/// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
/// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
-pub(crate) const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
+///
+/// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
+///
+/// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
+pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
/// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
/// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
/// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
-/// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
-/// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
-/// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
-/// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
-const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 12; //TODO?
+/// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly six hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
+///
+/// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
+///
+/// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
+// This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
+// i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
+// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
+// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
+pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 6;
pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
// Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
// LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
#[deny(const_err)]
#[allow(dead_code)]
-const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
+const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
// Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
// ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
#[deny(const_err)]
#[allow(dead_code)]
-const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
+const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
/// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
#[derive(Clone)]
if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
}
- if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
+ if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta() as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
}
let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
short_channel_id,
timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
- cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
+ cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
fee_base_msat: chan.get_holder_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator),
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ assert_eq!(*self.last_block_hash.read().unwrap(), header.prev_blockhash,
+ "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
+ assert_eq!(self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, height as u64 - 1,
+ "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
*self.last_block_hash.write().unwrap() = block_hash;
// See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ assert_eq!(*self.last_block_hash.read().unwrap(), header.block_hash(),
+ "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
*self.last_block_hash.write().unwrap() = header.prev_blockhash;
&events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => true,
&events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
&events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
+ &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
}
});
}
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff