use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
use bitcoin::key::constants::SECRET_KEY_SIZE;
-use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
+use bitcoin::network::Network;
use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
use bitcoin::{secp256k1, Sequence};
use crate::blinded_path::{BlindedPath, NodeIdLookUp};
+use crate::blinded_path::message::ForwardNode;
use crate::blinded_path::payment::{Bolt12OfferContext, Bolt12RefundContext, PaymentConstraints, PaymentContext, ReceiveTlvs};
use crate::chain;
use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
use crate::ln::inbound_payment;
use crate::ln::types::{ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
use crate::ln::channel::{self, Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, WithChannelContext};
-pub use crate::ln::channel::{InboundHTLCDetails, InboundHTLCStateDetails, OutboundHTLCDetails, OutboundHTLCStateDetails};
+pub use crate::ln::channel_state::{ChannelCounterparty, ChannelDetails, ChannelShutdownState, CounterpartyForwardingInfo};
+pub use crate::ln::channel_state::{InboundHTLCDetails, InboundHTLCStateDetails, OutboundHTLCDetails, OutboundHTLCStateDetails};
use crate::ln::features::{Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
#[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
+ onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
}
impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
(0, amount_msat, required),
(4, receiver_node_id, required),
(5, htlcs, optional_vec),
(7, sender_intended_value, option),
+ (9, onion_fields, option),
});
struct ClaimablePayment {
///
/// ```
/// use bitcoin::BlockHash;
-/// use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
+/// use bitcoin::network::Network;
/// use lightning::chain::BestBlock;
/// # use lightning::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
/// use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{ChainParameters, ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs};
/// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
-/// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
-#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
-pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
- /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
- pub fee_base_msat: u32,
- /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
- pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
- /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
- /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
- /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
- pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
-}
-
-/// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
-/// to better separate parameters.
-#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
-pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
- /// The node_id of our counterparty
- pub node_id: PublicKey,
- /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
- /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
- /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
- pub features: InitFeatures,
- /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
- /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
- /// claiming at least this value on chain.
- ///
- /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
- ///
- /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
- pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
- /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
- /// payments to us through this channel.
- pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
- /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
- /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
- /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
- pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
- /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
- pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
-}
-
-/// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
-#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
-pub struct ChannelDetails {
- /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
- /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
- /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
- /// lifetime of the channel.
- pub channel_id: ChannelId,
- /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
- pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
- /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
- /// our counterparty already.
- pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
- /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
- ///
- /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
- pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
- /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
- /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
- ///
- /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
- /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
- ///
- /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
- /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
- ///
- /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
- /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
- /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
- /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
- /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
- pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
- /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
- /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
- /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
- /// `Some(0)`).
- ///
- /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
- ///
- /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
- /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
- pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
- /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
- /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
- /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
- /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
- ///
- /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
- /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
- ///
- /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
- pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
- /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
- pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
- /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
- /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
- /// this value on chain.
- ///
- /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
- ///
- /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
- ///
- /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
- pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
- /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
- /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
- /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
- /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel. This may be zero for objects
- /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
- ///
- /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
- /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
- /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
- pub user_channel_id: u128,
- /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
- /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
- ///
- /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
- pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
- /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
- /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
- /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
- ///
- /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
- /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
- /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
- /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
- ///
- /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
- pub balance_msat: u64,
- /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
- /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
- /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
- /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
- ///
- /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
- ///
- /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
- /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
- /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
- pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
- /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
- /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
- /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
- /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
- ///
- /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
- /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
- pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
- /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
- /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
- /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
- /// route which is valid.
- pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
- /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
- /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
- /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
- /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
- /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
- ///
- /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
- /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
- /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
- pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
- /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
- /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
- /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
- /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
- /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
- ///
- /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
- ///
- /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
- /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
- /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
- pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
- /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
- ///
- /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
- pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
- /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
- /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
- /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
- /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
- /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
- ///
- /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
- pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
- /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
- pub is_outbound: bool,
- /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
- /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
- /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
- /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
- /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
- ///
- /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
- pub is_channel_ready: bool,
- /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
- /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
- pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
- /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
- /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
- ///
- /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
- pub is_usable: bool,
- /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
- pub is_public: bool,
- /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
- /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
- pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
- /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
- pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
- /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
- ///
- /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
- pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
- /// Pending inbound HTLCs.
- ///
- /// This field is empty for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.122.
- pub pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCDetails>,
- /// Pending outbound HTLCs.
- ///
- /// This field is empty for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.122.
- pub pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCDetails>,
-}
-
-impl ChannelDetails {
- /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
- /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
- /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
- ///
- /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
- /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
- pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
- self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
- }
-
- /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
- /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
- /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
- ///
- /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
- /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
- pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
- self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
- }
-
- fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
- context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
- fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
- ) -> Self
- where
- SP::Target: SignerProvider,
- F::Target: FeeEstimator
- {
- let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
- let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
- context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
- ChannelDetails {
- channel_id: context.channel_id(),
- counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
- node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
- features: latest_features,
- unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
- forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
- // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
- // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
- // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
- // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
- // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
- outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
- Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
- outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
- },
- funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
- // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
- // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
- channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
- short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
- outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
- inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
- channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
- feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
- unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
- balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
- inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
- outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
- next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
- next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
- user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
- confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
- confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
- force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
- is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
- is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
- is_usable: context.is_live(),
- is_public: context.should_announce(),
- inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
- inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
- config: Some(context.config()),
- channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
- pending_inbound_htlcs: context.get_pending_inbound_htlc_details(),
- pending_outbound_htlcs: context.get_pending_outbound_htlc_details(),
- }
- }
-}
-
-#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
-/// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
-/// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
-/// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
-/// the channel will be removed shortly.
-/// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
-/// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
-pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
- /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
- NotShuttingDown,
- /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
- ShutdownInitiated,
- /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
- /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
- ResolvingHTLCs,
- /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
- NegotiatingClosingFee,
- /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
- /// to drop the channel.
- ShutdownComplete,
-}
-
/// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
/// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
#[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
let mut result = Ok(());
- if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
+ if !funding_transaction.is_coinbase() {
for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
if inp.witness.is_empty() {
result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
is_batch_funding,
|chan, tx| {
let mut output_index = None;
- let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
+ let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_p2wsh();
for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
- if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
+ if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value.to_sat() == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
if output_index.is_some() {
return Err("Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value");
}
}
}
- let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
- let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
- let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
- ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
- payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
- });
- if dup_purpose.is_some() {
- debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
- log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
- &payment_hash);
- }
+ let claiming_payment = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments
+ .entry(payment_hash)
+ .and_modify(|_| {
+ debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
+ log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
+ &payment_hash);
+ })
+ .or_insert_with(|| {
+ let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
+ let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
+ ClaimingPayment {
+ amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
+ payment_purpose: payment.purpose,
+ receiver_node_id,
+ htlcs,
+ sender_intended_value,
+ onion_fields: payment.onion_fields,
+ }
+ });
- if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
+ if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = claiming_payment.onion_fields {
if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
&payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
receiver_node_id,
htlcs,
sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
+ onion_fields,
}) = payment {
self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
payment_hash,
receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
htlcs,
sender_intended_total_msat,
+ onion_fields,
}, None));
}
},
match phase.get_mut() {
ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
- (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
+ (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
},
_ => {
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id));
let peers = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap()
.iter()
- .filter(|(_, peer)| peer.lock().unwrap().latest_features.supports_onion_messages())
- .map(|(node_id, _)| *node_id)
+ .map(|(node_id, peer_state)| (node_id, peer_state.lock().unwrap()))
+ .filter(|(_, peer)| peer.latest_features.supports_onion_messages())
+ .map(|(node_id, peer)| ForwardNode {
+ node_id: *node_id,
+ short_channel_id: peer.channel_by_id
+ .iter()
+ .filter(|(_, channel)| channel.context().is_usable())
+ .min_by_key(|(_, channel)| channel.context().channel_creation_height)
+ .and_then(|(_, channel)| channel.context().get_short_channel_id()),
+ })
.collect::<Vec<_>>();
self.router
}
&mut chan.context
},
- // We retain UnfundedOutboundV1 channel for some time in case
- // peer unexpectedly disconnects, and intends to reconnect again.
- ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
- return true;
- },
+ // If we get disconnected and haven't yet committed to a funding
+ // transaction, we can replay the `open_channel` on reconnection, so don't
+ // bother dropping the channel here. However, if we already committed to
+ // the funding transaction we don't yet support replaying the funding
+ // handshake (and bailing if the peer rejects it), so we force-close in
+ // that case.
+ ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) if chan.is_resumable() => return true,
+ ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => &mut chan.context,
// Unfunded inbound channels will always be removed.
ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
&mut chan.context
amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
+ onion_fields: payment.onion_fields,
}, None));
}
}
use crate::util::test_utils;
use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
+ use bitcoin::amount::Amount;
use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
use bitcoin::{Transaction, TxOut};
+ use bitcoin::transaction::Version;
use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
let tx;
if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
- tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
- value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
+ tx = Transaction { version: Version::TWO, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
+ value: Amount::from_sat(8_000_000), script_pubkey: output_script,
}]};
node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
} else { panic!(); }
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff