// construct one themselves.
use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
pub use ln::channel::CounterpartyForwardingInfo;
-use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
+use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus};
use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
use routing::router::{Route, RouteHop};
use ln::msgs;
use util::logger::Logger;
use util::errors::APIError;
-use std::{cmp, mem};
+use core::{cmp, mem};
use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
use std::io::{Cursor, Read};
use std::sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
-use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
-use std::time::Duration;
+use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
+use core::time::Duration;
#[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
use std::time::Instant;
-use std::ops::Deref;
+use core::ops::Deref;
use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
// We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
/// Locked *after* channel_state.
pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
+ /// The session_priv bytes of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
+ /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
+ /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
+ /// PaymentSent/PaymentFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
+ /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
+ /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
+ /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
+ /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
+ ///
+ /// Locked *after* channel_state.
+ pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashSet<[u8; 32]>>,
+
our_network_key: SecretKey,
our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
/// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
/// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
/// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
- /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the PersistenceNotifier
- /// the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
+ /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
+ /// PersistenceNotifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
pub fn height(&self) -> u32 { self.height }
}
+#[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
+enum NotifyOption {
+ DoPersist,
+ SkipPersist,
+}
+
/// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
/// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
-/// `await_persistable_update` that new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
+/// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
/// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
/// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
/// updates are ready for persistence).
-struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a> {
+///
+/// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
+/// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
+/// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
+struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
+ should_persist: F,
// We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
_read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
}
-impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a> {
- fn new(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> Self {
+impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
+ fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
+ PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
+ }
+
+ fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
- Self {
+ PersistenceNotifierGuard {
persistence_notifier: notifier,
+ should_persist: persist_check,
_read_guard: read_guard,
}
}
}
-impl<'a> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a> {
+impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
fn drop(&mut self) {
- self.persistence_notifier.notify();
+ if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
+ self.persistence_notifier.notify();
+ }
}
}
pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
/// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
-/// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly six hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
+/// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
///
/// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
///
// i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
-pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 6;
+pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
/// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
/// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
/// this value.
-pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER;
+// Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
+// any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
+// a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
+pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
// Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
// ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
#[allow(dead_code)]
const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
-// Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
+// Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
// ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
#[deny(const_err)]
#[allow(dead_code)]
/// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
/// lifetime of the channel.
pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
+ /// our counterparty already.
+ ///
+ /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
+ /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
+ pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
/// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
/// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
/// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
/// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
+ /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
+ pub is_outbound: bool,
+ /// True if the channel is confirmed, funding_locked messages have been exchanged, and the
+ /// channel is not currently being shut down. `funding_locked` message exchange implies the
+ /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
+ /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations).
+ pub is_funding_locked: bool,
/// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
- /// the peer is connected, and (c) no monitor update failure is pending resolution.
- pub is_live: bool,
-
+ /// the peer is connected, (c) no monitor update failure is pending resolution, and (d) the
+ /// channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
+ ///
+ /// This is a strict superset of `is_funding_locked`.
+ pub is_usable: bool,
+ /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
+ pub is_public: bool,
/// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
/// payments to us through this channel.
pub counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
}),
pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
+ pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, config)?;
let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
// We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
res.push(ChannelDetails {
channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
+ funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
remote_network_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
counterparty_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
inbound_capacity_msat,
outbound_capacity_msat,
user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
- is_live: channel.is_live(),
+ is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
+ is_funding_locked: channel.is_usable(),
+ is_usable: channel.is_live(),
+ is_public: channel.should_announce(),
counterparty_forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
});
}
/// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
/// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
///
- /// These are guaranteed to have their is_live value set to true, see the documentation for
- /// ChannelDetails::is_live for more info on exactly what the criteria are.
+ /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
+ /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
+ /// are.
pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
// Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
// internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
///
/// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
/// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
/// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None) {
Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
- let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
+ let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
+ let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
.map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
}
let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ assert!(self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().insert(session_priv_bytes));
let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
/// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
/// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
if inp.witness.is_empty() {
// be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
// broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
// message...
- const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::std::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
+ const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::core::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
#[deny(const_err)]
#[allow(dead_code)]
// ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
///
/// Panics if addresses is absurdly large (more than 500).
pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
if addresses.len() > 500 {
panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
/// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
/// Will likely generate further events.
pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
let mut new_events = Vec::new();
let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
/// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
///
/// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
- fn process_background_events(&self) {
+ fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
let mut background_events = Vec::new();
mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
+ if background_events.is_empty() {
+ return false;
+ }
+
for event in background_events.drain(..) {
match event {
BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
},
}
}
+ true
}
#[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
///
/// Note that in some rare cases this may generate a `chain::Watch::update_channel` call.
pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
- self.process_background_events();
+ PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
+ let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
+ if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
- let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
- for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter_mut() {
- if chan.is_disabled_staged() && !chan.is_live() {
- if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
- channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
- msg: update
- });
+ let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
+ for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter_mut() {
+ match chan.channel_update_status() {
+ ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
+ ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
+ ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
+ ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
+ ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
+ if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
+ msg: update
+ });
+ }
+ should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
+ chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
+ },
+ ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
+ if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
+ msg: update
+ });
+ }
+ should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
+ chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
+ },
+ _ => {},
}
- chan.to_fresh();
- } else if chan.is_disabled_staged() && chan.is_live() {
- chan.to_fresh();
- } else if chan.is_disabled_marked() {
- chan.to_disabled_staged();
}
- }
+
+ should_persist
+ });
}
/// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
/// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
/// HTLC backwards has been started.
pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
},
- HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
- self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
- events::Event::PaymentFailed {
- payment_hash,
- rejected_by_dest: false,
+ HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } => {
+ if {
+ let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
+ session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
+ self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&session_priv_bytes)
+ } {
+ self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
+ events::Event::PaymentFailed {
+ payment_hash,
+ rejected_by_dest: false,
#[cfg(test)]
- error_code: None,
+ error_code: None,
#[cfg(test)]
- error_data: None,
- }
- )
+ error_data: None,
+ }
+ )
+ } else {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
+ }
},
};
}
// from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
// being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
match source {
- HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, .. } => {
+ HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, .. } => {
+ if {
+ let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
+ session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
+ !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&session_priv_bytes)
+ } {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
+ return;
+ }
log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
match &onion_error {
pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
match source {
- HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
+ HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } => {
mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
- let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
- pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
- payment_preimage
- });
+ if {
+ let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
+ session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
+ self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&session_priv_bytes)
+ } {
+ let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
+ pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
+ payment_preimage
+ });
+ } else {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
+ }
},
HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
/// 4) once all remote copies are updated, you call this function with the update_id that
/// completed, and once it is the latest the Channel will be re-enabled.
pub fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
let mut close_results = Vec::new();
let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
/// (C-not exported) Cause its doc(hidden) anyway
#[doc(hidden)]
pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
let counterparty_node_id;
let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
/// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
/// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
/// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
- /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 7,200 secs as a default validity time for
+ /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
/// invoices when no timeout is set.
///
/// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
}
fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
let new_height = height - 1;
{
let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
let block_hash = header.block_hash();
log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, &self.logger).map(|a| (a, Vec::new())));
}
let block_hash = header.block_hash();
log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
*self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
}
fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
L::Target: Logger,
{
fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
}
fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
}
fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
}
fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
}
fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
}
fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
}
fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
}
fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
}
fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
}
fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
}
fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
}
fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
}
fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
}
fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
}
fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
}
fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
}
fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
}
fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
let mut no_channels_remain = true;
// on peer disconnect here, there will need to be corresponding changes in
// reestablish logic.
let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
- chan.to_disabled_marked();
if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
{
let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
}
fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
for chan in self.list_channels() {
loop {
let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
+ if *guard {
+ *guard = false;
+ return;
+ }
guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
let result = *guard;
if result {
loop {
let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
+ if *guard {
+ *guard = false;
+ return true;
+ }
guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
// Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
// desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
- writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
- writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
+ write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
{
pending_payment.write(writer)?;
}
+ let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
+ (pending_outbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
+ for session_priv in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
+ session_priv.write(writer)?;
+ }
+
+ write_tlv_fields!(writer, {});
+
Ok(())
}
}
L::Target: Logger,
{
fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
- let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
- return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
- }
+ let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
}
}
+ let pending_outbound_payments_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut pending_outbound_payments: HashSet<[u8; 32]> = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
+ for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count {
+ if !pending_outbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?) {
+ return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
+ }
+ }
+
+ read_tlv_fields!(reader, {}, {});
+
let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
}),
pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
+ pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments),
our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &args.keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
mod tests {
use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
use std::sync::Arc;
- use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
+ use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
use std::thread;
- use std::time::Duration;
+ use core::time::Duration;
#[test]
fn test_wait_timeout() {
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff