// construct one themselves.
use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
-use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
+use ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, RouteParameters};
use ln::msgs;
use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
use util::config::UserConfig;
use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
use util::{byte_utils, events};
-use util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
+use util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
+use util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
use util::logger::{Level, Logger};
use util::errors::APIError;
#[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
use std::time::Instant;
+use util::crypto::sign;
mod inbound_payment {
use alloc::string::ToString;
// our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
#[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
-enum PendingHTLCRouting {
+pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
Forward {
onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
Receive {
payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
+ phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
},
ReceiveKeysend {
payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
#[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
- routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
- incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
+ pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
+ pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
payment_hash: PaymentHash,
pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
short_channel_id: u64,
htlc_id: u64,
incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
+ phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
// This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
// channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
cltv_expiry: u32,
value: u64,
onion_payload: OnionPayload,
+ timer_ticks: u8,
}
/// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
}
}
}
+#[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
#[cfg(test)]
impl HTLCSource {
pub fn dummy() -> Self {
// Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
+ /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) to the real channel id. Outbound SCID aliases are added
+ /// here once the channel is available for normal use, with SCIDs being added once the funding
+ /// transaction is confirmed at the channel's required confirmation depth.
pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
- /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
+ /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
+ ///
+ /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
+ /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
+ /// and via the classic SCID.
+ ///
/// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
/// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
/// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
/// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
/// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
/// concrete type of the KeysManager.
+///
+/// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
/// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
/// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
/// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
/// concrete type of the KeysManager.
+///
+/// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
/// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
/// Locked *after* channel_state.
pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment>>,
+ /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
+ /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
+ /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
+ /// active channel list on load.
+ outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
+
our_network_key: SecretKey,
our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
+ /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
+ /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
+ /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
+ ///
+ /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
+ fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
+
/// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
/// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
/// pending HTLCs in flight.
pub(crate) const PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
+/// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
+pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
+
/// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
/// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
/// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
+ /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
+ ///
+ /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
+ pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
/// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
/// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
+ ///
+ /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
+ /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
+ ///
+ /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
+ /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
+ /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
+ /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
+ /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
+ /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
+ ///
+ /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
+ /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
+ ///
+ /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
+ pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
/// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
/// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
pub is_public: bool,
}
+impl ChannelDetails {
+ /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
+ /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
+ /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
+ ///
+ /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
+ /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
+ pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
+ self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
+ }
+}
+
/// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
/// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
/// states for more.
},
}
+/// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
+///
+/// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
+#[derive(Clone)]
+pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
+ /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
+ pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
+ /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
+ /// route hints.
+ pub phantom_scid: u64,
+ /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
+ pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
+}
+
macro_rules! handle_error {
($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
match $internal {
}
}
+macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
+ ($self: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr) => {
+ if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
+ $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
+ } else {
+ // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
+ // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
+ // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
+ // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
+ // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
+ // stage.
+ let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
+ debug_assert!(alias_removed);
+ }
+ $short_to_id.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
+ }
+}
+
/// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
},
ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
- if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
- $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
- }
+ update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $short_to_id, $channel);
let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
(true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
},
ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => {
log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
- if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
- $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
- }
+ update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $short_to_id, $channel);
let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(false);
(true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
}
macro_rules! remove_channel {
- ($channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
+ ($self: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
{
let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
- if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
- $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
- }
+ update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel_state.short_to_id, channel);
channel
}
}
}
macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
- ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
- handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
- };
($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
match $err {
ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
- if let Some(short_id) = $chan.get_short_channel_id() {
- $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
- }
+ update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $short_to_id, $chan);
// TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
// chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
// will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
}
res
} };
+ ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY) => { {
+ debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
+ handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
+ } };
+ ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, NO_UPDATE) => {
+ handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
+ };
+ ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
+ handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
+ };
($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
- }
+ };
}
macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
}
}
+macro_rules! send_funding_locked {
+ ($short_to_id: expr, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $funding_locked_msg: expr) => {
+ $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
+ node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ msg: $funding_locked_msg,
+ });
+ // Note that we may send a funding locked multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
+ // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
+ let outbound_alias_insert = $short_to_id.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), $channel.channel_id());
+ assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == $channel.channel_id(),
+ "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
+ if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
+ let scid_insert = $short_to_id.insert(real_scid, $channel.channel_id());
+ assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == $channel.channel_id(),
+ "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
+ }
+ }
+}
+
macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
$raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
$pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $funding_locked: expr, $announcement_sigs: expr) => { {
let mut htlc_forwards = None;
- let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
+ let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
let res = loop {
let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
if !forwards.is_empty() {
// Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the funding_locked fly
// before it should be allowed to.
assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
- $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
- node_id: counterparty_node_id,
- msg,
- });
- $channel_state.short_to_id.insert($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), $channel_entry.get().channel_id());
+ send_funding_locked!($channel_state.short_to_id, $channel_state.pending_msg_events, $channel_entry.get(), msg);
}
if let Some(msg) = $announcement_sigs {
$channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
}),
+ outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
secp_ctx,
inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
+ fake_scid_rand_bytes: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
&self.default_configuration
}
+ fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
+ let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
+ let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
+ let mut i = 0;
+ loop {
+ if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
+ outbound_scid_alias += 1;
+ } else {
+ outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
+ }
+ if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
+ break;
+ }
+ i += 1;
+ if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
+ }
+ outbound_scid_alias
+ }
+
/// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
///
/// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
Some(peer_state) => {
+ let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
- Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, their_features,
- channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height())?
+ match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key,
+ their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
+ self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
+ {
+ Ok(res) => res,
+ Err(e) => {
+ self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
+ return Err(e);
+ },
+ }
},
None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
}
let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
- if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
+ if cfg!(fuzzing) {
return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
} else {
panic!("RNG is bad???");
forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
},
funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
+ // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
+ // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
+ channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
+ inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
balance_msat,
if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
let (result, is_permanent) =
- handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
+ handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
if is_permanent {
- remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
+ remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
break result;
}
}
});
if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
- let channel = remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
+ let channel = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
msg: channel_update
return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
}
}
- if let Some(short_id) = chan.get().get_short_channel_id() {
- channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
- }
if peer_node_id.is_some() {
if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
} else {
self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
}
- chan.remove_entry().1
+ remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan)
} else {
return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
}
}
fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
- payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
+ payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32
, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
{
// final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != cltv_expiry {
PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
payment_data: data,
incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
+ phantom_shared_secret,
}
} else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
// We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
// OUR PAYMENT!
- match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry) {
+ match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
Ok(info) => {
// Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
// message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
- let forwarding_id = match id_option {
+ let forwarding_id_opt = match id_option {
None => { // unknown_next_peer
- break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
+ // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
+ // phantom.
+ if fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id) {
+ None
+ } else {
+ break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
+ }
},
- Some(id) => id.clone(),
+ Some(id) => Some(id.clone()),
};
+ let (chan_update_opt, forwardee_cltv_expiry_delta) = if let Some(forwarding_id) = forwarding_id_opt {
+ let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
+ if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
+ // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
+ // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
+ // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
+ break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
+ }
+ if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
+ // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
+ // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
+ // we don't have the channel here.
+ break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
+ }
+ let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
+
+ // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
+ // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
+ // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
+ // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
+ // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
+ if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
+ break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
+ }
+ if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
+ break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
+ }
+ let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64)
+ .and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000)
+ .checked_add(chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat() as u64) });
+ if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
+ break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, chan_update_opt));
+ }
+ (chan_update_opt, chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta())
+ } else { (None, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA) };
- let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
-
- if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
- // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
- // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
- // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
- break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
- }
-
- // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
- // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
- // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
- // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
- // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
- if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
- break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
- }
- if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
- break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
- }
- let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64)
- .and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000)
- .checked_add(chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat() as u64) });
- if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
- break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
- }
- if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta() as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
- break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
+ if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + forwardee_cltv_expiry_delta as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
+ break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, chan_update_opt));
}
let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
// Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
// but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
// HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
- break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
+ break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
}
if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
// but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
// risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
- break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
+ break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
}
break None;
}
{
- let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
+ let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 8 + 2));
if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
- res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
+ msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
}
else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
- res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
+ msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
}
else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
// TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
- res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
+ 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
}
- res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
+ (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
+ chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
}
- return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
+ return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
}
}
}
Some(id) => id,
};
+ self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
+ }
+ fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
excess_data: Vec::new(),
};
let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
- let node_announce_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
+ let node_announce_sig = sign(&self.secp_ctx, &msghash, &self.our_network_key);
let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
let mut new_events = Vec::new();
let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
+ let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
{
let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
None => {
- failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
match forward_info {
- HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info,
- prev_funding_outpoint } => {
- let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
- short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
- outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
- htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
- incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
- });
- failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
- HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }
- ));
- },
+ HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
+ routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
+ prev_funding_outpoint } => {
+ macro_rules! fail_forward {
+ ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
+ {
+ log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
+ let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
+ short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
+ outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
+ htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
+ incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
+ phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
+ });
+ failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
+ HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: $err_code, data: $err_data }
+ ));
+ continue;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
+ let phantom_secret_res = self.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::PhantomNode);
+ if phantom_secret_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id) {
+ let phantom_shared_secret = {
+ let mut arr = [0; 32];
+ arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &phantom_secret_res.unwrap())[..]);
+ arr
+ };
+ let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
+ Ok(res) => res,
+ Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
+ let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
+ // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
+ // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
+ // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
+ // of the onion.
+ fail_forward!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
+ },
+ Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
+ fail_forward!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
+ },
+ };
+ match next_hop {
+ onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
+ match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
+ Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
+ Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => fail_forward!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
+ }
+ },
+ _ => panic!(),
+ }
+ } else {
+ fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
+ }
+ } else {
+ fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
+ }
+ },
HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
// Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
// the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
+ // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
+ phantom_shared_secret: None,
});
match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet, &self.logger) {
Err(e) => {
} else {
panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
}
- let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap();
+ let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
- HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
+ HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data }
));
continue;
},
}
ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
- let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
- if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
- channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
- }
+ let mut channel = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan);
// ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
- Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.get_user_id(), channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
+ Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel.channel_id(), channel.get_user_id(), channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
},
ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
};
HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
prev_funding_outpoint } => {
- let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload) = match routing {
- PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
- (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data)),
+ let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
+ PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } =>
+ (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret),
PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
- (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage)),
+ (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None),
_ => {
panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
}
outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
+ phantom_shared_secret,
},
value: amt_to_forward,
+ timer_ticks: 0,
cltv_expiry,
onion_payload,
};
outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
+ phantom_shared_secret,
}), payment_hash,
HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
));
macro_rules! check_total_value {
($payment_data_total_msat: expr, $payment_secret: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
- let mut total_value = 0;
let mut payment_received_generated = false;
let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
.or_insert(Vec::new());
continue
}
}
- htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
+ let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.value;
for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
total_value += htlc.value;
match &htlc.onion_payload {
if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data_total_msat {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data_total_msat);
- for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
- fail_htlc!(htlc);
- }
+ fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
} else if total_value == $payment_data_total_msat {
+ htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
payment_hash,
purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
// Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
// payment value yet, wait until we receive more
// MPP parts.
+ htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
}
payment_received_generated
}}
for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
}
+ self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
let ret_err = match res {
Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
- let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_id);
+ let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
if drop { retain_channel = false; }
res
} else {
let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
+ let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
{
let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
true
});
+
+ channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| {
+ if htlcs.is_empty() {
+ // This should be unreachable
+ debug_assert!(false);
+ return false;
+ }
+ if let OnionPayload::Invoice(ref final_hop_data) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
+ // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
+ // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
+ if final_hop_data.total_msat == htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.value) {
+ return true;
+ } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
+ htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
+ return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
+ }) {
+ timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.into_iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.prev_hop.clone(), payment_hash.clone())));
+ return false;
+ }
+ }
+ true
+ });
+ }
+
+ for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
+ self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0), &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 23, data: Vec::new() });
}
for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
} else { false }
}
+ /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
+ /// that we want to return and a channel.
+ ///
+ /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
+ /// forwarding
+ fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
+ // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
+ // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
+ // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
+ // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
+ let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
+ chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
+ } else {
+ chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
+ };
+ if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
+ self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
+ } else {
+ (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
+ }
+ }
+
+
+ /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
+ /// that we want to return and a channel.
+ fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
+ debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
+ if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
+ let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 4));
+ if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
+ // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
+ 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
+ }
+ (upd.serialized_length() as u16).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
+ upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
+ (desired_err_code, enc.0)
+ } else {
+ // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
+ // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
+ // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
+ // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
+ (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
+ }
+ }
+
// Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
// failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
// be surfaced to the user.
let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
- if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&chan_entry.get()) {
- (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len())
- } else {
- (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
- }
+ self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
};
pending_events.push(path_failure);
if let Some(ev) = full_failure_ev { pending_events.push(ev); }
},
- HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. }) => {
+ HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret, .. }) => {
let err_packet = match onion_error {
HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
- let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
- onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
+ if let Some(phantom_ss) = phantom_shared_secret {
+ let phantom_packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
+ let encrypted_phantom_packet = onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, &phantom_packet);
+ onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &encrypted_phantom_packet.data[..])
+ } else {
+ let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
+ onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
+ }
},
HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
// channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
// channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
// now.
- Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
- node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
- msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()).unwrap(),
- })
+ if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()) {
+ Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
+ node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ msg,
+ })
+ } else { None }
} else { None };
chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, None, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.funding_locked, updates.announcement_sigs);
if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
///
/// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted.
///
- /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: crate::util::events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
- pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ /// For inbound channels, the `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
+ /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
+ /// with which `accept_inbound_channel` call.
+ ///
+ /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
+ /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
+ pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], user_channel_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
}
channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
- msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(),
+ msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
});
}
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
}
- let mut channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(),
- &their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger)
- .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
+ let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
+ let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager,
+ counterparty_node_id.clone(), &their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration,
+ self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
+ {
+ Err(e) => {
+ self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
+ },
+ Ok(res) => res
+ };
let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
+ self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
+ },
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
- msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
+ msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(0),
});
} else {
let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
push_msat: msg.push_msat,
+ channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
}
);
}
// channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
// announcement_signatures.
log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
- channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
- node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
- msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
- });
+ if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
+ node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
+ msg,
+ });
+ }
}
Ok(())
},
if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
let (result, is_permanent) =
- handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
+ handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
if is_permanent {
- remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
+ remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
break result;
}
}
// also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
// fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
// watch for old state broadcasts)!
- if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
- channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
- }
- (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
+ (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry)))
} else { (tx, None) }
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
match pending_forward_info {
PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
- if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
- onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
- let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
- // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
- res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
- res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
- res
- }[..])
- } else {
- // The only case where we'd be unable to
- // successfully get a channel update is if the
- // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet,
- // implying our counterparty is trying to route
- // payments over the channel back to themselves
- // (because no one else should know the short_id
- // is a lightning channel yet). We should have
- // no problem just calling this
- // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10).
- onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
- }
+ let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
+ onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, real_code, &error_data)
} else {
onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
};
// If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
// down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
// they have the latest channel parameters.
- channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
- node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
- msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
- });
+ if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
+ channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
+ node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ msg,
+ });
+ }
}
let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(
let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
- let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
- if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
- if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
- short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
- }
+ if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
+ let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
/// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
/// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
/// update events as a separate process method here.
- #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
+ #[cfg(fuzzing)]
pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
self.process_pending_monitor_events();
}
if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
has_monitor_update = true;
- let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), channel_id);
+ let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, channel_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
if close_channel { return false; }
} else {
if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
// We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
// a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
- if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
- short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
- }
-
if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
msg: update
log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
+ update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_id, chan);
false
} else { true }
},
/// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
/// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
///
+ /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
+ ///
/// # Note
/// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
///
/// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
/// [`PaymentReceived`].
///
- /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
- ///
/// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
/// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
///
/// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
/// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
///
+ /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
+ ///
/// # Note
/// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
///
inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
}
- #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))]
+ /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
+ /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
+ ///
+ /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
+ pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
+ let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
+ loop {
+ let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block.height(), &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
+ // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
+ match channel_state.short_to_id.entry(scid_candidate) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => continue,
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return scid_candidate
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
+ ///
+ /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
+ pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
+ PhantomRouteHints {
+ channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
+ phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
+ real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
+ }
+ }
+
+ #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
let event_handler = |event: &events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event.clone());
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger)
.map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
+
+ let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
+ if height < last_best_block_height {
+ let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
+ self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
+ }
}
fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
let res = f(channel);
if let Ok((funding_locked_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
- let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
- timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
- failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
- data: chan_update,
+ let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
+ timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
+ failure_code, data,
}));
}
if let Some(funding_locked) = funding_locked_opt {
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
- node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
- msg: funding_locked,
- });
+ send_funding_locked!(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, channel, funding_locked);
if channel.is_usable() {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
- node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
- msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel).unwrap(),
- });
+ if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
+ node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ msg,
+ });
+ }
} else {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
}
- short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
}
if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
}
}
} else if let Err(reason) = res {
- if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
- short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
- }
+ update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_id, channel);
// It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
// reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
{
let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
- let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
+ let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
if no_connection_possible {
log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
- if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
- short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
- }
+ update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_id, chan);
failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
if chan.is_shutdown() {
- if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
- short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
- }
+ update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_id, chan);
self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
return false;
} else {
&events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
&events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
&events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
+ &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
}
});
}
}
}
} else {
+ {
+ // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
+ let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
+ if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
+ return;
+ }
+ if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
+ node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
+ msg,
+ });
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
// Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
}
});
impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelDetails, {
+ (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
(2, channel_id, required),
+ (3, channel_type, option),
(4, counterparty, required),
(6, funding_txo, option),
(8, short_channel_id, option),
(32, is_public, required),
});
+impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
+ (2, channels, vec_type),
+ (4, phantom_scid, required),
+ (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
+});
+
impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
(0, Forward) => {
(0, onion_packet, required),
},
(1, Receive) => {
(0, payment_data, required),
+ (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
(2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
},
(2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
(0, short_channel_id, required),
+ (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
(2, outpoint, required),
(4, htlc_id, required),
(6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
};
Ok(Self {
prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
+ timer_ticks: 0,
value,
onion_payload,
cltv_expiry,
write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
(1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
(3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
- (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required)
+ (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
+ (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
});
Ok(())
let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
+ let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
(1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
(3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
- (5, received_network_pubkey, option)
+ (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
+ (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
});
+ if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
+ fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
+ }
if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
}
}
+ let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
+ for (chan_id, chan) in by_id.iter_mut() {
+ if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
+ let mut outbound_scid_alias;
+ loop {
+ outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
+ .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.keys_manager);
+ if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
+ }
+ chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
+ } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
+ // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
+ // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
+ log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
+ return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
+ }
+ if chan.is_usable() {
+ if short_to_id.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), *chan_id).is_some() {
+ // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
+ // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
+ log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
+ return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
+ outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
+ fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
+
our_network_key,
our_network_pubkey,
secp_ctx,
use util::errors::APIError;
use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
use util::test_utils;
+ use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
#[cfg(feature = "std")]
#[test]
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
+ let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
// To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
};
let route = find_route(
&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, nodes[0].network_graph, None,
- nodes[0].logger, &scorer
+ nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
).unwrap();
nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
let route = find_route(
&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, nodes[0].network_graph, None,
- nodes[0].logger, &scorer
+ nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
).unwrap();
let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
- nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
- nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
+ nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
+ nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
let route_params = RouteParameters {
let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
+ let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
let route = find_route(
&payer_pubkey, &route_params, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
- nodes[0].logger, &scorer
+ nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
).unwrap();
let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
- nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
- nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
+ nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
+ nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
let route_params = RouteParameters {
let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
+ let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
let route = find_route(
&payer_pubkey, &route_params, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
- nodes[0].logger, &scorer
+ nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
).unwrap();
let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
pub mod bench {
use chain::Listen;
use chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
- use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
+ use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, KeysInterface, InMemorySigner};
use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
use util::test_utils;
use util::config::UserConfig;
- use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
+ use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
});
let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
- node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
- node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
+ node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
+ node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id())
.with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
- let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph,
- Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer).unwrap();
+ let seed = [3u8; 32];
+ let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42);
+ let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
+ let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph.read_only(),
+ Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff