use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
use bitcoin::key::constants::SECRET_KEY_SIZE;
-use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
+use bitcoin::network::Network;
use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
use bitcoin::{secp256k1, Sequence};
use crate::blinded_path::{BlindedPath, NodeIdLookUp};
+use crate::blinded_path::message::ForwardNode;
use crate::blinded_path::payment::{Bolt12OfferContext, Bolt12RefundContext, PaymentConstraints, PaymentContext, ReceiveTlvs};
use crate::chain;
use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
use crate::ln::inbound_payment;
use crate::ln::types::{ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
use crate::ln::channel::{self, Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, WithChannelContext};
-pub use crate::ln::channel::{InboundHTLCDetails, InboundHTLCStateDetails, OutboundHTLCDetails, OutboundHTLCStateDetails};
+pub use crate::ln::channel_state::{ChannelCounterparty, ChannelDetails, ChannelShutdownState, CounterpartyForwardingInfo};
+pub use crate::ln::channel_state::{InboundHTLCDetails, InboundHTLCStateDetails, OutboundHTLCDetails, OutboundHTLCStateDetails};
use crate::ln::features::{Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
#[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
use crate::onion_message::messenger::{new_pending_onion_message, Destination, MessageRouter, PendingOnionMessage, Responder, ResponseInstruction};
use crate::onion_message::offers::{OffersMessage, OffersMessageHandler};
use crate::sign::{EntropySource, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider};
-use crate::sign::ecdsa::WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner;
+use crate::sign::ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner;
use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
+ onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
}
impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
(0, amount_msat, required),
(4, receiver_node_id, required),
(5, htlcs, optional_vec),
(7, sender_intended_value, option),
+ (9, onion_fields, option),
});
struct ClaimablePayment {
type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
/// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
- /// A type implementing [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`].
- type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
+ /// A type implementing [`EcdsaChannelSigner`].
+ type Signer: EcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
/// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<EcdsaSigner= Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
/// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
///
/// ```
/// use bitcoin::BlockHash;
-/// use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
+/// use bitcoin::network::Network;
/// use lightning::chain::BestBlock;
/// # use lightning::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
/// use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{ChainParameters, ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs};
/// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
-/// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
-#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
-pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
- /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
- pub fee_base_msat: u32,
- /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
- pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
- /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
- /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
- /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
- pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
-}
-
-/// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
-/// to better separate parameters.
-#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
-pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
- /// The node_id of our counterparty
- pub node_id: PublicKey,
- /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
- /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
- /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
- pub features: InitFeatures,
- /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
- /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
- /// claiming at least this value on chain.
- ///
- /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
- ///
- /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
- pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
- /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
- /// payments to us through this channel.
- pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
- /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
- /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
- /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
- pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
- /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
- pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
-}
-
-/// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
-#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
-pub struct ChannelDetails {
- /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
- /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
- /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
- /// lifetime of the channel.
- pub channel_id: ChannelId,
- /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
- pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
- /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
- /// our counterparty already.
- pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
- /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
- ///
- /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
- pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
- /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
- /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
- ///
- /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
- /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
- ///
- /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
- /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
- ///
- /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
- /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
- /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
- /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
- /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
- pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
- /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
- /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
- /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
- /// `Some(0)`).
- ///
- /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
- ///
- /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
- /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
- pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
- /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
- /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
- /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
- /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
- ///
- /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
- /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
- ///
- /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
- pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
- /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
- pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
- /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
- /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
- /// this value on chain.
- ///
- /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
- ///
- /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
- ///
- /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
- pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
- /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
- /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
- /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
- /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel. This may be zero for objects
- /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
- ///
- /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
- /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
- /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
- pub user_channel_id: u128,
- /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
- /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
- ///
- /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
- pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
- /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
- /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
- /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
- ///
- /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
- /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
- /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
- /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
- ///
- /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
- pub balance_msat: u64,
- /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
- /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
- /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
- /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
- ///
- /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
- ///
- /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
- /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
- /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
- pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
- /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
- /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
- /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
- /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
- ///
- /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
- /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
- pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
- /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
- /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
- /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
- /// route which is valid.
- pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
- /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
- /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
- /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
- /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
- /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
- ///
- /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
- /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
- /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
- pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
- /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
- /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
- /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
- /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
- /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
- ///
- /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
- ///
- /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
- /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
- /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
- pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
- /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
- ///
- /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
- pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
- /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
- /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
- /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
- /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
- /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
- ///
- /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
- pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
- /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
- pub is_outbound: bool,
- /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
- /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
- /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
- /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
- /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
- ///
- /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
- pub is_channel_ready: bool,
- /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
- /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
- pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
- /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
- /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
- ///
- /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
- pub is_usable: bool,
- /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
- pub is_public: bool,
- /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
- /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
- pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
- /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
- pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
- /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
- ///
- /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
- pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
- /// Pending inbound HTLCs.
- ///
- /// This field is empty for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.122.
- pub pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCDetails>,
- /// Pending outbound HTLCs.
- ///
- /// This field is empty for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.122.
- pub pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCDetails>,
-}
-
-impl ChannelDetails {
- /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
- /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
- /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
- ///
- /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
- /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
- pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
- self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
- }
-
- /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
- /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
- /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
- ///
- /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
- /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
- pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
- self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
- }
-
- fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
- context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
- fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
- ) -> Self
- where
- SP::Target: SignerProvider,
- F::Target: FeeEstimator
- {
- let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
- let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
- context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
- ChannelDetails {
- channel_id: context.channel_id(),
- counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
- node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
- features: latest_features,
- unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
- forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
- // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
- // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
- // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
- // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
- // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
- outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
- Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
- outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
- },
- funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
- // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
- // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
- channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
- short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
- outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
- inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
- channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
- feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
- unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
- balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
- inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
- outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
- next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
- next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
- user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
- confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
- confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
- force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
- is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
- is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
- is_usable: context.is_live(),
- is_public: context.should_announce(),
- inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
- inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
- config: Some(context.config()),
- channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
- pending_inbound_htlcs: context.get_pending_inbound_htlc_details(),
- pending_outbound_htlcs: context.get_pending_outbound_htlc_details(),
- }
- }
-}
-
-#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
-/// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
-/// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
-/// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
-/// the channel will be removed shortly.
-/// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
-/// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
-pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
- /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
- NotShuttingDown,
- /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
- ShutdownInitiated,
- /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
- /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
- ResolvingHTLCs,
- /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
- NegotiatingClosingFee,
- /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
- /// to drop the channel.
- ShutdownComplete,
-}
-
/// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
/// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
#[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
let counterparty_node_id = shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id;
let channel_id = shutdown_res.channel_id;
let logger = WithContext::from(
- &$self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_id),
+ &$self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_id), None
);
log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel: {}", err.err);
(false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
},
ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
- let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$channel.context);
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$channel.context, None);
log_error!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: msg.clone() };
macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
- let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context, None);
let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&&logger,
&$self.node_signer, $self.chain_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
$self.best_block.read().unwrap().height);
macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
- let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context, None);
match $update_res {
ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
}
let logger = WithContext::from(
- &self.logger, Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id), Some(shutdown_res.channel_id),
+ &self.logger, Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id), Some(shutdown_res.channel_id), None
);
log_debug!(logger, "Finishing closure of channel due to {} with {} HTLCs to fail",
} else {
ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
};
- let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*peer_node_id), Some(*channel_id));
+ let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*peer_node_id), Some(*channel_id), None);
if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
}
log_info!(
- WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id)),
+ WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id), Some(msg.payment_hash)),
"Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", err_msg
);
// If `msg.blinding_point` is set, we must always fail with malformed.
macro_rules! return_err {
($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
{
- let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
+ let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id), Some(msg.payment_hash));
log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
}
- let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
}
/// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
/// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
- let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
}
fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
- let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
log_trace!(logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
- path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
- session_priv_bytes
+ path, payment_hash, recipient_onion: &recipient_onion, total_value,
+ cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv_bytes
})
}
&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height,
payment_hash, keysend_preimage, prng_seed
).map_err(|e| {
- let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
+ let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None, Some(*payment_hash));
log_error!(logger, "Failed to build an onion for path for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
e
})?;
let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
None => {
- let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
+ let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None, Some(*payment_hash));
log_error!(logger, "Failed to find first-hop for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()})
},
Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
};
- let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(id));
+ let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(id), Some(*payment_hash));
log_trace!(logger,
"Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
}
let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
- let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, Some(*payment_hash));
let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
path: path.clone(),
},
}
- let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &&logger);
match funding_res {
Ok(funding_msg) => (chan, funding_msg),
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
let mut result = Ok(());
- if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
+ if !funding_transaction.is_coinbase() {
for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
if inp.witness.is_empty() {
result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
is_batch_funding,
|chan, tx| {
let mut output_index = None;
- let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
+ let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_p2wsh();
for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
- if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
+ if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value.to_sat() == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
if output_index.is_some() {
return Err("Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value");
}
None => {
let error = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id);
- let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(next_node_id), Some(*next_hop_channel_id));
+ let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(next_node_id), Some(*next_hop_channel_id), None);
log_error!(logger, "{} when attempting to forward intercepted HTLC", error);
return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
err: error
// Process the HTLC on the incoming channel.
match self.do_funded_channel_callback(incoming_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
- let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, Some(update_add_htlc.payment_hash));
chan.can_accept_incoming_htlc(
update_add_htlc, &self.fee_estimator, &logger,
)
}) => {
macro_rules! failure_handler {
($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
- let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, forwarding_counterparty, Some(prev_channel_id));
+ let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, forwarding_counterparty, Some(prev_channel_id), Some(payment_hash));
log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
- let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
let queue_fail_htlc_res = match forward_info {
HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
}, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
},
}) => {
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, Some(payment_hash));
log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
- let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
// If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
| {
context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
- let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context, None);
log_error!(logger,
"Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
- let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
log_debug!(logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
- let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(*chan_id));
+ let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(*chan_id), None);
log_error!(logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
ref phantom_shared_secret, outpoint: _, ref blinded_failure, ref channel_id, ..
}) => {
log_trace!(
- WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(*channel_id)),
+ WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(*channel_id), Some(*payment_hash)),
"Failing {}HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us: {:?}",
if blinded_failure.is_some() { "blinded " } else { "" }, &payment_hash, onion_error
);
}
}
- let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
- let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
- let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
- ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
- payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
- });
- if dup_purpose.is_some() {
- debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
- log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
- &payment_hash);
- }
+ let claiming_payment = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments
+ .entry(payment_hash)
+ .and_modify(|_| {
+ debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
+ log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
+ &payment_hash);
+ })
+ .or_insert_with(|| {
+ let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
+ let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
+ ClaimingPayment {
+ amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
+ payment_purpose: payment.purpose,
+ receiver_node_id,
+ htlcs,
+ sender_intended_value,
+ onion_fields: payment.onion_fields,
+ }
+ });
- if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
+ if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = claiming_payment.onion_fields {
if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
&payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
// We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
// HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
- let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop_chan_id));
+ let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop_chan_id), Some(payment_hash));
log_error!(logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
} else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
}
if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
- let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
match fulfill_res {
// with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
// channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
// again on restart.
- log_error!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop.channel_id)),
+ log_error!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop.channel_id), None),
"Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
payment_preimage, update_res);
}
receiver_node_id,
htlcs,
sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
+ onion_fields,
}) = payment {
self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
payment_hash,
receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
htlcs,
sender_intended_total_msat,
+ onion_fields,
}, None));
}
},
funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
-> (Option<(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)>, Option<(u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>)>) {
- let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context, None);
log_trace!(logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {} pending update_add_htlcs, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
&channel.context.channel_id(),
if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
pending.len()
} else { 0 };
- let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context, None);
log_trace!(logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
remaining_in_flight);
fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
- let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(*temporary_channel_id));
+ let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(*temporary_channel_id), None);
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
let peers_without_funded_channels =
match phase.get_mut() {
ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
- (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
+ (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
},
_ => {
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id));
let (mut chan, funding_msg_opt, monitor) =
match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
- let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &inbound_chan.context);
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &inbound_chan.context, None);
match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger) {
Ok(res) => res,
Err((inbound_chan, err)) => {
}
Ok(())
} else {
- let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
log_error!(logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
fail_chan!("Duplicate funding outpoint");
}
let logger = WithContext::from(
&self.logger,
Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
- Some(chan.context.channel_id())
+ Some(chan.context.channel_id()),
+ None
);
let res =
chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger);
match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
- let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
self.chain_hash, &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
match phase {
ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
if !chan.received_shutdown() {
- let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
log_info!(logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
msg.channel_id,
if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
},
ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
let context = phase.context_mut();
- let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context, None);
log_error!(logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel));
};
if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
let channel_id = chan_option.as_ref().map(|channel| channel.context().channel_id());
- log_info!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id), "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
+ log_info!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id, None), "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
}
if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
),
Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
};
- let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, Some(msg.payment_hash));
// If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
// but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
// want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
- let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
log_trace!(logger,
"Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
msg.channel_id);
match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
- let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
},
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
- let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_channel_id));
+ let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_channel_id), Some(forward_info.payment_hash));
log_info!(logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
- let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
- let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
} else {
return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
} else {
- let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
log_debug!(logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id);
let did_change = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
// If nothing changed after applying their update, we don't need to bother
msg.channel_id
)
})?;
- let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
+ let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id), None);
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
match monitor_event {
MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
- let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, counterparty_node_id, Some(channel_id));
+ let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, counterparty_node_id, Some(channel_id), Some(htlc_update.payment_hash));
if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
log_trace!(logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage,
let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
- chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context));
+ chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None));
if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
}
peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
match phase {
ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
- let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &&logger) {
Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt, shutdown_result_opt)) => {
if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
///
/// Errors if the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the offer.
///
- /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
- ///
/// [`Offer`]: crate::offers::offer::Offer
/// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
pub fn create_offer_builder(&$self) -> Result<$builder, Bolt12SemanticError> {
/// - `amount_msats` is invalid, or
/// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the refund.
///
- /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
- ///
/// [`Refund`]: crate::offers::refund::Refund
/// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
/// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
let peers = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap()
.iter()
- .filter(|(_, peer)| peer.lock().unwrap().latest_features.supports_onion_messages())
- .map(|(node_id, _)| *node_id)
+ .map(|(node_id, peer_state)| (node_id, peer_state.lock().unwrap()))
+ .filter(|(_, peer)| peer.latest_features.supports_onion_messages())
+ .map(|(node_id, peer)| ForwardNode {
+ node_id: *node_id,
+ short_channel_id: peer.channel_by_id
+ .iter()
+ .filter(|(_, channel)| channel.context().is_usable())
+ .min_by_key(|(_, channel)| channel.context().channel_creation_height)
+ .and_then(|(_, channel)| channel.context().get_short_channel_id()),
+ })
.collect::<Vec<_>>();
self.router
mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
let logger = WithContext::from(
- &self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_id),
+ &self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_id), None
);
loop {
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
*best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
}
- self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
+ self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context, None)));
}
}
let _persistence_guard =
PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
- self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context))
+ self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context, None))
.map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
if height < last_best_block_height {
let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
- self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
+ self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context, None)));
}
}
self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
*self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
- self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
+ self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context, None)));
macro_rules! max_time {
($timestamp: expr) => {
self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
- channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
+ channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context, None)).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
} else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
} else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
});
timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
}
- let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context, None);
if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
if channel.context.is_usable() {
HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
let logger = WithContext::from(
- &self.logger, None, Some(htlc.prev_channel_id)
+ &self.logger, None, Some(htlc.prev_channel_id), Some(htlc.forward_info.payment_hash)
);
log_trace!(logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
false
let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
let remove_peer = {
log_debug!(
- WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None),
+ WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None, None),
"Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id)
);
peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
let context = match phase {
ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
- let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok() {
// We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
return true;
}
&mut chan.context
},
- // We retain UnfundedOutboundV1 channel for some time in case
- // peer unexpectedly disconnects, and intends to reconnect again.
- ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
- return true;
- },
+ // If we get disconnected and haven't yet committed to a funding
+ // transaction, we can replay the `open_channel` on reconnection, so don't
+ // bother dropping the channel here. However, if we already committed to
+ // the funding transaction we don't yet support replaying the funding
+ // handshake (and bailing if the peer rejects it), so we force-close in
+ // that case.
+ ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) if chan.is_resumable() => return true,
+ ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => &mut chan.context,
// Unfunded inbound channels will always be removed.
ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
&mut chan.context
}
fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
- let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None);
+ let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None, None);
if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
log_debug!(logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
return Err(());
for (_, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
match phase {
ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
- let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger),
let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
&args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
))?;
- let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context, None);
let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
funding_txo_to_channel_id.insert(funding_txo, channel.context.channel_id());
funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
// claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
// the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
// backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context, Some(*payment_hash));
log_info!(logger,
"Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
&channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
- let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
+ let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor, None);
let channel_id = monitor.channel_id();
log_info!(logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
&channel_id);
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
- let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context, None);
// Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
// discarded.
if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
let channel_id = funding_txo_to_channel_id.get(&funding_txo).copied();
- let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(counterparty_id), channel_id);
+ let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(counterparty_id), channel_id, None);
if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
// Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
// still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
let counterparty_opt = outpoint_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0);
if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
- let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
+ let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor, Some(htlc.payment_hash));
if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
if path.hops.is_empty() {
log_error!(logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
}
}
for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
+ let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor, Some(htlc.payment_hash));
match htlc_source {
HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
- let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context, None);
if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
let mut outbound_scid_alias;
loop {
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
- let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context, Some(payment_hash));
channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
}
}
amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
+ onion_fields: payment.onion_fields,
}, None));
}
}
for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
for (channel_id, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
- let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), Some(*channel_id));
+ let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), Some(*channel_id), None);
for action in actions.iter() {
if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
}
peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
} else {
- log_error!(WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), None), "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
+ log_error!(WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), None, None), "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
}
}
use crate::util::test_utils;
use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
+ use bitcoin::amount::Amount;
use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
use bitcoin::{Transaction, TxOut};
+ use bitcoin::transaction::Version;
use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
let tx;
if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
- tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
- value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
+ tx = Transaction { version: Version::TWO, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
+ value: Amount::from_sat(8_000_000), script_pubkey: output_script,
}]};
node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
} else { panic!(); }
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff