// Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
// construct one themselves.
use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
-pub use ln::channel::CounterpartyForwardingInfo;
use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
use routing::router::{Route, RouteHop};
use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, OptionalField};
use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
use util::config::UserConfig;
-use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
+use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
use util::{byte_utils, events};
use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
err: msgs::LightningError,
+ chan_id: Option<[u8; 32]>,
shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
}
impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
},
},
},
+ chan_id: None,
shutdown_finish: None,
}
}
err,
action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
},
+ chan_id: None,
shutdown_finish: None,
}
}
#[inline]
fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
- Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
+ Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
}
#[inline]
fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
},
},
},
+ chan_id: Some(channel_id),
shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
}
}
},
},
},
+ chan_id: None,
shutdown_finish: None,
}
}
/// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
/// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
///
+ /// Each payment has each of its MPP part's session_priv bytes in the HashSet of the map (even
+ /// payments over a single path).
+ ///
/// Locked *after* channel_state.
- pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashSet<[u8; 32]>>,
+ pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<MppId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>>,
our_network_key: SecretKey,
our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
#[allow(dead_code)]
const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
+/// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
+pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
+ /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
+ pub fee_base_msat: u32,
+ /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
+ pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
+ /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
+ /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
+ /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
+ pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
+}
+
/// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
/// to better separate parameters.
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
match $internal {
Ok(msg) => Ok(msg),
- Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
+ Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
#[cfg(debug_assertions)]
{
// In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
// entering the macro.
assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
+ assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
}
let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
msg: update
});
}
+ if let Some(channel_id) = chan_id {
+ $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed { channel_id, reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() } });
+ }
}
log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
}),
pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
- pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
+ pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
}
}
- fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
+ /// `peer_node_id` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed`
+ /// reason.
+ fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>, peer_msg: Option<&String>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
let mut chan = {
let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
if let Some(short_id) = chan.get().get_short_channel_id() {
channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
}
+ let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
+ if peer_node_id.is_some() {
+ if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
+ pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed { channel_id: *channel_id, reason: ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() } });
+ }
+ } else {
+ pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed { channel_id: *channel_id, reason: ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed });
+ }
chan.remove_entry().1
} else {
return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
/// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
- match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None) {
+ match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None, None) {
Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
- assert!(self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().insert(session_priv_bytes));
+ let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
+ let sessions = pending_outbounds.entry(mpp_id).or_insert(HashSet::new());
+ assert!(sessions.insert(session_priv_bytes));
let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
}
+ // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
},
ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
},
- HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } => {
- if {
- let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
- session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
- self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&session_priv_bytes)
- } {
- self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
- events::Event::PaymentFailed {
- payment_hash,
- rejected_by_dest: false,
- network_update: None,
-#[cfg(test)]
- error_code: None,
-#[cfg(test)]
- error_data: None,
+ HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, mpp_id, .. } => {
+ let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
+ session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
+ let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
+ if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut sessions) = outbounds.entry(mpp_id) {
+ if sessions.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes) {
+ self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
+ events::Event::PaymentFailed {
+ payment_hash,
+ rejected_by_dest: false,
+ network_update: None,
+ all_paths_failed: sessions.get().len() == 0,
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ error_code: None,
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ error_data: None,
+ }
+ );
+ if sessions.get().len() == 0 {
+ sessions.remove();
}
- )
+ }
} else {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
}
// from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
// being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
match source {
- HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, .. } => {
- if {
- let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
- session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
- !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&session_priv_bytes)
- } {
+ HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, mpp_id, .. } => {
+ let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
+ session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
+ let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
+ let mut all_paths_failed = false;
+ if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut sessions) = outbounds.entry(mpp_id) {
+ if !sessions.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes) {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
+ return;
+ }
+ if sessions.get().len() == 0 {
+ all_paths_failed = true;
+ sessions.remove();
+ }
+ } else {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
return;
}
payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
network_update,
+ all_paths_failed,
#[cfg(test)]
error_code: onion_error_code,
#[cfg(test)]
payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
network_update: None,
+ all_paths_failed,
#[cfg(test)]
error_code: Some(*failure_code),
#[cfg(test)]
fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool) {
match source {
- HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } => {
+ HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, mpp_id, .. } => {
mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
- if {
- let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
- session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
- self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&session_priv_bytes)
- } {
- let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
- pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
- payment_preimage
- });
+ let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
+ session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
+ let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
+ let found_payment = if let Some(mut sessions) = outbounds.remove(&mpp_id) {
+ sessions.remove(&session_priv_bytes)
+ } else { false };
+ if found_payment {
+ self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
+ events::Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage }
+ );
} else {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
}
msg: update
});
}
+ self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed { channel_id: msg.channel_id, reason: ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure });
}
Ok(())
}
msg: update
});
}
+ self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxBroadcasted });
pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
Err(e) => {
let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
+ // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
!close_channel
}
}
msg: update
});
}
+ self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxBroadcasted });
pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
msg: update
});
}
+ self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer });
false
} else {
true
if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
}
+ self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer });
return false;
} else {
no_channels_remain = false;
for chan in self.list_channels() {
if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
// Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
- let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id));
+ let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
}
}
} else {
// Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
- let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id));
+ let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
}
}
}
}
let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
- (pending_outbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
- for session_priv in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
- session_priv.write(writer)?;
+ // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
+ let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
+ for (_, outbounds) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
+ num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbounds.len() as u64;
+ }
+ num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
+ for (_, outbounds) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
+ for outbound in outbounds.iter() {
+ outbound.write(writer)?;
+ }
}
- write_tlv_fields!(writer, {});
+ write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
+ (1, pending_outbound_payments, required),
+ });
Ok(())
}
}
}
- let pending_outbound_payments_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut pending_outbound_payments: HashSet<[u8; 32]> = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
- for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count {
- if !pending_outbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?) {
- return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
- }
+ let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<MppId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> =
+ HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
+ for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
+ let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(MppId(session_priv), [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()).is_some() {
+ return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
+ };
}
- read_tlv_fields!(reader, {});
+ let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
+ read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
+ (1, pending_outbound_payments, option),
+ });
+ if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
+ pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
+ }
let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
}),
pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
- pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments),
+ pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &args.keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
- expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], events, our_payment_hash, true);
// Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, mpp_id, &None).unwrap();
nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- // There's an existing bug that generates a PaymentSent event for each MPP path, so handle that here.
+ // Note that successful MPP payments will generate 1 event upon the first path's success. No
+ // further events will be generated for subsequence path successes.
let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
match events[0] {
Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage: ref preimage } => {
},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
- match events[1] {
- Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage: ref preimage } => {
- assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
}
#[test]
fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
+
// (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
// outbound regular payment fails as expected.
// (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
- expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], events, payment_hash, true);
// Finally, claim the original payment.
claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
- expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], events, payment_hash, true);
// Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff