// The metadata is constructed as:
+ /// payment method (3 bits) || payment amount (8 bytes - 3 bits) || expiry (8 bytes)
+ /// and encrypted using a key derived from [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`].
+ ///
+ /// Then on payment receipt, we verify in this method that the payment preimage and payment secret
+ /// match what was constructed.
+ ///
+ /// [`create_inbound_payment`] and [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] are called by the user to
+ /// construct the payment secret and/or payment hash that this method is verifying. If the former
+ /// method is called, then the payment method bits mentioned above are represented internally as
+ /// [`Method::LdkPaymentHash`]. If the latter, [`Method::UserPaymentHash`].
+ ///
+ /// For the former method, the payment preimage is constructed as an HMAC of payment metadata and
+ /// random bytes. Because the payment secret is also encoded with these random bytes and metadata
+ /// (with the metadata encrypted with a block cipher), we're able to authenticate the preimage on
+ /// payment receipt.
+ ///
+ /// For the latter, the payment secret instead contains an HMAC of the user-provided payment hash
+ /// and payment metadata (encrypted with a block cipher), allowing us to authenticate the payment
+ /// hash and metadata on payment receipt.
+ ///
+ /// See [`ExpandedKey`] docs for more info on the individual keys used.
+ ///
+ /// [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`]: crate::chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material
+ /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_inbound_payment
+ /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
+ pub(super) fn verify<L: Deref>(payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData, highest_seen_timestamp: u64, keys: &ExpandedKey, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<PaymentPreimage>, ()>
+ where L::Target: Logger
+ {
+ let mut iv_bytes = [0; IV_LEN];
+ let (iv_slice, encrypted_metadata_bytes) = payment_data.payment_secret.0.split_at(IV_LEN);
+ iv_bytes.copy_from_slice(iv_slice);
+
+ let chacha_block = ChaCha20::get_single_block(&keys.metadata_key, &iv_bytes);
+ let mut metadata_bytes: [u8; METADATA_LEN] = [0; METADATA_LEN];
+ for i in 0..METADATA_LEN {
+ metadata_bytes[i] = chacha_block[i] ^ encrypted_metadata_bytes[i];
+ }
+
+ let payment_type_res = Method::from_bits((metadata_bytes[0] & 0b1110_0000) >> METHOD_TYPE_OFFSET);
+ let mut amt_msat_bytes = [0; AMT_MSAT_LEN];
+ amt_msat_bytes.copy_from_slice(&metadata_bytes[..AMT_MSAT_LEN]);
+ // Zero out the bits reserved to indicate the payment type.
+ amt_msat_bytes[0] &= 0b00011111;
+ let min_amt_msat: u64 = u64::from_be_bytes(amt_msat_bytes.into());
+ let expiry = u64::from_be_bytes(metadata_bytes[AMT_MSAT_LEN..].try_into().unwrap());
+
+ // Make sure to check to check the HMAC before doing the other checks below, to mitigate timing
+ // attacks.
+ let mut payment_preimage = None;
+ match payment_type_res {
+ Ok(Method::UserPaymentHash) => {
+ let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.user_pmt_hash_key);
+ hmac.input(&metadata_bytes[..]);
+ hmac.input(&payment_hash.0);
+ if !fixed_time_eq(&iv_bytes, &Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner().split_at_mut(IV_LEN).0) {
+ log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash {}: unexpected payment_secret", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
+ return Err(())
+ }
+ },
+ Ok(Method::LdkPaymentHash) => {
+ let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.ldk_pmt_hash_key);
+ hmac.input(&iv_bytes);
+ hmac.input(&metadata_bytes);
+ let decoded_payment_preimage = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
+ if !fixed_time_eq(&payment_hash.0, &Sha256::hash(&decoded_payment_preimage).into_inner()) {
+ log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {}: payment preimage {} did not match", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(decoded_payment_preimage));
+ return Err(())
+ }
+ payment_preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage(decoded_payment_preimage));
+ },
+ Err(unknown_bits) => {
+ log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment hash {} due to unknown payment type {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), unknown_bits);
+ return Err(());
+ }
+ }
+
+ if payment_data.total_msat < min_amt_msat {
+ log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} due to total_msat {} being less than the minimum amount of {} msat", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, min_amt_msat);
+ return Err(())
+ }
+
+ if expiry < highest_seen_timestamp {
+ log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {}: expired payment", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
+ return Err(())
+ }
+
+ Ok(payment_preimage)
+ }
+
+ fn hkdf_extract_expand(salt: &[u8], ikm: &KeyMaterial) -> ExpandedKey {
+ let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(salt);
+ hmac.input(&ikm.0);
+ let prk = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
+ let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&prk[..]);
+ hmac.input(&[1; 1]);
+ let metadata_key = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
+
+ let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&prk[..]);
+ hmac.input(&metadata_key);
+ hmac.input(&[2; 1]);
+ let ldk_pmt_hash_key = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
+
+ let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&prk[..]);
+ hmac.input(&ldk_pmt_hash_key);
+ hmac.input(&[3; 1]);
+ let user_pmt_hash_key = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
+
+ ExpandedKey {
+ metadata_key,
+ ldk_pmt_hash_key,
+ user_pmt_hash_key,
+ }
+ }
+}
+
// We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
//
// Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
}
/// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
-#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
short_channel_id: u64,
htlc_id: u64,
}
/// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
+/// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
#[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
}
}
/// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
-#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
+#[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
OutboundRoute {
/// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
payment_id: PaymentId,
+ payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
+ payee: Option<Payee>,
},
}
+#[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
+impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
+ fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
+ match self {
+ HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
+ 0u8.hash(hasher);
+ prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
+ },
+ HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payee } => {
+ 1u8.hash(hasher);
+ path.hash(hasher);
+ session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
+ payment_id.hash(hasher);
+ payment_secret.hash(hasher);
+ first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
+ payee.hash(hasher);
+ },
+ }
+ }
+}
#[cfg(test)]
impl HTLCSource {
pub fn dummy() -> Self {
session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
+ payment_secret: None,
+ payee: None,
}
}
}
struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
err: msgs::LightningError,
- chan_id: Option<[u8; 32]>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
+ chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u64)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
}
impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
}
#[inline]
- fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
+ fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u64, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
Self {
err: LightningError {
err: err.clone(),
},
},
},
- chan_id: Some(channel_id),
+ chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
}
}
///
/// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
/// here.
+///
+/// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
+/// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
struct PendingInboundPayment {
/// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
payment_hash: PaymentHash,
payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
pending_amt_msat: u64,
+ /// Used to track the fee paid. Only present if the payment was serialized on 0.0.103+.
+ pending_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
/// The total payment amount across all paths, used to verify that a retry is not overpaying.
total_msat: u64,
/// Our best known block height at the time this payment was initiated.
starting_block_height: u32,
},
+ /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
+ /// been resolved. This ensures we don't look up pending payments in ChannelMonitors on restart
+ /// and add a pending payment that was already fulfilled.
+ Fulfilled {
+ session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
+ payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
+ },
+ /// When a payer gives up trying to retry a payment, they inform us, letting us generate a
+ /// `PaymentFailed` event when all HTLCs have irrevocably failed. This avoids a number of race
+ /// conditions in MPP-aware payment retriers (1), where the possibility of multiple
+ /// `PaymentPathFailed` events with `all_paths_failed` can be pending at once, confusing a
+ /// downstream event handler as to when a payment has actually failed.
+ ///
+ /// (1) https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1164
+ Abandoned {
+ session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
+ payment_hash: PaymentHash,
+ },
}
impl PendingOutboundPayment {
- fn remove(&mut self, session_priv: &[u8; 32], part_amt_msat: u64) -> bool {
+ fn is_retryable(&self) -> bool {
+ match self {
+ PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { .. } => true,
+ _ => false,
+ }
+ }
+ fn is_fulfilled(&self) -> bool {
+ match self {
+ PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => true,
+ _ => false,
+ }
+ }
+ fn abandoned(&self) -> bool {
+ match self {
+ PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => true,
+ _ => false,
+ }
+ }
+ fn get_pending_fee_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
+ match self {
+ PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { pending_fee_msat, .. } => pending_fee_msat.clone(),
+ _ => None,
+ }
+ }
+
+ fn payment_hash(&self) -> Option<PaymentHash> {
+ match self {
+ PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None,
+ PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
+ PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => *payment_hash,
+ PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
+ }
+ }
+
+ fn mark_fulfilled(&mut self) {
+ let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
+ core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
+ PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
+ PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
+ PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
+ PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. }
+ => session_privs,
+ });
+ let payment_hash = self.payment_hash();
+ *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, payment_hash };
+ }
+
+ fn mark_abandoned(&mut self) -> Result<(), ()> {
+ let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
+ let our_payment_hash;
+ core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
+ PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } |
+ PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } =>
+ return Err(()),
+ PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } |
+ PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } => {
+ our_payment_hash = *payment_hash;
+ session_privs
+ },
+ });
+ *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash: our_payment_hash };
+ Ok(())
+ }
+
+ /// panics if path is None and !self.is_fulfilled
+ fn remove(&mut self, session_priv: &[u8; 32], path: Option<&Vec<RouteHop>>) -> bool {
let remove_res = match self {
PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
- PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
+ PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
+ PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
+ PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
session_privs.remove(session_priv)
}
};
if remove_res {
- if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, .. } = self {
- *pending_amt_msat -= part_amt_msat;
+ if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
+ let path = path.expect("Fulfilling a payment should always come with a path");
+ let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
+ *pending_amt_msat -= path_last_hop.fee_msat;
+ if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
+ *fee_msat -= path.get_path_fees();
+ }
}
}
remove_res
}
- fn insert(&mut self, session_priv: [u8; 32], part_amt_msat: u64) -> bool {
+ fn insert(&mut self, session_priv: [u8; 32], path: &Vec<RouteHop>) -> bool {
let insert_res = match self {
PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
session_privs.insert(session_priv)
}
+ PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => false,
+ PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => false,
};
if insert_res {
- if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, .. } = self {
- *pending_amt_msat += part_amt_msat;
+ if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
+ let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
+ *pending_amt_msat += path_last_hop.fee_msat;
+ if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
+ *fee_msat += path.get_path_fees();
+ }
}
}
insert_res
fn remaining_parts(&self) -> usize {
match self {
PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
- PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
+ PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
+ PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
+ PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
session_privs.len()
}
}
our_network_key: SecretKey,
our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
+ inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
+
/// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
/// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
#[allow(dead_code)]
const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
+/// The number of blocks before we consider an outbound payment for expiry if it doesn't have any
+/// pending HTLCs in flight.
+pub(crate) const PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
+
/// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
///
/// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
- /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
- pub user_id: u64,
+ /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
+ pub user_channel_id: u64,
+ /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
+ /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
+ /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
+ ///
+ /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
+ /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
+ /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
+ /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
+ ///
+ /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
+ pub balance_msat: u64,
/// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
- /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
+ /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
/// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
/// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
///
+ /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
+ ///
/// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
/// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
/// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
/// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
- /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
+ /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
/// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
/// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
/// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
/// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
/// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
/// with the latest update_id.
- PartialFailure(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
+ PartialFailure {
+ /// The errors themselves, in the same order as the route hops.
+ results: Vec<Result<(), APIError>>,
+ /// If some paths failed without irrevocably committing to the new HTLC(s), this will
+ /// contain a [`RouteParameters`] object which can be used to calculate a new route that
+ /// will pay all remaining unpaid balance.
+ failed_paths_retry: Option<RouteParameters>,
+ /// The payment id for the payment, which is now at least partially pending.
+ payment_id: PaymentId,
+ },
}
macro_rules! handle_error {
msg: update
});
}
- if let Some(channel_id) = chan_id {
- $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed { channel_id, reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() } });
+ if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
+ $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
+ channel_id, user_channel_id,
+ reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
+ });
}
}
$short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
}
let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
- (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
+ (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
+ shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
},
ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => {
log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
$short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
}
let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(false);
- (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
+ (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
+ shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
}
}
}
($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
};
- ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
+ ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
match $err {
ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
// splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
// given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
// retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
- let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id,
+ let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
$chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
(res, true)
},
ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
- log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
+ log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
match $action_type {
else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
else { "nothing" },
(&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
- (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
+ (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
+ (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
if !$resend_commitment {
debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
}
if !$resend_raa {
debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
}
- $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
+ $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
(Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
},
}
};
- ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => { {
- let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $entry.key());
+ ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
+ let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
if drop {
$entry.remove_entry();
}
res
} };
+ ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
+ handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
+ }
}
macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
-
+ let inbound_pmt_key_material = keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
+ let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
ChannelManager {
default_configuration: config.clone(),
genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
secp_ctx,
+ inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
+
last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
/// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
///
- /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady events to allow
- /// tracking of which events correspond with which create_channel call. Note that the
- /// user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for
- /// user_id here. user_id has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and
- /// otherwise ignored.
- ///
- /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
- /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
+ /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
+ /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
+ /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to 0
+ /// for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for `user_channel_id` here.
+ /// `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and otherwise
+ /// ignored.
///
- /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
- /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
+ /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
+ /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
///
/// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
/// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
- /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten.
- pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
+ ///
+ /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
+ /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
+ /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
+ /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
+ /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
+ /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
+ ///
+ /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
+ /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
+ /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
+ pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
}
let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
- Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, config)?
+ Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, their_features,
+ channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height())?
},
None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
}
// We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
+ let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
+ match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
node_id: their_network_key,
msg: res,
});
- Ok(())
+ Ok(temporary_channel_id)
}
fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
+ let balance_msat = channel.get_balance_msat();
let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
res.push(ChannelDetails {
short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
+ balance_msat,
inbound_capacity_msat,
outbound_capacity_msat,
- user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
+ user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
},
None => {},
}
- pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), reason: closure_reason });
+ pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
+ channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
+ user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
+ reason: closure_reason
+ });
}
fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
let (result, is_permanent) =
- handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
+ handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
if is_permanent {
remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
break result;
break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
}
let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
- // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now, but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty
- // packet sanitization (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational)
+ // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
+ // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
+ // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
}
if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
}
- // In theory, we would be safe against unintentional channel-closure, if we only required a margin of LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
- // But, to be safe against policy reception, we use a longer delay.
- if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER) as u64 {
+ // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
+ // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
+ // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
+ // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
+ // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
+ // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
+ // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
+ // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
+ if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
}
}
// Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
- pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, pay
ee: &Option<Payee>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+
+ let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
+ let payment_entry = pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id);
+ if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(payment) = &payment_entry {
+ if !payment.get().is_retryable() {
+ return Err(APIError::RouteError {
+ err: "Payment already completed"
+ });
+ }
+ }
+
let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
Some(id) => id.clone(),
};
+ macro_rules! insert_outbound_payment {
+ () => {
+ let payment = payment_entry.or_insert_with(|| PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
+ session_privs: HashSet::new(),
+ pending_amt_msat: 0,
+ pending_fee_msat: Some(0),
+ payment_hash: *payment_hash,
+ payment_secret: *payment_secret,
+ starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
+ total_msat: total_value,
+ });
+ assert!(payment.insert(session_priv_bytes, path));
+ }
+ }
+
let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
match {
if !chan.get().is_live() {
return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
}
- let send_res = break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
+ break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
path: path.clone(),
session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
payment_id,
+ payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
+ payee: payee.clone(),
}, onion_packet, &self.logger),
- channel_state, chan);
-
- let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
- let payment = pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id).or_insert_with(|| PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
- session_privs: HashSet::new(),
- pending_amt_msat: 0,
- payment_hash: *payment_hash,
- payment_secret: *payment_secret,
- starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
- total_msat: total_value,
- });
- assert!(payment.insert(session_priv_bytes, path.last().unwrap().fee_msat));
-
- send_res
+ channel_state, chan)
} {
Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
// is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
// it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
// send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
+ insert_outbound_payment!(); // Only do this after possibly break'ing on Perm failure above.
return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
}
+ insert_outbound_payment!();
log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
},
});
},
- None => {},
+ None => { insert_outbound_payment!(); },
}
} else { unreachable!(); }
return Ok(());
let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
let mut results = Vec::new();
for path in route.paths.iter() {
- results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage));
+ results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &route.payee, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage));
}
let mut has_ok = false;
let mut has_err = false;
- for res in results.iter() {
+ let mut pending_amt_unsent = 0;
+ let mut max_unsent_cltv_delta = 0;
+ for (res, path) in results.iter().zip(route.paths.iter()) {
if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
// PartialFailure.
has_err = true;
has_ok = true;
- break;
+ } else if res.is_err() {
+ pending_amt_unsent += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
+ max_unsent_cltv_delta = cmp::max(max_unsent_cltv_delta, path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta);
}
}
if has_err && has_ok {
- Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure(results))
+ Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure {
+ results,
+ payment_id,
+ failed_paths_retry: if pending_amt_unsent != 0 {
+ if let Some(payee) = &route.payee {
+ Some(RouteParameters {
+ payee: payee.clone(),
+ final_value_msat: pending_amt_unsent,
+ final_cltv_expiry_delta: max_unsent_cltv_delta,
+ })
+ } else { None }
+ } else { None },
+ })
} else if has_err {
+ // If we failed to send any paths, we shouldn't have inserted the new PaymentId into
+ // our `pending_outbound_payments` map at all.
+ debug_assert!(self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().get(&payment_id).is_none());
Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
} else {
Ok(payment_id)
///
/// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
/// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
- /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, or if the payment
- /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success).
+ /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment
+ /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if
+ /// further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`].
///
/// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
+ /// [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]
pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10;
for path in route.paths.iter() {
return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string()
}))
- }
+ },
+ PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {
+ return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
+ err: "Payment already completed".to_owned()
+ }));
+ },
+ PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {
+ return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
+ err: "Payment already abandoned (with some HTLCs still pending)".to_owned()
+ }));
+ },
}
} else {
return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
return self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, Some(payment_id), Some(total_msat)).map(|_| ())
}
+ /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur.
+ ///
+ /// After this method returns, any future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id`
+ /// will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`]. If no such event has been generated,
+ /// an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event will be generated as soon as there are no remaining
+ /// pending HTLCs for this payment.
+ ///
+ /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
+ /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
+ /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
+ ///
+ /// [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment
+ /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
+ /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
+ pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+
+ let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
+ if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
+ if let Ok(()) = payment.get_mut().mark_abandoned() {
+ if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
+ self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
+ payment_id,
+ payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
+ });
+ payment.remove();
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
/// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
/// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
/// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
(chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
.map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
- MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
+ MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
} else { unreachable!(); })
, chan)
},
/// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
/// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
///
- /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
+ /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
+ /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
///
/// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
/// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
/// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
///
/// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
+ /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
});
- match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet) {
+ match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet, &self.logger) {
Err(e) => {
if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
}
// ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
- Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
+ Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.get_user_id(), channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
},
ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
};
}
}
+ macro_rules! check_total_value {
+ ($payment_data_total_msat: expr, $payment_secret: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
+ let mut total_value = 0;
+ let mut payment_received_generated = false;
+ let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
+ .or_insert(Vec::new());
+ if htlcs.len() == 1 {
+ if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
+ fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
+ continue
+ }
+ }
+ htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
+ for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
+ total_value += htlc.value;
+ match &htlc.onion_payload {
+ OnionPayload::Invoice(htlc_payment_data) => {
+ if htlc_payment_data.total_msat != $payment_data_total_msat {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
+ log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data_total_msat, htlc_payment_data.total_msat);
+ total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
+ }
+ if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
+ },
+ _ => unreachable!(),
+ }
+ }
+ if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data_total_msat {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
+ log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data_total_msat);
+ for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
+ fail_htlc!(htlc);
+ }
+ } else if total_value == $payment_data_total_msat {
+ new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
+ payment_hash,
+ purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
+ payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
+ payment_secret: $payment_secret,
+ },
+ amt: total_value,
+ });
+ payment_received_generated = true;
+ } else {
+ // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
+ // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
+ // MPP parts.
+ }
+ payment_received_generated
+ }}
+ }
+
// Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
// MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
// "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
- OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we didn't have a corresponding inbound payment.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
- fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
+ OnionPayload::Invoice(ref payment_data) => {
+ let payment_preimage = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, payment_data.clone(), self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
+ Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
+ Err(()) => {
+ fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
+ continue
+ }
+ };
+ let payment_data_total_msat = payment_data.total_msat;
+ let payment_secret = payment_data.payment_secret.clone();
+ check_total_value!(payment_data_total_msat, payment_secret, payment_preimage);
},
OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
} else {
- let mut total_value = 0;
- let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
- .or_insert(Vec::new());
- if htlcs.len() == 1 {
- if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
- fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
- continue
- }
- }
- htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
- for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
- total_value += htlc.value;
- match &htlc.onion_payload {
- OnionPayload::Invoice(htlc_payment_data) => {
- if htlc_payment_data.total_msat != payment_data.total_msat {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
- log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, htlc_payment_data.total_msat);
- total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
- }
- if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
- },
- _ => unreachable!(),
- }
- }
- if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > payment_data.total_msat {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
- log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, payment_data.total_msat);
- for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
- fail_htlc!(htlc);
- }
- } else if total_value == payment_data.total_msat {
- new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
- payment_hash,
- purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
- payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
- payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
- user_payment_id: inbound_payment.get().user_payment_id,
- },
- amt: total_value,
- });
- // Only ever generate at most one PaymentReceived
- // per registered payment_hash, even if it isn't
- // claimed.
+ let payment_received_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data.total_msat, payment_data.payment_secret, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
+ if payment_received_generated {
inbound_payment.remove_entry();
- } else {
- // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
- // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
- // MPP parts.
}
}
},
let ret_err = match res {
Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
- let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_id);
+ let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_id);
if drop { retain_channel = false; }
res
} else {
self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
},
- HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
+ HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, payee, .. } => {
let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
- if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, path.last().unwrap().fee_msat) {
- self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
- events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
- payment_hash,
- rejected_by_dest: false,
- network_update: None,
- all_paths_failed: payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0,
- path: path.clone(),
- short_channel_id: None,
- #[cfg(test)]
- error_code: None,
- #[cfg(test)]
- error_data: None,
- }
- );
+ if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) && !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
+ let retry = if let Some(payee_data) = payee {
+ let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
+ Some(RouteParameters {
+ payee: payee_data,
+ final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
+ final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
+ })
+ } else { None };
+ let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
+ pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
+ payment_id: Some(payment_id),
+ payment_hash,
+ rejected_by_dest: false,
+ network_update: None,
+ all_paths_failed: payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0,
+ path: path.clone(),
+ short_channel_id: None,
+ retry,
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ error_code: None,
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ error_data: None,
+ });
+ if payment.get().abandoned() && payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
+ pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
+ payment_id,
+ payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
+ });
+ payment.remove();
+ }
}
} else {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
// from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
// being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
match source {
- HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, payment_id, .. } => {
+ HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, payment_id, ref payee, .. } => {
let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
let mut all_paths_failed = false;
- if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut sessions) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
- if !sessions.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, path.last().unwrap().fee_msat) {
+ let mut full_failure_ev = None;
+ if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
+ if !payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
return;
}
- if sessions.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
+ if payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Received failure of HTLC with payment_hash {} after payment completion", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
+ return;
+ }
+ if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
all_paths_failed = true;
+ if payment.get().abandoned() {
+ full_failure_ev = Some(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
+ payment_id,
+ payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
+ });
+ payment.remove();
+ }
}
} else {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
return;
}
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
- match &onion_error {
+ let retry = if let Some(payee_data) = payee {
+ let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
+ Some(RouteParameters {
+ payee: payee_data.clone(),
+ final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
+ final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
+ })
+ } else { None };
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
+
+ let path_failure = match &onion_error {
&HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
#[cfg(test)]
let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
// TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
// process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
// next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
- self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
- events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
- payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
- rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
- network_update,
- all_paths_failed,
- path: path.clone(),
- short_channel_id,
+ events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
+ payment_id: Some(payment_id),
+ payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
+ rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
+ network_update,
+ all_paths_failed,
+ path: path.clone(),
+ short_channel_id,
+ retry,
#[cfg(test)]
- error_code: onion_error_code,
+ error_code: onion_error_code,
#[cfg(test)]
- error_data: onion_error_data
- }
- );
+ error_data: onion_error_data
+ }
},
&HTLCFailReason::Reason {
#[cfg(test)]
// ChannelDetails.
// TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
// channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
- self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
- events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
- payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
- rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
- network_update: None,
- all_paths_failed,
- path: path.clone(),
- short_channel_id: Some(path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id),
+ events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
+ payment_id: Some(payment_id),
+ payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
+ rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
+ network_update: None,
+ all_paths_failed,
+ path: path.clone(),
+ short_channel_id: Some(path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id),
+ retry,
#[cfg(test)]
- error_code: Some(*failure_code),
+ error_code: Some(*failure_code),
#[cfg(test)]
- error_data: Some(data.clone()),
- }
- );
+ error_data: Some(data.clone()),
+ }
}
- }
+ };
+ let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
+ pending_events.push(path_failure);
+ if let Some(ev) = full_failure_ev { pending_events.push(ev); }
},
HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. }) => {
let err_packet = match onion_error {
}
}
- /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
- /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
- /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
+ /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentReceived`], generating any
+ /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
///
/// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
/// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
/// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
/// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
///
- /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
+ /// Returns whether any HTLCs were claimed, and thus if any new [`MessageSendEvent`]s are now
+ /// pending for processing via [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`].
///
+ /// [`Event::PaymentReceived`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentReceived
/// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
/// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
+ /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
} else { unreachable!(); }
}
+ fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
+ let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
+ for source in sources.drain(..) {
+ if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } = source {
+ let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
+ session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
+ let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
+ if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
+ assert!(payment.get().is_fulfilled());
+ if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None) {
+ pending_events.push(
+ events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
+ payment_id,
+ payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash(),
+ path,
+ }
+ );
+ }
+ if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
+ payment.remove();
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool) {
match source {
HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
- let found_payment = if let Some(mut sessions) = outbounds.remove(&payment_id) {
- sessions.remove(&session_priv_bytes, path.last().unwrap().fee_msat)
- } else { false };
- if found_payment {
- let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
- self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
- events::Event::PaymentSent {
- payment_preimage,
- payment_hash: payment_hash
+ if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
+ let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
+ if !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
+ let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
+ let fee_paid_msat = payment.get().get_pending_fee_msat();
+ pending_events.push(
+ events::Event::PaymentSent {
+ payment_id: Some(payment_id),
+ payment_preimage,
+ payment_hash,
+ fee_paid_msat,
+ }
+ );
+ payment.get_mut().mark_fulfilled();
+ }
+
+ if from_onchain {
+ // We currently immediately remove HTLCs which were fulfilled on-chain.
+ // This could potentially lead to removing a pending payment too early,
+ // with a reorg of one block causing us to re-add the fulfilled payment on
+ // restart.
+ // TODO: We should have a second monitor event that informs us of payments
+ // irrevocably fulfilled.
+ if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
+ let payment_hash = Some(PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()));
+ pending_events.push(
+ events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
+ payment_id,
+ payment_hash,
+ path,
+ }
+ );
+ }
+
+ if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
+ payment.remove();
}
- );
+ }
} else {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
}
self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
}
- /// Restores a single, given channel to normal operation after a
- /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
- /// operation.
- ///
- /// All ChannelMonitor updates up to and including highest_applied_update_id must have been
- /// fully committed in every copy of the given channels' ChannelMonitors.
- ///
- /// Note that there is no effect to calling with a highest_applied_update_id other than the
- /// current latest ChannelMonitorUpdate and one call to this function after multiple
- /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures is fine. The highest_applied_update_id field
- /// exists largely only to prevent races between this and concurrent update_monitor calls.
- ///
- /// Thus, the anticipated use is, at a high level:
- /// 1) You register a chain::Watch with this ChannelManager,
- /// 2) it stores each update to disk, and begins updating any remote (eg watchtower) copies of
- /// said ChannelMonitors as it can, returning ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures
- /// any time it cannot do so instantly,
- /// 3) update(s) are applied to each remote copy of a ChannelMonitor,
- /// 4) once all remote copies are updated, you call this function with the update_id that
- /// completed, and once it is the latest the Channel will be re-enabled.
- pub fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
+ fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
let chan_restoration_res;
- let mut pending_failures = {
+ let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims) = {
let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
return;
}
- let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, pending_failures, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked) = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger);
- let channel_update = if funding_locked.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() && !channel.get().should_announce() {
+ let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger);
+ let channel_update = if updates.funding_locked.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() && !channel.get().should_announce() {
// We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
// funding_locked and the channel is in a usable state. Further, we rely on the
// normal announcement_signatures process to send a channel_update for public
msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()).unwrap(),
})
} else { None };
- chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, raa, commitment_update, order, None, pending_forwards, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked);
+ chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, None, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.funding_locked);
if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
}
- pending_failures
+ (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs)
};
post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
+ self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
}
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
}
- let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(), &their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration)
+ if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
+ }
+
+ let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(),
+ &their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger)
.map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
// hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
// accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
// until we have persisted our monitor.
- chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
+ chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
},
}
}
if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
let (result, is_permanent) =
- handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
+ handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
if is_permanent {
remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
break result;
break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
}
let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
- let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail_in) =
- break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
- htlcs_to_fail = htlcs_to_fail_in;
- if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
+ let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
+ chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
+ htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
+ if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update) {
if was_frozen_for_monitor {
- assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
+ assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
+ assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
} else {
- if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures) {
+ if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan,
+ RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
+ raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(),
+ raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
+ raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
break Err(e);
} else { unreachable!(); }
}
}
- if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
+ if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
updates,
});
}
- break Ok((pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"), chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
+ break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
+ raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
+ chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
+ .expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"),
+ chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
}
};
self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
match res {
- Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) => {
+ Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
+ short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) =>
+ {
for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
}
self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
+ self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
Ok(())
},
Err(e) => Err(e)
self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
}
},
- MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) => {
+ MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
+ MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
msg: update
});
}
- self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
+ let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
+ ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
+ } else {
+ ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
+ };
+ self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
});
}
},
+ MonitorEvent::UpdateCompleted { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
+ self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
+ },
}
}
has_pending_monitor_events
}
+ /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
+ /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
+ /// update events as a separate process method here.
+ #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
+ pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
+ self.process_pending_monitor_events();
+ }
+
/// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
/// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
/// update was applied.
if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
has_monitor_update = true;
- let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), channel_id);
+ let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), channel_id);
handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
if close_channel { return false; }
} else {
}
}
- fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32
, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
+ fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
+ if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
+ return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
+ }
+
let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
- payment_secret, min_value_msat, user_payment_id, payment_preimage,
+ payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
+ user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
// We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
- // its updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
+ // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
// a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
// Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
// never fail a payment too early.
/// to pay us.
///
/// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
- /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you, returning the first and storing the second.
+ /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
///
/// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
/// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
///
/// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
///
+ /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
+ /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
+ ///
+ /// # Note
+ ///
+ /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
+ /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
+ ///
+ /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
+ ///
/// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
/// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
/// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
/// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
- pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> (PaymentHash, PaymentSecret) {
+ pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
+ inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, &self.keys_manager, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
+ }
+
+ /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
+ /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
+ ///
+ /// # Note
+ /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
+ ///
+ /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
+ #[deprecated]
+ pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
-
- (payment_hash,
- self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
- .expect("RNG Generated Duplicate PaymentHash"))
+ let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
+ Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
}
/// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
/// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) must be globally unique. This
/// method may return an Err if another payment with the same payment_hash is still pending.
///
- /// `user_payment_id` will be provided back in [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id`] events to
- /// allow tracking of which events correspond with which calls to this and
- /// [`create_inbound_payment`]. `user_payment_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply
- /// copied to events and otherwise ignored. It may be used to correlate PaymentReceived events
- /// with invoice metadata stored elsewhere.
- ///
/// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
/// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
/// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
/// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
/// [`PaymentReceived`].
///
- /// Pending inbound payments are stored in memory and in serialized versions of this
- /// [`ChannelManager`]. If potentially unbounded numbers of inbound payments may exist and
- /// space is limited, you may wish to rate-limit inbound payment creation.
- ///
/// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
///
/// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
/// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
///
+ /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
+ /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
+ ///
+ /// # Note
+ ///
+ /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
+ /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
+ ///
+ /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
+ ///
/// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
/// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
- /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id
- pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
- self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
+ pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
+ inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
+ }
+
+ /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
+ /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
+ ///
+ /// # Note
+ /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
+ ///
+ /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
+ #[deprecated]
+ pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
+ self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
}
#[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))]
pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
!self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty()
}
+
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
+ self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().clear()
+ }
}
impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
});
+ let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
- outbounds.retain(|_, payment| {
- const PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
+ outbounds.retain(|payment_id, payment| {
if payment.remaining_parts() != 0 { return true }
- if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { starting_block_height, .. } = payment {
- return *starting_block_height + PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS > height
- }
- true
+ if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { starting_block_height, payment_hash, .. } = payment {
+ if *starting_block_height + PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS <= height {
+ log_info!(self.logger, "Timing out payment with id {} and hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_id.0), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
+ pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
+ payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash,
+ });
+ false
+ } else { true }
+ } else { true }
});
}
/// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
/// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
/// the function.
- fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage>>
+ fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ClosureReason>>
(&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
// Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
// during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
}
short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
}
- } else if let Err(e) = res {
+ } else if let Err(reason) = res {
if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
}
msg: update
});
}
- self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
+ let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
+ self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
- action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
+ action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
+ channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
+ data: reason_message,
+ } },
});
return false;
}
/// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
/// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
/// up.
- /// Note that the feature `allow_wallclock_use` must be enabled to use this function.
- #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
+ ///
+ /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
+ #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
}
}
}
- #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
+ #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
let current_time = Instant::now();
loop {
let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
let mut payment_id = None;
+ let mut payment_secret = None;
+ let mut payee = None;
read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
(0, session_priv, required),
(1, payment_id, option),
(2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
+ (3, payment_secret, option),
(4, path, vec_type),
+ (5, payee, option),
});
if payment_id.is_none() {
// For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
first_hop_htlc_msat: first_hop_htlc_msat,
path: path.unwrap(),
payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
+ payment_secret,
+ payee,
})
}
1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::io::Error> {
match self {
- HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
+ HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payee } => {
0u8.write(writer)?;
let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
(0, session_priv, required),
(1, payment_id_opt, option),
(2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
+ (3, payment_secret, option),
(4, path, vec_type),
+ (5, payee, option),
});
}
HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
(8, min_value_msat, required),
});
-impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingOutboundPayment,
+impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(PendingOutboundPayment,
(0, Legacy) => {
(0, session_privs, required),
},
+ (1, Fulfilled) => {
+ (0, session_privs, required),
+ (1, payment_hash, option),
+ },
(2, Retryable) => {
(0, session_privs, required),
+ (1, pending_fee_msat, option),
(2, payment_hash, required),
(4, payment_secret, option),
(6, total_msat, required),
(8, pending_amt_msat, required),
(10, starting_block_height, required),
},
-;);
+ (3, Abandoned) => {
+ (0, session_privs, required),
+ (2, payment_hash, required),
+ },
+);
impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
// For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
- num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
+ if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
+ num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
+ }
}
num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
session_priv.write(writer)?;
}
}
+ PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
+ PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
}
}
PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
- }
+ },
+ _ => {},
}
}
write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
///
/// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
/// is:
-/// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
-/// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling:
-/// <(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)
-/// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
-/// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
-/// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints the same
-/// way you would handle a `chain::Filter` call using ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch() and
-/// ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
-/// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
-/// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
-/// 6) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local chain::Watch.
+/// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
+/// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
+/// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
+/// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
+/// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
+/// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
+/// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
+/// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
+/// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
+/// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
+/// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
+/// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
+/// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
+/// the next step.
+/// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
+/// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
///
-/// Note that the ordering of #4-6 is not of importance, however all three must occur before you
-/// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized ChannelManager.
+/// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
+/// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
///
/// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
/// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
/// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
/// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
/// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
+///
+/// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
for _ in 0..channel_count {
- let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, &args.keys_manager)?;
+ let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (&args.keys_manager, best_block_height))?;
let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
+ user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
});
} else {
+ log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
}
for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
+ log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
}
}
outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
}
pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
+ } else {
+ // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
+ // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
+ // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
+ // corresponding `Channel` at all).
+ // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
+ // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
+ // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
+ // 0.0.102+
+ for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors {
+ if by_id.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
+ for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
+ if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
+ if path.is_empty() {
+ log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
+ return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
+ }
+ let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
+ let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
+ session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
+ match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
+ let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
+ log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
+ if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
+ },
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
+ let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
+ entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
+ session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
+ payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
+ payment_secret,
+ pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
+ pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
+ total_msat: path_amt,
+ starting_block_height: best_block_height,
+ });
+ log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
+ path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
}
let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
}
+ let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
+ let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
genesis_hash,
fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
claimable_htlcs,
pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
}),
+ inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
use core::time::Duration;
+ use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
- use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
+ use ln::channelmanager::inbound_payment;
+ use ln::features::InitFeatures;
use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
use ln::msgs;
use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
- use routing::router::{get_keysend_route, get_route};
- use routing::scorer::Scorer;
+ use routing::router::{Payee, RouteParameters, find_route};
use util::errors::APIError;
use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
use util::test_utils;
fn test_wait_timeout() {
use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
use sync::Arc;
- use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
+ use core::sync::atomic::AtomicBool;
use std::thread;
let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
// Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
// indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
- nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payee, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
// Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
- nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payee, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- // Note that successful MPP payments will generate 1 event upon the first path's success. No
- // further events will be generated for subsequence path successes.
+ // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
+ // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
match events[0] {
- Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash } => {
+ Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
+ assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
+ match events[1] {
+ Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
+ assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
+ assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
+ assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ match events[2] {
+ Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
+ assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
+ assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
+ assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
}
#[test]
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
- let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
- let scorer = Scorer::new(0);
+ let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
// To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
// Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
- let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 100_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger, &scorer).unwrap();
+ let params = RouteParameters {
+ payee: Payee::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id()),
+ final_value_msat: 100_000,
+ final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
+ };
+ let route = find_route(
+ &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), ¶ms, nodes[0].network_graph, None,
+ nodes[0].logger, &scorer
+ ).unwrap();
nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
// To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
- let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 100_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger, &scorer).unwrap();
+ let route = find_route(
+ &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), ¶ms, nodes[0].network_graph, None,
+ nodes[0].logger, &scorer
+ ).unwrap();
let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
- let network_graph = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph;
+ let params = RouteParameters {
+ payee: Payee::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
+ final_value_msat: 10000,
+ final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
+ };
+ let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
- let scorer = Scorer::new(0);
- let route = get_keysend_route(&payer_pubkey, network_graph, &payee_pubkey,
- Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()), &vec![], 10000, 40,
- nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
+ let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
+ let route = find_route(
+ &payer_pubkey, ¶ms, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
+ nodes[0].logger, &scorer
+ ).unwrap();
let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
- let network_graph = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph;
+ let params = RouteParameters {
+ payee: Payee::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
+ final_value_msat: 10000,
+ final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
+ };
+ let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
- let scorer = Scorer::new(0);
- let route = get_keysend_route(&payer_pubkey, network_graph, &payee_pubkey,
- Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()), &vec![], 10000, 40,
- nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
+ let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
+ let route = find_route(
+ &payer_pubkey, ¶ms, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
+ nodes[0].logger, &scorer
+ ).unwrap();
let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
_ => panic!("unexpected error")
}
}
+
+ #[test]
+ fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
+ // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
+ let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
+ payment_secret,
+ total_msat: 100_000,
+ };
+
+ // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
+ // payment verification fails as expected.
+ let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
+ bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
+ match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, payment_data.clone(), nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
+ Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
+ Err(()) => {
+ nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
+ assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
+ }
}
#[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "unstable"))]
pub mod bench {
use chain::Listen;
- use chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor;
- use chain::channelmonitor::Persist;
+ use chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
- use routing::router::get_route;
- use routing::scorer::Scorer;
+ use routing::router::{Payee, get_route};
+ use routing::scoring::Scorer;
use util::test_utils;
use util::config::UserConfig;
use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
macro_rules! send_payment {
($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
- let scorer = Scorer::new(0);
- let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &dummy_graph, &$node_b.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()),
- Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), &[], 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer).unwrap();
+ let payee = Payee::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id())
+ .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
+ let scorer = Scorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
+ let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payee, &dummy_graph,
+ Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer).unwrap();
let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
payment_count += 1;
let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
- let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, 0).unwrap();
+ let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
$node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff