#[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
-use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, Router};
+use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
use crate::ln::msgs;
use crate::ln::onion_utils;
}
}
-struct ReceiveError {
+struct InboundOnionErr {
err_code: u16,
err_data: Vec<u8>,
msg: &'static str,
/// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
/// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
enum BackgroundEvent {
- /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel. This is only separated from
- /// [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the maybe-non-closing variant needs a public
- /// key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the channel has been force-closed we do not
- /// need the counterparty node_id.
+ /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
+ /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
+ /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
+ /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
///
/// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
/// are regenerated on startup.
- ClosingMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
+ ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
/// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
/// channel to continue normal operation.
///
/// In general this should be used rather than
- /// [`Self::ClosingMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
+ /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
/// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
/// error the other variant is acceptable.
///
funding_txo: OutPoint,
update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
},
+ /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
+ /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
+ /// on a channel.
+ MonitorUpdatesComplete {
+ counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
+ channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ },
}
#[derive(Debug)]
/// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
///
/// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
-pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e DefaultRouter<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L, &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters, ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>, &'g L>;
+pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
+ ChannelManager<
+ &'a M,
+ &'b T,
+ &'c KeysManager,
+ &'c KeysManager,
+ &'c KeysManager,
+ &'d F,
+ &'e DefaultRouter<
+ &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
+ &'g L,
+ &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
+ ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
+ ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
+ >,
+ &'g L
+ >;
macro_rules! define_test_pub_trait { ($vis: vis) => {
/// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`] used in testing.
/// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
- #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
persistence_notifier: Notifier,
///
/// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
pub is_channel_ready: bool,
+ /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
+ /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
+ pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
/// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
/// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
///
self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
}
- fn from_channel_context<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner>(context: &ChannelContext<Signer>,
- best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures) -> Self {
-
- let balance = context.get_available_balances();
+ fn from_channel_context<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, F: Deref>(
+ context: &ChannelContext<Signer>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
+ fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
+ ) -> Self
+ where F::Target: FeeEstimator
+ {
+ let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
ChannelDetails {
inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
config: Some(context.config()),
+ channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
}
}
}
+#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
+/// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
+/// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
+/// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
+/// the channel will be removed shortly.
+/// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
+/// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
+pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
+ /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
+ NotShuttingDown,
+ /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
+ ShutdownInitiated,
+ /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
+ /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
+ ResolvingHTLCs,
+ /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
+ NegotiatingClosingFee,
+ /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
+ /// to drop the channel.
+ ShutdownComplete,
+}
+
/// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
/// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
#[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
// update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in
// any case so that it won't deadlock.
debug_assert_ne!($self.id_to_peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
- #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
- debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
- }
+ debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
match $update_res {
ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
pending_events.drain(..num_events);
processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
+ // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
+ // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
$self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
}
pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
- #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
- peer_state.latest_features.clone());
+ peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
res.push(details);
}
}
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
- peer_state.latest_features.clone());
+ peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
res.push(details);
}
for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter() {
let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
- peer_state.latest_features.clone());
+ peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
res.push(details);
}
for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter() {
let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
- peer_state.latest_features.clone());
+ peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
res.push(details);
}
}
return peer_state.channel_by_id
.iter()
.map(|(_, channel)|
- ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height, features.clone()))
+ ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
+ features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator))
.collect();
}
vec![]
}
}
+ fn construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(
+ &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, hop_hmac: [u8; 32],
+ new_packet_bytes: [u8; onion_utils::ONION_DATA_LEN], shared_secret: [u8; 32],
+ next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
+ ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
+ debug_assert!(next_packet_pubkey_opt.is_some());
+ let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
+ version: 0,
+ public_key: next_packet_pubkey_opt.unwrap_or(Err(secp256k1::Error::InvalidPublicKey)),
+ hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
+ hmac: hop_hmac,
+ };
+
+ let (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value) = match hop_data {
+ msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value } =>
+ (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value),
+ msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. } =>
+ return Err(InboundOnionErr {
+ msg: "Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node",
+ err_code: 0x4000 | 22,
+ err_data: Vec::new(),
+ }),
+ };
+
+ Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
+ routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
+ onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
+ short_channel_id,
+ },
+ payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
+ incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
+ incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
+ outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward,
+ outgoing_cltv_value,
+ skimmed_fee_msat: None,
+ })
+ }
+
fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(
- &self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32], payment_hash: PaymentHash,
+ &self, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, shared_secret: [u8; 32], payment_hash: PaymentHash,
amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>, allow_underpay: bool,
counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
- ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError> {
+ ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
+ let (payment_data, keysend_preimage, onion_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata) = match hop_data {
+ msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
+ payment_data, keysend_preimage, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata, ..
+ } =>
+ (payment_data, keysend_preimage, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata),
+ _ =>
+ return Err(InboundOnionErr {
+ err_code: 0x4000|22,
+ err_data: Vec::new(),
+ msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
+ }),
+ };
// final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
- if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
- return Err(ReceiveError {
+ if outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
+ return Err(InboundOnionErr {
msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
err_code: 18,
err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
// payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
// channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
- if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
+ if (outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
- return Err(ReceiveError {
+ return Err(InboundOnionErr {
err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
});
}
- if (!allow_underpay && hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat) ||
- (allow_underpay && hop_data.amt_to_forward >
+ if (!allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat > amt_msat) ||
+ (allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat >
amt_msat.saturating_add(counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)))
{
- return Err(ReceiveError {
+ return Err(InboundOnionErr {
err_code: 19,
err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
});
}
- let routing = match hop_data.format {
- msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
- return Err(ReceiveError {
+ let routing = if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
+ // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
+ // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
+ // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
+ // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
+ // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
+ let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
+ if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
+ return Err(InboundOnionErr {
err_code: 0x4000|22,
err_data: Vec::new(),
- msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
+ msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
});
- },
- msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage, payment_metadata } => {
- if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
- // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
- // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
- // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
- // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
- // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
- let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
- if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
- return Err(ReceiveError {
- err_code: 0x4000|22,
- err_data: Vec::new(),
- msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
- });
- }
- if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && payment_data.is_some() {
- return Err(ReceiveError {
- err_code: 0x4000|22,
- err_data: Vec::new(),
- msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
- });
- }
- PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
- payment_data,
- payment_preimage,
- payment_metadata,
- incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
- }
- } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
- PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
- payment_data: data,
- payment_metadata,
- incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
- phantom_shared_secret,
- }
- } else {
- return Err(ReceiveError {
- err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
- err_data: Vec::new(),
- msg: "We require payment_secrets",
- });
- }
- },
+ }
+ if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && payment_data.is_some() {
+ return Err(InboundOnionErr {
+ err_code: 0x4000|22,
+ err_data: Vec::new(),
+ msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
+ });
+ }
+ PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
+ payment_data,
+ payment_preimage,
+ payment_metadata,
+ incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
+ }
+ } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
+ PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
+ payment_data: data,
+ payment_metadata,
+ incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
+ phantom_shared_secret,
+ }
+ } else {
+ return Err(InboundOnionErr {
+ err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
+ err_data: Vec::new(),
+ msg: "We require payment_secrets",
+ });
};
Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
routing,
payment_hash,
incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
- outgoing_amt_msat: hop_data.amt_to_forward,
- outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
+ outgoing_amt_msat: onion_amt_msat,
+ outgoing_cltv_value,
skimmed_fee_msat: counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
})
}
};
let (outgoing_scid, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, next_packet_pk_opt) = match next_hop {
onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
- next_hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData {
- format: msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id }, amt_to_forward,
- outgoing_cltv_value,
+ next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward {
+ short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value
}, ..
} => {
let next_pk = onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx,
// We'll do receive checks in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] so we have access to the
// inbound channel's state.
onion_utils::Hop::Receive { .. } => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
- onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
- next_hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData { format: msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. }, .. }, ..
- } => {
+ onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. }, .. } => {
return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0; 0]);
}
};
// delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
},
- Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
+ Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
}
},
onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
- debug_assert!(next_packet_pubkey_opt.is_some());
- let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
- version: 0,
- public_key: next_packet_pubkey_opt.unwrap_or(Err(secp256k1::Error::InvalidPublicKey)),
- hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
- hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
- };
-
- let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
- msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
- msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
- return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
- },
- };
-
- PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
- routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
- onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
- short_channel_id,
- },
- payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
- incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
- incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
- outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
- outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
- skimmed_fee_msat: None,
- })
+ match self.construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
+ new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
+ Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
+ Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
+ }
}
}
}
session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
payment_id,
- }, onion_packet, None, &self.logger);
+ }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
match break_chan_entry!(self, send_res, chan) {
Some(monitor_update) => {
match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
/// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
/// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
///
+ /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
/// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
/// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
/// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None)
{
Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
- Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
+ Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
}
},
_ => panic!(),
});
if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
- onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, &self.logger)
+ onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, &self.fee_estimator,
+ &self.logger)
{
if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
- #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
let mut background_events = Vec::new();
for event in background_events.drain(..) {
match event {
- BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
+ BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
// The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
// monitor updating completing.
let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
}
let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
},
+ BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
+ let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
+ if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
+ let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
+ let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
+ if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
+ handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
+ } else {
+ let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
+ .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
+ mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
+ mem::drop(per_peer_state);
+ self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
+ }
+ }
+ },
}
}
NotifyOption::DoPersist
log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
- chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.logger);
+ chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
NotifyOption::DoPersist
}
-> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
//TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
+ // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
+ // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
+ // `BackgroundEvent`s.
+ let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
+
{
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
log_bytes!(chan_id), action);
peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
}
- let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
- peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
- if let Err(e) = res {
- // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
- // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor
- // update over and over again until morale improves.
- log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage);
- return Err((counterparty_node_id, e));
+ if !during_init {
+ let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
+ peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
+ if let Err(e) = res {
+ // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
+ // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor
+ // update over and over again until morale improves.
+ log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage);
+ return Err((counterparty_node_id, e));
+ }
+ } else {
+ // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
+ // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
+ // monitor update as a background event.
+ self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
+ BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
+ counterparty_node_id,
+ funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
+ update: monitor_update.clone(),
+ });
}
}
return Ok(());
payment_preimage,
}],
};
- // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
- // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
- let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
- if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
- // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
- // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
- // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
- // again on restart.
- log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
- payment_preimage, update_res);
+
+ if !during_init {
+ // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
+ // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
+ let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
+ if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
+ // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
+ // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
+ // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
+ // again on restart.
+ log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
+ payment_preimage, update_res);
+ }
+ } else {
+ // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
+ // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
+ // event.
+ // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
+ // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
+ // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
+ // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
+ // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
+ // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
+ // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
+ self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
+ BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
+ prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update,
+ )));
}
// Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
// duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
match source {
HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
+ debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
+ "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
},
HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
- let mut channel = {
- match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()){
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
- }
- };
+ let channel =
+ if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
+ chan
+ } else {
+ let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
+ .remove(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
+ mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
+ mem::drop(per_peer_state);
+ self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
+ return;
+ };
let remaining_in_flight =
if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
pending.len()
} else { 0 };
log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
- highest_applied_update_id, channel.get().context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
+ highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
remaining_in_flight);
- if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
+ if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
return;
}
- handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel.get_mut());
+ handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
}
/// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
_ => pending_forward_info
}
};
- try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
+ try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), chan);
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
}
}
}
- // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued.
fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
- let forward_ev_exists = pending_events.iter()
- .find(|(ev, _)| if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false })
- .is_some();
- if !forward_ev_exists {
- pending_events.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
- time_forwardable:
- Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
+ let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
+ let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
+ if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
+ ).count();
+ // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
+ // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
+ // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
+ // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
+ // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
+ // real by taking more time.
+ if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
+ pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
+ time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
}, None));
}
}
/// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
- /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other event
+ /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
/// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
/// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
let funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo();
- let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
+ let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), chan);
let res = if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan).map(|_| ())
let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
- chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger);
+ chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
}
/// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
/// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
/// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
- /// making progress and then any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
+ /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
let mut errors = Vec::new();
loop {
(35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
(37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
(39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
+ (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
});
Ok(())
}
(35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
(37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
(39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
+ (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
});
// `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
+ channel_shutdown_state,
})
}
}
impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
- (2, channels, vec_type),
+ (2, channels, required_vec),
(4, phantom_scid, required),
(6, real_node_pubkey, required),
});
0 => {
let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
- let mut path_hops: Option<Vec<RouteHop>> = Some(Vec::new());
+ let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
let mut payment_id = None;
let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
(0, session_priv, required),
(1, payment_id, option),
(2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
- (4, path_hops, vec_type),
+ (4, path_hops, required_vec),
(5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
(6, blinded_tail, option),
});
// instead.
payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
}
- let path = Path { hops: path_hops.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?, blinded_tail };
+ let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
if path.hops.len() == 0 {
return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
}
(1, payment_id_opt, option),
(2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
// 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
- (4, path.hops, vec_type),
+ (4, path.hops, required_vec),
(5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
(6, path.blinded_tail, option),
});
(6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
(7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
(8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
- (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
+ (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
(10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
(11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
(13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
}
}
+impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
+ (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
+ (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
+ (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
+ (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
+ (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
+);
+
/// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
///
/// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
};
- close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
+ close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
}
}
(6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
(7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
(8, events_override, option),
- (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
+ (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
(10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
(11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
(13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
update: update.clone(),
});
}
+ if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
+ // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
+ // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
+ // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
+ pending_background_events.push(
+ BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
+ counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
+ channel_id: $funding_txo.to_channel_id(),
+ });
+ }
if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
log_error!(args.logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
// Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
+ // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
+ // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
+ // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
+ let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
+
{
// If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
// ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
// We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
// 0.0.102+
for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
- if id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
+ let counterparty_opt = id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
+ if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
if path.hops.is_empty() {
}
}
}
+
+ // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
+ // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
+ // payments.
+ let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
+ .into_iter()
+ .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
+ if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
+ if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
+ Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
+ // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
+ // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
+ // channel_id -> peer map entry).
+ counterparty_opt.is_none(),
+ monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()))
+ } else { None }
+ } else {
+ // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
+ // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
+ // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
+ // channel still live case here.
+ None
+ }
+ });
+ for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
+ pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
+ }
}
}
blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
.entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
.or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
+ } else {
+ // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
+ // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
+ // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
+ // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
+ // anymore.
}
}
}
pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
- #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
}
+ for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_chan_id) in pending_claims_to_replay {
+ // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
+ // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
+ // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
+ channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value),
+ downstream_closed, downstream_chan_id);
+ }
+
//TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
//connection or two.
let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
let extra_fee_msat = 10;
- let hop_data = msgs::OnionHopData {
- amt_to_forward: 100,
+ let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
+ amt_msat: 100,
outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
- format: msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode {
- keysend_preimage: None,
- payment_metadata: None,
- payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
- payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
- }),
- }
+ payment_metadata: None,
+ keysend_preimage: None,
+ payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
+ payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
+ }),
};
// Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
// intended amount, we fail the payment.
- if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::ReceiveError { err_code, .. }) =
+ if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundOnionErr { err_code, .. }) =
node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat))
{
} else { panic!(); }
// If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
- let hop_data = msgs::OnionHopData { // This is the same hop_data as above, OnionHopData doesn't implement Clone
- amt_to_forward: 100,
+ let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
+ amt_msat: 100,
outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
- format: msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode {
- keysend_preimage: None,
- payment_metadata: None,
- payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
- payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
- }),
- }
+ payment_metadata: None,
+ keysend_preimage: None,
+ payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
+ payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
+ }),
};
assert!(node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat)).is_ok());
use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
use crate::util::test_utils;
- use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
+ use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
+ config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff