use ln::msgs;
use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
use ln::onion_utils;
-use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, OptionalField};
+use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT, OptionalField};
use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
use util::config::UserConfig;
use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
use util::{byte_utils, events};
use util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
-use util::logger::{Logger, Level};
+use util::logger::{Level, Logger};
use util::errors::APIError;
use io;
use sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
use core::time::Duration;
-#[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
-use std::time::Instant;
use core::ops::Deref;
+#[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
+use std::time::Instant;
+
+mod inbound_payment {
+ use alloc::string::ToString;
+ use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
+ use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
+ use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
+ use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
+ use chain::keysinterface::{KeyMaterial, KeysInterface, Sign};
+ use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
+ use ln::channelmanager::APIError;
+ use ln::msgs;
+ use ln::msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
+ use util::chacha20::ChaCha20;
+ use util::logger::Logger;
+
+ use core::convert::TryInto;
+ use core::ops::Deref;
+
+ const IV_LEN: usize = 16;
+ const METADATA_LEN: usize = 16;
+ const METADATA_KEY_LEN: usize = 32;
+ const AMT_MSAT_LEN: usize = 8;
+ // Used to shift the payment type bits to take up the top 3 bits of the metadata bytes, or to
+ // retrieve said payment type bits.
+ const METHOD_TYPE_OFFSET: usize = 5;
+
+ /// A set of keys that were HKDF-expanded from an initial call to
+ /// [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`].
+ ///
+ /// [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`]: crate::chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material
+ pub(super) struct ExpandedKey {
+ /// The key used to encrypt the bytes containing the payment metadata (i.e. the amount and
+ /// expiry, included for payment verification on decryption).
+ metadata_key: [u8; 32],
+ /// The key used to authenticate an LDK-provided payment hash and metadata as previously
+ /// registered with LDK.
+ ldk_pmt_hash_key: [u8; 32],
+ /// The key used to authenticate a user-provided payment hash and metadata as previously
+ /// registered with LDK.
+ user_pmt_hash_key: [u8; 32],
+ }
+
+ impl ExpandedKey {
+ pub(super) fn new(key_material: &KeyMaterial) -> ExpandedKey {
+ hkdf_extract_expand(b"LDK Inbound Payment Key Expansion", &key_material)
+ }
+ }
+
+ enum Method {
+ LdkPaymentHash = 0,
+ UserPaymentHash = 1,
+ }
+
+ impl Method {
+ fn from_bits(bits: u8) -> Result<Method, u8> {
+ match bits {
+ bits if bits == Method::LdkPaymentHash as u8 => Ok(Method::LdkPaymentHash),
+ bits if bits == Method::UserPaymentHash as u8 => Ok(Method::UserPaymentHash),
+ unknown => Err(unknown),
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ pub(super) fn create<Signer: Sign, K: Deref>(keys: &ExpandedKey, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, keys_manager: &K, highest_seen_timestamp: u64) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()>
+ where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>
+ {
+ let metadata_bytes = construct_metadata_bytes(min_value_msat, Method::LdkPaymentHash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, highest_seen_timestamp)?;
+
+ let mut iv_bytes = [0 as u8; IV_LEN];
+ let rand_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
+ iv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&rand_bytes[..IV_LEN]);
+
+ let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.ldk_pmt_hash_key);
+ hmac.input(&iv_bytes);
+ hmac.input(&metadata_bytes);
+ let payment_preimage_bytes = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
+
+ let ldk_pmt_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_bytes).into_inner());
+ let payment_secret = construct_payment_secret(&iv_bytes, &metadata_bytes, &keys.metadata_key);
+ Ok((ldk_pmt_hash, payment_secret))
+ }
+
+ pub(super) fn create_from_hash(keys: &ExpandedKey, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, payment_hash: PaymentHash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, highest_seen_timestamp: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
+ let metadata_bytes = construct_metadata_bytes(min_value_msat, Method::UserPaymentHash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, highest_seen_timestamp)?;
+
+ let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.user_pmt_hash_key);
+ hmac.input(&metadata_bytes);
+ hmac.input(&payment_hash.0);
+ let hmac_bytes = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
+
+ let mut iv_bytes = [0 as u8; IV_LEN];
+ iv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&hmac_bytes[..IV_LEN]);
+
+ Ok(construct_payment_secret(&iv_bytes, &metadata_bytes, &keys.metadata_key))
+ }
+
+ fn construct_metadata_bytes(min_value_msat: Option<u64>, payment_type: Method, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, highest_seen_timestamp: u64) -> Result<[u8; METADATA_LEN], ()> {
+ if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
+ return Err(());
+ }
+
+ let mut min_amt_msat_bytes: [u8; AMT_MSAT_LEN] = match min_value_msat {
+ Some(amt) => amt.to_be_bytes(),
+ None => [0; AMT_MSAT_LEN],
+ };
+ min_amt_msat_bytes[0] |= (payment_type as u8) << METHOD_TYPE_OFFSET;
+
+ // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time - it's updated when
+ // we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in a header. It should never be more
+ // than two hours in the future. Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we
+ // absolutely never fail a payment too early.
+ // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date timestamps.
+ let expiry_bytes = (highest_seen_timestamp + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200).to_be_bytes();
+
+ let mut metadata_bytes: [u8; METADATA_LEN] = [0; METADATA_LEN];
+ metadata_bytes[..AMT_MSAT_LEN].copy_from_slice(&min_amt_msat_bytes);
+ metadata_bytes[AMT_MSAT_LEN..].copy_from_slice(&expiry_bytes);
+
+ Ok(metadata_bytes)
+ }
+
+ fn construct_payment_secret(iv_bytes: &[u8; IV_LEN], metadata_bytes: &[u8; METADATA_LEN], metadata_key: &[u8; METADATA_KEY_LEN]) -> PaymentSecret {
+ let mut payment_secret_bytes: [u8; 32] = [0; 32];
+ let (iv_slice, encrypted_metadata_slice) = payment_secret_bytes.split_at_mut(IV_LEN);
+ iv_slice.copy_from_slice(iv_bytes);
+
+ let chacha_block = ChaCha20::get_single_block(metadata_key, iv_bytes);
+ for i in 0..METADATA_LEN {
+ encrypted_metadata_slice[i] = chacha_block[i] ^ metadata_bytes[i];
+ }
+ PaymentSecret(payment_secret_bytes)
+ }
+
+ /// Check that an inbound payment's `payment_data` field is sane.
+ ///
+ /// LDK does not store any data for pending inbound payments. Instead, we construct our payment
+ /// secret (and, if supplied by LDK, our payment preimage) to include encrypted metadata about the
+ /// payment.
+ ///
+ /// The metadata is constructed as:
+ /// payment method (3 bits) || payment amount (8 bytes - 3 bits) || expiry (8 bytes)
+ /// and encrypted using a key derived from [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`].
+ ///
+ /// Then on payment receipt, we verify in this method that the payment preimage and payment secret
+ /// match what was constructed.
+ ///
+ /// [`create_inbound_payment`] and [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] are called by the user to
+ /// construct the payment secret and/or payment hash that this method is verifying. If the former
+ /// method is called, then the payment method bits mentioned above are represented internally as
+ /// [`Method::LdkPaymentHash`]. If the latter, [`Method::UserPaymentHash`].
+ ///
+ /// For the former method, the payment preimage is constructed as an HMAC of payment metadata and
+ /// random bytes. Because the payment secret is also encoded with these random bytes and metadata
+ /// (with the metadata encrypted with a block cipher), we're able to authenticate the preimage on
+ /// payment receipt.
+ ///
+ /// For the latter, the payment secret instead contains an HMAC of the user-provided payment hash
+ /// and payment metadata (encrypted with a block cipher), allowing us to authenticate the payment
+ /// hash and metadata on payment receipt.
+ ///
+ /// See [`ExpandedKey`] docs for more info on the individual keys used.
+ ///
+ /// [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`]: crate::chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material
+ /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_inbound_payment
+ /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
+ pub(super) fn verify<L: Deref>(payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData, highest_seen_timestamp: u64, keys: &ExpandedKey, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<PaymentPreimage>, ()>
+ where L::Target: Logger
+ {
+ let (iv_bytes, metadata_bytes) = decrypt_metadata(payment_data.payment_secret, keys);
+
+ let payment_type_res = Method::from_bits((metadata_bytes[0] & 0b1110_0000) >> METHOD_TYPE_OFFSET);
+ let mut amt_msat_bytes = [0; AMT_MSAT_LEN];
+ amt_msat_bytes.copy_from_slice(&metadata_bytes[..AMT_MSAT_LEN]);
+ // Zero out the bits reserved to indicate the payment type.
+ amt_msat_bytes[0] &= 0b00011111;
+ let min_amt_msat: u64 = u64::from_be_bytes(amt_msat_bytes.into());
+ let expiry = u64::from_be_bytes(metadata_bytes[AMT_MSAT_LEN..].try_into().unwrap());
+
+ // Make sure to check to check the HMAC before doing the other checks below, to mitigate timing
+ // attacks.
+ let mut payment_preimage = None;
+ match payment_type_res {
+ Ok(Method::UserPaymentHash) => {
+ let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.user_pmt_hash_key);
+ hmac.input(&metadata_bytes[..]);
+ hmac.input(&payment_hash.0);
+ if !fixed_time_eq(&iv_bytes, &Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner().split_at_mut(IV_LEN).0) {
+ log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash {}: unexpected payment_secret", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
+ return Err(())
+ }
+ },
+ Ok(Method::LdkPaymentHash) => {
+ match derive_ldk_payment_preimage(payment_hash, &iv_bytes, &metadata_bytes, keys) {
+ Ok(preimage) => payment_preimage = Some(preimage),
+ Err(bad_preimage_bytes) => {
+ log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} due to mismatching preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(bad_preimage_bytes));
+ return Err(())
+ }
+ }
+ },
+ Err(unknown_bits) => {
+ log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment hash {} due to unknown payment type {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), unknown_bits);
+ return Err(());
+ }
+ }
+
+ if payment_data.total_msat < min_amt_msat {
+ log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} due to total_msat {} being less than the minimum amount of {} msat", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, min_amt_msat);
+ return Err(())
+ }
+
+ if expiry < highest_seen_timestamp {
+ log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {}: expired payment", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
+ return Err(())
+ }
+
+ Ok(payment_preimage)
+ }
+
+ pub(super) fn get_payment_preimage(payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret, keys: &ExpandedKey) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
+ let (iv_bytes, metadata_bytes) = decrypt_metadata(payment_secret, keys);
+
+ match Method::from_bits((metadata_bytes[0] & 0b1110_0000) >> METHOD_TYPE_OFFSET) {
+ Ok(Method::LdkPaymentHash) => {
+ derive_ldk_payment_preimage(payment_hash, &iv_bytes, &metadata_bytes, keys)
+ .map_err(|bad_preimage_bytes| APIError::APIMisuseError {
+ err: format!("Payment hash {} did not match decoded preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(bad_preimage_bytes))
+ })
+ },
+ Ok(Method::UserPaymentHash) => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
+ err: "Expected payment type to be LdkPaymentHash, instead got UserPaymentHash".to_string()
+ }),
+ Err(other) => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Unknown payment type: {}", other) }),
+ }
+ }
+
+ fn decrypt_metadata(payment_secret: PaymentSecret, keys: &ExpandedKey) -> ([u8; IV_LEN], [u8; METADATA_LEN]) {
+ let mut iv_bytes = [0; IV_LEN];
+ let (iv_slice, encrypted_metadata_bytes) = payment_secret.0.split_at(IV_LEN);
+ iv_bytes.copy_from_slice(iv_slice);
+
+ let chacha_block = ChaCha20::get_single_block(&keys.metadata_key, &iv_bytes);
+ let mut metadata_bytes: [u8; METADATA_LEN] = [0; METADATA_LEN];
+ for i in 0..METADATA_LEN {
+ metadata_bytes[i] = chacha_block[i] ^ encrypted_metadata_bytes[i];
+ }
+
+ (iv_bytes, metadata_bytes)
+ }
+
+ // Errors if the payment preimage doesn't match `payment_hash`. Returns the bad preimage bytes in
+ // this case.
+ fn derive_ldk_payment_preimage(payment_hash: PaymentHash, iv_bytes: &[u8; IV_LEN], metadata_bytes: &[u8; METADATA_LEN], keys: &ExpandedKey) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, [u8; 32]> {
+ let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.ldk_pmt_hash_key);
+ hmac.input(iv_bytes);
+ hmac.input(metadata_bytes);
+ let decoded_payment_preimage = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
+ if !fixed_time_eq(&payment_hash.0, &Sha256::hash(&decoded_payment_preimage).into_inner()) {
+ return Err(decoded_payment_preimage);
+ }
+ return Ok(PaymentPreimage(decoded_payment_preimage))
+ }
+
+ fn hkdf_extract_expand(salt: &[u8], ikm: &KeyMaterial) -> ExpandedKey {
+ let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(salt);
+ hmac.input(&ikm.0);
+ let prk = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
+ let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&prk[..]);
+ hmac.input(&[1; 1]);
+ let metadata_key = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
+
+ let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&prk[..]);
+ hmac.input(&metadata_key);
+ hmac.input(&[2; 1]);
+ let ldk_pmt_hash_key = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
+
+ let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&prk[..]);
+ hmac.input(&ldk_pmt_hash_key);
+ hmac.input(&[3; 1]);
+ let user_pmt_hash_key = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
+
+ ExpandedKey {
+ metadata_key,
+ ldk_pmt_hash_key,
+ user_pmt_hash_key,
+ }
+ }
+}
+
// We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
//
// Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
/// and add a pending payment that was already fulfilled.
Fulfilled {
session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
+ payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
+ },
+ /// When a payer gives up trying to retry a payment, they inform us, letting us generate a
+ /// `PaymentFailed` event when all HTLCs have irrevocably failed. This avoids a number of race
+ /// conditions in MPP-aware payment retriers (1), where the possibility of multiple
+ /// `PaymentPathFailed` events with `all_paths_failed` can be pending at once, confusing a
+ /// downstream event handler as to when a payment has actually failed.
+ ///
+ /// (1) https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1164
+ Abandoned {
+ session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
+ payment_hash: PaymentHash,
},
}
_ => false,
}
}
+ fn abandoned(&self) -> bool {
+ match self {
+ PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => true,
+ _ => false,
+ }
+ }
fn get_pending_fee_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
match self {
PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { pending_fee_msat, .. } => pending_fee_msat.clone(),
}
}
+ fn payment_hash(&self) -> Option<PaymentHash> {
+ match self {
+ PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None,
+ PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
+ PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => *payment_hash,
+ PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
+ }
+ }
+
fn mark_fulfilled(&mut self) {
let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
- PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs }
- => session_privs
+ PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
+ PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. }
+ => session_privs,
+ });
+ let payment_hash = self.payment_hash();
+ *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, payment_hash };
+ }
+
+ fn mark_abandoned(&mut self) -> Result<(), ()> {
+ let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
+ let our_payment_hash;
+ core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
+ PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } |
+ PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } =>
+ return Err(()),
+ PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } |
+ PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } => {
+ our_payment_hash = *payment_hash;
+ session_privs
+ },
});
- *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs };
+ *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash: our_payment_hash };
+ Ok(())
}
/// panics if path is None and !self.is_fulfilled
let remove_res = match self {
PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
- PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs } => {
+ PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
+ PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
session_privs.remove(session_priv)
}
};
PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
session_privs.insert(session_priv)
}
- PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => false
+ PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => false,
+ PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => false,
};
if insert_res {
if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
match self {
PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
- PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs } => {
+ PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
+ PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
session_privs.len()
}
}
our_network_key: SecretKey,
our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
+ inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
+
/// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
/// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
#[allow(dead_code)]
const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
+/// The number of blocks before we consider an outbound payment for expiry if it doesn't have any
+/// pending HTLCs in flight.
+pub(crate) const PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
+
/// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
/// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
pub user_channel_id: u64,
+ /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
+ /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
+ /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
+ ///
+ /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
+ /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
+ /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
+ /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
+ ///
+ /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
+ pub balance_msat: u64,
/// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
- /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
+ /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
/// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
/// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
///
+ /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
+ ///
/// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
/// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
/// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
/// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
- /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
+ /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
/// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
/// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
/// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
$raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
- $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $funding_locked: expr) => { {
+ $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $funding_locked: expr, $announcement_sigs: expr) => { {
let mut htlc_forwards = None;
let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
node_id: counterparty_node_id,
msg,
});
- if let Some(announcement_sigs) = $self.get_announcement_sigs($channel_entry.get()) {
- $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
- node_id: counterparty_node_id,
- msg: announcement_sigs,
- });
- }
$channel_state.short_to_id.insert($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), $channel_entry.get().channel_id());
}
+ if let Some(msg) = $announcement_sigs {
+ $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
+ node_id: counterparty_node_id,
+ msg,
+ });
+ }
let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
-
+ let inbound_pmt_key_material = keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
+ let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
ChannelManager {
default_configuration: config.clone(),
genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
secp_ctx,
+ inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
+
last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
+ let balance_msat = channel.get_balance_msat();
let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
res.push(ChannelDetails {
short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
+ balance_msat,
inbound_capacity_msat,
outbound_capacity_msat,
user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
///
/// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
/// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
- /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, or if the payment
- /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success).
+ /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment
+ /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if
+ /// further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`].
///
/// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
+ /// [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]
pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10;
for path in route.paths.iter() {
}))
},
PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {
- return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError {
- err: "Payment already completed"
+ return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
+ err: "Payment already completed".to_owned()
+ }));
+ },
+ PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {
+ return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
+ err: "Payment already abandoned (with some HTLCs still pending)".to_owned()
}));
},
}
return self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, Some(payment_id), Some(total_msat)).map(|_| ())
}
+ /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur.
+ ///
+ /// After this method returns, any future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id`
+ /// will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`]. If no such event has been generated,
+ /// an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event will be generated as soon as there are no remaining
+ /// pending HTLCs for this payment.
+ ///
+ /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
+ /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
+ /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
+ ///
+ /// [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment
+ /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
+ /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
+ pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+
+ let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
+ if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
+ if let Ok(()) = payment.get_mut().mark_abandoned() {
+ if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
+ self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
+ payment_id,
+ payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
+ });
+ payment.remove();
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
/// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
/// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
/// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
/// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
/// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
///
- /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
+ /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
+ /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
///
/// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
/// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
/// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
///
/// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
+ /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
})
}
- fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
- if !chan.should_announce() {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
- return None
- }
-
- let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
- Ok(res) => res,
- Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
- };
- let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
- let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
-
- Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
- channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
- short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
- node_signature: our_node_sig,
- bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
- })
- }
-
#[allow(dead_code)]
// Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
// be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
let mut announced_chans = false;
for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
- if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
+ if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()) {
channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
msg,
update_msg: match self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
});
- match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet) {
+ match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet, &self.logger) {
Err(e) => {
if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
}
}
+ macro_rules! check_total_value {
+ ($payment_data_total_msat: expr, $payment_secret: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
+ let mut total_value = 0;
+ let mut payment_received_generated = false;
+ let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
+ .or_insert(Vec::new());
+ if htlcs.len() == 1 {
+ if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
+ fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
+ continue
+ }
+ }
+ htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
+ for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
+ total_value += htlc.value;
+ match &htlc.onion_payload {
+ OnionPayload::Invoice(htlc_payment_data) => {
+ if htlc_payment_data.total_msat != $payment_data_total_msat {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
+ log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data_total_msat, htlc_payment_data.total_msat);
+ total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
+ }
+ if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
+ },
+ _ => unreachable!(),
+ }
+ }
+ if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data_total_msat {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
+ log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data_total_msat);
+ for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
+ fail_htlc!(htlc);
+ }
+ } else if total_value == $payment_data_total_msat {
+ new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
+ payment_hash,
+ purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
+ payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
+ payment_secret: $payment_secret,
+ },
+ amt: total_value,
+ });
+ payment_received_generated = true;
+ } else {
+ // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
+ // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
+ // MPP parts.
+ }
+ payment_received_generated
+ }}
+ }
+
// Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
// MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
// "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
- OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we didn't have a corresponding inbound payment.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
- fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
+ OnionPayload::Invoice(ref payment_data) => {
+ let payment_preimage = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, payment_data.clone(), self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
+ Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
+ Err(()) => {
+ fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
+ continue
+ }
+ };
+ let payment_data_total_msat = payment_data.total_msat;
+ let payment_secret = payment_data.payment_secret.clone();
+ check_total_value!(payment_data_total_msat, payment_secret, payment_preimage);
},
OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
} else {
- let mut total_value = 0;
- let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
- .or_insert(Vec::new());
- if htlcs.len() == 1 {
- if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
- fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
- continue
- }
- }
- htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
- for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
- total_value += htlc.value;
- match &htlc.onion_payload {
- OnionPayload::Invoice(htlc_payment_data) => {
- if htlc_payment_data.total_msat != payment_data.total_msat {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
- log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, htlc_payment_data.total_msat);
- total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
- }
- if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
- },
- _ => unreachable!(),
- }
- }
- if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > payment_data.total_msat {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
- log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, payment_data.total_msat);
- for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
- fail_htlc!(htlc);
- }
- } else if total_value == payment_data.total_msat {
- new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
- payment_hash,
- purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
- payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
- payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
- },
- amt: total_value,
- });
- // Only ever generate at most one PaymentReceived
- // per registered payment_hash, even if it isn't
- // claimed.
+ let payment_received_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data.total_msat, payment_data.payment_secret, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
+ if payment_received_generated {
inbound_payment.remove_entry();
- } else {
- // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
- // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
- // MPP parts.
}
}
},
final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
})
} else { None };
- self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
- events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
- payment_id: Some(payment_id),
- payment_hash,
- rejected_by_dest: false,
- network_update: None,
- all_paths_failed: payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0,
- path: path.clone(),
- short_channel_id: None,
- retry,
- #[cfg(test)]
- error_code: None,
- #[cfg(test)]
- error_data: None,
- }
- );
+ let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
+ pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
+ payment_id: Some(payment_id),
+ payment_hash,
+ rejected_by_dest: false,
+ network_update: None,
+ all_paths_failed: payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0,
+ path: path.clone(),
+ short_channel_id: None,
+ retry,
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ error_code: None,
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ error_data: None,
+ });
+ if payment.get().abandoned() && payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
+ pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
+ payment_id,
+ payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
+ });
+ payment.remove();
+ }
}
} else {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
let mut all_paths_failed = false;
+ let mut full_failure_ev = None;
if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
if !payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
}
if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
all_paths_failed = true;
+ if payment.get().abandoned() {
+ full_failure_ev = Some(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
+ payment_id,
+ payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
+ });
+ payment.remove();
+ }
}
} else {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
})
} else { None };
log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
- match &onion_error {
+
+ let path_failure = match &onion_error {
&HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
#[cfg(test)]
let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
// TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
// process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
// next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
- self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
- events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
- payment_id: Some(payment_id),
- payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
- rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
- network_update,
- all_paths_failed,
- path: path.clone(),
- short_channel_id,
- retry,
+ events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
+ payment_id: Some(payment_id),
+ payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
+ rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
+ network_update,
+ all_paths_failed,
+ path: path.clone(),
+ short_channel_id,
+ retry,
#[cfg(test)]
- error_code: onion_error_code,
+ error_code: onion_error_code,
#[cfg(test)]
- error_data: onion_error_data
- }
- );
+ error_data: onion_error_data
+ }
},
&HTLCFailReason::Reason {
#[cfg(test)]
// ChannelDetails.
// TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
// channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
- self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
- events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
- payment_id: Some(payment_id),
- payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
- rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
- network_update: None,
- all_paths_failed,
- path: path.clone(),
- short_channel_id: Some(path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id),
- retry,
+ events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
+ payment_id: Some(payment_id),
+ payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
+ rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
+ network_update: None,
+ all_paths_failed,
+ path: path.clone(),
+ short_channel_id: Some(path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id),
+ retry,
#[cfg(test)]
- error_code: Some(*failure_code),
+ error_code: Some(*failure_code),
#[cfg(test)]
- error_data: Some(data.clone()),
- }
- );
+ error_data: Some(data.clone()),
+ }
}
- }
+ };
+ let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
+ pending_events.push(path_failure);
+ if let Some(ev) = full_failure_ev { pending_events.push(ev); }
},
HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. }) => {
let err_packet = match onion_error {
}
}
- /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
- /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
- /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
+ /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentReceived`], generating any
+ /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
///
/// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
/// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
/// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
/// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
///
- /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
+ /// Returns whether any HTLCs were claimed, and thus if any new [`MessageSendEvent`]s are now
+ /// pending for processing via [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`].
///
+ /// [`Event::PaymentReceived`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentReceived
/// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
/// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
+ /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
}
fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
+ let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
for source in sources.drain(..) {
- if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, .. } = source {
+ if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } = source {
let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
assert!(payment.get().is_fulfilled());
- payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None);
+ if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None) {
+ pending_events.push(
+ events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
+ payment_id,
+ payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash(),
+ path,
+ }
+ );
+ }
if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
payment.remove();
}
session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
- let found_payment = !payment.get().is_fulfilled();
- let fee_paid_msat = payment.get().get_pending_fee_msat();
- payment.get_mut().mark_fulfilled();
+ let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
+ if !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
+ let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
+ let fee_paid_msat = payment.get().get_pending_fee_msat();
+ pending_events.push(
+ events::Event::PaymentSent {
+ payment_id: Some(payment_id),
+ payment_preimage,
+ payment_hash,
+ fee_paid_msat,
+ }
+ );
+ payment.get_mut().mark_fulfilled();
+ }
+
if from_onchain {
// We currently immediately remove HTLCs which were fulfilled on-chain.
// This could potentially lead to removing a pending payment too early,
// restart.
// TODO: We should have a second monitor event that informs us of payments
// irrevocably fulfilled.
- payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path));
+ if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
+ let payment_hash = Some(PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()));
+ pending_events.push(
+ events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
+ payment_id,
+ payment_hash,
+ path,
+ }
+ );
+ }
+
if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
payment.remove();
}
}
- if found_payment {
- let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
- self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
- events::Event::PaymentSent {
- payment_id: Some(payment_id),
- payment_preimage,
- payment_hash: payment_hash,
- fee_paid_msat,
- }
- );
- }
} else {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
}
return;
}
- let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger);
- let channel_update = if updates.funding_locked.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() && !channel.get().should_announce() {
+ let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
+ let channel_update = if updates.funding_locked.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() {
// We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
- // funding_locked and the channel is in a usable state. Further, we rely on the
- // normal announcement_signatures process to send a channel_update for public
- // channels, only generating a unicast channel_update if this is a private channel.
+ // funding_locked and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
+ // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
+ // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
+ // now.
Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()).unwrap(),
})
} else { None };
- chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, None, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.funding_locked);
+ chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, None, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.funding_locked, updates.announcement_sigs);
if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
}
}
let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(),
- &their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height())
+ &their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger)
.map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
}
- try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
- if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
- // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
- // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
- // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
- // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
- // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
- // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
- // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
- // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
- // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
+ let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg, self.get_our_node_id(),
+ self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
+ if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
msg: announcement_sigs,
});
} else if chan.get().is_usable() {
+ // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
+ // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
+ // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
+ // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
+ // announcement_signatures.
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
}
channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
- msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), msg), channel_state, chan),
+ msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
+ self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), msg), channel_state, chan),
// Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
// so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
// disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
// freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
// add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
- let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, order, htlcs_failed_forward, shutdown) =
- try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
+ let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
+ msg, &self.logger, self.our_network_pubkey.clone(), self.genesis_hash,
+ &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), channel_state, chan);
let mut channel_update = None;
- if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
+ if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown {
channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
msg,
});
}
let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
- chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order, monitor_update_opt, Vec::new(), None, funding_locked);
+ chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(
+ self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
+ responses.mon_update, Vec::new(), None, responses.funding_locked, responses.announcement_sigs);
if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
}
- (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround)
+ (responses.holding_cell_failed_htlcs, need_lnd_workaround)
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
}
fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
+ if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
+ return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
+ }
+
let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
// We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
- // its updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
+ // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
// a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
// Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
// never fail a payment too early.
/// to pay us.
///
/// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
- /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you, returning the first and storing the second.
+ /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
///
/// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
/// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
///
/// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
///
+ /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
+ /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
+ ///
+ /// # Note
+ ///
+ /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
+ /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
+ ///
+ /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
+ ///
/// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
/// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
/// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
/// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
- pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> (PaymentHash, PaymentSecret) {
+ pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
+ inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, &self.keys_manager, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
+ }
+
+ /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
+ /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
+ ///
+ /// # Note
+ /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
+ ///
+ /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
+ #[deprecated]
+ pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
-
- (payment_hash,
- self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
- .expect("RNG Generated Duplicate PaymentHash"))
+ let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
+ Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
}
/// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
/// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
/// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
///
- /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) must be globally unique. This
- /// method may return an Err if another payment with the same payment_hash is still pending.
+ /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
+ /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
+ /// payments.
///
/// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
/// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
/// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
/// [`PaymentReceived`].
///
- /// Pending inbound payments are stored in memory and in serialized versions of this
- /// [`ChannelManager`]. If potentially unbounded numbers of inbound payments may exist and
- /// space is limited, you may wish to rate-limit inbound payment creation.
- ///
/// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
///
/// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
/// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
///
+ /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
+ /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
+ ///
+ /// # Note
+ ///
+ /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
+ /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
+ ///
+ /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
+ ///
/// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
/// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
- pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
+ pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
+ inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
+ }
+
+ /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
+ /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
+ ///
+ /// # Note
+ /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
+ ///
+ /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
+ #[deprecated]
+ pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
}
+ /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
+ /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
+ ///
+ /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
+ pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
+ inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
+ }
+
#[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))]
pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
!self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty()
}
+
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
+ self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().clear()
+ }
}
impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
*best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
}
- self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, &self.logger));
+ self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
}
}
log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
- self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, &self.logger).map(|a| (a, Vec::new())));
+ self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger)
+ .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
}
fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
*self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
- self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, &self.logger));
+ self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
macro_rules! max_time {
($timestamp: expr) => {
inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
});
+ let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
- outbounds.retain(|_, payment| {
- const PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
+ outbounds.retain(|payment_id, payment| {
if payment.remaining_parts() != 0 { return true }
- if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { starting_block_height, .. } = payment {
- return *starting_block_height + PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS > height
- }
- true
+ if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { starting_block_height, payment_hash, .. } = payment {
+ if *starting_block_height + PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS <= height {
+ log_info!(self.logger, "Timing out payment with id {} and hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_id.0), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
+ pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
+ payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash,
+ });
+ false
+ } else { true }
+ } else { true }
});
}
self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
- channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|_| (None, Vec::new()))
- } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
- } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
+ channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
+ } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
+ } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
});
}
}
/// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
/// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
/// the function.
- fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ClosureReason>>
+ fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
(&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
// Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
// during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
let res = f(channel);
- if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res {
+ if let Ok((funding_locked_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
data: chan_update,
}));
}
- if let Some(funding_locked) = chan_res {
+ if let Some(funding_locked) = funding_locked_opt {
pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
msg: funding_locked,
});
- if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
- node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
- msg: announcement_sigs,
- });
- } else if channel.is_usable() {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures but with private channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
+ if channel.is_usable() {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel).unwrap(),
});
} else {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
}
short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
}
+ if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
+ node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ msg: announcement_sigs,
+ });
+ if let Some(height) = height_opt {
+ if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, height) {
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
+ msg: announcement,
+ // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
+ // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
+ update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap(),
+ });
+ }
+ }
+ }
} else if let Err(reason) = res {
if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
/// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
/// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
/// up.
- /// Note that the feature `allow_wallclock_use` must be enabled to use this function.
- #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
+ ///
+ /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
+ #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
}
}
}
- #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
+ #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
let current_time = Instant::now();
loop {
},
(1, Fulfilled) => {
(0, session_privs, required),
+ (1, payment_hash, option),
},
(2, Retryable) => {
(0, session_privs, required),
(8, pending_amt_msat, required),
(10, starting_block_height, required),
},
+ (3, Abandoned) => {
+ (0, session_privs, required),
+ (2, payment_hash, required),
+ },
);
impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
// For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
- if !outbound.is_fulfilled() {
+ if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
}
}
}
}
PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
+ PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
}
}
pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
}
+ let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
+ let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
genesis_hash,
fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
claimable_htlcs,
pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
}),
+ inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
use core::time::Duration;
+ use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
+ use ln::channelmanager::inbound_payment;
use ln::features::InitFeatures;
use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
use ln::msgs;
fn test_wait_timeout() {
use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
use sync::Arc;
- use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
+ use core::sync::atomic::AtomicBool;
use std::thread;
let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- // Note that successful MPP payments will generate 1 event upon the first path's success. No
- // further events will be generated for subsequence path successes.
+ // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
+ // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
match events[0] {
Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
+ match events[1] {
+ Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
+ assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
+ assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
+ assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ match events[2] {
+ Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
+ assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
+ assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
+ assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
}
#[test]
_ => panic!("unexpected error")
}
}
+
+ #[test]
+ fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
+ // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
+ let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
+ payment_secret,
+ total_msat: 100_000,
+ };
+
+ // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
+ // payment verification fails as expected.
+ let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
+ bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
+ match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, payment_data.clone(), nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
+ Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
+ Err(()) => {
+ nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
+ assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
+ }
}
#[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "unstable"))]
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff