//! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
//! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
-use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
+use bitcoin::blockdata::block::Header;
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
+use bitcoin::key::constants::SECRET_KEY_SIZE;
use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
-use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
+use bitcoin::{secp256k1, Sequence};
use crate::blinded_path::BlindedPath;
use crate::blinded_path::payment::{PaymentConstraints, ReceiveTlvs};
user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
value_msat: val.value,
+ counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: val.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0),
}
}
}
/// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
- OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
+ OutboundRoute { session_priv: [u8; SECRET_KEY_SIZE] },
}
impl SentHTLCId {
pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
},
HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
- Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
+ Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: session_priv.secret_bytes() },
}
}
}
/// Invalid inbound onion payment.
pub struct InboundOnionErr {
- err_code: u16,
- err_data: Vec<u8>,
- msg: &'static str,
+ /// BOLT 4 error code.
+ pub err_code: u16,
+ /// Data attached to this error.
+ pub err_data: Vec<u8>,
+ /// Error message text.
+ pub msg: &'static str,
}
/// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
/// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
/// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
///
+ /// If `temporary_channel_id` is specified, it will be used as the temporary channel ID of the
+ /// channel. Otherwise, a random one will be generated for you.
+ ///
/// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
/// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
/// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
/// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
/// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
/// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
- pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
+ pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
}
.ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
+
+ if let Some(temporary_channel_id) = temporary_channel_id {
+ if peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temporary_channel_id) {
+ return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Channel with temporary channel ID {} already exists!", temporary_channel_id)});
+ }
+ }
+
let channel = {
let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
- self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
+ self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias, temporary_channel_id)
{
Ok(res) => res,
Err(e) => {
let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
- let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
- .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
- let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
-
- let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash)
- .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute { err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()})?;
+ let (onion_packet, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::create_payment_onion(
+ &self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height,
+ payment_hash, keysend_preimage, prng_seed
+ )?;
let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
- let (chan, msg) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
+ let (chan, msg_opt) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) => {
let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
}),
};
- peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
- node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
- msg,
- });
+ if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
+ peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
+ node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ msg,
+ });
+ }
match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
// lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
// node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
// module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
- if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 1 {
+ if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) &&
+ funding_transaction.lock_time.is_block_height() &&
+ funding_transaction.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() > height + 1
+ {
result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
}));
err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
}),
- None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
- err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
- next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
- })
+ None => {
+ let error = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
+ next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id);
+ log_error!(self.logger, "{} when attempting to forward intercepted HTLC", error);
+ return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
+ err: error
+ })
+ }
}
};
) {
Ok(res) => res,
Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
- let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
+ let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).to_byte_array();
// In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
// `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
// if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
}
fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
- let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
+ let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
- let (chan, funding_msg, monitor) =
+ let (chan, funding_msg_opt, monitor) =
match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger) {
None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
};
- match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
+ match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
- Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
+ Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
+ "Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(),
+ chan.context.channel_id()
+ ))
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
let mut id_to_peer_lock = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
"The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
- funding_msg.channel_id))
+ chan.context.channel_id()))
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
// hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
// accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
// until we have persisted our monitor.
- peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
- node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
- msg: funding_msg,
- });
+ if let Some(msg) = funding_msg_opt {
+ peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
+ node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
+ msg,
+ });
+ }
if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
Ok(())
} else {
log_error!(self.logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
+ let channel_id = match funding_msg_opt {
+ Some(msg) => msg.channel_id,
+ None => chan.context.channel_id(),
+ };
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
"The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
- funding_msg.channel_id));
+ channel_id));
}
}
}
if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.chain_hash)
{
- let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
+ let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).to_byte_array());
let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
has_update
}
+ /// When a call to a [`ChannelSigner`] method returns an error, this indicates that the signer
+ /// is (temporarily) unavailable, and the operation should be retried later.
+ ///
+ /// This method allows for that retry - either checking for any signer-pending messages to be
+ /// attempted in every channel, or in the specifically provided channel.
+ ///
+ /// [`ChannelSigner`]: crate::sign::ChannelSigner
+ #[cfg(test)] // This is only implemented for one signer method, and should be private until we
+ // actually finish implementing it fully.
+ pub fn signer_unblocked(&self, channel_opt: Option<(PublicKey, ChannelId)>) {
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
+
+ let unblock_chan = |phase: &mut ChannelPhase<SP>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>| {
+ let node_id = phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id();
+ if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
+ let msgs = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger);
+ if let Some(updates) = msgs.commitment_update {
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
+ node_id,
+ updates,
+ });
+ }
+ if let Some(msg) = msgs.funding_signed {
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
+ node_id,
+ msg,
+ });
+ }
+ if let Some(msg) = msgs.funding_created {
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
+ node_id,
+ msg,
+ });
+ }
+ if let Some(msg) = msgs.channel_ready {
+ send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
+ }
+ }
+ };
+
+ let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
+ if let Some((counterparty_node_id, channel_id)) = channel_opt {
+ if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
+ let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
+ let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
+ if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
+ unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
+ let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
+ let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
+ for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
+ unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
/// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
/// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
/// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
// could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
// with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
// time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
- let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
+ let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
return Err(InboundOnionErr {
err_code: 0x4000|22,
return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
channel_id: msg.channel_id,
htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
- sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
+ sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).to_byte_array(),
failure_code: $err_code,
}));
}
R::Target: Router,
L::Target: Logger,
{
- fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
+ fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
{
let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
self.best_block_updated(header, height);
}
- fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
+ fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
let _persistence_guard =
PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
R::Target: Router,
L::Target: Logger,
{
- fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
+ fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
// Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
// during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
// See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
}
}
- fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
+ fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
// Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
// during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
// See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
});
}
- fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
+ fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> {
let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
- if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.context.get_funding_txo(), chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
- res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
+ let txid_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
+ let height_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmation_height();
+ let hash_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in();
+ if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(conf_height), Some(block_hash)) = (txid_opt, height_opt, hash_opt) {
+ res.push((funding_txo.txid, conf_height, Some(block_hash)));
}
}
}
});
}
+ fn handle_stfu(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Stfu) {
+ let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
+ "Quiescence not supported".to_owned(),
+ msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
+ }
+
+ fn handle_splice(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Splice) {
+ let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
+ "Splicing not supported".to_owned(),
+ msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
+ }
+
+ fn handle_splice_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceAck) {
+ let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
+ "Splicing not supported (splice_ack)".to_owned(),
+ msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
+ }
+
+ fn handle_splice_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceLocked) {
+ let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
+ "Splicing not supported (splice_locked)".to_owned(),
+ msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
+ }
+
fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
// Common Channel Establishment
&events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
&events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
+ // Quiescence
+ &events::MessageSendEvent::SendStfu { .. } => false,
+ // Splicing
+ &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSplice { .. } => false,
+ &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceAck { .. } => false,
+ &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceLocked { .. } => false,
// Interactive Transaction Construction
&events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
&events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
- let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
+ let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
- let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
+ let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
- let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
+ let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
- nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
- let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().into_inner());
+ let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().to_byte_array());
{
// Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
// funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
// Test the API functions.
- check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
+ check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None), unkown_public_key);
check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
// Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
- nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
let mut funding_tx = None;
open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
// Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
- nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
// If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
// Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
- nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
// but we can still open an outbound channel.
- nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
// but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
// Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
- nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
// First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
&[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
- nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
- nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None, None).unwrap();
let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
let recipient_onion = RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(pay_secret);
let preimage_bytes = [43; 32];
let preimage = PaymentPreimage(preimage_bytes);
- let rhash_bytes = Sha256::hash(&preimage_bytes).into_inner();
+ let rhash_bytes = Sha256::hash(&preimage_bytes).to_byte_array();
let payment_hash = PaymentHash(rhash_bytes);
let prng_seed = [44; 32];
use crate::util::test_utils;
use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
+ use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
- use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
+ use bitcoin::{Block, Transaction, TxOut};
use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
}, false).unwrap();
- node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
+ node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
let tx;
if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
- tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
+ tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
}]};
node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
payment_count += 1;
- let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
+ let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
$node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff