//! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
//!
-//! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
+//! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
//! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
//! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
//!
use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
+use crate::events;
+use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
// Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
// construct one themselves.
use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
#[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
-use crate::routing::router::{DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, RoutePath, Router};
+use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, Router};
use crate::routing::scoring::ProbabilisticScorer;
use crate::ln::msgs;
use crate::ln::onion_utils;
use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, ChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
-use crate::util::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
-use crate::util::events;
use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
+use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
use crate::util::errors::APIError;
use core::cell::RefCell;
use crate::io::Read;
use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
-use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
+use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
use core::time::Duration;
use core::ops::Deref;
// Re-export this for use in the public API.
-pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure};
+pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
// We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
//
},
Receive {
payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
+ payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
},
ReceiveKeysend {
payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
+ payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
},
}
pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
payment_hash: PaymentHash,
+ /// Amount received
pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
+ /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
+ /// may overshoot this in either case)
pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
}
cltv_expiry: u32,
/// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
value: u64,
+ /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
+ /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
+ sender_intended_value: u64,
onion_payload: OnionPayload,
timer_ticks: u8,
- /// The sum total of all MPP parts
+ /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
+ /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
+ total_value_received: Option<u64>,
+ /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
total_msat: u64,
}
/// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
-/// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
+///
+/// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
#[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
}
/// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
-/// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
+///
+/// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
#[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
OutboundRoute {
- path: Vec<RouteHop>,
+ path: Path,
session_priv: SecretKey,
/// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
/// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
payment_id: PaymentId,
- payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
- /// Note that this is now "deprecated" - we write it for forwards (and read it for
- /// backwards) compatibility reasons, but prefer to use the data in the
- /// [`super::outbound_payment`] module, which stores per-payment data once instead of in
- /// each HTLC.
- payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters>,
},
}
#[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
0u8.hash(hasher);
prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
},
- HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payment_params } => {
+ HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
1u8.hash(hasher);
path.hash(hasher);
session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
payment_id.hash(hasher);
- payment_secret.hash(hasher);
first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
- payment_params.hash(hasher);
},
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
pub fn dummy() -> Self {
HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
- path: Vec::new(),
+ path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
- payment_secret: None,
- payment_params: None,
}
}
(4, receiver_node_id, required),
});
+struct ClaimablePayment {
+ purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
+ onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
+ htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
+}
+
/// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
struct ClaimablePayments {
/// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
///
/// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
/// we don't get a duplicate payment.
- claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, (events::PaymentPurpose, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>)>,
+ claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
/// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
/// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
}
-/// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
-/// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
+/// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
+/// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
/// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
-/// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
-/// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
-/// that implements KeysInterface or Router for its keys manager and router, respectively, but this
-/// type alias chooses the concrete types of KeysManager and DefaultRouter.
+/// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
+/// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
+/// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
+/// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
+/// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
///
-/// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
+/// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
Arc<M>,
Arc<T>,
Arc<L>
>;
-/// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
-/// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
+/// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
+/// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
/// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
-/// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
+/// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
/// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
/// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
-/// that implements KeysInterface or Router for its keys manager and router, respectively, but this
-/// type alias chooses the concrete types of KeysManager and DefaultRouter.
+/// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
+/// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
+/// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
///
-/// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
+/// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e DefaultRouter<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L, &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>>, &'g L>;
+/// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`] used in testing.
+#[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
+pub trait AChannelManager {
+ type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer>;
+ type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
+ type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface;
+ type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
+ type EntropySource: EntropySource;
+ type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
+ type NodeSigner: NodeSigner;
+ type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
+ type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner;
+ type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<Signer = Self::Signer>;
+ type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
+ type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator;
+ type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
+ type Router: Router;
+ type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
+ type Logger: Logger;
+ type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
+ fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
+}
+#[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
+impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
+for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
+where
+ M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> + Sized,
+ T::Target: BroadcasterInterface + Sized,
+ ES::Target: EntropySource + Sized,
+ NS::Target: NodeSigner + Sized,
+ SP::Target: SignerProvider + Sized,
+ F::Target: FeeEstimator + Sized,
+ R::Target: Router + Sized,
+ L::Target: Logger + Sized,
+{
+ type Watch = M::Target;
+ type M = M;
+ type Broadcaster = T::Target;
+ type T = T;
+ type EntropySource = ES::Target;
+ type ES = ES;
+ type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
+ type NS = NS;
+ type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer;
+ type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
+ type SP = SP;
+ type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
+ type F = F;
+ type Router = R::Target;
+ type R = R;
+ type Logger = L::Target;
+ type L = L;
+ fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
+}
+
/// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
/// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
///
-/// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
+/// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
/// to individual Channels.
///
-/// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
+/// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
/// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
-/// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
-/// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
+/// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
+/// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
///
-/// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
-/// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
-/// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
-/// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
+/// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
+/// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
+/// returning from [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`], with ChannelManagers, writing updates
+/// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during
/// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
-/// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
-/// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
+/// [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the
+/// `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
///
-/// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
-/// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
-/// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
-/// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
-/// object!
+/// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
+/// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
+/// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
///
-/// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
-/// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
+/// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
+/// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
/// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
/// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
-/// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
+/// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
///
-/// To avoid trivial DoS issues, ChannelManager limits the number of inbound connections and
+/// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
/// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
/// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
/// many peers with unfunded channels.
/// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
/// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
///
-/// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
-/// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
-/// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
-/// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
+/// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
+/// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
+/// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
+/// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
/// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
+///
+/// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
+/// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
+/// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
+/// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
+/// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
+/// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
+/// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
+/// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
//
// Lock order:
// The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
/// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
+ /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
+ pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
/// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
/// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
/// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
+/// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
+/// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
+pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
+
+/// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
+/// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
+pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
+
/// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
/// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
/// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
}
-/// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
+/// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
pub struct ChannelDetails {
/// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
/// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
/// 0.0.113.
pub user_channel_id: u128,
+ /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
+ /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
+ ///
+ /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
+ pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
/// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
/// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
/// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
+ feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(channel.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
}
macro_rules! handle_error {
- ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
+ ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
+ // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
+ // entering the macro.
+ debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
+ debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
+
match $internal {
Ok(msg) => Ok(msg),
Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
- // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
- // entering the macro.
- debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
- debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
-
let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
Err(err)
},
}
- }
+ } }
}
macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
}}
}
+macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
+ ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
+ if $channel.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
+ $locked_events.push(events::Event::ChannelPending {
+ channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
+ former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.temporary_channel_id(),
+ counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
+ funding_txo: $channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
+ });
+ $channel.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
+ }
+ }
+}
+
macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
- ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {
+ ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
if $channel.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
- {
- let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
- pending_events.push(events::Event::ChannelReady {
- channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
- user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
- counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
- channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
- });
- }
+ debug_assert!($channel.channel_pending_event_emitted());
+ $locked_events.push(events::Event::ChannelReady {
+ channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
+ user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
+ counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
+ });
$channel.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
}
}
($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { {
// update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in
// any case so that it won't deadlock.
- debug_assert!($self.id_to_peer.try_lock().is_ok());
+ debug_assert_ne!($self.id_to_peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
match $update_res {
ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
}
}
+macro_rules! process_events_body {
+ ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
+ let mut processed_all_events = false;
+ while !processed_all_events {
+ if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
+
+ {
+ // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
+ // persists happen while processing monitor events.
+ let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+
+ // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
+ // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
+ if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
+ result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
+ }
+ }
+
+ let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
+ let num_events = pending_events.len();
+ if !pending_events.is_empty() {
+ result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
+ }
+
+ for event in pending_events {
+ $event_to_handle = event;
+ $handle_event;
+ }
+
+ {
+ let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
+ pending_events.drain(..num_events);
+ processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
+ $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
+ }
+
+ if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
+ $self.persistence_notifier.notify();
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
+
impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
where
M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
R::Target: Router,
L::Target: Logger,
{
- /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
+ /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
///
/// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
- /// ChannelMessageHandler.
+ /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
///
/// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
///
- /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
- /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
- /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
+ /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
+ /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
+ /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
+ /// more details.
+ ///
+ /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
+ /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
+ /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
- claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
+ claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
+ pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
/// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
/// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
///
+ /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
+ /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
+ /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
+ ///
/// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
/// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
/// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
res
}
- /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
+ /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
/// more information.
pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
/// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
/// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
///
- /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
+ /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
+ ///
+ /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
+ /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
+ /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
+ /// channel.
///
/// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
/// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
/// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
+ /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
}
/// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
/// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
///
- /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
+ /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
+ ///
+ /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
+ /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
+ /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
+ /// channel.
///
/// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
/// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
/// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
+ /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
}
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
- self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
+ self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) });
} else {
self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
}
payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
{
// final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
- if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != cltv_expiry {
+ if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
return Err(ReceiveError {
- msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value",
+ msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
err_code: 18,
err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
})
msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
});
},
- msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
+ msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage, payment_metadata } => {
if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
return Err(ReceiveError {
err_code: 0x4000|22,
} else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
payment_data: data,
+ payment_metadata,
incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
phantom_shared_secret,
}
PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
payment_preimage,
+ payment_metadata,
incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
}
} else {
payment_hash,
incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
- outgoing_amt_msat: amt_msat,
+ outgoing_amt_msat: hop_data.amt_to_forward,
outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
})
}
// hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
// on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
- break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
+ // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
+ // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
+ // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
+ if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
+ break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
+ } else {
+ break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
+ }
}
if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
pending_forward_info
}
- /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
+ /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
/// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
/// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
///
- /// Note that in `internal_closing_signed`, this function is called without the `peer_state`
+ /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
/// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
/// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
+ ///
+ /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
+ /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
if !chan.should_announce() {
return Err(LightningError {
self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
}
- /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
- /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
+ /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
+ /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
/// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
/// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
///
- /// Note that through `internal_closing_signed`, this function is called without the
+ /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
/// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
/// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
+ ///
+ /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
+ /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
+ let enabled = chan.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
+ ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
+ ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
+ ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
+ ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
+ };
+
let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
short_channel_id,
timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
- flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
+ flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
}
#[cfg(test)]
- pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &
Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &
Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
- self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv_bytes)
+ self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv_bytes)
}
- fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &
Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &
Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
// The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
.map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
- let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
+ let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()});
}
let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
- let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
+ let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
};
session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
payment_id,
- payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
- payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
}, onion_packet, &self.logger);
match break_chan_entry!(self, send_res, chan) {
Some(monitor_update) => {
return Ok(());
};
- match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
+ match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
Err(e) => {
Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
/// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
/// fields for more info.
///
- /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
+ /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
/// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
///
/// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
///
/// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
///
- /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
+ /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
/// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
/// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
///
/// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
/// relevant updates.
///
- /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
+ /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
/// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
/// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
///
- /// # A caution on `payment_secret`
- ///
- /// `payment_secret` is unrelated to `payment_hash` (or [`PaymentPreimage`]) and exists to
- /// authenticate the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization)
- /// attacks. For newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one,
- /// the [`Route`] must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a
- /// recipient-provided `payment_secret`.
- ///
- /// If a `payment_secret` *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret
- /// feature bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the
- /// [`Route`], we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
- ///
/// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
/// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
+ /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
/// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
/// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
- pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
+ pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
self.pending_outbound_payments
- .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
- |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
- self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
+ .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
+ |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
+ self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
}
/// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment`], but will automatically find a route based on
/// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
- pub fn send_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
+ pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
self.pending_outbound_payments
- .send_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
+ .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
&self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
&self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
&self.pending_events,
- |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
- self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
+ |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
+ self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
}
#[cfg(test)]
-
fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
+
pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
- self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
- |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
- self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
+ self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
+ |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
+ self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
}
#[cfg(test)]
- pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
+ pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
- self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
+ self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
+ }
+
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
+ self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
}
/// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
- self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, &self.pending_events);
+ self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
}
/// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
/// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
///
/// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
- pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
+ pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
- route, payment_preimage, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
- best_block_height,
- |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
- self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
+ route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
+ &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
+ |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
+ self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
}
/// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
/// payments.
///
/// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
- pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
+ pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
- self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, payment_id,
- retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
+ self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
+ payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
|| self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
&self.logger, &self.pending_events,
- |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
- self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
+ |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
+ self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
}
/// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
/// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
/// us to easily discern them from real payments.
- pub fn send_probe(&self, hops: Vec<RouteHop>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
+ pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
- self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(hops, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
- |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
- self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
+ self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
+ |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
+ self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
}
/// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
- let (chan, msg) = {
- let (res, chan) = {
- match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
- Some(mut chan) => {
- let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
-
- (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
- .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
- MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
- } else { unreachable!(); })
- , chan)
+ let (msg, chan) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
+ Some(mut chan) => {
+ let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
+
+ let funding_res = chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
+ .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
+ MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
+ } else { unreachable!(); });
+ match funding_res {
+ Ok(funding_msg) => (funding_msg, chan),
+ Err(_) => {
+ mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
+ mem::drop(per_peer_state);
+
+ let _ = handle_error!(self, funding_res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
+ return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
+ err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
+ });
},
- None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) }) },
}
- };
- match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
- Ok(funding_msg) => {
- (chan, funding_msg)
- },
- Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
- err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
- }) },
- }
+ },
+ None => {
+ return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
+ err: format!(
+ "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
+ log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
+ })
+ },
};
peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
/// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
/// for more details.
///
- /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
- /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
+ /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
+ /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
}
{
let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
- // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools at the next block. However, the modules
- // constituting our Lightning node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if
- // the wallet module is in advance on the LDK view, allow one more block of headroom.
- if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 2 {
+ // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
+ // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
+ // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
+ // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
+ if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 1 {
return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
});
}
}
} else {
- for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
+ 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
match forward_info {
HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
- routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
+ routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
}
}) => {
- let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
- PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
+ let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
+ PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
- (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data }, Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret)
+ let onion_fields =
+ RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret), payment_metadata };
+ (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
+ Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
+ },
+ PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry } => {
+ let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: None, payment_metadata };
+ (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
+ None, None, onion_fields)
},
- PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
- (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None, None),
_ => {
panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
}
};
- let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
+ let mut claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
phantom_shared_secret,
},
- value: outgoing_amt_msat,
+ // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
+ // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
+ // if routing nodes overpay
+ value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
+ sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
timer_ticks: 0,
+ total_value_received: None,
total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
cltv_expiry,
onion_payload,
};
+ let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
+
macro_rules! fail_htlc {
($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
+ debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
));
+ continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
}
}
let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
- continue
}
- let (_, htlcs) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
- .or_insert_with(|| (purpose(), Vec::new()));
+ let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
+ .entry(payment_hash)
+ // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
+ .or_insert_with(|| {
+ committed_to_claimable = true;
+ ClaimablePayment {
+ purpose: purpose(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
+ }
+ });
+ if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
+ if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
+ fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
+ }
+ } else {
+ claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
+ }
+ let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
if htlcs.len() == 1 {
if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
- continue
}
}
- let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.value;
+ let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
+ let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
- total_value += htlc.value;
+ total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
+ earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
match &htlc.onion_payload {
OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
_ => unreachable!(),
}
}
- if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data.total_msat {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
- log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data.total_msat);
+ // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
+ // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
+ if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
+ fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
+ } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= $payment_data.total_msat {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
+ log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
- } else if total_value == $payment_data.total_msat {
+ } else if total_value >= $payment_data.total_msat {
+ #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
+ committed_to_claimable = true;
+ }
let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
+ let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
+ htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
payment_hash,
purpose: purpose(),
- amount_msat: total_value,
+ amount_msat,
via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
+ claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
+ onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
});
payment_claimable_generated = true;
} else {
// payment value yet, wait until we receive more
// MPP parts.
htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
+ #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
+ committed_to_claimable = true;
+ }
}
payment_claimable_generated
}}
Err(()) => {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
- continue
}
};
if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
- continue;
}
}
check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
- continue
}
- match claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
+ match claimable_payments.claimable_payments.entry(payment_hash) {
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
+ let amount_msat = claimable_htlc.value;
+ claimable_htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat);
+ let claim_deadline = Some(claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER);
let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
- e.insert((purpose.clone(), vec![claimable_htlc]));
+ e.insert(ClaimablePayment {
+ purpose: purpose.clone(),
+ onion_fields: Some(onion_fields.clone()),
+ htlcs: vec![claimable_htlc],
+ });
let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
payment_hash,
- amount_msat: outgoing_amt_msat,
+ amount_msat,
purpose,
via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
+ claim_deadline,
+ onion_fields: Some(onion_fields),
});
},
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
if payment_data.is_none() {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
- continue
};
let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
|| self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
&self.pending_events, &self.logger,
- |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
- self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv));
+ |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
+ self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv));
for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
if !chan.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
// If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
- if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
+ if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
- log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
+ log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
}
if !chan.is_live() {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
- log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
+ log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
}
log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
- log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
+ log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.logger);
NotifyOption::DoPersist
///
/// This currently includes:
/// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
- /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
+ /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
/// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
/// the channel.
- /// * Expiring a channel's previous `ChannelConfig` if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
- /// with the current `ChannelConfig`.
+ /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
+ /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
/// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
///
- /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
+ /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
/// estimate fetches.
+ ///
+ /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
+ /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
}
match chan.channel_update_status() {
- ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
- ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
- ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
- ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
- ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
- if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
- msg: update
- });
+ ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
+ ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
+ ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.is_live()
+ => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
+ ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.is_live()
+ => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
+ ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.is_live() => {
+ n += 1;
+ if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
+ chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
+ if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
+ msg: update
+ });
+ }
+ should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
+ } else {
+ chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
}
- should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
- chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
},
- ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
- if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
- msg: update
- });
+ ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.is_live() => {
+ n += 1;
+ if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
+ chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
+ if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
+ msg: update
+ });
+ }
+ should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
+ } else {
+ chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
}
- should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
- chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
},
_ => {},
}
}
}
- self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
- if htlcs.is_empty() {
+ self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
+ if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
// This should be unreachable
debug_assert!(false);
return false;
}
- if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
+ if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
// Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
// In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
- if htlcs[0].total_msat == htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.value) {
+ // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
+ // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
+ if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
+ .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
+ {
return true;
- } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
+ } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
}) {
- timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.drain(..).map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
+ timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
+ .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
return false;
}
}
pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
- let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
- if let Some((_, mut sources)) = removed_source {
- for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
+ let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
+ if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
+ for htlc in payment.htlcs {
let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
// from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
// being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
match source {
- HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => {
+ HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
- session_priv, payment_id, payment_params, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
+ session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
&self.pending_events, &self.logger)
{ self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
},
/// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
/// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
///
- /// Note that calling this method does *not* guarantee that the payment has been claimed. You
- /// *must* wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] event which upon a successful claim will be
- /// provided to your [`EventHandler`] when [`process_pending_events`] is next called.
+ /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
+ /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
+ /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
+ /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
///
/// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
/// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
/// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
/// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
///
- /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
- /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
+ /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
+ /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
+ /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
/// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
/// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
/// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
let mut sources = {
let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
- if let Some((payment_purpose, sources)) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
+ if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
- for htlc in sources.iter() {
+ for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
.expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
}
let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
- ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: sources.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
- payment_purpose, receiver_node_id,
+ ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
+ payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id,
});
if dup_purpose.is_some() {
debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
}
- sources
+ payment.htlcs
} else { return; }
};
debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
- // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we check that all channels which contain a claimable
- // HTLC still exist. While this isn't guaranteed to remain true if a channel closes while
- // we're claiming (or even after we claim, before the commitment update dance completes),
- // it should be a relatively rare race, and we'd rather not claim HTLCs that require us to
- // go on-chain (and lose the on-chain fee to do so) than just reject the payment.
- //
- // Note that we'll still always get our funds - as long as the generated
- // `ChannelMonitorUpdate` makes it out to the relevant monitor we can claim on-chain.
- //
- // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
- // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
- // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
- // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
- // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
- // it.
+ // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
+ // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
+ // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
+ // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
+ let mut prev_total_msat = None;
let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
let mut valid_mpp = true;
let mut errs = Vec::new();
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
for htlc in sources.iter() {
- let (counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
- Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
- None => {
- valid_mpp = false;
- break;
- }
- };
-
- let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
- if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
- valid_mpp = false;
- break;
- }
-
- let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
- let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
-
- if peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&chan_id).is_none() {
+ if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
+ log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
+ debug_assert!(false);
valid_mpp = false;
break;
}
+ prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
- if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
- log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
+ if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
+ log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
debug_assert!(false);
valid_mpp = false;
break;
}
+ expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
- expected_amt_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
// We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
// that there's one payment here and move on.
-> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
//TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
- let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
- let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
- let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
- Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
- None => None
- };
+ {
+ let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
+ let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
+ let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
+ Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
+ None => None
+ };
- let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
- |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id).map(
- |peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap()
- )
- ).unwrap_or(None);
+ let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
+ |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
+ .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
+ ).unwrap_or(None);
- if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
- let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
- let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
- if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
- let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
- let fulfill_res = chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
-
- if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
- if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
- log_bytes!(chan_id), action);
- peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
- }
- let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
- let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update);
- let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
- peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
- if let Err(e) = res {
- // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
- // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor
- // update over and over again until morale improves.
- log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage);
- return Err((counterparty_node_id, e));
+ if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
+ let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
+ let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
+ if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
+ let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
+ let fulfill_res = chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
+
+ if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
+ if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
+ log_bytes!(chan_id), action);
+ peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
+ }
+ let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
+ let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update);
+ let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
+ peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
+ if let Err(e) = res {
+ // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
+ // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor
+ // update over and over again until morale improves.
+ log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage);
+ return Err((counterparty_node_id, e));
+ }
}
+ return Ok(());
}
- return Ok(());
}
}
let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
prev_channel_id,
next_channel_id,
+ outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
}})
} else { None }
});
});
}
- emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
-
macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
}
+ {
+ let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
+ emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
+ emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
+ }
+
htlc_forwards
}
}
}
- emit_channel_ready_event!(self, chan.get_mut());
+ {
+ let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
+ emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan.get_mut());
+ }
Ok(())
},
Ok(())
}
- /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
+ /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
&self, handler: H
) {
- // We'll acquire our total consistency lock until the returned future completes so that
- // we can be sure no other persists happen while processing events.
- let _read_guard = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
-
- let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
-
- // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
- // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
- if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
- result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
- }
-
- let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
- if !pending_events.is_empty() {
- result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
- }
-
- for event in pending_events {
- handler(event).await;
- }
-
- if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
- self.persistence_notifier.notify();
- }
+ let mut ev;
+ process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
}
}
/// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
/// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
- PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
- let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
-
- // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
- // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
- if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
- result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
- }
-
- let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
- if !pending_events.is_empty() {
- result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
- }
-
- for event in pending_events {
- handler.handle_event(event);
- }
-
- result
- });
+ let mut ev;
+ process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
}
}
}
}
- emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
+ {
+ let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
+ emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
+ }
if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
}
if let Some(height) = height_opt {
- self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
- htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
+ self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
+ payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
// If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
// our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
// number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
false
} else { true }
});
- !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
+ !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
});
let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
}
}
- /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
- /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
- /// [`await_persistable_update`], [`await_persistable_update_timeout`], or a future returned by
- /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
+ /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
///
- /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
+ /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
+ /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
///
- /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
- /// [`await_persistable_update_timeout`]: Self::await_persistable_update_timeout
- /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
- #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
- pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
- self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
- }
-
- /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
- /// [`await_persistable_update`], `await_persistable_update_timeout`, or a future returned by
- /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
- ///
- /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
- /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
- pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
- self.persistence_notifier.wait()
- }
-
- /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when a persistable update is available. Note that
- /// callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this [`ChannelManager`] and
- /// should instead register actions to be taken later.
pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
}
/// [`ChannelManager`].
pub fn provided_init_features(_config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
// Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
- // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the ChannelMessageHandler impl for
- // ErroringMessageHandler.
+ // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
+ // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
features.set_data_loss_protect_optional();
features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
(33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
(35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
(37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
+ (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
});
Ok(())
}
(33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
(35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
(37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
+ (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
});
// `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
+ feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
})
}
}
(0, payment_data, required),
(1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
(2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
+ (3, payment_metadata, option),
},
(2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
(0, payment_preimage, required),
(2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
+ (3, payment_metadata, option),
},
;);
(0, self.prev_hop, required),
(1, self.total_msat, required),
(2, self.value, required),
+ (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
(4, payment_data, option),
+ (5, self.total_value_received, option),
(6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
(8, keysend_preimage, option),
});
fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
let mut value = 0;
+ let mut sender_intended_value = None;
let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
+ let mut total_value_received = None;
let mut total_msat = None;
let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
(0, prev_hop, required),
(1, total_msat, option),
(2, value, required),
+ (3, sender_intended_value, option),
(4, payment_data, option),
+ (5, total_value_received, option),
(6, cltv_expiry, required),
(8, keysend_preimage, option)
});
prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
timer_ticks: 0,
value,
+ sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
+ total_value_received,
total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
onion_payload,
cltv_expiry,
0 => {
let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
- let mut path: Option<Vec<RouteHop>> = Some(Vec::new());
+ let mut path_hops: Option<Vec<RouteHop>> = Some(Vec::new());
let mut payment_id = None;
- let mut payment_secret = None;
let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
+ let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
(0, session_priv, required),
(1, payment_id, option),
(2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
- (3, payment_secret, option),
- (4, path, vec_type),
+ (4, path_hops, vec_type),
(5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
+ (6, blinded_tail, option),
});
if payment_id.is_none() {
// For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
// instead.
payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
}
- if path.is_none() || path.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
+ let path = Path { hops: path_hops.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?, blinded_tail };
+ if path.hops.len() == 0 {
return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
}
- let path = path.unwrap();
if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
if params.final_cltv_expiry_delta == 0 {
- params.final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta;
+ params.final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
}
}
Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
first_hop_htlc_msat,
path,
payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
- payment_secret,
- payment_params,
})
}
1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
match self {
- HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_params } => {
+ HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
0u8.write(writer)?;
let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
(0, session_priv, required),
(1, payment_id_opt, option),
(2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
- (3, payment_secret, option),
- (4, *path, vec_type),
- (5, payment_params, option),
+ // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
+ (4, path.hops, vec_type),
+ (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
+ (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
});
}
HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
- (claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
- for (payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops)) in claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
+ let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
+ (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
+ for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
payment_hash.write(writer)?;
- (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
- for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
+ (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
+ for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
htlc.write(writer)?;
}
- htlc_purposes.push(purpose);
+ htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
+ htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
}
let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
(7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
(9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
(11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
+ (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
});
Ok(())
/// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
/// this struct.
///
- /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
+ /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
}
let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
+ let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
for _ in 0..channel_count {
let mut channel: Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (
&args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
- let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
+ let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
+ if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
+ pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate(monitor_update));
+ }
failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
- monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
}
}
- for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
+ for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
- log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
- monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
+ let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
+ update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
+ updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
+ };
+ pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
}
}
}
let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
for _ in 0..background_event_count {
match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
- 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
+ 0 => {
+ let (funding_txo, monitor_update): (OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate) = (Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?);
+ if pending_background_events.iter().find(|e| {
+ let BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((pending_funding_txo, pending_monitor_update)) = e;
+ *pending_funding_txo == funding_txo && *pending_monitor_update == monitor_update
+ }).is_none() {
+ pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)));
+ }
+ }
_ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
}
}
let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
+ let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = Some(Vec::new());
read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
(7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
(9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
(11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
+ (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
});
if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
if id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
- if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
- if path.is_empty() {
+ if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
+ if path.hops.is_empty() {
log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
}
- let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
+ let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
- let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
+ let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
retry_strategy: None,
attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
payment_params: None,
session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
- payment_secret,
+ payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
+ payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
- let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
- if let Some(mut purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
+ let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
+ if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
}
- for (purpose, (payment_hash, previous_hops)) in purposes.drain(..).zip(claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..)) {
- claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
+ if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
+ if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
+ return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
+ }
+ for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
+ purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
+ {
+ let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
+ purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
+ });
+ if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
+ }
+ } else {
+ for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
+ let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
+ purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
+ });
+ if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
+ }
}
} else {
// LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
// include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
- for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
- if previous_hops.is_empty() {
+ for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
+ if htlcs.is_empty() {
return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
}
- let purpose = match &previous_hops[0].onion_payload {
+ let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
};
- claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
+ claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
+ purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
+ });
}
}
for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
- if let Some((payment_purpose, claimable_htlcs)) = claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
+ if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
- let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
+ let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
.expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
}
- for claimable_htlc in claimable_htlcs {
+ for claimable_htlc in payment.htlcs {
claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
// Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
receiver_node_id,
payment_hash,
- purpose: payment_purpose,
+ purpose: payment.purpose,
amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
});
}
pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
- claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
+ claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
- pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
+ pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
+ pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
- use core::time::Duration;
use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
+ use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
- use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, InterceptId};
+ use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
use crate::ln::msgs;
use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
use crate::util::errors::APIError;
- use crate::util::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
use crate::util::test_utils;
use crate::util::config::ChannelConfig;
use crate::chain::keysinterface::EntropySource;
// All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
// with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
- assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
- assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
- assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
+ assert!(nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
// The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
- assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
- assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
// ... but the last node should not.
- assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
+ assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
// After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
- assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
- assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
+ assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
+ assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
// Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
// about the channel.
nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
- assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
+ assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
// The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
// parties.
nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
- assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
- assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
+ assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
+ assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
// At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
// persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
- assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
- assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
+ assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
+ assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
// the channel info has updated.
nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
- assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
- assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
}
// Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
// indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
- let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
- nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
+ let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
+ RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
+ RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
// Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
- nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
+ RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
// Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
- nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
+ RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
).unwrap();
- nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
+ RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
).unwrap();
- let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
+ let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
+ RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
// Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
- nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
+ RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
- let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash, None, PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
- nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
+ let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
+ RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
+ RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
- nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
+ nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
}
#[test]
let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
- let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, Some(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
- nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
+ let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
+ RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
+ RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
+ PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
- nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
+ nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
}
#[test]
let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
let path = route.paths[0].clone();
route.paths.push(path);
- route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
- route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
- route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
- route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
- route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
- route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
-
- match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None, PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap_err() {
+ route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
+ route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
+ route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
+ route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
+ route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
+ route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
+
+ match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
+ RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
+ .unwrap_err() {
PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
- assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
+ assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
+ },
_ => panic!("unexpected error")
}
}
match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
Err(()) => {
- nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
+ nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
}
}
assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
}
+ expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
{
// Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+
let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
}
open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
}
pub mod bench {
use crate::chain::Listen;
use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
- use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
- use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId};
+ use crate::chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
+ use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
+ use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
- use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
+ use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
use crate::util::test_utils;
use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
- use crate::util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
use test::Bencher;
- struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
- node: &'a ChannelManager<
- &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
- &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
- &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
- &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
- &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
- &'a test_utils::TestLogger>,
+ type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
+ &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
+ &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
+ &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
+ &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
+ &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
+ &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
+
+ struct ANodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
+ node: &'a Manager<'a, P>,
+ }
+ impl<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'a, P> {
+ type CM = Manager<'a, P>;
+ #[inline]
+ fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'a, P> { self.node }
+ #[inline]
+ fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
}
#[cfg(test)]
// calls per node.
let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
- let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
+ let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
network,
best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
});
- let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
+ let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
network,
best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
});
- let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
+ let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_b.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_a.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
} else { panic!(); }
node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
+ let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
+ match events_b[0] {
+ Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
+ assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
+ let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
+ match events_a[0] {
+ Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
+ assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
- let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a);
-
let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
macro_rules! send_payment {
($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
- let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
.with_features($node_b.invoice_features());
- let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
- let seed = [3u8; 32];
- let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42);
- let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
- let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph.read_only(),
- Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
-
let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
payment_count += 1;
let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
- $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
+ $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
+ PaymentId(payment_hash.0), RouteParameters {
+ payment_params, final_value_msat: 10_000,
+ }, Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
$node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
$node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
- let (raa, cs) = do_get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
+ let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
$node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
$node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
- $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
+ $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
- expect_payment_claimable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
+ expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
$node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
- expect_payment_claimed!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
+ expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
_ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
}
- let (raa, cs) = do_get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
+ let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
$node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
$node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
- $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
+ $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
- expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
+ expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
}
}
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff