use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
// Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
// construct one themselves.
-use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
-use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel};
+use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
+use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel};
use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
#[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
-use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
+use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
#[cfg(test)]
use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
-use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment};
+use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs};
use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
-use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, ChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
+use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
+ /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
+ custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
},
ReceiveKeysend {
/// This was added in 0.0.116 and will break deserialization on downgrades.
payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
+ /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
+ custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
},
}
pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
// Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
short_channel_id: u64,
+ user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
htlc_id: u64,
incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
}
+impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
+ fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
+ events::ClaimedHTLC {
+ channel_id: val.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
+ user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
+ cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
+ value_msat: val.value,
+ }
+ }
+}
+
/// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
///
/// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
}
}
+impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
+ fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
+ crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
+ }
+}
+
/// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
///
/// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
pub enum FailureCode {
/// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
/// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
- TemporaryNodeFailure = 0x2000 | 2,
+ TemporaryNodeFailure,
/// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
/// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
- RequiredNodeFeatureMissing = 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
+ RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
/// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
/// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
/// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
/// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
- IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails = 0x4000 | 15,
+ IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
+ /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
+ /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
+ ///
+ /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
+ /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
+ InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
+}
+
+impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
+ fn into(self) -> u16 {
+ match self {
+ FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
+ FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
+ FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
+ FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
+ }
+ }
}
/// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
err: msgs::LightningError,
- chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
+ chan_id: Option<(ChannelId, u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
+ channel_capacity: Option<u64>,
}
impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
#[inline]
- fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
+ fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
Self {
err: LightningError {
err: err.clone(),
},
chan_id: None,
shutdown_finish: None,
+ channel_capacity: None,
}
}
#[inline]
fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
- Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
+ Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None, channel_capacity: None }
}
#[inline]
- fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
+ fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, channel_capacity: u64) -> Self {
Self {
err: LightningError {
err: err.clone(),
},
chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
+ channel_capacity: Some(channel_capacity)
}
}
#[inline]
- fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
+ fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
Self {
err: match err {
ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
},
chan_id: None,
shutdown_finish: None,
+ channel_capacity: None,
}
}
}
amount_msat: u64,
payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
+ htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
+ sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
}
impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
(0, amount_msat, required),
(2, payment_purpose, required),
(4, receiver_node_id, required),
+ (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
+ (7, sender_intended_value, option),
});
struct ClaimablePayment {
/// on a channel.
MonitorUpdatesComplete {
counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
- channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ channel_id: ChannelId,
},
}
/// durably to disk.
ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
/// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
- channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ channel_id: ChannelId,
/// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
htlc_id: u64,
},
/// State we hold per-peer.
-pub(super) struct PeerState<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
+pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
/// `channel_id` -> `Channel`.
///
/// Holds all funded channels where the peer is the counterparty.
- pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
+ pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, Channel<SP>>,
/// `temporary_channel_id` -> `OutboundV1Channel`.
///
/// Holds all outbound V1 channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once an outbound channel has
/// been assigned a `channel_id`, the entry in this map is removed and one is created in
/// `channel_by_id`.
- pub(super) outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], OutboundV1Channel<Signer>>,
+ pub(super) outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, OutboundV1Channel<SP>>,
/// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundV1Channel`.
///
/// Holds all inbound V1 channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once an inbound channel has
/// been assigned a `channel_id`, the entry in this map is removed and one is created in
/// `channel_by_id`.
- pub(super) inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], InboundV1Channel<Signer>>,
+ pub(super) inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundV1Channel<SP>>,
+ /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
+ ///
+ /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
+ /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
+ /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
+ /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
+ pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
/// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
latest_features: InitFeatures,
/// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
/// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
/// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
/// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
- monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
+ monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
/// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
/// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
/// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
/// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
- actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
+ actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
/// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
/// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
/// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
is_connected: bool,
}
-impl <Signer: ChannelSigner> PeerState<Signer> {
+impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
/// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
/// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
/// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
&& self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
}
- // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including pending channels.
+ // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
self.channel_by_id.len() +
self.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.len() +
- self.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.len()
+ self.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.len() +
+ self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
}
// Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
- fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> bool {
- self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
- self.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
- self.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
+ fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
+ self.channel_by_id.contains_key(&channel_id) ||
+ self.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.contains_key(&channel_id) ||
+ self.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.contains_key(&channel_id) ||
+ self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(&channel_id)
}
}
+/// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
+/// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
+pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
+ /// The original OpenChannel message.
+ pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
+ /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
+ pub ticks_remaining: i32,
+}
+
+/// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
+/// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
+const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
+
/// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
/// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
///
/// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
///
/// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
- id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
+ id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<ChannelId, PublicKey>>,
/// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
///
///
/// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
#[cfg(test)]
- pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
+ pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
#[cfg(not(test))]
- short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
+ short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
///
/// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
#[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
- per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
+ per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
#[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
- pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
+ pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
/// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
/// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
/// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
///
/// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
+ #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
+ #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
+ pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
+
/// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
}
/// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
+///
+/// Balances of a channel are available through [`ChainMonitor::get_claimable_balances`] and
+/// [`ChannelMonitor::get_claimable_balances`], calculated with respect to the corresponding on-chain
+/// transactions.
+///
+/// [`ChainMonitor::get_claimable_balances`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor::get_claimable_balances
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
pub struct ChannelDetails {
/// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
/// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
/// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
/// lifetime of the channel.
- pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ pub channel_id: ChannelId,
/// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
/// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
///
/// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
- /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
- /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
- /// 0.0.113.
+ /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
+ /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
+ /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
+ /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel. This may be zero for objects
+ /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
+ ///
+ /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
+ /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
+ /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
pub user_channel_id: u128,
/// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
/// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
///
/// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
- /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
- /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
- /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
- ///
- /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
- /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
- /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
- /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
- ///
- /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
- pub balance_msat: u64,
/// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
/// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
/// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
/// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
///
- /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
- ///
/// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
/// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
/// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
/// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
/// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
///
- /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
- /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
+ /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`] and
+ /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
/// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
/// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
}
- fn from_channel_context<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, F: Deref>(
- context: &ChannelContext<Signer>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
+ fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
+ context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
) -> Self
- where F::Target: FeeEstimator
+ where
+ SP::Target: SignerProvider,
+ F::Target: FeeEstimator
{
let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
- balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
match $internal {
Ok(msg) => Ok(msg),
- Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
+ Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish, channel_capacity }) => {
let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
$self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
channel_id, user_channel_id,
- reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
+ reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() },
+ counterparty_node_id: Some($counterparty_node_id),
+ channel_capacity_sats: channel_capacity,
}, None));
}
}
(false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
},
ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
- log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
+ log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", &$channel_id, msg);
update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$channel.context);
let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
(true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.context.get_user_id(),
- shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
+ shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok(), $channel.context.get_value_satoshis()))
},
}
};
- ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_context: expr, $channel_id: expr, PREFUNDED) => {
+ ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_context: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED) => {
match $err {
- // We should only ever have `ChannelError::Close` when prefunded channels error.
+ // We should only ever have `ChannelError::Close` when unfunded channels error.
// In any case, just close the channel.
ChannelError::Warn(msg) | ChannelError::Ignore(msg) | ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
- log_error!($self.logger, "Closing prefunded channel {} due to an error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
+ log_error!($self.logger, "Closing unfunded channel {} due to an error: {}", &$channel_id, msg);
update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$channel_context);
let shutdown_res = $channel_context.force_shutdown(false);
(true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel_context.get_user_id(),
- shutdown_res, None))
+ shutdown_res, None, $channel_context.get_value_satoshis()))
},
}
}
match $res {
Ok(res) => res,
Err(e) => {
- let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut().context, $entry.key(), PREFUNDED);
+ let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut().context, $entry.key(), UNFUNDED);
if drop {
$entry.remove_entry();
}
match $update_res {
ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
- log_bytes!($chan.context.channel_id()[..]));
+ &$chan.context.channel_id());
Ok(false)
},
ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure",
- log_bytes!($chan.context.channel_id()[..]));
+ &$chan.context.channel_id());
update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$chan.context);
let res = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(
"ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.context.channel_id(),
$chan.context.get_user_id(), $chan.context.force_shutdown(false),
- $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok()));
+ $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok(), $chan.context.get_value_satoshis()));
$remove;
res
},
/// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
/// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
/// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
- pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
+ pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
}
Ok(temporary_channel_id)
}
- fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
+ fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
// Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
// Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
// a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
+ // Only `Channels` in the channel_by_id map can be considered funded.
for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
+ let chan_context_to_details = |context| {
+ ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
+ };
return peer_state.channel_by_id
.iter()
- .map(|(_, channel)|
- ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
- features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator))
+ .map(|(_, channel)| &channel.context)
+ .chain(peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, channel)| &channel.context))
+ .chain(peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, channel)| &channel.context))
+ .map(chan_context_to_details)
.collect();
}
vec![]
}
/// Helper function that issues the channel close events
- fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, context: &ChannelContext<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
+ fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, context: &ChannelContext<SP>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
match context.unbroadcasted_funding() {
Some(transaction) => {
pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
channel_id: context.channel_id(),
user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
- reason: closure_reason
+ reason: closure_reason,
+ counterparty_node_id: Some(context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
+ channel_capacity_sats: Some(context.get_value_satoshis()),
}, None));
}
- fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
- let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
+ {
+ let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
- let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
- .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
+ let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
+ .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
- let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
- let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
- match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
- let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().context.get_funding_txo();
- let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
- let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut()
- .get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
- failed_htlcs = htlcs;
+ let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
+ let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
- // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
- // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
- // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
- peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
- node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
- msg: shutdown_msg,
- });
+ match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
+ let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().context.get_funding_txo();
+ let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
+ let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut()
+ .get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
+ failed_htlcs = htlcs;
- // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
- if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
- break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
- peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry).map(|_| ());
- }
+ // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
+ // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
+ // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
+ peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
+ node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
+ msg: shutdown_msg,
+ });
- if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
- let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
- if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
- peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
- msg: channel_update
- });
+ // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
+ if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
+ break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
+ peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry).map(|_| ());
}
- self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
- }
- break Ok(());
- },
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id) })
+
+ if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
+ let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
+ if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
+ peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
+ msg: channel_update
+ });
+ }
+ self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
+ }
+ break Ok(());
+ },
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (),
+ }
}
+ // If we reach this point, it means that the channel_id either refers to an unfunded channel or
+ // it does not exist for this peer. Either way, we can attempt to force-close it.
+ //
+ // An appropriate error will be returned for non-existence of the channel if that's the case.
+ return self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, false).map(|_| ())
+ // TODO(dunxen): This is still not ideal as we're doing some extra lookups.
+ // Fix this with https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/2422
};
for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
/// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
/// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
/// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
- pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
}
/// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
/// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
/// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
- pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
}
/// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
/// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
- fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
+ fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
-> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
};
if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
- log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
+ log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, closure_reason);
let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan);
self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast));
(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
} else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
- log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
+ log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, closure_reason);
let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan);
self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
- // Prefunded channel has no update
+ // Unfunded channel has no update
(None, chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
} else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
- log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
+ log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, closure_reason);
let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan);
self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
- // Prefunded channel has no update
+ // Unfunded channel has no update
(None, chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
+ } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
+ log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
+ // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
+ // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
+ // events anyway.
+ (None, *peer_node_id)
} else {
- return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
+ return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
}
};
if let Some(update) = update_opt {
Ok(counterparty_node_id)
}
- fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
/// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
/// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
/// channel.
- pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
+ pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
-> Result<(), APIError> {
self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
}
///
/// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
/// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
- pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
+ pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
-> Result<(), APIError> {
self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
}
}
fn construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(
- &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, hop_hmac: [u8; 32],
+ &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, hop_hmac: [u8; 32],
new_packet_bytes: [u8; onion_utils::ONION_DATA_LEN], shared_secret: [u8; 32],
next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
version: 0,
public_key: next_packet_pubkey_opt.unwrap_or(Err(secp256k1::Error::InvalidPublicKey)),
hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
- hmac: hop_hmac.clone(),
+ hmac: hop_hmac,
};
- let short_channel_id = match hop_data.format {
- msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
- msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
+ let (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value) = match hop_data {
+ msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value } =>
+ (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value),
+ msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. } =>
return Err(InboundOnionErr {
msg: "Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node",
err_code: 0x4000 | 22,
err_data: Vec::new(),
- })
- },
+ }),
};
Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
short_channel_id,
},
- payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
+ payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
- outgoing_amt_msat: hop_data.amt_to_forward,
- outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
+ outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward,
+ outgoing_cltv_value,
skimmed_fee_msat: None,
})
}
fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(
- &self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32], payment_hash: PaymentHash,
+ &self, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, shared_secret: [u8; 32], payment_hash: PaymentHash,
amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>, allow_underpay: bool,
counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
- let (payment_data, keysend_preimage, payment_metadata) = match hop_data.format {
- msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage, payment_metadata } =>
- (payment_data, keysend_preimage, payment_metadata),
+ let (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, onion_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata) = match hop_data {
+ msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
+ payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata, ..
+ } =>
+ (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata),
_ =>
return Err(InboundOnionErr {
err_code: 0x4000|22,
}),
};
// final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
- if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
+ if outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
return Err(InboundOnionErr {
msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
err_code: 18,
// payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
// channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
- if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
+ if (outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
});
}
- if (!allow_underpay && hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat) ||
- (allow_underpay && hop_data.amt_to_forward >
+ if (!allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat > amt_msat) ||
+ (allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat >
amt_msat.saturating_add(counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)))
{
return Err(InboundOnionErr {
payment_data,
payment_preimage,
payment_metadata,
- incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
+ incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
+ custom_tlvs,
}
} else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
payment_data: data,
payment_metadata,
- incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
+ incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
phantom_shared_secret,
+ custom_tlvs,
}
} else {
return Err(InboundOnionErr {
payment_hash,
incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
- outgoing_amt_msat: hop_data.amt_to_forward,
- outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
+ outgoing_amt_msat: onion_amt_msat,
+ outgoing_cltv_value,
skimmed_fee_msat: counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
})
}
};
let (outgoing_scid, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, next_packet_pk_opt) = match next_hop {
onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
- next_hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData {
- format: msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id }, amt_to_forward,
- outgoing_cltv_value,
+ next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward {
+ short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value
}, ..
} => {
- let next_pk = onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx,
+ let next_packet_pk = onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx,
msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &shared_secret);
- (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(next_pk))
+ (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(next_packet_pk))
},
// We'll do receive checks in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] so we have access to the
// inbound channel's state.
onion_utils::Hop::Receive { .. } => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
- onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
- next_hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData { format: msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. }, .. }, ..
- } => {
+ onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. }, .. } => {
return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0; 0]);
}
};
///
/// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
/// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
- fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
+ fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
if !chan.context.should_announce() {
return Err(LightningError {
err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
}
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()));
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
}
///
/// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
/// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
- fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()));
+ fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
Some(id) => id,
self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
}
- fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()));
+ fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
#[cfg(test)]
pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
- self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv_bytes)
+ self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
+ path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
+ session_priv_bytes
+ })
}
- fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ let SendAlongPathArgs {
+ path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
+ session_priv_bytes
+ } = args;
// The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
+ log_trace!(self.logger,
+ "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
+ payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
self.pending_outbound_payments
- .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
- |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
- self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
+ .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
+ &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
+ |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
}
/// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
.send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
&self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
&self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
- &self.pending_events,
- |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
- self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
+ &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
}
#[cfg(test)]
pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
- self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
- |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
- self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
+ self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
+ keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
+ best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
}
#[cfg(test)]
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
- &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
- |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
- self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
+ &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
}
/// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
|| self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
- &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
- |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
- self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
+ &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
}
/// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
- self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
- |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
- self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
+ self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
+ &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
+ |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
}
/// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
/// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
/// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
- fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&OutboundV1Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
- &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
+ fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
+ &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
) -> Result<(), APIError> {
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
- let (chan, msg) = match peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
+ let (chan, msg) = match peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.remove(&temporary_channel_id) {
Some(chan) => {
let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
- let funding_res = chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
+ let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
.map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
let user_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
- (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None))
+ let channel_capacity = chan.context.get_value_satoshis();
+ (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, channel_capacity))
} else { unreachable!(); });
match funding_res {
Ok((chan, funding_msg)) => (chan, funding_msg),
return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
err: format!(
"Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
- log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
+ temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
})
},
};
}
#[cfg(test)]
- pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
})
///
/// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
/// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
- pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
/// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
/// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
- &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
+ &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
) -> Result<(), APIError> {
if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
for channel_id in channel_ids {
- if !peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) {
+ if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
- err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
+ err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
});
- }
+ };
}
for channel_id in channel_ids {
- let channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
- let mut config = channel.context.config();
- config.apply(config_update);
- if !channel.context.update_config(&config) {
+ if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
+ let mut config = channel.context.config();
+ config.apply(config_update);
+ if !channel.context.update_config(&config) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
+ peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
+ } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
+ peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
+ node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ msg,
+ });
+ }
continue;
}
- if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
- peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
- } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
- peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
- node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
- msg,
+
+ let context = if let Some(channel) = peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
+ &mut channel.context
+ } else if let Some(channel) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
+ &mut channel.context
+ } else {
+ // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
+ debug_assert!(false);
+ return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
+ err: format!(
+ "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
+ channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
});
- }
+ };
+ let mut config = context.config();
+ config.apply(config_update);
+ // We update the config, but we MUST NOT broadcast a `channel_update` before `channel_ready`
+ // which would be the case for pending inbound/outbound channels.
+ context.update_config(&config);
}
Ok(())
}
/// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
/// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
pub fn update_channel_config(
- &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
+ &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
) -> Result<(), APIError> {
return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
}
/// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
// TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
// `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
- pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
let next_hop_scid = {
.ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
- match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
+ match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&next_hop_channel_id) {
Some(chan) => {
if !chan.context.is_usable() {
return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
- err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
+ err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
})
}
chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
},
None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
err: format!("Funded channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}. Channel may still be opening.",
- log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
+ next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
})
}
};
if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
+ user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
+ user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
match forward_info {
HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
- prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
+ prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
},
}) => {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
+ user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
&self.logger)
{
if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
} else {
panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
}
}
}) => {
let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
- PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
+ PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret, custom_tlvs } => {
let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
- let onion_fields =
- RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret), payment_metadata };
+ let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
+ payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
(incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
},
- PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry } => {
+ PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs } => {
let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
- payment_metadata
+ payment_metadata,
+ custom_tlvs,
};
(incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
payment_data, None, onion_fields)
let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
+ user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
);
failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
+ user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
});
if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), log_keysend(!is_keysend));
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
}
if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
}
if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
- log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
+ &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
}
if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
} else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
- log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
+ &payment_hash);
fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
} else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
#[allow(unused_assignments)] {
let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
Ok(result) => result,
Err(()) => {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
}
};
let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
- log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
+ &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
}
}
},
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
}
let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
} else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
- log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
+ &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
} else {
let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
|| self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
- &self.pending_events, &self.logger,
- |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
- self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv));
+ &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
let _ = self.process_background_events();
}
- fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
+ fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
// If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
- log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
+ &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
}
if !chan.context.is_live() {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
- log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
+ &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
}
log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
- log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
+ &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
NotifyOption::DoPersist
PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
let mut should_persist = self.process_background_events();
- let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
+ let normal_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
+ let min_mempool_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum);
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
+ let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
+ min_mempool_feerate
+ } else {
+ normal_feerate
+ };
let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
}
/// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
/// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
/// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
+ /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
///
/// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
/// estimate fetches.
PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
let mut should_persist = self.process_background_events();
- let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
+ let normal_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
+ let min_mempool_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum);
let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
+ let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
+ min_mempool_feerate
+ } else {
+ normal_feerate
+ };
let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
log_debug!(self.logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
- counterparty_node_id, log_bytes!(*chan_id));
+ counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
node_id: counterparty_node_id,
action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
true
});
+
+ let process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
+ chan_id: &ChannelId,
+ chan_context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
+ unfunded_chan_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
+ pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
+ | {
+ chan_context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
+ if unfunded_chan_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
+ log_error!(self.logger,
+ "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner",
+ &chan_id);
+ update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan_context);
+ self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
+ self.finish_force_close_channel(chan_context.force_shutdown(false));
+ pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
+ node_id: counterparty_node_id,
+ action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
+ msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
+ channel_id: *chan_id,
+ data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
+ },
+ },
+ });
+ false
+ } else {
+ true
+ }
+ };
+ peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| process_unfunded_channel_tick(
+ chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context, pending_msg_events));
+ peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| process_unfunded_channel_tick(
+ chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context, pending_msg_events));
+
+ for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
+ if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
+ log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
+ peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
+ events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
+ node_id: counterparty_node_id,
+ action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
+ msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
+ },
+ }
+ );
+ }
+ }
+ peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
+
if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
}
/// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
match failure_code {
- FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
- FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
+ FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
+ FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
- HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code as u16, htlc_msat_height_data)
+ HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
+ },
+ FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
+ let fail_data = match data {
+ Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
+ None => Vec::new(),
+ };
+ HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
}
}
}
///
/// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
/// forwarding
- fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
+ fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
// We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
// guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
// we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
/// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
/// that we want to return and a channel.
- fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
+ fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
// failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
// be surfaced to the user.
fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
- &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
) {
let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
&self.pending_events, &self.logger)
{ self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
},
- HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
+ HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint, .. }) => {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", &payment_hash, onion_error);
let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
let mut push_forward_ev = false;
/// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
/// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
///
+ /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
+ /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
+ /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
+ ///
/// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
/// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
/// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
/// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
/// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
/// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
+ /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
+ self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
+ }
+
+ /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
+ /// even type numbers.
+ ///
+ /// # Note
+ ///
+ /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
+ /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
+ ///
+ /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
+ pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
+ self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
+ }
+
+ fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
}
}
+ let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
+ let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
- payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id,
+ payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
});
if dup_purpose.is_some() {
debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
- log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
+ &payment_hash);
}
+
+ if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
+ if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
+ log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
+ &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
+ claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
+ mem::drop(claimable_payments);
+ for htlc in payment.htlcs {
+ let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
+ let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
+ let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
+ self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
+ }
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+
payment.htlcs
} else { return; }
};
if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
- log_bytes!(chan_id), action);
+ &chan_id, action);
peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
}
if !during_init {
self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
}
- fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
+ fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint) {
match source {
HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
"We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
- self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
+ let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
+ channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint,
+ counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
+ };
+ self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
+ session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
+ &self.logger);
},
HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
fee_earned_msat,
claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
- next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_id),
+ next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
},
downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: None,
match action {
MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
- if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
+ if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
+ amount_msat,
+ payment_purpose: purpose,
+ receiver_node_id,
+ htlcs,
+ sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
+ }) = payment {
self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
- payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
+ payment_hash,
+ purpose,
+ amount_msat,
+ receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
+ htlcs,
+ sender_intended_total_msat,
}, None));
}
},
/// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
/// update completion.
fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
- channel: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
+ channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
-> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
- log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()),
+ &channel.context.channel_id(),
if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
///
/// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
/// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
- pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
}
///
/// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
/// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
- pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
}
- fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
let peers_without_funded_channels =
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
- match peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
- if !channel.get().is_awaiting_accept() {
- return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
+
+ // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
+ // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
+ // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
+ // succeed.
+ let mut channel = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
+ Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
+ let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
+ InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
+ counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
+ &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
+ &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|e| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.to_string() })
+ }
+ _ => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() })
+ }?;
+
+ if accept_0conf {
+ // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
+ debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
+ } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
+ let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
+ node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
+ msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
}
- if accept_0conf {
- channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
- } else if channel.get().context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
- let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
- node_id: channel.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
- action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
- msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
- }
- };
- peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
- let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
- return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
- } else {
- // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
- // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
- // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
- if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
- let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
- node_id: channel.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
- action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
- msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
- }
- };
- peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
- let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
- return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
+ };
+ peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
+ return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
+ } else {
+ // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
+ // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
+ // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
+ if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
+ let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
+ node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
+ msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
}
- }
-
- peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
- node_id: channel.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
- msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
- });
- }
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
- return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) });
+ };
+ peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
+ return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
}
}
+
+ // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
+ let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
+ channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
+
+ peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
+ node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
+ });
+
+ peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), channel);
+
Ok(())
}
/// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
/// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
- where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> bool {
+ where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
{
}
fn unfunded_channel_count(
- peer: &PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, best_block_height: u32
+ peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
) -> usize {
let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
for (_, chan) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
num_unfunded_channels += 1;
}
}
- num_unfunded_channels
+ num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
}
fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
}
- let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
- random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
- let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
- let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
-
// Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
// about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
// channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
}
+ let channel_id = msg.temporary_channel_id;
+ let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
+ if channel_exists {
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
+ }
+
+ // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
+ if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
+ let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
+ pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
+ temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
+ counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
+ funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
+ push_msat: msg.push_msat,
+ channel_type: msg.channel_type.clone().unwrap(),
+ }, None));
+ peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
+ open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
+ ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
+ });
+ return Ok(());
+ }
+
+ // Otherwise create the channel right now.
+ let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
+ random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
+ let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
- &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
+ &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
{
Err(e) => {
- self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
},
Ok(res) => res
};
- let channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
- let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
- if channel_exists {
- self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
- return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
- } else {
- if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
- let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
- if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
- return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
- }
- if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
- return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
- }
- peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
- node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
- msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
- });
- } else {
- let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
- pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
- temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
- counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
- funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
- push_msat: msg.push_msat,
- channel_type: channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
- }, None));
- }
- peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, channel);
+
+ let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
+ if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
+ }
+ if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
}
+
+ let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
+ channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
+
+ peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
+ node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
+ msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
+ });
+ peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, channel);
Ok(())
}
let user_id = inbound_chan.context.get_user_id();
let shutdown_res = inbound_chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(format!("{}", err),
- msg.temporary_channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None));
+ msg.temporary_channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, inbound_chan.context.get_value_satoshis()));
},
}
},
let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().context.channel_id()));
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", &chan.get().context.channel_id());
peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
msg: announcement_sigs,
// counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
// channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
// announcement_signatures.
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().context.channel_id()));
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", &chan.get().context.channel_id());
if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
})?;
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
- match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
-
- if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
- log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
- log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
- if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
- }
+ // TODO(dunxen): Fix this duplication when we switch to a single map with enums as per
+ // https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/2422
+ if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
+ log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
+ self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_entry.get().context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel);
+ let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
+ self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
+ return Ok(());
+ } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
+ log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
+ self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_entry.get().context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel);
+ let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
+ self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
+ return Ok(());
+ } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
+ if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
+ log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
+ &msg.channel_id,
+ if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
+ }
- let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().context.get_funding_txo();
- let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self,
- chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
- dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
+ let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().context.get_funding_txo();
+ let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self,
+ chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
+ dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
- if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
- // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
- // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
- // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
- peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
- node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
- msg,
- });
- }
+ if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
+ // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
+ // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
+ // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
+ peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
+ node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
+ msg,
+ });
+ }
- // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
- if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
- break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
- peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry).map(|_| ());
- }
- break Ok(());
- },
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
+ // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
+ if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
+ break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
+ peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry).map(|_| ());
+ }
+ break Ok(());
+ } else {
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
}
};
for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
chan.get().context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt),
Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
};
- let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
+ let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<SP>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
// If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
// but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
// want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
}
fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
+ let funding_txo;
let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
- try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
+ let res = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan);
+ funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
+ res
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
}
};
- self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
+ self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, funding_txo);
Ok(())
}
log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
+ user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
/// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
/// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
- actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
+ actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
) -> bool {
actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
- let funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo();
- let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), chan);
+ let funding_txo_opt = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo();
+ let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
+ self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
+ &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo,
+ *counterparty_node_id)
+ } else { false };
+ let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_entry!(self,
+ chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger, mon_update_blocked), chan);
let res = if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
- handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
+ let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
+ .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
+ handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan).map(|_| ())
} else { Ok(()) };
(htlcs_to_fail, res)
if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
} else {
- log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", &chan_id);
try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
}
},
match monitor_event {
MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
- self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", &preimage);
+ self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint);
} else {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
has_monitor_update = true;
- let channel_id: [u8; 32] = *channel_id;
+ let channel_id: ChannelId = *channel_id;
let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING,
peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id));
// blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
// update(s) when those blockers complete.
log_trace!(self.logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
- log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
+ &channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
break;
}
debug_assert_eq!(chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.get_mut().unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
log_debug!(self.logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
- log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
+ &channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
{
}
} else {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
- log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
+ &channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
}
}
} else {
/// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
/// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
/// the function.
- fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
+ fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
(&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
// Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
// during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
if channel.context.is_usable() {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", &channel.context.channel_id());
if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
});
}
} else {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", &channel.context.channel_id());
}
}
}
if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", &channel.context.channel_id());
pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
msg: announcement_sigs,
if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
+ user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
phantom_shared_secret: None,
provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
}
- /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
+ /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
/// [`ChannelManager`].
///
/// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
/// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
#[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
- pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> InvoiceFeatures {
+ pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
}
self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
false
});
+ // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
+ // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
+ peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
match msg {
// V1 Channel Establishment
channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
+ inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
- for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
+ if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
- peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
- let retain = if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
- if !chan.context.have_received_message() {
- // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
- // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
- // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
- // drop it.
- false
- } else {
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
- node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
- msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
- });
- true
- }
- } else { true };
- if retain && chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
- if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.default_configuration) {
- if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
- node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
- msg, update_msg,
- });
- }
- }
- }
- retain
+
+ // Since unfunded channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer, and they're not persisted
+ // (so won't be recovered after a crash) we don't need to bother closing unfunded channels and
+ // clearing their maps here. Instead we can just send queue channel_reestablish messages for
+ // channels in the channel_by_id map.
+ peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().for_each(|(_, chan)| {
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
+ node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
+ });
});
}
//TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
- if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
- let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = {
+ match &msg.data as &str {
+ "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
+ "link failed to shutdown" =>
+ {
+ // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
+ // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
+ // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
+ // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
+ // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
+ // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
+ // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
+ if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
+ let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
+ let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
+ if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
+ let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
+ if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
+ if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
+ peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
+ node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
+ msg,
+ });
+ }
+ peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
+ node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
+ action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
+ msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
+ channel_id: msg.channel_id,
+ data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
+ },
+ log_level: Level::Trace,
+ }
+ });
+ }
+ }
+ return;
+ }
+ _ => {}
+ }
+
+ if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
+ let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
+ // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
+ // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
+ peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned()
.chain(peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.keys().cloned())
.chain(peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.keys().cloned()).collect()
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
if let Some(chan) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
- if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
+ if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
msg,
/// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
/// [`ChannelManager`].
pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
- provided_init_features(config).to_context()
+ let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
+ node_features.set_keysend_optional();
+ node_features
}
-/// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
+/// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
/// [`ChannelManager`].
///
/// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
/// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
#[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
-pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InvoiceFeatures {
+pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
provided_init_features(config).to_context()
}
(10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
(12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
(14, user_channel_id_low, required),
- (16, self.balance_msat, required),
+ (16, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required), // Forwards compatibility for removed balance_msat field.
(18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
(19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
(20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
- _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
+ _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
(1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
(2, channel_id, required),
(3, channel_type, option),
(10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
(12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
(14, user_channel_id_low, required),
- (16, balance_msat, required),
+ (16, _balance_msat, option), // Backwards compatibility for removed balance_msat field.
(18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
// Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
// filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
+ let _balance_msat: Option<u64> = _balance_msat;
+
Ok(Self {
inbound_scid_alias,
channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
unspendable_punishment_reserve,
user_channel_id,
- balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
(1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
(2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
(3, payment_metadata, option),
+ (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
},
(2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
(0, payment_preimage, required),
(2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
(3, payment_metadata, option),
(4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
+ (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
},
;);
(1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
(2, outpoint, required),
(4, htlc_id, required),
- (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
+ (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
+ (7, user_channel_id, option),
});
impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
- _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
+ _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
(0, prev_hop, required),
(1, total_msat, option),
(2, value_ser, required),
let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
- let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
+ let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, Channel<SP>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
for _ in 0..channel_count {
- let mut channel: Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (
+ let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
&args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
))?;
let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
- log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
+ &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = monitor_update {
close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
- reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
+ reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
+ counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
+ channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
}, None));
for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
let mut found_htlc = false;
// backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
log_info!(args.logger,
"Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
- log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
+ &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
}
}
} else {
log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
- log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
+ &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
monitor.get_latest_update_id());
if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
+ counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
+ channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
}, None));
} else {
- log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
+ log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
log_info!(args.logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
- log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
+ &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
channel_by_id,
outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
+ inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
};
let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>)>()));
+ let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
for _ in 0..peer_count {
let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
let peer_chans = peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new());
$chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
log_trace!(args.logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
- update.update_id, $channel_info_log, log_bytes!($funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
+ update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$funding_txo.to_channel_id());
max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
pending_background_events.push(
BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
// If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
- log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
+ &chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
log_error!(args.logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
} else {
log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.",
- log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
+ &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
- if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
+ if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), &htlc.payment_hash);
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
+ custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
total_msat: path_amt,
starting_block_height: best_block_height,
});
log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
- path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
+ path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
}
}
}
if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
- log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
+ &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
false
} else { true }
} else { true }
pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
- log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
+ &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
intercepted_id != ev_id
// generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
// it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
// `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
- pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv, path, false, &pending_events, &args.logger);
+ let compl_action =
+ EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
+ channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
+ counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
+ };
+ pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
+ path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &args.logger);
pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
}
},
// downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
// channel_id -> peer map entry).
counterparty_opt.is_none(),
- monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()))
+ monitor.get_funding_txo().0))
} else { None }
} else {
// If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
Err(()) => {
- log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
+ log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
}
}
for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
- log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
+ log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
.expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
}
- for claimable_htlc in payment.htlcs {
+ for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
// Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
payment_hash,
purpose: payment.purpose,
amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
+ htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
+ sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
}, None));
}
}
channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
}
- for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_chan_id) in pending_claims_to_replay {
+ for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_funding) in pending_claims_to_replay {
// We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
// don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
// channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value),
- downstream_closed, downstream_chan_id);
+ downstream_closed, downstream_funding);
}
//TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
+ use crate::ln::ChannelId;
use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
+ expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
// Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
// path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
match events[0] {
- Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
- assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
- assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
- assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
- match events[1] {
Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
- match events[2] {
+ match events[1] {
Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
{
// Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
- let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
+ let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().into_inner());
{
// Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
// funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
// as it has the funding transaction.
let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
- assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
+ assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
}
assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
{
let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
- assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
+ assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
}
expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
// as it has the funding transaction.
let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
- assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
+ assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
}
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
- nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
// party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
- assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
+ assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
}
{
// kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
- assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
+ assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
}
nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
// doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
- assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
+ assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
}
let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
}
let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
- check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
}
fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
// Dummy values
- let channel_id = [4; 32];
+ let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
}
- open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
+ open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
}
// A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
- open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
+ open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
- open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
+ open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
}
nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
+ open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
}
// Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
- open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
+ open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
}
// If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
let extra_fee_msat = 10;
- let hop_data = msgs::OnionHopData {
- amt_to_forward: 100,
+ let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
+ amt_msat: 100,
outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
- format: msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode {
- keysend_preimage: None,
- payment_metadata: None,
- payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
- payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
- }),
- }
+ payment_metadata: None,
+ keysend_preimage: None,
+ payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
+ payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
+ }),
+ custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
};
// Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
// intended amount, we fail the payment.
} else { panic!(); }
// If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
- let hop_data = msgs::OnionHopData { // This is the same hop_data as above, OnionHopData doesn't implement Clone
- amt_to_forward: 100,
+ let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
+ amt_msat: 100,
outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
- format: msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode {
- keysend_preimage: None,
- payment_metadata: None,
- payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
- payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
- }),
- }
+ payment_metadata: None,
+ keysend_preimage: None,
+ payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
+ payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
+ }),
+ custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
};
assert!(node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat)).is_ok());
let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
- check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
+ // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
+ // not have generated any events.
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
}
#[test]
MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
_ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
}
+
+ // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
+ // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
+ let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
+ let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
+ let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
+ assert!(
+ matches!(
+ nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
+ forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
+ ..Default::default()
+ }),
+ Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
+ )
+ );
+ // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn test_payment_display() {
+ let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
+ assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
+ let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
+ assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
+ let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
+ assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
}
}
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
- use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
+ use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
use criterion::Criterion;
&'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
&'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
- struct ANodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
- node: &'a Manager<'a, P>,
+ struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
+ node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
}
- impl<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'a, P> {
- type CM = Manager<'a, P>;
+ impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
+ type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
#[inline]
- fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'a, P> { self.node }
+ fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
#[inline]
fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
}
let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
- let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
+ let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff