use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
-use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
+use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::{genesis_block, ChainHash};
use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
// Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
// construct one themselves.
-use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
-use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
+use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
+use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel};
use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
#[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
-use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
+use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
-use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, Router};
-use crate::routing::scoring::ProbabilisticScorer;
+use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
+use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
use crate::ln::msgs;
use crate::ln::onion_utils;
use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
-use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
+use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
#[cfg(test)]
use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
-use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment};
+use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs};
use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
-use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, ChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
-use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
+use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
+use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
use core::ops::Deref;
// Re-export this for use in the public API.
-pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
+pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
// We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
+ /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
+ custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
},
ReceiveKeysend {
+ /// This was added in 0.0.116 and will break deserialization on downgrades.
+ payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
+ /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
+ custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
},
}
/// may overshoot this in either case)
pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
+ /// The fee being skimmed off the top of this HTLC. If this is a forward, it'll be the fee we are
+ /// skimming. If we're receiving this HTLC, it's the fee that our counterparty skimmed.
+ pub(super) skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
}
#[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
}
/// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
-#[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
// Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
short_channel_id: u64,
+ user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
htlc_id: u64,
incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
total_value_received: Option<u64>,
/// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
total_msat: u64,
+ /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
+ counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
}
-/// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
+impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
+ fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
+ events::ClaimedHTLC {
+ channel_id: val.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
+ user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
+ cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
+ value_msat: val.value,
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
+/// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
///
/// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
#[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
-pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
+pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
+
+impl PaymentId {
+ /// Number of bytes in the id.
+ pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
+}
impl Writeable for PaymentId {
fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
}
}
+impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
+ fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
+ crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
+ }
+}
+
/// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
///
/// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
}
}
-#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
+#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
/// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
/// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
#[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
-#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
OutboundRoute {
}
}
impl HTLCSource {
- #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
+ #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
#[cfg(test)]
pub fn dummy() -> Self {
HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
}
}
-struct ReceiveError {
+struct InboundOnionErr {
err_code: u16,
err_data: Vec<u8>,
msg: &'static str,
pub enum FailureCode {
/// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
/// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
- TemporaryNodeFailure = 0x2000 | 2,
+ TemporaryNodeFailure,
/// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
/// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
- RequiredNodeFeatureMissing = 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
+ RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
/// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
/// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
/// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
/// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
- IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails = 0x4000 | 15,
+ IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
+ /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
+ /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
+ ///
+ /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
+ /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
+ InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
}
-type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>);
+impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
+ fn into(self) -> u16 {
+ match self {
+ FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
+ FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
+ FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
+ FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
+ }
+ }
+}
/// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
/// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
err: msgs::LightningError,
- chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
+ chan_id: Option<(ChannelId, u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
+ channel_capacity: Option<u64>,
}
impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
#[inline]
- fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
+ fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
Self {
err: LightningError {
err: err.clone(),
},
chan_id: None,
shutdown_finish: None,
+ channel_capacity: None,
}
}
#[inline]
fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
- Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
+ Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None, channel_capacity: None }
}
#[inline]
- fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
+ fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, channel_capacity: u64) -> Self {
Self {
err: LightningError {
err: err.clone(),
},
chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
+ channel_capacity: Some(channel_capacity)
}
}
#[inline]
- fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
+ fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
Self {
err: match err {
ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
},
chan_id: None,
shutdown_finish: None,
+ channel_capacity: None,
}
}
+
+ fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
+ self.chan_id.is_some()
+ }
}
/// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
amount_msat: u64,
payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
+ htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
+ sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
}
impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
(0, amount_msat, required),
(2, payment_purpose, required),
(4, receiver_node_id, required),
+ (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
+ (7, sender_intended_value, option),
});
struct ClaimablePayment {
pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
}
-/// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
-/// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
-/// quite some time lag.
+/// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
+/// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
+/// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
+/// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
enum BackgroundEvent {
- /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
- /// commitment transaction.
- ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
+ /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
+ /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
+ /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
+ /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
+ ///
+ /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
+ /// are regenerated on startup.
+ ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
+ /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
+ /// channel to continue normal operation.
+ ///
+ /// In general this should be used rather than
+ /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
+ /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
+ /// error the other variant is acceptable.
+ ///
+ /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
+ /// are regenerated on startup.
+ MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
+ counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
+ funding_txo: OutPoint,
+ update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
+ },
+ /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
+ /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
+ /// on a channel.
+ MonitorUpdatesComplete {
+ counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
+ channel_id: ChannelId,
+ },
}
#[derive(Debug)]
/// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
/// event can be generated.
PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
- /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user.
- EmitEvent { event: events::Event },
+ /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
+ /// operation of another channel.
+ ///
+ /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
+ /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
+ /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
+ /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
+ /// outbound edge.
+ EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
+ event: events::Event,
+ downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
+ },
}
impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
(0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
- (2, EmitEvent) => { (0, event, upgradable_required) },
+ (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
+ (0, event, upgradable_required),
+ // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
+ // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
+ // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
+ // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
+ // downgrades to prior versions.
+ (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
+ },
);
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
};
);
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
+/// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
+/// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
+pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
+ /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
+ /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
+ /// durably to disk.
+ ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
+ /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
+ channel_id: ChannelId,
+ /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
+ htlc_id: u64,
+ },
+}
+
+impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
+ fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
+ Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
+ channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
+ htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
+ (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
+;);
+
+
/// State we hold per-peer.
-pub(super) struct PeerState<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
- /// `temporary_channel_id` or `channel_id` -> `channel`.
- ///
- /// Holds all channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once a channel has been assigned a
- /// `channel_id`, the `temporary_channel_id` key in the map is updated and is replaced by the
- /// `channel_id`.
- pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
+pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
+ /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
+ ///
+ /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
+ pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
+ /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
+ ///
+ /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
+ /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
+ /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
+ /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
+ pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
/// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
latest_features: InitFeatures,
/// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
/// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
+ /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
+ /// user but which have not yet completed.
+ ///
+ /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
+ /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
+ /// for a missing channel.
+ in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
/// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
/// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
///
/// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
/// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
/// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
- monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
+ monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
+ /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
+ /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
+ /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
+ /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
+ actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
/// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
/// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
/// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
is_connected: bool,
}
-impl <Signer: ChannelSigner> PeerState<Signer> {
+impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
/// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
/// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
/// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
return false
}
- self.channel_by_id.is_empty() && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
+ self.channel_by_id.iter().filter(|(_, phase)| matches!(phase, ChannelPhase::Funded(_))).count() == 0
+ && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
+ && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
+ }
+
+ // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
+ fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
+ self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
+ }
+
+ // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
+ fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
+ self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
+ self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
}
}
+/// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
+/// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
+pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
+ /// The original OpenChannel message.
+ pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
+ /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
+ pub ticks_remaining: i32,
+}
+
+/// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
+/// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
+const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
+
/// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
/// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
///
Arc<DefaultRouter<
Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
Arc<L>,
- Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>
+ Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
+ ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
+ ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
>>,
Arc<L>
>;
/// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
///
/// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
-pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e DefaultRouter<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L, &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>>, &'g L>;
-
-/// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`] used in testing.
-#[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
+pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
+ ChannelManager<
+ &'a M,
+ &'b T,
+ &'c KeysManager,
+ &'c KeysManager,
+ &'c KeysManager,
+ &'d F,
+ &'e DefaultRouter<
+ &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
+ &'g L,
+ &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
+ ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
+ ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
+ >,
+ &'g L
+ >;
+
+/// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`].
pub trait AChannelManager {
- type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer>;
+ /// A type implementing [`chain::Watch`].
+ type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
+ /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Watch`].
type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
- type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface;
+ /// A type implementing [`BroadcasterInterface`].
+ type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
+ /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Broadcaster`].
type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
- type EntropySource: EntropySource;
+ /// A type implementing [`EntropySource`].
+ type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
+ /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::EntropySource`].
type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
- type NodeSigner: NodeSigner;
+ /// A type implementing [`NodeSigner`].
+ type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
+ /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
- type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner;
- type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<Signer = Self::Signer>;
+ /// A type implementing [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`].
+ type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
+ /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
+ type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<Signer = Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
+ /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
- type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator;
+ /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
+ type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
+ /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::FeeEstimator`].
type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
- type Router: Router;
+ /// A type implementing [`Router`].
+ type Router: Router + ?Sized;
+ /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Router`].
type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
- type Logger: Logger;
+ /// A type implementing [`Logger`].
+ type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
+ /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Logger`].
type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
+ /// Returns a reference to the actual [`ChannelManager`] object.
fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
}
-#[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
+
impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
where
- M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> + Sized,
- T::Target: BroadcasterInterface + Sized,
- ES::Target: EntropySource + Sized,
- NS::Target: NodeSigner + Sized,
- SP::Target: SignerProvider + Sized,
- F::Target: FeeEstimator + Sized,
- R::Target: Router + Sized,
- L::Target: Logger + Sized,
+ M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
+ T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
+ ES::Target: EntropySource,
+ NS::Target: NodeSigner,
+ SP::Target: SignerProvider,
+ F::Target: FeeEstimator,
+ R::Target: Router,
+ L::Target: Logger,
{
type Watch = M::Target;
type M = M;
/// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
///
/// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
-/// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
-/// returning from [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`], with ChannelManagers, writing updates
-/// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during
-/// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
-/// [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the
-/// `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
+/// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each
+/// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from
+/// [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With
+/// `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other
+/// `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the
+/// deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to
+/// [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds
+/// will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees).
///
/// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
/// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
/// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
///
/// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
- id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
+ id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<ChannelId, PublicKey>>,
/// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
///
///
/// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
#[cfg(test)]
- pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
+ pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
#[cfg(not(test))]
- short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
+ short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
///
/// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
#[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
- per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
+ per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
#[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
- pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
+ pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
/// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
/// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
/// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
///
/// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
+ #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
+ #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
+ pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
+
/// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
+
+ /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
+ /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
+ /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
+ /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
+ /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
+ ///
+ /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
+ ///
/// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
+ ///
+ /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
/// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
/// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
/// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
- persistence_notifier: Notifier,
+ background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
+
+ event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
+ needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
entropy_source: ES,
node_signer: NS,
}
#[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
+#[must_use]
enum NotifyOption {
DoPersist,
- SkipPersist,
+ SkipPersistHandleEvents,
+ SkipPersistNoEvents,
}
/// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
/// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
/// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
/// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
-struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
- persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
+struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
+ event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
+ needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
should_persist: F,
// We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
_read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
}
impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
- fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
- PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
+ /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
+ /// events to handle.
+ ///
+ /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
+ /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
+ /// isn't ideal.
+ fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
+ Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
+ }
+
+ fn optionally_notify<F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, mut persist_check: F)
+ -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
+ let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+ let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
+
+ PersistenceNotifierGuard {
+ event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
+ needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
+ should_persist: move || {
+ // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
+ // processing and return that.
+ let notify = persist_check();
+ match (notify, force_notify) {
+ (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
+ (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
+ (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
+ (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
+ _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
+ }
+ },
+ _read_guard: read_guard,
+ }
}
- fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
- let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
+ /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
+ /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
+ /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
+ fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
+ (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
+ let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
PersistenceNotifierGuard {
- persistence_notifier: notifier,
+ event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
+ needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
should_persist: persist_check,
_read_guard: read_guard,
}
}
}
-impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
+impl<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
fn drop(&mut self) {
- if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
- self.persistence_notifier.notify();
+ match (self.should_persist)() {
+ NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
+ self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
+ self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
+ },
+ NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
+ self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
+ NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
}
}
}
/// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
-/// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
-/// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
-/// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
-pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
-
/// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
/// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
}
/// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
+///
+/// Balances of a channel are available through [`ChainMonitor::get_claimable_balances`] and
+/// [`ChannelMonitor::get_claimable_balances`], calculated with respect to the corresponding on-chain
+/// transactions.
+///
+/// [`ChainMonitor::get_claimable_balances`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor::get_claimable_balances
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
pub struct ChannelDetails {
/// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
/// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
/// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
/// lifetime of the channel.
- pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ pub channel_id: ChannelId,
/// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
/// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
///
/// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
- /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
- /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
- /// 0.0.113.
+ /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
+ /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
+ /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
+ /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel. This may be zero for objects
+ /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
+ ///
+ /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
+ /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
+ /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
pub user_channel_id: u128,
/// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
/// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
///
/// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
- /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
- /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
- /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
- ///
- /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
- /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
- /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
- /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
- ///
- /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
- pub balance_msat: u64,
/// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
/// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
/// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
/// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
///
- /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
- ///
/// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
/// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
/// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
/// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
/// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
///
- /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
+ /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`] and
+ /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
+ /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
+ /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
+ /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
+ /// route which is valid.
+ pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
/// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
/// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
/// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
///
/// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
pub is_channel_ready: bool,
+ /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
+ /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
+ pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
/// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
/// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
///
self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
}
- fn from_channel<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner>(channel: &Channel<Signer>,
- best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures) -> Self {
-
- let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
+ fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
+ context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
+ fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
+ ) -> Self
+ where
+ SP::Target: SignerProvider,
+ F::Target: FeeEstimator
+ {
+ let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
- channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
+ context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
ChannelDetails {
- channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
+ channel_id: context.channel_id(),
counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
- node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
features: latest_features,
unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
- forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
+ forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
// Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
// from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
// message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
// Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
// default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
- outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
- Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
- outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
+ outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
+ Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
+ outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
},
- funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
+ funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
// Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
// `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
- channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
- short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
- outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
- inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
- channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
- feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(channel.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
+ channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
+ short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
+ outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
+ inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
+ channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
+ feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
- balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
- user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
- confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
- confirmations: Some(channel.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
- force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
- is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
- is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
- is_usable: channel.is_live(),
- is_public: channel.should_announce(),
- inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
- inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
- config: Some(channel.config()),
+ next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
+ user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
+ confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
+ confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
+ force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
+ is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
+ is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
+ is_usable: context.is_live(),
+ is_public: context.should_announce(),
+ inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
+ inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
+ config: Some(context.config()),
+ channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
}
}
}
+#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
+/// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
+/// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
+/// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
+/// the channel will be removed shortly.
+/// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
+/// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
+pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
+ /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
+ NotShuttingDown,
+ /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
+ ShutdownInitiated,
+ /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
+ /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
+ ResolvingHTLCs,
+ /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
+ NegotiatingClosingFee,
+ /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
+ /// to drop the channel.
+ ShutdownComplete,
+}
+
/// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
/// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
#[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
+ /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
+ AwaitingInvoice {
+ /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
+ /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
+ payment_id: PaymentId,
+ },
/// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
Pending {
+ /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
+ /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
+ payment_id: PaymentId,
/// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
/// abandoned.
payment_hash: PaymentHash,
/// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
/// payment is removed from tracking.
Fulfilled {
+ /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
+ /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
+ payment_id: PaymentId,
/// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
/// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
/// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
/// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
Abandoned {
+ /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
+ /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
+ payment_id: PaymentId,
/// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
payment_hash: PaymentHash,
},
match $internal {
Ok(msg) => Ok(msg),
- Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
+ Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish, channel_capacity }) => {
let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
$self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
channel_id, user_channel_id,
- reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
+ reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() },
+ counterparty_node_id: Some($counterparty_node_id),
+ channel_capacity_sats: channel_capacity,
}, None));
}
}
Err(err)
},
}
- } }
+ } };
+ ($self: ident, $internal: expr) => {
+ match $internal {
+ Ok(res) => Ok(res),
+ Err((chan, msg_handle_err)) => {
+ let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
+ handle_error!($self, Err(msg_handle_err), counterparty_node_id).map_err(|err| (chan, err))
+ },
+ }
+ };
}
macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
- ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{
- $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
+ ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
+ $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.channel_id());
let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
- if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
+ if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
} else {
// If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
// also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
// opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
// stage.
- let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
+ let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
debug_assert!(alias_removed);
}
- short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
+ short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
}}
}
/// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
-macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
- ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
+macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
+ ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
match $err {
ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
- (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
+ (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
},
ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
- (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
+ (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
},
ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
- log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
- update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel);
- let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
- (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
- shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
+ log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
+ update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
+ let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
+ let user_id = $channel.context.get_user_id();
+ let channel_capacity_satoshis = $channel.context.get_value_satoshis();
+
+ (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, user_id,
+ shutdown_res, $channel_update, channel_capacity_satoshis))
},
}
- }
+ };
+ ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
+ convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
+ };
+ ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
+ convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
+ };
+ ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
+ match $channel_phase {
+ ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
+ convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
+ },
+ ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
+ convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
+ },
+ ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
+ convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
+ },
+ }
+ };
}
-macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
+macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
match $res {
Ok(res) => res,
Err(e) => {
- let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
+ let key = *$entry.key();
+ let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
if drop {
$entry.remove_entry();
}
}
}
-macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
+macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
match $res {
Ok(res) => res,
Err(e) => {
- let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
+ let key = *$entry.key();
+ let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
if drop {
$entry.remove_entry();
}
}
}
-macro_rules! remove_channel {
+macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
{
let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
- update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, channel);
+ update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
channel
}
}
macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
$pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
- node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
msg: $channel_ready_msg,
});
// Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
// we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
- let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
- assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
+ let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
+ assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
"SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
- if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
- let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
- assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
+ if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
+ let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
+ assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
"SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
}
}}
macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
- if $channel.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
+ if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
$locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
- channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
- former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.temporary_channel_id(),
- counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
- user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
- funding_txo: $channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
+ channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
+ former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
+ counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
+ funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
}, None));
- $channel.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
+ $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
}
}
}
macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
- if $channel.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
- debug_assert!($channel.channel_pending_event_emitted());
+ if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
+ debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
$locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
- channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
- user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
- counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
- channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
+ channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
+ user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
+ counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
}, None));
- $channel.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
+ $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
}
}
}
macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
- ($self: ident, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
+ ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
&$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
$self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
- let counterparty_node_id = $chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
- let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.is_usable() {
+ let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
+ let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
// We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
// channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
// channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
} else { None };
let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
- .remove(&$chan.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
+ .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
&mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
$peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
}
- let channel_id = $chan.channel_id();
+ let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
}
macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
- ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { {
- // update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in
- // any case so that it won't deadlock.
- debug_assert_ne!($self.id_to_peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
+ ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
+ debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
match $update_res {
+ ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
+ let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
+ log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err_str);
+ panic!("{}", err_str);
+ },
ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
- log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
- Ok(())
- },
- ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
- log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure",
- log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
- update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
- let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(
- "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.channel_id(),
- $chan.get_user_id(), $chan.force_shutdown(false),
- $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok()));
- $remove;
- res
+ &$chan.context.channel_id());
+ false
},
ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
- $chan.complete_one_mon_update($update_id);
- if $chan.no_monitor_updates_pending() {
- handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
- }
- Ok(())
+ $completed;
+ true
},
}
} };
- ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => {
- handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
- }
+ ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
+ handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $chan, _internal,
+ handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
+ };
+ ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
+ let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
+ .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
+ // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
+ // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
+ // filter for uniqueness here.
+ let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
+ .unwrap_or_else(|| {
+ in_flight_updates.push($update);
+ in_flight_updates.len() - 1
+ });
+ let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
+ handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $chan, _internal,
+ {
+ let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
+ if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
+ handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
+ }
+ })
+ } };
}
macro_rules! process_events_body {
return;
}
- let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
+ let mut result;
{
// We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
// persists happen while processing monitor events.
let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+ // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
+ // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
+ result = $self.process_background_events();
+
// TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
// ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
pending_events.drain(..num_events);
processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
+ // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
+ // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
$self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
}
processed_all_events = false;
}
- if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
- $self.persistence_notifier.notify();
+ match result {
+ NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
+ $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
+ $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
+ },
+ NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
+ $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
+ NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
}
}
}
{
/// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
///
+ /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
+ ///
/// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
/// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
///
/// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
/// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
/// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
- pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
+ pub fn new(
+ fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
+ node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
+ current_timestamp: u32,
+ ) -> Self {
let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
- highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
+ highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
- persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
+ background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
+
+ event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
+ needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
entropy_source,
node_signer,
/// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
/// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
/// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
- pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
+ pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
}
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
// We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
- match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
+ match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
{
};
let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
- let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
+ let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
if cfg!(fuzzing) {
panic!("RNG is bad???");
}
},
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
}
peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
Ok(temporary_channel_id)
}
- fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
+ fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
// Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
// Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
// a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
- for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
- let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel(channel, best_block_height,
- peer_state.latest_features.clone());
- res.push(details);
- }
+ res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
+ .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
+ // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
+ ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
+ _ => None,
+ })
+ .filter(f)
+ .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
+ ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
+ peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
+ })
+ );
}
}
res
/// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
/// more information.
pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
- self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
+ // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
+ // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
+ // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
+ // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
+ // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
+ // the same channel.
+ let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
+ {
+ let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
+ let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
+ for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
+ let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
+ let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
+ for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
+ let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
+ peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
+ res.push(details);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ res
}
/// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
// Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
// internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
// really wanted anyway.
- self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
+ self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
}
/// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
+ let context_to_details = |context| {
+ ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
+ };
return peer_state.channel_by_id
.iter()
- .map(|(_, channel)|
- ChannelDetails::from_channel(channel, best_block_height, features.clone()))
+ .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
+ .map(context_to_details)
.collect();
}
vec![]
/// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
- .filter_map(|(_, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
+ .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
+ PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
+ Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
+ },
+ // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
+ PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
+ Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
+ },
PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
+ payment_id: *payment_id,
payment_hash: *payment_hash,
total_msat: *total_msat,
})
},
PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
- Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
+ Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
},
PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
- Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
+ Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
},
PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
})
}
/// Helper function that issues the channel close events
- fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
+ fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, context: &ChannelContext<SP>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
- match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
+ match context.unbroadcasted_funding() {
Some(transaction) => {
pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
- channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction
+ channel_id: context.channel_id(), transaction
}, None));
},
None => {},
}
pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
- channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
- user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
- reason: closure_reason
+ channel_id: context.channel_id(),
+ user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
+ reason: closure_reason,
+ counterparty_node_id: Some(context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
+ channel_capacity_sats: Some(context.get_value_satoshis()),
}, None));
}
- fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
- let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
+ loop {
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
+
match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
- let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
- let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
- let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut()
- .get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
- failed_htlcs = htlcs;
-
- // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
- // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
- // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
- peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
- node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
- msg: shutdown_msg,
- });
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
+ if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
+ let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
+ let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
+ let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) =
+ chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
+ failed_htlcs = htlcs;
- // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
- if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
- let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
- let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
- break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
- }
+ // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
+ // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
+ // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
+ peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
+ node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
+ msg: shutdown_msg,
+ });
- if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
- let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
- if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
- peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
- msg: channel_update
- });
+ debug_assert!(monitor_update_opt.is_none() || !chan.is_shutdown(),
+ "We can't both complete shutdown and generate a monitor update");
+
+ // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
+ if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
+ handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
+ peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if chan.is_shutdown() {
+ if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
+ if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
+ peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
+ msg: channel_update
+ });
+ }
+ self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
+ }
}
- self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
+ break;
}
- break Ok(());
},
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id) })
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
+ // If we reach this point, it means that the channel_id either refers to an unfunded channel or
+ // it does not exist for this peer. Either way, we can attempt to force-close it.
+ //
+ // An appropriate error will be returned for non-existence of the channel if that's the case.
+ return self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, false).map(|_| ())
+ },
}
- };
+ }
for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
}
- let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
Ok(())
}
/// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
/// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
/// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
- pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
}
/// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
/// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
/// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
- pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
}
- #[inline]
fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
+ debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
+ #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
+ for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
+ debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
+ }
+
let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
}
- if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
+ if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
// There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
// force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
// the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
/// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
/// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
- fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
+ fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
-> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
.ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
- let mut chan = {
- let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
- let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
- if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
- if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
- self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) });
- } else {
- self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
+ let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
+ let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
+ let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
+ ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
+ } else {
+ ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
+ };
+ if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
+ log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
+ self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_phase_entry.get().context(), closure_reason);
+ let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
+ mem::drop(peer_state);
+ mem::drop(per_peer_state);
+ match chan_phase {
+ ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
+ self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast));
+ (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
+ },
+ ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
+ self.finish_force_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
+ // Unfunded channel has no update
+ (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
+ },
}
- remove_channel!(self, chan)
+ } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
+ log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
+ // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
+ // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
+ // events anyway.
+ (None, *peer_node_id)
} else {
- return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
+ return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
}
};
- log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
- self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
- if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
- let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
- peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
- msg: update
- });
+ if let Some(update) = update_opt {
+ // Try to send the `BroadcastChannelUpdate` to the peer we just force-closed on, but if
+ // not try to broadcast it via whatever peer we have.
+ let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
+ let a_peer_state_opt = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
+ .ok_or(per_peer_state.values().next());
+ if let Ok(a_peer_state_mutex) = a_peer_state_opt {
+ let mut a_peer_state = a_peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
+ a_peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
+ msg: update
+ });
+ }
}
- Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
+ Ok(counterparty_node_id)
}
- fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
/// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
/// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
/// channel.
- pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
+ pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
-> Result<(), APIError> {
self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
}
///
/// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
/// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
- pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
+ pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
-> Result<(), APIError> {
self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
}
}
}
- fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
- payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
- {
+ fn construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(
+ &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, hop_hmac: [u8; 32],
+ new_packet_bytes: [u8; onion_utils::ONION_DATA_LEN], shared_secret: [u8; 32],
+ next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
+ ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
+ debug_assert!(next_packet_pubkey_opt.is_some());
+ let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
+ version: 0,
+ public_key: next_packet_pubkey_opt.unwrap_or(Err(secp256k1::Error::InvalidPublicKey)),
+ hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
+ hmac: hop_hmac,
+ };
+
+ let (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value) = match hop_data {
+ msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value } =>
+ (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value),
+ msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. } | msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive { .. } =>
+ return Err(InboundOnionErr {
+ msg: "Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node",
+ err_code: 0x4000 | 22,
+ err_data: Vec::new(),
+ }),
+ };
+
+ Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
+ routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
+ onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
+ short_channel_id,
+ },
+ payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
+ incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
+ incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
+ outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward,
+ outgoing_cltv_value,
+ skimmed_fee_msat: None,
+ })
+ }
+
+ fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(
+ &self, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, shared_secret: [u8; 32], payment_hash: PaymentHash,
+ amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>, allow_underpay: bool,
+ counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
+ ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
+ let (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, onion_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata) = match hop_data {
+ msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
+ payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata, ..
+ } =>
+ (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata),
+ msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive {
+ amt_msat, total_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_secret, ..
+ } => {
+ let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData { payment_secret, total_msat };
+ (Some(payment_data), None, Vec::new(), amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, None)
+ }
+ msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { .. } => {
+ return Err(InboundOnionErr {
+ err_code: 0x4000|22,
+ err_data: Vec::new(),
+ msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
+ })
+ },
+ };
// final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
- if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
- return Err(ReceiveError {
+ if outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
+ return Err(InboundOnionErr {
msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
err_code: 18,
err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
// payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
// channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
- if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
+ if (outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
- return Err(ReceiveError {
+ return Err(InboundOnionErr {
err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
});
}
- if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
- return Err(ReceiveError {
+ if (!allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat > amt_msat) ||
+ (allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat >
+ amt_msat.saturating_add(counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)))
+ {
+ return Err(InboundOnionErr {
err_code: 19,
err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
});
}
- let routing = match hop_data.format {
- msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
- return Err(ReceiveError {
+ let routing = if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
+ // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
+ // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
+ // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
+ // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
+ // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
+ let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
+ if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
+ return Err(InboundOnionErr {
err_code: 0x4000|22,
err_data: Vec::new(),
- msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
+ msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
});
- },
- msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage, payment_metadata } => {
- if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
- return Err(ReceiveError {
- err_code: 0x4000|22,
- err_data: Vec::new(),
- msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
- });
- } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
- PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
- payment_data: data,
- payment_metadata,
- incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
- phantom_shared_secret,
- }
- } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
- // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
- // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
- // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
- // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
- // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
- let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
- if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
- return Err(ReceiveError {
- err_code: 0x4000|22,
- err_data: Vec::new(),
- msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
- });
- }
-
- PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
- payment_preimage,
- payment_metadata,
- incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
- }
- } else {
- return Err(ReceiveError {
- err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
- err_data: Vec::new(),
- msg: "We require payment_secrets",
- });
- }
- },
+ }
+ if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && payment_data.is_some() {
+ return Err(InboundOnionErr {
+ err_code: 0x4000|22,
+ err_data: Vec::new(),
+ msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
+ });
+ }
+ PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
+ payment_data,
+ payment_preimage,
+ payment_metadata,
+ incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
+ custom_tlvs,
+ }
+ } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
+ PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
+ payment_data: data,
+ payment_metadata,
+ incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
+ phantom_shared_secret,
+ custom_tlvs,
+ }
+ } else {
+ return Err(InboundOnionErr {
+ err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
+ err_data: Vec::new(),
+ msg: "We require payment_secrets",
+ });
};
Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
routing,
payment_hash,
incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
- outgoing_amt_msat: hop_data.amt_to_forward,
- outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
+ outgoing_amt_msat: onion_amt_msat,
+ outgoing_cltv_value,
+ skimmed_fee_msat: counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
})
}
- fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
+ fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
+ &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC
+ ) -> Result<(onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg> {
macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
{
log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
- return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
+ return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
channel_id: msg.channel_id,
htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
{
log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
- return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
+ return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
channel_id: msg.channel_id,
htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
}
}
- let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
+ let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
+ shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac,
+ msg.payment_hash, &self.node_signer
+ ) {
Ok(res) => res,
Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
},
};
-
- let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
- onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
- // OUR PAYMENT!
- match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
- Ok(info) => {
- // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
- // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
- // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
- // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
- PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
- },
- Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
- }
+ let (outgoing_scid, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, next_packet_pk_opt) = match next_hop {
+ onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
+ next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward {
+ short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value
+ }, ..
+ } => {
+ let next_packet_pk = onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx,
+ msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &shared_secret);
+ (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(next_packet_pk))
},
- onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
- let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
- let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
- version: 0,
- public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
- hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
- hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
- };
-
- let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
- msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
- msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
- return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
- },
- };
-
- PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
- routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
- onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
- short_channel_id,
- },
- payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
- incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
- incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
- outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
- outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
- })
+ // We'll do receive checks in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] so we have access to the
+ // inbound channel's state.
+ onion_utils::Hop::Receive { .. } => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
+ onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. }, .. } |
+ onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive { .. }, .. } =>
+ {
+ return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0; 0]);
}
};
- if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref outgoing_amt_msat, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
- // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
- // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
- // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
- if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
- if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
- let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(short_channel_id).cloned();
- let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
- None => { // unknown_next_peer
- // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
- // phantom or an intercept.
- if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
- fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
- fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)
- {
- None
- } else {
- break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
- }
- },
- Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
- };
- let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
- let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
- let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
- if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
- break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
- }
- let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
- let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
- let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
- None => {
- // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
- // have no consistency guarantees.
- break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
- },
- Some(chan) => chan
- };
- if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
- // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
- // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
- // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
- break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
- }
- if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
- // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
- // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
- // we don't have the channel here.
- break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
- }
- let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
-
- // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
- // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
- // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
- // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
- // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
- if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
- // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
- // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
- // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
- if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
- break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
- } else {
- break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
- }
- }
- if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
- break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
- }
- if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *outgoing_amt_msat, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
- break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
- }
- chan_update_opt
- } else {
- if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
- // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
- // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
- // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
- break Some((
- "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
- 0x2000 | 2, None,
- ));
- }
+ // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
+ // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
+ if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
+ let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
+ let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
+ None => { // unknown_next_peer
+ // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
+ // phantom or an intercept.
+ if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
+ fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
+ fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.genesis_hash)
+ {
None
- };
-
- let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
- // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
- // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
- // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
- if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
- break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
- }
- if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
- break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
+ } else {
+ break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
}
- // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
- // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
- // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
- // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
- // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
- // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
- // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
- // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
- if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
- break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
+ },
+ Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
+ };
+ let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
+ let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
+ let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
+ if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
+ break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
+ }
+ let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
+ let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
+ let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).map(
+ |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
+ ).flatten() {
+ None => {
+ // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
+ // have no consistency guarantees.
+ break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
+ },
+ Some(chan) => chan
+ };
+ if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
+ // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
+ // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
+ // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
+ break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
+ }
+ if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
+ // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
+ // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
+ // we don't have the channel here.
+ break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
+ }
+ let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
+
+ // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
+ // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
+ // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
+ // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
+ // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
+ if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
+ // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
+ // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
+ // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
+ if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
+ break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
+ } else {
+ break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
}
+ }
+ if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
+ break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
+ }
+ if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
+ break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
+ }
+ chan_update_opt
+ } else {
+ if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
+ // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
+ // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
+ // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
+ break Some((
+ "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
+ 0x2000 | 2, None,
+ ));
+ }
+ None
+ };
+
+ let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
+ // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
+ // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
+ // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
+ if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
+ break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
+ }
+ if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
+ break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
+ }
+ // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
+ // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
+ // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
+ // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
+ // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
+ // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
+ // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
+ // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
+ if (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
+ break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
+ }
- break None;
+ break None;
+ }
+ {
+ let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
+ if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
+ if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
+ msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
}
- {
- let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
- if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
- if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
- msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
- }
- else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
- msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
- }
- else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
- // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
- 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
- }
- (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
- msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
- chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
- } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
- // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
- // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
- // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
- // instead.
- code = 0x2000 | 2;
- }
- return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
+ else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
+ msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
}
+ else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
+ // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
+ 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
+ }
+ (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
+ msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
+ chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
+ } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
+ // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
+ // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
+ // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
+ // instead.
+ code = 0x2000 | 2;
}
+ return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
}
+ Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt))
+ }
- pending_forward_info
+ fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
+ &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, shared_secret: [u8; 32], decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop,
+ allow_underpay: bool, next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
+ ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
+ macro_rules! return_err {
+ ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
+ {
+ log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
+ return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
+ channel_id: msg.channel_id,
+ htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
+ reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
+ .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
+ }));
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ match decoded_hop {
+ onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
+ // OUR PAYMENT!
+ match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
+ msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat)
+ {
+ Ok(info) => {
+ // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
+ // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
+ // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
+ // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
+ PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
+ },
+ Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
+ }
+ },
+ onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
+ match self.construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
+ new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
+ Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
+ Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
+ }
+ }
+ }
}
/// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
///
/// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
/// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
- fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
- if !chan.should_announce() {
+ fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
+ if !chan.context.should_announce() {
return Err(LightningError {
err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
});
}
- if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
+ if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
}
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
}
///
/// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
/// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
- fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
- let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
+ fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
+ let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
Some(id) => id,
};
self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
}
- fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
- let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
- let enabled = chan.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
+ fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
+ let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
+
+ let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
short_channel_id,
- timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
+ timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
- cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
- htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
- htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
- fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
- fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
+ cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
+ htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
+ htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
+ fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
+ fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
excess_data: Vec::new(),
};
// Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
#[cfg(test)]
pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
- self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv_bytes)
+ self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
+ path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
+ session_priv_bytes
+ })
}
- fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ let SendAlongPathArgs {
+ path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
+ session_priv_bytes
+ } = args;
// The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
+ log_trace!(self.logger,
+ "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
+ payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
.map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
- if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
- return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()});
- }
- let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
+
+ let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash)
+ .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute { err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()})?;
let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
.ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
- if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
- if !chan.get().is_live() {
- return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
- }
- let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap();
- let send_res = chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
- htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
- path: path.clone(),
- session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
- first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
- payment_id,
- }, onion_packet, &self.logger);
- match break_chan_entry!(self, send_res, chan) {
- Some(monitor_update) => {
- let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
- let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
- if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
- break Err(e);
+ if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
+ match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
+ ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
+ if !chan.context.is_live() {
+ return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
}
- if update_res == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress {
- // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
- // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
- // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
- // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
- // which we do in the send_payment check for
- // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
- return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
+ let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
+ let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
+ htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
+ path: path.clone(),
+ session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
+ first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
+ payment_id,
+ }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
+ match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
+ Some(monitor_update) => {
+ match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
+ false => {
+ // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
+ // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
+ // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
+ // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
+ // which we do in the send_payment check for
+ // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
+ return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
+ },
+ true => {},
+ }
+ },
+ None => {},
}
},
- None => { },
- }
+ _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
+ };
} else {
// The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
// `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
/// In general, a path may raise:
/// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
/// node public key) is specified.
- /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
- /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
- /// failure).
+ /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available as it has been
+ /// closed, doesn't exist, or the peer is currently disconnected.
/// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
/// relevant updates.
///
/// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
/// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
///
+ /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
/// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
/// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
/// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
/// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
self.pending_outbound_payments
- .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
- |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
- self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
+ .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
+ &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
+ |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
}
- /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment`], but will automatically find a route based on
+ /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
/// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
self.pending_outbound_payments
.send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
&self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
&self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
- &self.pending_events,
- |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
- self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
+ &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
}
#[cfg(test)]
pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
- self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
- |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
- self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
+ self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
+ keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
+ best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
}
#[cfg(test)]
}
- /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
+ /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
/// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
/// retries are exhausted.
///
+ /// # Event Generation
+ ///
/// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
/// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
///
/// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
/// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
///
- /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
- /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
+ /// # Requested Invoices
///
- /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
- /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
+ /// In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`], abandoning the payment prior to receiving the
+ /// invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`] and prevent any attempts at paying
+ /// it once received. The other events may only be generated once the invoice has been received.
+ ///
+ /// # Restart Behavior
+ ///
+ /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
+ /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for
+ /// [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
+ ///
+ /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
}
/// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
/// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
///
- /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
- ///
/// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
- &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
- |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
- self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
+ &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
}
/// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
/// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
|| self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
- &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
- |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
- self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
+ &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
}
/// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
/// us to easily discern them from real payments.
pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
- self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
- |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
- self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
+ self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
+ &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
+ |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
}
/// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
}
+ /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
+ /// amount to the given `node_id`.
+ ///
+ /// See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
+ pub fn send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(
+ &self, node_id: PublicKey, amount_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
+ liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
+ ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
+ let payment_params =
+ PaymentParameters::from_node_id(node_id, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
+
+ let route_params = RouteParameters { payment_params, final_value_msat: amount_msat };
+
+ self.send_preflight_probes(route_params, liquidity_limit_multiplier)
+ }
+
+ /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
+ /// according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
+ ///
+ /// This may be used to send "pre-flight" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
+ /// the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
+ /// probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
+ /// confirmation in a wallet UI.
+ ///
+ /// Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
+ /// actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
+ /// liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
+ /// payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
+ /// amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
+ /// probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
+ pub fn send_preflight_probes(
+ &self, route_params: RouteParameters, liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
+ ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
+ let liquidity_limit_multiplier = liquidity_limit_multiplier.unwrap_or(3);
+
+ let payer = self.get_our_node_id();
+ let usable_channels = self.list_usable_channels();
+ let first_hops = usable_channels.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
+ let inflight_htlcs = self.compute_inflight_htlcs();
+
+ let route = self
+ .router
+ .find_route(&payer, &route_params, Some(&first_hops), inflight_htlcs)
+ .map_err(|e| {
+ log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to find path for payment probe: {:?}", e);
+ ProbeSendFailure::RouteNotFound
+ })?;
+
+ let mut used_liquidity_map = HashMap::with_capacity(first_hops.len());
+
+ let mut res = Vec::new();
+
+ for mut path in route.paths {
+ // If the last hop is probably an unannounced channel we refrain from probing all the
+ // way through to the end and instead probe up to the second-to-last channel.
+ while let Some(last_path_hop) = path.hops.last() {
+ if last_path_hop.maybe_announced_channel {
+ // We found a potentially announced last hop.
+ break;
+ } else {
+ // Drop the last hop, as it's likely unannounced.
+ log_debug!(
+ self.logger,
+ "Avoided sending payment probe all the way to last hop {} as it is likely unannounced.",
+ last_path_hop.short_channel_id
+ );
+ let final_value_msat = path.final_value_msat();
+ path.hops.pop();
+ if let Some(new_last) = path.hops.last_mut() {
+ new_last.fee_msat += final_value_msat;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if path.hops.len() < 2 {
+ log_debug!(
+ self.logger,
+ "Skipped sending payment probe over path with less than two hops."
+ );
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if let Some(first_path_hop) = path.hops.first() {
+ if let Some(first_hop) = first_hops.iter().find(|h| {
+ h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(first_path_hop.short_channel_id)
+ }) {
+ let path_value = path.final_value_msat() + path.fee_msat();
+ let used_liquidity =
+ used_liquidity_map.entry(first_path_hop.short_channel_id).or_insert(0);
+
+ if first_hop.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
+ < (*used_liquidity + path_value) * liquidity_limit_multiplier
+ {
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipped sending payment probe to avoid putting channel {} under the liquidity limit.", first_path_hop.short_channel_id);
+ continue;
+ } else {
+ *used_liquidity += path_value;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ res.push(self.send_probe(path).map_err(|e| {
+ log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to send pre-flight probe: {:?}", e);
+ ProbeSendFailure::SendingFailed(e)
+ })?);
+ }
+
+ Ok(res)
+ }
+
/// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
/// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
- fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
- &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
+ fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
+ &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
) -> Result<(), APIError> {
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
- let (msg, chan) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
- Some(mut chan) => {
+ let (chan, msg) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
+ Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) => {
let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
- let funding_res = chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
- .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
- MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
+ let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
+ .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
+ let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
+ let user_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
+ let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
+ let channel_capacity = chan.context.get_value_satoshis();
+ (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, channel_capacity))
} else { unreachable!(); });
match funding_res {
- Ok(funding_msg) => (funding_msg, chan),
- Err(_) => {
+ Ok((chan, funding_msg)) => (chan, funding_msg),
+ Err((chan, err)) => {
mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
mem::drop(per_peer_state);
- let _ = handle_error!(self, funding_res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
+ let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
});
},
}
},
- None => {
- return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
+ Some(phase) => {
+ peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
+ return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
err: format!(
- "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
- log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
+ "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
+ temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
})
},
+ None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
+ "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
+ temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
+ }),
};
peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
- node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
msg,
});
- match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
+ match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
- if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
+ if id_to_peer.insert(chan.context.channel_id(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
}
- e.insert(chan);
+ e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
}
}
Ok(())
}
#[cfg(test)]
- pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
})
///
/// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
/// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
- pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
-
- for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
- if inp.witness.is_empty() {
- return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
- err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
- });
+ pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
+
+ if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
+ for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
+ if inp.witness.is_empty() {
+ return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
+ err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
+ });
+ }
}
}
{
}
}
self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
+ if tx.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
+ return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
+ err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
+ });
+ }
+
let mut output_index = None;
- let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
+ let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
- if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
+ if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
if output_index.is_some() {
return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
});
}
- if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
- return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
- err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
- });
- }
output_index = Some(idx as u16);
}
}
})
}
- /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
+ /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
///
/// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
/// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
/// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
/// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
/// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
- pub fn update_channel_config(
- &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
+ pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
+ &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
) -> Result<(), APIError> {
- if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
+ if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
});
}
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
- &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
- );
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
.ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
for channel_id in channel_ids {
- if !peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) {
+ if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
- err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
+ err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
});
- }
+ };
}
for channel_id in channel_ids {
- let channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
- if !channel.update_config(config) {
+ if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
+ let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
+ config.apply(config_update);
+ if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
+ if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
+ peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
+ } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
+ peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
+ node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ msg,
+ });
+ }
+ }
continue;
- }
- if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
- peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
- } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
- peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
- node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
- msg,
+ } else {
+ // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
+ debug_assert!(false);
+ return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
+ err: format!(
+ "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
+ channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
});
- }
+ };
}
Ok(())
}
+ /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
+ ///
+ /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
+ /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
+ /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
+ /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
+ ///
+ /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
+ /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
+ ///
+ /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
+ /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
+ ///
+ /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
+ ///
+ /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
+ /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
+ /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
+ /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
+ /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
+ /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
+ /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
+ pub fn update_channel_config(
+ &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
+ ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
+ }
+
/// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
/// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
///
/// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
///
/// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
- /// you from forwarding more than you received.
+ /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
+ /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
+ /// than expected.
///
/// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
/// backwards.
///
/// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
/// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
+ /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
// TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
// `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
- pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
let next_hop_scid = {
let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
- Some(chan) => {
- if !chan.is_usable() {
+ Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
+ if !chan.context.is_usable() {
return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
- err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
+ err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
})
}
- chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.outbound_scid_alias())
+ chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
},
+ Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
+ err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
+ next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
+ }),
None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
- err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
+ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}.",
+ next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
})
}
};
},
_ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
};
+ let skimmed_fee_msat =
+ payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
+ skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
};
///
/// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
.ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
+ user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
/// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
/// Will likely generate further events.
pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
- outgoing_cltv_value, incoming_amt_msat: _
+ outgoing_cltv_value, ..
}
}) => {
macro_rules! failure_handler {
let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
+ user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
- let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
+ let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
+ phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
+ payment_hash, &self.node_signer
+ ) {
Ok(res) => res,
Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
};
match next_hop {
onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
- match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
+ match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
+ incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
+ outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None)
+ {
Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
- Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
+ Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
}
},
_ => panic!(),
}
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
- match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
- forwarding_channel_not_found!();
- continue;
- },
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
- for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
- match forward_info {
- HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
- prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
- forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
- incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
- routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, incoming_amt_msat: _,
- },
- }) => {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
- let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
- short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
- outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
- htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
- incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
- // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
- phantom_shared_secret: None,
- });
- if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
- payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
- onion_packet, &self.logger)
- {
- if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
- } else {
- panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
- }
- let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
- failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
- HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
- HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
- ));
- continue;
- }
+ if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
+ for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
+ match forward_info {
+ HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
+ prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
+ forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
+ incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
+ routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
},
- HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
- panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
- },
- HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
- if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
- htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
- ) {
- if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
- } else {
- panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
- }
- // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
- // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
- // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
- continue;
+ }) => {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
+ let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
+ short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
+ user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
+ outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
+ htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
+ incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
+ // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
+ phantom_shared_secret: None,
+ });
+ if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
+ payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
+ onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, &self.fee_estimator,
+ &self.logger)
+ {
+ if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
+ } else {
+ panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
}
- },
- }
+ let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
+ failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
+ HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
+ HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
+ ));
+ continue;
+ }
+ },
+ HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
+ panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
+ },
+ HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
+ if let Err(e) = chan.queue_fail_htlc(
+ htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
+ ) {
+ if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
+ } else {
+ panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
+ }
+ // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
+ // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
+ // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
+ continue;
+ }
+ },
}
}
+ } else {
+ forwarding_channel_not_found!();
+ continue;
}
} else {
'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
- routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
+ routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
+ skimmed_fee_msat, ..
}
}) => {
let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
- PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
+ PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret, custom_tlvs } => {
let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
- let onion_fields =
- RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret), payment_metadata };
+ let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
+ payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
(incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
},
- PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry } => {
- let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: None, payment_metadata };
+ PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs } => {
+ let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
+ payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
+ payment_metadata,
+ custom_tlvs,
+ };
(incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
- None, None, onion_fields)
+ payment_data, None, onion_fields)
},
_ => {
panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
}
};
- let mut claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
+ let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
+ user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
cltv_expiry,
onion_payload,
+ counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
};
let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
);
failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
+ user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
}
macro_rules! check_total_value {
- ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
+ ($purpose: expr) => {{
let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
- let purpose = || {
- events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
- payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
- payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
- }
+ let is_keysend = match $purpose {
+ events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
+ events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
};
let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
.or_insert_with(|| {
committed_to_claimable = true;
ClaimablePayment {
- purpose: purpose(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
+ purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
}
});
+ if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
+ let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
+ fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
+ }
+ if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
+ fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
+ }
if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
}
let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
- if htlcs.len() == 1 {
- if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
- fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
- }
- }
let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
- match &htlc.onion_payload {
- OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
- if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
- log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
- total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
- }
- if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
- },
- _ => unreachable!(),
+ if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
+ &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
+ total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
}
+ if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
}
// The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
// match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
- } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= $payment_data.total_msat {
+ } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
- log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
+ &payment_hash);
fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
- } else if total_value >= $payment_data.total_msat {
+ } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
#[allow(unused_assignments)] {
committed_to_claimable = true;
}
htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
+ let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
+ .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
+ debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
+ counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
payment_hash,
- purpose: purpose(),
+ purpose: $purpose,
amount_msat,
+ counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
Ok(result) => result,
Err(()) => {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
}
};
let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
- log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
+ &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
}
}
- check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
+ let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
+ payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
+ payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
+ };
+ check_total_value!(purpose);
},
OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
- let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
- if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
- fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
- }
- match claimable_payments.claimable_payments.entry(payment_hash) {
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
- let amount_msat = claimable_htlc.value;
- claimable_htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat);
- let claim_deadline = Some(claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER);
- let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
- e.insert(ClaimablePayment {
- purpose: purpose.clone(),
- onion_fields: Some(onion_fields.clone()),
- htlcs: vec![claimable_htlc],
- });
- let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
- new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
- receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
- payment_hash,
- amount_msat,
- purpose,
- via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
- via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
- claim_deadline,
- onion_fields: Some(onion_fields),
- }, None));
- },
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
- fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
- }
- }
+ let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
+ check_total_value!(purpose);
}
}
},
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
- if payment_data.is_none() {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
+ if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
- };
+ }
let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
} else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
- log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
+ &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
} else {
- let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
+ let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
+ payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
+ payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
+ };
+ let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
if payment_claimable_generated {
inbound_payment.remove_entry();
}
let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
|| self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
- &self.pending_events, &self.logger,
- |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
- self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv));
+ &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
events.append(&mut new_events);
}
- /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
- ///
- /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
- /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
+ /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
///
/// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
- fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
+ fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
+ debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
+
+ self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
+
let mut background_events = Vec::new();
mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
if background_events.is_empty() {
- return false;
+ return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
}
for event in background_events.drain(..) {
match event {
- BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
+ BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
// The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
// monitor updating completing.
let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
},
+ BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
+ let mut updated_chan = false;
+ {
+ let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
+ if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
+ let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
+ let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
+ match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
+ if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase.get_mut() {
+ updated_chan = true;
+ handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
+ peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
+ } else {
+ debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't have an update for a non-funded channel");
+ }
+ },
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {},
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if !updated_chan {
+ // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
+ let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
+ }
+ },
+ BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
+ let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
+ if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
+ let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
+ let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
+ if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
+ handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
+ } else {
+ let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
+ .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
+ mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
+ mem::drop(per_peer_state);
+ self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
+ }
+ }
+ },
}
}
- true
+ NotifyOption::DoPersist
}
#[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
/// Process background events, for functional testing
pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
- self.process_background_events();
+ let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+ let _ = self.process_background_events();
}
- fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
- if !chan.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
+ fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
+ if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
// If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
- if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
+ if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
- log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
- return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
+ chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
+ return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
}
- if !chan.is_live() {
+ if !chan.context.is_live() {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
- log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
- return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
+ chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
+ return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
}
log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
- log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
+ &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
- chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.logger);
+ chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
NotifyOption::DoPersist
}
/// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
/// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
- PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
- let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
+ PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
+ let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
- let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
+ let normal_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
+ let min_mempool_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum);
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
- for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
+ for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
+ |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
+ ) {
+ let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
+ min_mempool_feerate
+ } else {
+ normal_feerate
+ };
let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
}
/// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
/// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
/// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
+ /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
///
/// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
/// estimate fetches.
/// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
/// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
- PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
- let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
- if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
+ PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
+ let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
- let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
+ let normal_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
+ let min_mempool_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum);
let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
+ let mut shutdown_channels = Vec::new();
+
+ let mut process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
+ chan_id: &ChannelId,
+ context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
+ unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
+ pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
+ counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
+ | {
+ context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
+ if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
+ log_error!(self.logger,
+ "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
+ update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
+ self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
+ shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false));
+ pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
+ node_id: counterparty_node_id,
+ action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
+ msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
+ channel_id: *chan_id,
+ data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
+ },
+ },
+ });
+ false
+ } else {
+ true
+ }
+ };
+
{
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
- peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
- let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
- if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
-
- if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
- let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
- handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
- if needs_close { return false; }
- }
-
- match chan.channel_update_status() {
- ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
- ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
- ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.is_live()
- => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
- ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.is_live()
- => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
- ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.is_live() => {
- n += 1;
- if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
- chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
- if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
- msg: update
- });
- }
- should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
+ peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
+ match phase {
+ ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
+ let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
+ min_mempool_feerate
} else {
- chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
+ normal_feerate
+ };
+ let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
+ if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
+
+ if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
+ let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
+ handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
+ if needs_close { return false; }
}
- },
- ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.is_live() => {
- n += 1;
- if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
- chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
- if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
- msg: update
- });
- }
- should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
- } else {
- chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
+
+ match chan.channel_update_status() {
+ ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
+ ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
+ ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
+ => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
+ ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
+ => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
+ ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
+ n += 1;
+ if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
+ chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
+ if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
+ msg: update
+ });
+ }
+ should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
+ } else {
+ chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
+ }
+ },
+ ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
+ n += 1;
+ if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
+ chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
+ if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
+ msg: update
+ });
+ }
+ should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
+ } else {
+ chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
+ }
+ },
+ _ => {},
+ }
+
+ chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
+
+ if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
+ counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
+ pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
+ node_id: counterparty_node_id,
+ action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
+ msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
+ channel_id: *chan_id,
+ data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
+ },
+ },
+ });
}
+
+ true
+ },
+ ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
+ process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
+ pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
+ },
+ ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
+ process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
+ pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
},
- _ => {},
}
+ });
- chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
+ for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
+ if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
+ log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
+ peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
+ events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
+ node_id: counterparty_node_id,
+ action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
+ msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
+ },
+ }
+ );
+ }
+ }
+ peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
- true
- });
if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
}
let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
}
- self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
+ for shutdown_res in shutdown_channels {
+ self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
+ }
+
+ self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(&self.pending_events);
// Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
// channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
///
/// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
/// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
match failure_code {
- FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
- FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
+ FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
+ FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
- HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code as u16, htlc_msat_height_data)
+ HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
+ },
+ FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
+ let fail_data = match data {
+ Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
+ None => Vec::new(),
+ };
+ HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
}
}
}
///
/// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
/// forwarding
- fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
+ fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
// We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
// guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
// we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
// an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
- let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
- chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
+ let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
+ chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
} else {
- chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
+ chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
};
if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
/// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
/// that we want to return and a channel.
- fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
+ fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
// failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
// be surfaced to the user.
fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
- &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
) {
let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
- self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
+ if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
+ self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
+ } else {
+ // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
+ debug_assert!(false);
+ (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
+ }
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
}
// This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
// `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
// this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
+ #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
}
&self.pending_events, &self.logger)
{ self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
},
- HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
+ HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint, .. }) => {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", &payment_hash, onion_error);
let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
let mut push_forward_ev = false;
/// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
/// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
///
+ /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
+ /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
+ /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
+ ///
/// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
/// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
/// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
/// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
/// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
/// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
+ /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
+ self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
+ }
+
+ /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
+ /// even type numbers.
+ ///
+ /// # Note
+ ///
+ /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
+ /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
+ ///
+ /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
+ pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
+ self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
+ }
+
+ fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
let mut sources = {
let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
}
}
+ let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
+ let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
- payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id,
+ payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
});
if dup_purpose.is_some() {
debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
- log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
+ &payment_hash);
}
+
+ if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
+ if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
+ log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
+ &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
+ claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
+ mem::drop(claimable_payments);
+ for htlc in payment.htlcs {
+ let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
+ let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
+ let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
+ self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
+ }
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+
payment.htlcs
} else { return; }
};
break;
}
expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
-
- if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
- // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
- // that there's one payment here and move on.
- if sources.len() != 1 {
- log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
- debug_assert!(false);
- valid_mpp = false;
- break;
- }
- }
-
claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
}
mem::drop(per_peer_state);
-> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
//TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
+ // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
+ // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
+ // `BackgroundEvent`s.
+ let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
+
{
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
- if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
- let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
- let fulfill_res = chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
-
- if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
- if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
- log_bytes!(chan_id), action);
- peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
- }
- let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
- let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update);
- let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
- peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
- if let Err(e) = res {
- // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
- // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor
- // update over and over again until morale improves.
- log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage);
- return Err((counterparty_node_id, e));
+ if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
+ if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
+ let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
+ let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
+
+ if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
+ if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
+ chan_id, action);
+ peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
+ }
+ if !during_init {
+ handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
+ peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
+ } else {
+ // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
+ // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
+ // monitor update as a background event.
+ self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
+ BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
+ counterparty_node_id,
+ funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
+ update: monitor_update.clone(),
+ });
+ }
}
}
return Ok(());
payment_preimage,
}],
};
- // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
- // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
- let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
- if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
- // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
- // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
- // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
- // again on restart.
- log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
- payment_preimage, update_res);
+
+ if !during_init {
+ // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
+ // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
+ let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
+ if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
+ // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
+ // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
+ // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
+ // again on restart.
+ log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
+ payment_preimage, update_res);
+ }
+ } else {
+ // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
+ // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
+ // event.
+ // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
+ // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
+ // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
+ // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
+ // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
+ // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
+ // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
+ self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
+ BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
+ prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update,
+ )));
}
// Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
// duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
}
- fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
+ fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
+ forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool,
+ next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>, next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint
+ ) {
match source {
HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
- self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
+ debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
+ "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
+ if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
+ debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
+ }
+ let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
+ channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint,
+ counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
+ };
+ self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
+ session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
+ &self.logger);
},
HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
+ let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
|htlc_claim_value_msat| {
if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
} else { None };
- let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
- let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
-
- Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
- fee_earned_msat,
- claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
- prev_channel_id,
- next_channel_id,
- outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
- }})
+ Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
+ event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
+ fee_earned_msat,
+ claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
+ prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
+ next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
+ outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
+ },
+ downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
+ if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
+ Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, completed_blocker))
+ } else {
+ // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
+ // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
+ // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
+ // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
+ // closed.
+ None
+ },
+ })
} else { None }
});
if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
match action {
MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
- if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
+ if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
+ amount_msat,
+ payment_purpose: purpose,
+ receiver_node_id,
+ htlcs,
+ sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
+ }) = payment {
self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
- payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
+ payment_hash,
+ purpose,
+ amount_msat,
+ receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
+ htlcs,
+ sender_intended_total_msat,
}, None));
}
},
- MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event } => {
+ MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
+ event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
+ } => {
self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
+ if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
+ self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
+ }
},
}
}
/// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
/// update completion.
fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
- channel: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
+ channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
-> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
- log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()),
+ &channel.context.channel_id(),
if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
let mut htlc_forwards = None;
- let counterparty_node_id = channel.get_counterparty_node_id();
+ let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
- htlc_forwards = Some((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.outbound_scid_alias()),
- channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
+ htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
+ channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
}
if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
- self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
+ self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
}
{
if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
- let mut channel = {
- match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()){
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
- }
- };
- log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}",
- highest_applied_update_id, channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id());
- if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
+ let channel =
+ if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
+ chan
+ } else {
+ let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
+ .remove(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
+ mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
+ mem::drop(per_peer_state);
+ self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
+ return;
+ };
+ let remaining_in_flight =
+ if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
+ pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
+ pending.len()
+ } else { 0 };
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
+ highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
+ remaining_in_flight);
+ if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
return;
}
- handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, highest_applied_update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel.get_mut());
+ handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
}
/// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
///
/// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
/// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
- pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
}
///
/// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
/// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
- pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
}
- fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
- let peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| !peer.channel_by_id.is_empty());
+ let peers_without_funded_channels =
+ self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
.ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
- let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.len() == 1;
- match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
- if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
- return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
+ let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
+
+ // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
+ // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
+ // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
+ // succeed.
+ let mut channel = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
+ Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
+ let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
+ InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
+ counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
+ &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
+ &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|e| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.to_string() })
+ }
+ _ => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() })
+ }?;
+
+ if accept_0conf {
+ // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
+ debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
+ } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
+ let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
+ node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
+ msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
}
- if accept_0conf {
- channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
- } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
- let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
- node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
- action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
- msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
- }
- };
- peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
- let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
- return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
- } else {
- // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
- // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
- // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
- if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
- let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
- node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
- action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
- msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
- }
- };
- peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
- let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
- return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
+ };
+ peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
+ return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
+ } else {
+ // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
+ // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
+ // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
+ if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
+ let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
+ node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
+ msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
}
- }
-
- peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
- node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
- msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
- });
- }
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
- return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) });
+ };
+ peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
+ return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
}
}
+
+ // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
+ let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
+ channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
+
+ peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
+ node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
+ });
+
+ peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
+
Ok(())
}
/// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
/// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
- where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> bool {
+ where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
{
let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
- if num_unfunded_channels == peer.channel_by_id.len() {
+ if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
}
}
}
fn unfunded_channel_count(
- peer: &PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, best_block_height: u32
+ peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
) -> usize {
let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
- for (_, chan) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
- if !chan.is_outbound() && chan.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
- chan.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
- {
- num_unfunded_channels += 1;
+ for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
+ match phase {
+ ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
+ // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
+ // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
+ if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
+ chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
+ {
+ num_unfunded_channels += 1;
+ }
+ },
+ ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
+ if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
+ num_unfunded_channels += 1;
+ }
+ },
+ ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
+ // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
+ continue;
+ }
}
}
- num_unfunded_channels
+ num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
}
fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
+ // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
+ // likely to be lost on restart!
if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
}
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
}
- let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
- random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
- let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
- let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
-
// Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
// about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
// channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
- let channeled_peers_without_funding = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| !node.channel_by_id.is_empty());
+ let channeled_peers_without_funding =
+ self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
// If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
// with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
// channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
- if peer_state.channel_by_id.is_empty() &&
+ if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
!self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
{
msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
}
- let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
+ let channel_id = msg.temporary_channel_id;
+ let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
+ if channel_exists {
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
+ }
+
+ // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
+ if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
+ let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
+ pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
+ temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
+ counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
+ funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
+ push_msat: msg.push_msat,
+ channel_type: msg.channel_type.clone().unwrap(),
+ }, None));
+ peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
+ open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
+ ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
+ });
+ return Ok(());
+ }
+
+ // Otherwise create the channel right now.
+ let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
+ random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
+ let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
+ let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
- &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
+ &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
{
Err(e) => {
- self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
},
Ok(res) => res
};
- match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
- self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
- return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
- },
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
- if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
- if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
- return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
- }
- peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
- node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
- msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
- });
- } else {
- let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
- pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
- temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
- counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
- funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
- push_msat: msg.push_msat,
- channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
- }, None));
- }
- entry.insert(channel);
- }
+ let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
+ if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
+ }
+ if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
}
+
+ let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
+ channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
+
+ peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
+ node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
+ msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
+ });
+ peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
Ok(())
}
fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
+ // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
+ // likely to be lost on restart!
let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
- try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan);
- (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
+ match phase.get_mut() {
+ ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
+ try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
+ (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
+ },
+ _ => {
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
+ }
+ }
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
}
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
- let ((funding_msg, monitor), chan) =
- match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
- (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
+ let (chan, funding_msg, monitor) =
+ match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
+ Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
+ match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger) {
+ Ok(res) => res,
+ Err((mut inbound_chan, err)) => {
+ // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
+ // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
+ // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
+ update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &inbound_chan.context);
+ let user_id = inbound_chan.context.get_user_id();
+ let shutdown_res = inbound_chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(format!("{}", err),
+ msg.temporary_channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, inbound_chan.context.get_value_satoshis()));
+ },
+ }
},
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
+ Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(_)) | Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) => {
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
+ },
+ None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
};
match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
- match self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().entry(chan.channel_id()) {
+ let mut id_to_peer_lock = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
+ match id_to_peer_lock.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
"The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
funding_msg.channel_id))
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
- i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
- }
- }
-
- // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
- // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
- // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
- // until we have persisted our monitor.
- let new_channel_id = funding_msg.channel_id;
- peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
- node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
- msg: funding_msg,
- });
+ let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
+ if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
+ i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
+ mem::drop(id_to_peer_lock);
+
+ // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
+ // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
+ // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
+ // until we have persisted our monitor.
+ peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
+ node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
+ msg: funding_msg,
+ });
- let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
-
- let chan = e.insert(chan);
- let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, monitor_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
- per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING, { peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&new_channel_id) });
-
- // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
- // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
- // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
- // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
- // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
- // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
- // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
- if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { shutdown_finish: Some((res, _)), .. }) = &mut res {
- res.0 = None;
+ if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
+ handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
+ per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
+ } else {
+ unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
+ }
+ Ok(())
+ } else {
+ log_error!(self.logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
+ "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
+ funding_msg.channel_id));
+ }
+ }
}
- res
}
}
}
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
- let monitor = try_chan_entry!(self,
- chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan);
- let update_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor);
- let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
- if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
- // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
- // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
- // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
- if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
- shutdown_finish.0.take();
- }
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
+ match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
+ ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => {
+ let monitor = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
+ chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
+ if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
+ handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
+ Ok(())
+ } else {
+ try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned())), chan_phase_entry)
+ }
+ },
+ _ => {
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
+ },
}
- res
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
}
}
fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
+ // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
+ // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
.ok_or_else(|| {
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
- let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
- self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
- if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
- peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
- node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
- msg: announcement_sigs,
- });
- } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
- // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
- // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
- // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
- // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
- // announcement_signatures.
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
- if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
- peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
+ if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
+ let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
+ self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
+ if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
+ peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
- msg,
+ msg: announcement_sigs,
});
+ } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
+ // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
+ // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
+ // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
+ // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
+ // announcement_signatures.
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
+ if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
+ peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
+ node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
+ msg,
+ });
+ }
+ }
+
+ {
+ let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
+ emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
}
- }
- {
- let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
- emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan.get_mut());
+ Ok(())
+ } else {
+ try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
+ "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
}
-
- Ok(())
},
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
+ Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
+ }
}
}
fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
- let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
- let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
+ let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
+ let mut finish_shutdown = None;
+ {
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
.ok_or_else(|| {
})?;
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
- match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
-
- if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
- log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
- log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
- if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
- }
-
- let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
- let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self,
- chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
- dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
+ if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
+ let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
+ match phase {
+ ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
+ if !chan.received_shutdown() {
+ log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
+ msg.channel_id,
+ if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
+ }
- if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
- // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
- // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
- // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
- peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
- node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
- msg,
- });
- }
+ let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
+ let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
+ chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
+ dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
- // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
- if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
- let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
- let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
- break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
- }
- break Ok(());
- },
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
+ if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
+ // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
+ // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
+ // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
+ peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
+ node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
+ msg,
+ });
+ }
+ // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
+ if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
+ handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
+ peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
+ }
+ },
+ ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
+ let context = phase.context_mut();
+ log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
+ self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel);
+ let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
+ finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
+ },
+ }
+ } else {
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
}
- };
+ }
for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
}
+ if let Some(shutdown_res) = finish_shutdown {
+ self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
+ }
- result
+ Ok(())
}
fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
- let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
- if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
- peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
- node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
- msg,
- });
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
+ if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
+ let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
+ if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
+ peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
+ node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
+ msg,
+ });
+ }
+ if tx.is_some() {
+ // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
+ // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
+ // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
+ // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
+ // watch for old state broadcasts)!
+ (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)))
+ } else { (tx, None) }
+ } else {
+ return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
+ "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
}
- if tx.is_some() {
- // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
- // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
- // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
- // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
- // watch for old state broadcasts)!
- (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
- } else { (tx, None) }
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
}
};
if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
- self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
+ self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
}
- if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
+ if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
msg: update
});
}
- self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
+ self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
}
Ok(())
}
//encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
//but we should prevent it anyway.
- let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
+ // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
+ // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
+
+ let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
.ok_or_else(|| {
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
-
- let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
- // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
- // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
- // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
- match pending_forward_info {
- PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
- let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
- let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
- HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
- } else {
- HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
- }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
- let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
- channel_id: msg.channel_id,
- htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
- reason
- };
- PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
- },
- _ => pending_forward_info
- }
- };
- try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
+ if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
+ let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
+ Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
+ self.construct_pending_htlc_status(msg, shared_secret, next_hop,
+ chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt),
+ Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
+ };
+ let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<SP>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
+ // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
+ // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
+ // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
+ match pending_forward_info {
+ PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
+ let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
+ let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
+ HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
+ } else {
+ HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
+ }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
+ let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
+ channel_id: msg.channel_id,
+ htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
+ reason
+ };
+ PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
+ },
+ _ => pending_forward_info
+ }
+ };
+ try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
+ } else {
+ return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
+ "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
+ }
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
}
}
fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
+ let funding_txo;
let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
- try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
+ if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
+ let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
+ if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
+ peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
+ .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
+ .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
+ }
+ // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
+ // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
+ // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
+ // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
+ // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
+ // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
+ funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
+ res
+ } else {
+ return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
+ "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
+ }
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
}
};
- self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
+ self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, Some(*counterparty_node_id), funding_txo);
Ok(())
}
fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
+ // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
+ // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
.ok_or_else(|| {
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
- try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
+ if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
+ try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
+ } else {
+ return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
+ "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
+ }
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
}
}
fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
+ // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
+ // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
.ok_or_else(|| {
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
- try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
+ try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
+ }
+ if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
+ try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
+ } else {
+ return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
+ "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
}
- try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
Ok(())
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
- let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
- let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
- if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
- let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
- let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
- handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
- peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
- } else { Ok(()) }
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
+ if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
+ let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
+ let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
+ if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
+ handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
+ peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
+ }
+ Ok(())
+ } else {
+ return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
+ "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
+ }
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
}
log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
+ user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
}
}
- // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued.
fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
- let forward_ev_exists = pending_events.iter()
- .find(|(ev, _)| if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false })
- .is_some();
- if !forward_ev_exists {
- pending_events.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
- time_forwardable:
- Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
+ let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
+ let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
+ if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
+ ).count();
+ // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
+ // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
+ // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
+ // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
+ // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
+ // real by taking more time.
+ if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
+ pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
+ time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
}, None));
}
}
+ /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
+ /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
+ /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
+ /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
+ fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
+ actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
+ channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
+ ) -> bool {
+ actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
+ .get(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
+ || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
+ action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
+ channel_funding_outpoint,
+ counterparty_node_id,
+ })
+ })
+ }
+
+ #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
+ pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
+ counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
+ ) -> bool {
+ let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
+ if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
+ let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
+ let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
+
+ if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
+ return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
+ chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), counterparty_node_id);
+ }
+ }
+ false
+ }
+
fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
- let (htlcs_to_fail, res) = {
+ let htlcs_to_fail = {
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
.ok_or_else(|| {
}).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
- let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
- let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
- let res = if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
- let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
- let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
- handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
- peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
- } else { Ok(()) };
- (htlcs_to_fail, res)
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
+ if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
+ let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
+ let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
+ self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
+ &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo,
+ *counterparty_node_id)
+ } else { false };
+ let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
+ chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
+ if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
+ let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
+ .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
+ handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
+ peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
+ }
+ htlcs_to_fail
+ } else {
+ return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
+ "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
+ }
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
}
};
self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
- res
+ Ok(())
}
fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
- try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
+ if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
+ try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
+ } else {
+ return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
+ "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
+ }
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
}
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
- if !chan.get().is_usable() {
- return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
- }
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
+ if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
+ if !chan.context.is_usable() {
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
+ }
- peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
- msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
- &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
- msg, &self.default_configuration
- ), chan),
- // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
- // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
- update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap()),
- });
+ peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
+ msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
+ &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
+ msg, &self.default_configuration
+ ), chan_phase_entry),
+ // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
+ // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
+ update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
+ });
+ } else {
+ return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
+ "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
+ }
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
}
Ok(())
}
- /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
+ /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
None => {
// It's not a local channel
- return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
+ return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
}
};
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
- return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
+ return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
}
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
- if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
- if chan.get().should_announce() {
- // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
- // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
- // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
- return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
+ if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
+ if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
+ if chan.context.should_announce() {
+ // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
+ // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
+ // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
+ return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
+ }
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
+ }
+ let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
+ let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
+ if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
+ return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
+ } else {
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", chan_id);
+ try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
}
- return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
- }
- let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
- let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
- if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
- return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
} else {
- log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
- try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
+ return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
+ "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
}
},
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
}
Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
}
- fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
+ fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
let htlc_forwards;
let need_lnd_workaround = {
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
- // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
- // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
- // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
- // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
- let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
- msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
- &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
- let mut channel_update = None;
- if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
- peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
- node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
- msg,
- });
- } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
- // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
- // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
- // they have the latest channel parameters.
- if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
- channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
- node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
+ if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
+ // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
+ // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
+ // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
+ // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
+ let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
+ msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
+ &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
+ let mut channel_update = None;
+ if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
+ peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
+ node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
msg,
});
+ } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
+ // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
+ // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
+ // they have the latest channel parameters.
+ if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
+ channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
+ node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ msg,
+ });
+ }
}
+ let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
+ htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
+ &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
+ Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
+ if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
+ peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
+ }
+ need_lnd_workaround
+ } else {
+ return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
+ "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
}
- let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
- htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
- &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
- Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
- if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
- peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
- }
- need_lnd_workaround
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
}
};
+ let mut persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
+ persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
}
if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
}
- Ok(())
+ Ok(persist)
}
/// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
match monitor_event {
MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
- self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
+ self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint);
} else {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
}
},
- MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
- MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
+ MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(funding_outpoint) => {
let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
None => {
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
- if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
- let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
- failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
- if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
- msg: update
+ if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
+ if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
+ failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
+ if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
+ msg: update
+ });
+ }
+ self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
+ node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
+ msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
+ },
});
}
- let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
- ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
- } else {
- ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
- };
- self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
- node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
- action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
- msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
- },
- });
}
}
}
/// update events as a separate process method here.
#[cfg(fuzzing)]
pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
- PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
- if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
- NotifyOption::DoPersist
- } else {
- NotifyOption::SkipPersist
- }
- });
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
+ self.process_pending_monitor_events();
}
/// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
let mut has_monitor_update = false;
let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
- let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
// Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
// update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
'chan_loop: loop {
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
- for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
- let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
- let funding_txo = chan.get_funding_txo();
+ for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
+ |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
+ ) {
+ let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
+ let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
- chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger);
+ chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
}
if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
has_monitor_update = true;
- let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(
- funding_txo.expect("channel is live"), monitor_update);
- let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
- let channel_id: [u8; 32] = *channel_id;
- let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
- peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING,
- peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id));
- if res.is_err() {
- handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, res));
- }
+ handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
+ peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
continue 'peer_loop;
}
}
break 'peer_loop;
}
- let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
+ let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
}
- for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
- let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
- }
-
has_update
}
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
- peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
- match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
- Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
- if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
- has_update = true;
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
- node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
- });
- }
- if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
- // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
- // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
- if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
- msg: update
- });
- }
+ peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
+ match phase {
+ ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
+ match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
+ Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
+ if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
+ has_update = true;
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
+ node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
+ });
+ }
+ if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
+ // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
+ // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
+ if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
+ msg: update
+ });
+ }
- self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
+ self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
- log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
- self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
- update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
- false
- } else { true }
+ log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
+ self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
+ update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
+ false
+ } else { true }
+ },
+ Err(e) => {
+ has_update = true;
+ let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
+ handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
+ !close_channel
+ }
+ }
},
- Err(e) => {
- has_update = true;
- let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
- handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
- !close_channel
- }
+ _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
}
});
}
// Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
// so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
// timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
- if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
+ if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
assert!(should_broadcast);
} else { unreachable!(); }
- self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
+ self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
+ BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
+ counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
+ });
}
self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
}
}
- fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
- assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
-
- if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
- return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
- }
-
- let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
-
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
- let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
- match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
- e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
- payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
- user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
- // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
- // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
- // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
- // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
- // never fail a payment too early.
- // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
- // timestamps.
- expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
- });
- },
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
- }
- Ok(payment_secret)
- }
-
/// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
/// to pay us.
///
min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
}
- /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
- /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
- ///
- /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
- ///
- /// # Note
- /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
- ///
- /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
- #[deprecated]
- pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
- let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
- let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
- let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
- Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
- }
-
/// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
/// stored external to LDK.
///
min_final_cltv_expiry)
}
- /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
- /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
- ///
- /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
- ///
- /// # Note
- /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
- ///
- /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
- #[deprecated]
- pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
- self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
- }
-
/// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
/// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
///
for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
- for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
+ for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
+ |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
+ ) {
for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
inflight_htlcs
}
- #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
+ #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
}
- fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint) {
- let mut errors = Vec::new();
+ /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
+ /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
+ /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
+ /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
+ fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
loop {
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
- if self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter()
- .any(|(_ev, action_opt)| action_opt == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
- channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
- }))
- {
- // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have another event
- // blocking any monitor updates for this channel. If we do, let those
- // events be the ones that ultimately release the monitor update(s).
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another event is pending",
- log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
+
+ if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
+ // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
+ if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
+ .get_mut(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
+ {
+ blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
+ channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id) {
+ // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
+ // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
+ // update(s) when those blockers complete.
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
+ &channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
break;
}
- if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
- debug_assert_eq!(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
- if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.get_mut().unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
- log_debug!(self.logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
- log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
- let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update);
- let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
- if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
- peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
- {
- errors.push((e, counterparty_node_id));
- }
- if further_update_exists {
- // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
- // top of the loop.
- continue;
+
+ if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
+ if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
+ debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
+ if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
+ channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
+ handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
+ peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
+ if further_update_exists {
+ // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
+ // top of the loop.
+ continue;
+ }
+ } else {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
+ channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
}
- } else {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
- log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
}
}
} else {
}
break;
}
- for (err, counterparty_node_id) in errors {
- let res = Err::<(), _>(err);
- let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
- }
}
fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
} => {
- self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint);
+ self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, None);
}
}
}
/// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
- PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
- let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
+ PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
+ let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
// TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
// ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
}
fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard =
+ PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
+ self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
let new_height = height - 1;
{
let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
let block_hash = header.block_hash();
log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard =
+ PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
+ self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
.map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
let block_hash = header.block_hash();
log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
-
+ let _persistence_guard =
+ PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
+ self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
*self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
- for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
- if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
+ for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
+ if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.context.get_funding_txo(), chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
}
}
}
fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard =
+ PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
+ self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
- if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
+ if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
} else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
/// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
/// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
/// the function.
- fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
+ fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
(&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
// Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
// during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
- peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
- let res = f(channel);
- if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
- for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
- let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
- timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
- HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
- }
- if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
- send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
- if channel.is_usable() {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
- if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
- node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
- msg,
- });
+ peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
+ match phase {
+ // Retain unfunded channels.
+ ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
+ ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
+ let res = f(channel);
+ if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
+ for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
+ let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
+ timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
+ HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
+ }
+ if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
+ send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
+ if channel.context.is_usable() {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
+ if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
+ node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ msg,
+ });
+ }
+ } else {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
+ }
}
- } else {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
- }
- }
- {
- let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
- emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
- }
+ {
+ let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
+ emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
+ }
- if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
- node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
- msg: announcement_sigs,
- });
- if let Some(height) = height_opt {
- if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
- msg: announcement,
- // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
- // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
- update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
+ if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
+ node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ msg: announcement_sigs,
});
+ if let Some(height) = height_opt {
+ if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
+ msg: announcement,
+ // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
+ // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
+ update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
+ });
+ }
+ }
}
+ if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
+ if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
+ // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
+ // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
+ // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
+ // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
+ // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
+ // is always consistent.
+ let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
+ let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
+ assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
+ "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
+ fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
+ }
+ }
+ } else if let Err(reason) = res {
+ update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
+ // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
+ // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
+ failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true));
+ if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
+ msg: update
+ });
+ }
+ let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
+ self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, reason);
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
+ node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
+ channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
+ data: reason_message,
+ } },
+ });
+ return false;
}
+ true
}
- if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
- if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
- // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
- // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
- // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
- // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
- // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
- // is always consistent.
- let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
- let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
- assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
- "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
- fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
- }
- }
- } else if let Err(reason) = res {
- update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel);
- // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
- // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
- failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
- if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
- msg: update
- });
- }
- let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
- self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
- node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
- action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
- channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
- data: reason_message,
- } },
- });
- return false;
}
- true
});
}
}
if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
+ user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
phantom_shared_secret: None,
}
}
- /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
+ /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
+ /// may have events that need processing.
+ ///
+ /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
+ /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
///
/// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
/// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
- ///
- pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
- self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
+ pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
+ self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
+ }
+
+ /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
+ pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
+ self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
}
#[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
- pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
- self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
+ pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
+ self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
}
/// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
}
- /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
+ /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
/// [`ChannelManager`].
///
/// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
/// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
#[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
- pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> InvoiceFeatures {
+ pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
}
L::Target: Logger,
{
fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
- let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
+ // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
+ // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
+ // change to the contents.
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
+ let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
+ let persist = match &res {
+ Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
+ debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
+ NotifyOption::DoPersist
+ },
+ _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
+ };
+ let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
+ persist
+ });
}
fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
}
fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
- let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
+ // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
+ // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
+ // change to the contents.
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
+ let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
+ NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
+ });
}
fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
}
fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
}
fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
}
fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
- let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
+ // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
+ // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
+ // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
+ // will not force-close the channel on startup.
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
+ let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
+ let persist = match &res {
+ Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
+ _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
+ };
+ let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
+ persist
+ });
}
fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
}
fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
}
fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
- let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
+ // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
+ // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
+ // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
+ let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
+ let persist = match &res {
+ Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
+ Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
+ Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
+ };
+ let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
+ persist
+ });
}
fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
}
fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
- let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
+ // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
+ // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
+ // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
+ let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
+ let persist = match &res {
+ Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
+ Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
+ Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
+ };
+ let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
+ persist
+ });
}
fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
- let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
+ // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
+ // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
+ // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
+ let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
+ let persist = match &res {
+ Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
+ Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
+ Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
+ };
+ let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
+ persist
+ });
}
fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
}
fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
}
fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
- let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
+ // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
+ // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
+ // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
+ let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
+ let persist = match &res {
+ Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
+ Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
+ Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
+ };
+ let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
+ persist
+ });
}
fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
}
fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
- PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
+ PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
persist
} else {
- NotifyOption::SkipPersist
+ NotifyOption::DoPersist
}
});
}
fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
- let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
+ let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg);
+ let persist = match &res {
+ Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
+ Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
+ Ok(persist) => *persist,
+ };
+ let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
+ persist
+ });
}
fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
+ self, || NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents);
+
let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
let remove_peer = {
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
- peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
- chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
- if chan.is_shutdown() {
- update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
- self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
- return false;
- }
- true
+ peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
+ let context = match phase {
+ ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
+ chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
+ // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
+ if !chan.is_shutdown() {
+ return true;
+ }
+ &chan.context
+ },
+ // Unfunded channels will always be removed.
+ ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
+ &chan.context
+ },
+ ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
+ &chan.context
+ },
+ };
+ // Clean up for removal.
+ update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
+ self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
+ false
});
+ // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
+ // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
+ peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
match msg {
// V1 Channel Establishment
return Err(());
}
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let mut res = Ok(());
+
+ PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
+ // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
+ // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
+ // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
+ // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
+ let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
+ let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
+
+ {
+ let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
+ match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
+ if inbound_peer_limited {
+ res = Err(());
+ return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
+ }
+ e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
+ channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
+ inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
+ latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
+ pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
+ in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
+ monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
+ actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
+ is_connected: true,
+ }));
+ },
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
+ let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
+ peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
+
+ let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
+ if inbound_peer_limited &&
+ Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
+ peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
+ {
+ res = Err(());
+ return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
+ }
+
+ debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
+ peer_state.is_connected = true;
+ },
+ }
+ }
- // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
- // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
- // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
- // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
- let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
- let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
- {
- let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
- match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
- if inbound_peer_limited {
- return Err(());
- }
- e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
- channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
- latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
- pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
- monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
- is_connected: true,
- }));
- },
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
- let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
- peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
-
- let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
- if inbound_peer_limited &&
- Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
- peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
- {
- return Err(());
- }
+ let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
+ if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
+ let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
+ let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
+ let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
- debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
- peer_state.is_connected = true;
- },
+ peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(|(_, phase)|
+ if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else {
+ // Since unfunded channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer, and they're not persisted
+ // (so won't be recovered after a crash), they shouldn't exist here and we would never need to
+ // worry about closing and removing them.
+ debug_assert!(false);
+ None
+ }
+ ).for_each(|chan| {
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
+ node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
+ });
+ });
}
- }
- log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
+ return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
+ //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
+ });
+ res
+ }
- let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
- for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
- let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
- let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
- let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
- peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
- let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
- if !chan.have_received_message() {
- // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
- // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
- // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
- // drop it.
- false
- } else {
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
- node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
- msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
- });
- true
- }
- } else { true };
- if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
- if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.default_configuration) {
- if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
+ fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
+
+ match &msg.data as &str {
+ "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
+ "link failed to shutdown" =>
+ {
+ // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
+ // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
+ // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
+ // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
+ // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
+ // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
+ // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
+ if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
+ let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
+ let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
+ if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
+ let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
+ if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
+ if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
+ peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
- msg, update_msg,
+ msg,
});
}
+ peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
+ node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
+ action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
+ msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
+ channel_id: msg.channel_id,
+ data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
+ },
+ log_level: Level::Trace,
+ }
+ });
}
}
- retain
- });
+ return;
+ }
+ _ => {}
}
- //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
- Ok(())
- }
-
- fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
- if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
- let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = {
+ if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
+ let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
+ // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
+ // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
+ peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
};
for channel_id in channel_ids {
if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
- if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
- if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
+ if let Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
+ if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
msg,
provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
}
+ fn get_genesis_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
+ Some(vec![ChainHash::from(&self.genesis_hash[..])])
+ }
+
fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
"Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
/// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
/// [`ChannelManager`].
pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
- provided_init_features(config).to_context()
+ let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
+ node_features.set_keysend_optional();
+ node_features
}
-/// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
+/// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
/// [`ChannelManager`].
///
/// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
/// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
#[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
-pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InvoiceFeatures {
+pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
provided_init_features(config).to_context()
}
/// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
/// [`ChannelManager`].
-pub fn provided_init_features(_config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
+pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
// Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
// should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
// [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
features.set_channel_type_optional();
features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
features.set_zero_conf_optional();
- #[cfg(anchors)]
- { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
- if _config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
- features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
- }
+ if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
+ features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
}
features
}
(10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
(12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
(14, user_channel_id_low, required),
- (16, self.balance_msat, required),
+ (16, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required), // Forwards compatibility for removed balance_msat field.
(18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
- // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
- // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
- (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
+ (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
(20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
+ (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
(22, self.confirmations_required, option),
(24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
(26, self.is_outbound, required),
(35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
(37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
(39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
+ (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
});
Ok(())
}
impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
- _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
+ _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
(1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
(2, channel_id, required),
(3, channel_type, option),
(10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
(12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
(14, user_channel_id_low, required),
- (16, balance_msat, required),
+ (16, _balance_msat, option), // Backwards compatibility for removed balance_msat field.
(18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
// Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
// filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
(19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
(20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
+ (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
(22, confirmations_required, option),
(24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
(26, is_outbound, required),
(35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
(37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
(39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
+ (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
});
// `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
+ let _balance_msat: Option<u64> = _balance_msat;
+
Ok(Self {
inbound_scid_alias,
channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
unspendable_punishment_reserve,
user_channel_id,
- balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
+ next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
confirmations_required,
confirmations,
inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
+ channel_shutdown_state,
})
}
}
impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
- (2, channels, vec_type),
+ (2, channels, required_vec),
(4, phantom_scid, required),
(6, real_node_pubkey, required),
});
(1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
(2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
(3, payment_metadata, option),
+ (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
},
(2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
(0, payment_preimage, required),
(2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
(3, payment_metadata, option),
+ (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
+ (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
},
;);
(6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
(8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
(9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
+ (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
});
(1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
(2, outpoint, required),
(4, htlc_id, required),
- (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
+ (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
+ (7, user_channel_id, option),
});
impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
(5, self.total_value_received, option),
(6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
(8, keysend_preimage, option),
+ (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
});
Ok(())
}
impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
- let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
- let mut value = 0;
- let mut sender_intended_value = None;
- let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
- let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
- let mut total_value_received = None;
- let mut total_msat = None;
- let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
- read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
+ _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
(0, prev_hop, required),
(1, total_msat, option),
- (2, value, required),
+ (2, value_ser, required),
(3, sender_intended_value, option),
- (4, payment_data, option),
+ (4, payment_data_opt, option),
(5, total_value_received, option),
(6, cltv_expiry, required),
- (8, keysend_preimage, option)
+ (8, keysend_preimage, option),
+ (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
});
+ let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
+ let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
Some(p) => {
if payment_data.is_some() {
total_value_received,
total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
onion_payload,
- cltv_expiry,
+ cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
+ counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
})
}
}
0 => {
let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
- let mut path_hops: Option<Vec<RouteHop>> = Some(Vec::new());
+ let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
let mut payment_id = None;
let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
(0, session_priv, required),
(1, payment_id, option),
(2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
- (4, path_hops, vec_type),
+ (4, path_hops, required_vec),
(5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
(6, blinded_tail, option),
});
// instead.
payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
}
- let path = Path { hops: path_hops.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?, blinded_tail };
+ let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
if path.hops.len() == 0 {
return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
}
(1, payment_id_opt, option),
(2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
// 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
- (4, path.hops, vec_type),
+ (4, path.hops, required_vec),
(5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
(6, path.blinded_tail, option),
});
let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
{
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
- let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
- let mut number_of_channels = 0;
+ let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
serializable_peer_count += 1;
}
- number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
- for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
- if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
- unfunded_channels += 1;
- }
- }
+
+ number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
+ |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_initiated() } else { false }
+ ).count();
}
- ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
+ (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
- for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
- if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
- channel.write(writer)?;
- }
+ for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
+ |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
+ if channel.context.is_funding_initiated() { Some(channel) } else { None }
+ } else { None }
+ ) {
+ channel.write(writer)?;
}
}
}
}
}
- let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
- (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
- for event in background_events.iter() {
- match event {
- BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
- 0u8.write(writer)?;
- funding_txo.write(writer)?;
- monitor_update.write(writer)?;
- },
- }
- }
+ // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
+ // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
+ // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
+ // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
+ // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
+ 0u64.write(writer)?;
// Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
// `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
session_priv.write(writer)?;
}
}
+ PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
+ PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
}
pending_claiming_payments = None;
}
+ let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
+ for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
+ for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
+ if !updates.is_empty() {
+ if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(HashMap::new()); }
+ in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
(1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
(2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
(6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
(7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
(8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
- (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
+ (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
+ (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
(11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
(13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
});
}
}
+impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
+ (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
+ (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
+ (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
+ (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
+ (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
+);
+
/// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
///
/// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
pub default_config: UserConfig,
/// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
- /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
+ /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
///
/// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
/// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
- let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
+ let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
- let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
+ let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
for _ in 0..channel_count {
- let mut channel: Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (
+ let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
&args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
))?;
- let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
+ let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
- if channel.get_latest_complete_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
- // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
- log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
- log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
- log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_complete_monitor_update_id());
- log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
- log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
- log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
- log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
- return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
- } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
+ if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
- channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
+ channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
// But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
- log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
- log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
- let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
- if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
- pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate(monitor_update));
+ if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
+ log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
+ &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
+ }
+ if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
+ log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
+ &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
+ }
+ if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
+ log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
+ &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
+ }
+ if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
+ log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
+ &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
+ }
+ let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
+ if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = monitor_update {
+ close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
+ counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
+ });
}
failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
- channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
- user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
- reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
+ channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
+ user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
+ reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
+ counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
+ channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
}, None));
for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
let mut found_htlc = false;
// backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
log_info!(args.logger,
"Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
- log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
- failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
+ &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
+ failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
}
}
} else {
- log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
- if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
- short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
+ log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
+ &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
+ monitor.get_latest_update_id());
+ if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
+ short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
}
- if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
- id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
+ if channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
+ id_to_peer.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
}
- match peer_channels.entry(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
+ match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
- by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
+ by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
- by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
+ by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
entry.insert(by_id_map);
}
}
// If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
// was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
// safely discard the channel.
- let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false);
+ let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false);
channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
- channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
- user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
+ channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
+ user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
+ counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
+ channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
}, None));
} else {
- log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
+ log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
log_info!(args.logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
- log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
+ &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
};
- pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
+ close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
}
}
claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
}
- let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>)>()));
- for _ in 0..peer_count {
- let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let peer_state = PeerState {
- channel_by_id: peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new()),
- latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
+ PeerState {
+ channel_by_id,
+ inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
+ latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
+ in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
+ actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
is_connected: false,
- };
+ }
+ };
+
+ let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
+ for _ in 0..peer_count {
+ let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new());
+ let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
+ peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
}
for _ in 0..background_event_count {
match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
0 => {
- let (funding_txo, monitor_update): (OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate) = (Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?);
- if pending_background_events.iter().find(|e| {
- let BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((pending_funding_txo, pending_monitor_update)) = e;
- *pending_funding_txo == funding_txo && *pending_monitor_update == monitor_update
- }).is_none() {
- pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)));
- }
+ // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
+ // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
+ // on-startup monitor updates.
+ let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
}
_ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
}
let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
- let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = Some(Vec::new());
+ let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
let mut events_override = None;
+ let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
(1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
(2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
(6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
(7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
(8, events_override, option),
- (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
+ (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
+ (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
(11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
(13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
});
retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
};
+ // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
+ // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
+ // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
+ // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
+ // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
+ //
+ // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
+ // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
+ // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
+ //
+ // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
+ let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
+ macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
+ ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
+ $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
+ ) => { {
+ let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
+ $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
+ for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
+ log_trace!(args.logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
+ update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$funding_txo.to_channel_id());
+ max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
+ pending_background_events.push(
+ BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
+ counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
+ funding_txo: $funding_txo,
+ update: update.clone(),
+ });
+ }
+ if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
+ // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
+ // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
+ // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
+ pending_background_events.push(
+ BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
+ counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
+ channel_id: $funding_txo.to_channel_id(),
+ });
+ }
+ if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
+ log_error!(args.logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
+ return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
+ }
+ max_in_flight_update_id
+ } }
+ }
+
+ for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
+ let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
+ let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
+ for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
+ if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
+ // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
+ // discarded.
+ let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
+ let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
+ .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
+ let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
+ if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
+ if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
+ max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
+ handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
+ funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, ""));
+ }
+ }
+ if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
+ // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
+ log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
+ log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
+ chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
+ log_error!(args.logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
+ log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
+ log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
+ log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
+ log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
+ return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
+ }
+ } else {
+ // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
+ // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
+ debug_assert!(false);
+ return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
+ for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
+ if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
+ // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
+ // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
+ // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
+ let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
+ Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(HashMap::new()))
+ });
+ let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
+ handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
+ funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, "closed ");
+ } else {
+ log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
+ log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.",
+ &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
+ log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
+ log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
+ log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
+ log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
+ return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
+ pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
+
+ // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
+ // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
+ // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
+ let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
+
{
// If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
// ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
// We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
// 0.0.102+
for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
- if id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
+ let counterparty_opt = id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
+ if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
if path.hops.is_empty() {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
- if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
+ if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), &htlc.payment_hash);
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
+ custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
total_msat: path_amt,
starting_block_height: best_block_height,
});
log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
- path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
+ path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
}
}
}
if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
- log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
+ &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
false
} else { true }
} else { true }
pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
- log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
+ &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
intercepted_id != ev_id
// generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
// it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
// `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
- pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv, path, false, &pending_events, &args.logger);
+ let compl_action =
+ EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
+ channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
+ counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
+ };
+ pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
+ path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &args.logger);
pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
}
},
}
}
}
+
+ // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
+ // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
+ // payments.
+ let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
+ .into_iter()
+ .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
+ if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
+ if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
+ Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
+ // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
+ // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
+ // channel_id -> peer map entry).
+ counterparty_opt.is_none(),
+ counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
+ monitor.get_funding_txo().0))
+ } else { None }
+ } else {
+ // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
+ // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
+ // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
+ // channel still live case here.
+ None
+ }
+ });
+ for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
+ pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
+ }
}
}
None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
Err(()) => {
- log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
+ log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
}
}
for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
- for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
- if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
- let mut outbound_scid_alias;
- loop {
- outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
- .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
- if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
- }
- chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
- } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
- // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
- // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
- log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
- return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
- }
- if chan.is_usable() {
- if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
+ for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
+ if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
+ if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
+ let mut outbound_scid_alias;
+ loop {
+ outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
+ .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
+ if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
+ }
+ chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
+ } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
// Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
// channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
- log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
+ log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
}
+ if chan.context.is_usable() {
+ if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
+ // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
+ // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
+ log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
+ return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
+ // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
+ debug_assert!(false);
+ return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
}
}
}
for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
- log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
+ log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
.expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
}
- for claimable_htlc in payment.htlcs {
+ for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
// Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
- if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
+ if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
}
}
payment_hash,
purpose: payment.purpose,
amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
+ htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
+ sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
}, None));
}
}
}
for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
- if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get_mut(&node_id) {
+ if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
+ for (_, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
+ for action in actions.iter() {
+ if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
+ downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
+ Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
+ } = action {
+ if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
+ blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
+ .entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
+ .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
+ } else {
+ // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
+ // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
+ // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
+ // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
+ // anymore.
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
} else {
log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
- persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
+ background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
+
+ event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
+ needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
node_signer: args.node_signer,
channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
}
+ for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding) in pending_claims_to_replay {
+ // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
+ // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
+ // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
+ channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value),
+ downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding);
+ }
+
//TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
//connection or two.
use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
+ use crate::ln::ChannelId;
use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
- use crate::ln::msgs;
+ use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
use crate::util::errors::APIError;
use crate::util::test_utils;
- use crate::util::config::ChannelConfig;
+ use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
use crate::sign::EntropySource;
#[test]
// All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
// with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
- assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
- assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
- assert!(nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
+ assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
// The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
- assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
- assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
// ... but the last node should not.
- assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
+ assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
// After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
- assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
- assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
+ assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
+ assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
// Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
// about the channel.
nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
- assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
+ assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
// The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
// parties.
nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
- assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
- assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
+ assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
+ assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
// At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
// persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
- assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
- assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
+ assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
+ assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
// the channel info has updated.
nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
- assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
- assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
}
let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
+ expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
// Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
// path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
match events[0] {
- Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
- assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
- assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
- assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
- match events[1] {
Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
- match events[2] {
+ match events[1] {
Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
#[test]
fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
+ do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
+ do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
+ }
+
+ fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
// (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
// outbound regular payment fails as expected.
// (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
// fails as expected.
+ // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
+ // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
+ // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
+ // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
+ // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
+ // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
- let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
+ let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
+ mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
// To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
- let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
+ let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
// Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
- let route_params = RouteParameters {
- payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV),
- final_value_msat: 100_000,
- };
+ let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
+ PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
+ TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
let route = find_route(
&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
- None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
+ None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
).unwrap();
nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
let route = find_route(
&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
- None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
+ None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
).unwrap();
let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
// Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
+
+ // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
+ let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
+ let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
+ RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ let event = events.pop().unwrap();
+ let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
+ pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
+
+ // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
+ let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
+ PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
+ 100_000
+ );
+ let route = find_route(
+ &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
+ None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
+ ).unwrap();
+ let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
+ nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
+ RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
+ let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
+ assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
+ expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
+
+ // Finally, claim the original payment.
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
}
#[test]
let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
- let route_params = RouteParameters {
- payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
- final_value_msat: 10_000,
- };
+ let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
+ PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
let route = find_route(
&payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
- nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
+ nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
).unwrap();
let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
#[test]
fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
- // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
+ // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
+ // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
+ let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
+ reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
- let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
- let route_params = RouteParameters {
- payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
- final_value_msat: 10_000,
- };
+ let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
+ PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
let route = find_route(
&payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
- nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
+ nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
).unwrap();
let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
{
// Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
- let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
+ let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().into_inner());
{
// Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
// funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
// as it has the funding transaction.
let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
- assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
+ assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
}
assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
{
let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
- assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
+ assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
}
expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
// as it has the funding transaction.
let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
- assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
+ assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
}
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
- nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
// party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
- assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
+ assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
}
{
// kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
- assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
+ assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
}
nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
// doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
- assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
+ assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
}
let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
}
let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
- check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
}
fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
// Dummy values
- let channel_id = [4; 32];
+ let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
}
- open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
+ open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
}
// A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
- open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
+ open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
&SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
peer_pks.push(random_pk);
nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
- features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
+ features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, true).unwrap();
}
let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
&SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
- features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err();
+ features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, true).unwrap_err();
// Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
// them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
}
nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
- features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
+ features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, true).unwrap();
nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
- features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err();
+ features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, true).unwrap_err();
// but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
- features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
+ features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, false).unwrap();
nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
// Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
- open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
+ open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
}
nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
// "protected" and can connect again.
mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
- features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
+ features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, true).unwrap();
get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
// Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
+ open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
}
// Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
&SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
- features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
+ features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, true).unwrap();
nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
- open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
+ open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
}
// If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
&SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
- features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
+ features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, true).unwrap();
nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
match events[0] {
get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
}
- #[cfg(anchors)]
+ #[test]
+ fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
+ let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
+ let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
+ let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
+ let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
+ let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
+ let extra_fee_msat = 10;
+ let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
+ amt_msat: 100,
+ outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
+ payment_metadata: None,
+ keysend_preimage: None,
+ payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
+ payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
+ }),
+ custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
+ };
+ // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
+ // intended amount, we fail the payment.
+ if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundOnionErr { err_code, .. }) =
+ node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
+ sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat))
+ {
+ assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
+ } else { panic!(); }
+
+ // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
+ let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
+ amt_msat: 100,
+ outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
+ payment_metadata: None,
+ keysend_preimage: None,
+ payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
+ payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
+ }),
+ custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
+ };
+ assert!(node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
+ sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat)).is_ok());
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
+ // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
+ // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
+ let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
+ anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
+
+ let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
+ anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
+
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
+ &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
+ let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
+ let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+ let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ match &msg_events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
+ assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ match action {
+ ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
+ assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
+ }
+ }
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
+ nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
+ let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ match events[0] {
+ Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
+ nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ }
+
#[test]
fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
// Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
- check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
+ // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
+ // not have generated any events.
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn test_update_channel_config() {
+ let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
+ let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
+ let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
+ let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
+
+ nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
+
+ user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
+ nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match &events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
+ }
+
+ nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
+
+ let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
+ nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
+ cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
+ ..Default::default()
+ }).unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match &events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
+ }
+
+ let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
+ nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
+ forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
+ ..Default::default()
+ }).unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match &events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
+ }
+
+ // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
+ // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
+ let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
+ let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
+ let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
+ assert!(
+ matches!(
+ nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
+ forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
+ ..Default::default()
+ }),
+ Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
+ )
+ );
+ // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn test_payment_display() {
+ let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
+ assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
+ let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
+ assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
+ let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
+ assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
}
}
-#[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
+#[cfg(ldk_bench)]
pub mod bench {
use crate::chain::Listen;
use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
use crate::util::test_utils;
- use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
+ use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
- use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
+ use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
- use test::Bencher;
+ use criterion::Criterion;
type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
&'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
&'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
&'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
- struct ANodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
- node: &'a Manager<'a, P>,
+ struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
+ node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
}
- impl<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'a, P> {
- type CM = Manager<'a, P>;
+ impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
+ type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
#[inline]
- fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'a, P> { self.node }
+ fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
#[inline]
fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
}
- #[cfg(test)]
- #[bench]
- fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
- bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
+ pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
+ bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
}
- pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
+ pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
// Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
// Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
// calls per node.
let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
+ let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
- let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
+ let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
+ config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
network,
best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
- });
+ }, genesis_block.header.time);
let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
network,
best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
- });
+ }, genesis_block.header.time);
let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
- node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_b.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
- node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_a.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
+ node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
+ features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, true).unwrap();
+ node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
+ features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, false).unwrap();
node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
- let block = Block {
- header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
- txdata: vec![tx],
- };
+ let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
$node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
- PaymentId(payment_hash.0), RouteParameters {
- payment_params, final_value_msat: 10_000,
- }, Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
+ PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
+ RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
+ Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
$node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
$node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
}
}
- bench.iter(|| {
+ bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
send_payment!(node_b, node_a);
- });
+ }));
}
}