use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
// Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
// construct one themselves.
+use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
pub use ln::channel::CounterpartyForwardingInfo;
use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
use std::time::Duration;
#[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
use std::time::Instant;
-use std::marker::{Sync, Send};
use std::ops::Deref;
use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
}
}
-/// payment_hash type, use to cross-lock hop
-/// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
-#[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
-pub struct PaymentHash(pub [u8;32]);
-/// payment_preimage type, use to route payment between hop
-/// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
-#[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
-pub struct PaymentPreimage(pub [u8;32]);
-/// payment_secret type, use to authenticate sender to the receiver and tie MPP HTLCs together
-/// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
-#[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
-pub struct PaymentSecret(pub [u8;32]);
-
type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
/// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
/// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
/// this payment being removed.
expiry_time: u64,
+ /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
+ user_payment_id: u64,
// Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
/// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
/// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
/// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
- /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts.
+ /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
/// Locked *after* channel_state.
pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 6;
pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
+/// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
+/// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
+/// this value.
+pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER;
+
// Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
// ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
// LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
/// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
/// lifetime of the channel.
pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
+ /// our counterparty already.
+ ///
+ /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
+ /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
+ pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
/// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
/// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
/// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
/// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
+ /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
+ pub is_outbound: bool,
+ /// True if the channel is confirmed, funding_locked messages have been exchanged, and the
+ /// channel is not currently being shut down. `funding_locked` message exchange implies the
+ /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
+ /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations).
+ pub is_funding_locked: bool,
/// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
- /// the peer is connected, and (c) no monitor update failure is pending resolution.
- pub is_live: bool,
-
+ /// the peer is connected, (c) no monitor update failure is pending resolution, and (d) the
+ /// channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
+ ///
+ /// This is a strict superset of `is_funding_locked`.
+ pub is_usable: bool,
+ /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
+ pub is_public: bool,
/// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
/// payments to us through this channel.
pub counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
res.push(ChannelDetails {
channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
+ funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
remote_network_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
counterparty_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
inbound_capacity_msat,
outbound_capacity_msat,
user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
- is_live: channel.is_live(),
+ is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
+ is_funding_locked: channel.is_usable(),
+ is_usable: channel.is_live(),
+ is_public: channel.should_announce(),
counterparty_forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
});
}
/// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
/// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
///
- /// These are guaranteed to have their is_live value set to true, see the documentation for
- /// ChannelDetails::is_live for more info on exactly what the criteria are.
+ /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
+ /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
+ /// are.
pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
// Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
// internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
} else if total_value == payment_data.total_msat {
new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
payment_hash,
- payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
+ payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
+ payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
amt: total_value,
+ user_payment_id: inbound_payment.get().user_payment_id,
});
// Only ever generate at most one PaymentReceived
// per registered payment_hash, even if it isn't
/// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
/// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
/// HTLC backwards has been started.
- pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, _payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> bool {
+ pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
/// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
/// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
///
- /// You must specify the expected amounts for this HTLC, and we will only claim HTLCs
- /// available within a few percent of the expected amount. This is critical for several
- /// reasons : a) it avoids providing senders with `proof-of-payment` (in the form of the
- /// payment_preimage without having provided the full value and b) it avoids certain
- /// privacy-breaking recipient-probing attacks which may reveal payment activity to
- /// motivated attackers.
- ///
- /// Note that the privacy concerns in (b) are not relevant in payments with a payment_secret
- /// set. Thus, for such payments we will claim any payments which do not under-pay.
+ /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
+ /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
+ /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
+ /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
///
/// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
- pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, _payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, expected_amount: u64) -> bool {
+ ///
+ /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
+ /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
+ pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
// we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
// provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
// it.
- let mut valid_mpp = sources[0].payment_data.total_msat >= expected_amount;
+ let mut valid_mpp = true;
for htlc in sources.iter() {
if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
valid_mpp = false;
}
}
- fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
+ fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
- payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
+ payment_secret, min_value_msat, user_payment_id, payment_preimage,
// We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
// its updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
// a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
/// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
/// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you, returning the first and storing the second.
///
+ /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
+ /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
+ /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
+ ///
/// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
///
+ /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
+ /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
+ /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
/// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
- pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> (PaymentHash, PaymentSecret) {
+ pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> (PaymentHash, PaymentSecret) {
let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
(payment_hash,
- self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
+ self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
.expect("RNG Generated Duplicate PaymentHash"))
}
/// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) must be globally unique. This
/// method may return an Err if another payment with the same payment_hash is still pending.
///
+ /// `user_payment_id` will be provided back in [`PaymentReceived::user_payment_id`] events to
+ /// allow tracking of which events correspond with which calls to this and
+ /// [`create_inbound_payment`]. `user_payment_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply
+ /// copied to events and otherwise ignored. It may be used to correlate PaymentReceived events
+ /// with invoice metadata stored elsewhere.
+ ///
/// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
/// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
/// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
/// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
/// [`PaymentReceived`].
///
+ /// Pending inbound payments are stored in memory and in serialized versions of this
+ /// [`ChannelManager`]. If potentially unbounded numbers of inbound payments may exist and
+ /// space is limited, you may wish to rate-limit inbound payment creation.
+ ///
/// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
///
+ /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
+ /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
+ ///
/// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
/// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
- pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
- self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
+ /// [`PaymentReceived::user_payment_id`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::user_payment_id
+ pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
+ self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
}
}
}
max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
+ let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
+ payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
+ inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
+ });
}
fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
}
}
-impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref + Sync + Send, T: Deref + Sync + Send, K: Deref + Sync + Send, F: Deref + Sync + Send, L: Deref + Sync + Send>
+impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
impl_writeable!(PendingInboundPayment, 0, {
payment_secret,
expiry_time,
+ user_payment_id,
payment_preimage,
min_value_msat
});
payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
payment_count += 1;
let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
- let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
+ let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, 0).unwrap();
$node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
- assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage, &Some(payment_secret), 10_000));
+ assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {