use crate::routing::router::{InFlightHtlcs, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, RouteParameters};
use crate::ln::msgs;
use crate::ln::onion_utils;
+use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
use crate::chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, Recipient};
use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
use crate::util::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
-use crate::util::{byte_utils, events};
+use crate::util::events;
use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
}
}
-#[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
-pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
- LightningError {
- err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
- },
- Reason {
- failure_code: u16,
- data: Vec<u8>,
- }
-}
-
struct ReceiveError {
err_code: u16,
err_data: Vec<u8>,
msg: &'static str,
}
-/// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
-enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
- PrevHopForceClosed,
- MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
- Success(u64),
- DuplicateClaim,
-}
-
type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>);
/// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
RevokeAndACKFirst,
}
+/// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
+struct ClaimingPayment {
+ amount_msat: u64,
+ payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
+ receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
+}
+impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
+ (0, amount_msat, required),
+ (2, payment_purpose, required),
+ (4, receiver_node_id, required),
+});
+
+/// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
+struct ClaimablePayments {
+ /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
+ /// failed/claimed by the user.
+ ///
+ /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
+ /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
+ ///
+ /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
+ /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
+ claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, (events::PaymentPurpose, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>)>,
+
+ /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
+ /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
+ /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
+ pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
+}
+
// Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
}
+pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
+ /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
+ /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
+ /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
+ /// event can be generated.
+ PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
+ /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user.
+ EmitEvent { event: events::Event },
+}
+
/// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
/// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
struct PeerState {
// |
// |__`pending_inbound_payments`
// | |
-// | |__`claimable_htlcs`
+// | |__`claimable_payments`
// | |
// | |__`pending_outbound_payments`
// | |
channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>,
/// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
- /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
+ /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
/// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
- /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
+ /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
///
/// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
/// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
- /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
- /// failed/claimed by the user.
- ///
- /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
- /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
+ /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
+ /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
///
/// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
- claimable_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, (events::PaymentPurpose, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>)>>,
+ claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
/// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
/// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
- claimable_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
+ claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
};
for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
+ let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
- self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
+ self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
}
let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
+ let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
- self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
+ self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
}
if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
// There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
return Err(ReceiveError {
msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value",
err_code: 18,
- err_data: byte_utils::be32_to_array(cltv_expiry).to_vec()
+ err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
})
}
// final_expiry_too_soon
// Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
// payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
// channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
- if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
+ let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
+ if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
+ let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
+ err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
+ err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
return Err(ReceiveError {
- err_code: 17,
- err_data: Vec::new(),
+ err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
});
}
if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
return Err(ReceiveError {
err_code: 19,
- err_data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(amt_msat).to_vec(),
+ err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
});
}
return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
channel_id: msg.channel_id,
htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
- reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
+ reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
+ .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
}));
}
}
// with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
// short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
- if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
+ if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let forwarding_id_opt = match id_option {
}
chan_update_opt
} else {
- if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
+ if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
+ // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
+ // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
+ // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
break Some((
"Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
- 0x1000 | 13, None,
+ 0x2000 | 2, None,
));
}
None
(chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
+ } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
+ // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
+ // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
+ // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
+ // instead.
+ code = 0x2000 | 2;
}
return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
}
phantom_shared_secret: None,
});
- let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() };
+ let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
- self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, failure_reason, destination);
+ self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
} else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
Ok(())
let mut new_events = Vec::new();
let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
- let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
{
let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
};
failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
- HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: $err_code, data: $err_data },
+ HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
reason
));
continue;
continue;
},
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
- let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
- let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
match forward_info {
HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
// Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
phantom_shared_secret: None,
});
- match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet, &self.logger) {
- Err(e) => {
- if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
- } else {
- panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
- }
- let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
- failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
- HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data },
- HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
- ));
- continue;
- },
- Ok(update_add) => {
- match update_add {
- Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
- None => {
- // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
- // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
- // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
- // commitment_signed messages when we can.
- // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
- // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
- // this channel currently :/.
- }
- }
+ if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
+ payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
+ onion_packet, &self.logger)
+ {
+ if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
+ } else {
+ panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
}
+ let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
+ failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
+ HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
+ HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
+ ));
+ continue;
}
},
HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
},
HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
- match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
- Err(e) => {
- if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
- } else {
- panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
- }
- // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
- // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
- // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
- continue;
- },
- Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
- Ok(None) => {
- // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
- // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
- // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
- // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
- // messages when we can.
- // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
- // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
- // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
+ if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
+ htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
+ ) {
+ if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
+ } else {
+ panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
}
+ // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
+ // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
+ // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
+ continue;
}
},
}
}
-
- if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
- let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
- Ok(res) => res,
- Err(e) => {
- // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
- // close channel and then send error message to peer.
- let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
- let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
- ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
- panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
- }
- ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
- let mut channel = remove_channel!(self, chan);
- // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
- Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel.channel_id(), channel.get_user_id(), channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
- },
- };
- handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
- continue;
- }
- };
- match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
- ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
- e => {
- handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
- continue;
- }
- }
- log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
- add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
- channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
- node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
- updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
- update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
- update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
- update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fee: None,
- commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
- },
- });
- }
}
}
} else {
macro_rules! fail_htlc {
($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
- let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
+ let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
- &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
+ &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
);
failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
phantom_shared_secret,
}), payment_hash,
- HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data },
+ HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
));
}
macro_rules! check_total_value {
($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
- let mut payment_received_generated = false;
+ let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
let purpose = || {
events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
}
};
- let mut claimable_htlcs = self.claimable_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
- let (_, htlcs) = claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
+ let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
+ if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
+ fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
+ continue
+ }
+ let (_, htlcs) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
.or_insert_with(|| (purpose(), Vec::new()));
if htlcs.len() == 1 {
if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
} else if total_value == $payment_data.total_msat {
let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
- new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
+ new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
payment_hash,
purpose: purpose(),
via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
});
- payment_received_generated = true;
+ payment_claimable_generated = true;
} else {
// Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
// payment value yet, wait until we receive more
// MPP parts.
htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
}
- payment_received_generated
+ payment_claimable_generated
}}
}
check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
},
OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
- match self.claimable_htlcs.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_hash) {
+ let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
+ if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
+ fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
+ continue
+ }
+ match claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
e.insert((purpose.clone(), vec![claimable_htlc]));
let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
- new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
+ new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
payment_hash,
amount_msat: outgoing_amt_msat,
log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
} else {
- let payment_received_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
- if payment_received_generated {
+ let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
+ if payment_claimable_generated {
inbound_payment.remove_entry();
}
}
}
for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
- self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason, destination);
+ self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
}
self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
- for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
- let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
- }
+ // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
+ // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
+ // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
+ // network stack.
+ self.check_free_holding_cells();
if new_events.is_empty() { return }
let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
self.process_background_events();
}
- fn update_channel_fee(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
- if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
+ fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
+ if !chan.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
// If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
- return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
+ return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
}
if !chan.is_live() {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
- return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
+ return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
}
log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
- let mut retain_channel = true;
- let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
- Ok(res) => Ok(res),
- Err(e) => {
- let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
- if drop { retain_channel = false; }
- Err(res)
- }
- };
- let ret_err = match res {
- Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
- match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
- ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
- node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
- updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
- update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fee: Some(update_fee),
- commitment_signed,
- },
- });
- Ok(())
- },
- e => {
- let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
- if drop { retain_channel = false; }
- res
- }
- }
- },
- Ok(None) => Ok(()),
- Err(e) => Err(e),
- };
- (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
+ chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.logger);
+ NotifyOption::DoPersist
}
#[cfg(fuzzing)]
let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
- let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
- {
- let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
- let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
- channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
- let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
- if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
- if err.is_err() {
- handle_errors.push(err);
- }
- retain_channel
- });
+ let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ for (chan_id, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter_mut() {
+ let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
+ if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
}
should_persist
let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
- let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
+ let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
{
let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
- let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
- let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
+ let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
- if err.is_err() {
- handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
- }
- if !retain_channel { return false; }
if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
});
}
- self.claimable_htlcs.lock().unwrap().retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
+ self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
if htlcs.is_empty() {
// This should be unreachable
debug_assert!(false);
});
for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
+ let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
+ let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
- self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone()), &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 23, data: Vec::new() }, receiver );
+ self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
}
for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
self.remove_stale_resolved_payments();
+ // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
+ // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
+ // than block the message queueing pipeline.
+ if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
+ should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
+ }
+
should_persist
});
}
/// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
- /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
+ /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
/// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
///
/// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
/// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
- /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentReceived`] event. Alternatively, the payment
+ /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
/// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
///
/// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
- let removed_source = self.claimable_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(payment_hash);
+ let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
if let Some((_, mut sources)) = removed_source {
for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
- let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
- htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
- self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
- self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(
- HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
- HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data },
- HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash });
+ let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
+ htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
+ let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
+ let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
+ let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
+ self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
}
}
}
&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
) {
- for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
- let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
- match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
- self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
- },
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
- };
+ let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
+ match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
+ self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
+ },
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
+ };
+ for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
+ let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
- self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data }, receiver);
+ self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
}
}
/// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
/// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
- fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason,destination: HTLCDestination) {
+ fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
#[cfg(debug_assertions)]
{
// Ensure that the `channel_state` lock is not held when calling this function.
// from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
// being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
match source {
- HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => {
+ HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => {
let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
let mut all_paths_failed = false;
let mut full_failure_ev = None;
- if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
+ if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(*payment_id) {
if !payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
return;
all_paths_failed = true;
if payment.get().abandoned() {
full_failure_ev = Some(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
- payment_id,
+ payment_id: *payment_id,
payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
});
payment.remove();
} else { None };
log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
- let path_failure = match &onion_error {
- &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
+ let path_failure = {
#[cfg(test)]
- let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
+ let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_error.decode_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source);
#[cfg(not(test))]
- let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
+ let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_error.decode_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source);
- if self.payment_is_probe(payment_hash, &payment_id) {
- if !payment_retryable {
- events::Event::ProbeSuccessful {
- payment_id,
- payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
- path: path.clone(),
- }
- } else {
- events::Event::ProbeFailed {
- payment_id,
- payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
- path: path.clone(),
- short_channel_id,
- }
- }
- } else {
- // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
- // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
- // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
- if let Some(scid) = short_channel_id {
- retry.as_mut().map(|r| r.payment_params.previously_failed_channels.push(scid));
- }
- events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
- payment_id: Some(payment_id),
- payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
- payment_failed_permanently: !payment_retryable,
- network_update,
- all_paths_failed,
- path: path.clone(),
- short_channel_id,
- retry,
- #[cfg(test)]
- error_code: onion_error_code,
- #[cfg(test)]
- error_data: onion_error_data
- }
- }
- },
- &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
-#[cfg(test)]
- ref failure_code,
-#[cfg(test)]
- ref data,
- .. } => {
- // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
- // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
- // failures here, but that would be insufficient as find_route
- // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
- // ChannelDetails.
- // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
- // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
- let scid = path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id;
- retry.as_mut().map(|r| r.payment_params.previously_failed_channels.push(scid));
-
- if self.payment_is_probe(payment_hash, &payment_id) {
- events::Event::ProbeFailed {
- payment_id,
+ if self.payment_is_probe(payment_hash, &payment_id) {
+ if !payment_retryable {
+ events::Event::ProbeSuccessful {
+ payment_id: *payment_id,
payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
path: path.clone(),
- short_channel_id: Some(scid),
}
} else {
- events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
- payment_id: Some(payment_id),
+ events::Event::ProbeFailed {
+ payment_id: *payment_id,
payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
- payment_failed_permanently: false,
- network_update: None,
- all_paths_failed,
path: path.clone(),
- short_channel_id: Some(scid),
- retry,
-#[cfg(test)]
- error_code: Some(*failure_code),
-#[cfg(test)]
- error_data: Some(data.clone()),
+ short_channel_id,
}
}
+ } else {
+ // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
+ // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
+ // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
+ if let Some(scid) = short_channel_id {
+ retry.as_mut().map(|r| r.payment_params.previously_failed_channels.push(scid));
+ }
+ events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
+ payment_id: Some(*payment_id),
+ payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
+ payment_failed_permanently: !payment_retryable,
+ network_update,
+ all_paths_failed,
+ path: path.clone(),
+ short_channel_id,
+ retry,
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ error_code: onion_error_code,
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ error_data: onion_error_data
+ }
}
};
let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
pending_events.push(path_failure);
if let Some(ev) = full_failure_ev { pending_events.push(ev); }
},
- HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret, outpoint }) => {
- let err_packet = match onion_error {
- HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
- if let Some(phantom_ss) = phantom_shared_secret {
- let phantom_packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
- let encrypted_phantom_packet = onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, &phantom_packet);
- onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &encrypted_phantom_packet.data[..])
- } else {
- let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
- onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
- }
- },
- HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
- onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
- }
- };
+ HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
+ let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
let mut forward_event = None;
let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
}
- match forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
+ match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
- entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
+ entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
- entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
+ entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
}
}
mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
}
pending_events.push(events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
- failed_next_destination: destination
+ failed_next_destination: destination,
});
},
}
}
- /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentReceived`], generating any
+ /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
/// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
///
/// Note that calling this method does *not* guarantee that the payment has been claimed. You
/// provided to your [`EventHandler`] when [`process_pending_events`] is next called.
///
/// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
- /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
+ /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
/// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
/// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
///
- /// [`Event::PaymentReceived`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentReceived
+ /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
/// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
/// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
/// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
/// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
- /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
- let removed_source = self.claimable_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&payment_hash);
- if let Some((payment_purpose, mut sources)) = removed_source {
- assert!(!sources.is_empty());
-
- // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
- // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
- // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
- // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
- //
- // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
- // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
- // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
- // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
- // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
- // it.
- let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
- let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
- let mut valid_mpp = true;
- let mut errs = Vec::new();
- let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
- let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
- let mut receiver_node_id = Some(self.our_network_pubkey);
- for htlc in sources.iter() {
- let chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
- Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
- None => {
- valid_mpp = false;
+ let mut sources = {
+ let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
+ if let Some((payment_purpose, sources)) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
+ let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
+ for htlc in sources.iter() {
+ if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
+ let phantom_pubkey = self.keys_manager.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
+ .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
+ receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
break;
}
- };
+ }
- if let None = channel_state.by_id.get(&chan_id) {
- valid_mpp = false;
- break;
+ let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
+ ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: sources.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
+ payment_purpose, receiver_node_id,
+ });
+ if dup_purpose.is_some() {
+ debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
+ log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
+ log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
}
+ sources
+ } else { return; }
+ };
+ debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
- if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
- log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
- debug_assert!(false);
+ // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we check that all channels which contain a claimable
+ // HTLC still exist. While this isn't guaranteed to remain true if a channel closes while
+ // we're claiming (or even after we claim, before the commitment update dance completes),
+ // it should be a relatively rare race, and we'd rather not claim HTLCs that require us to
+ // go on-chain (and lose the on-chain fee to do so) than just reject the payment.
+ //
+ // Note that we'll still always get our funds - as long as the generated
+ // `ChannelMonitorUpdate` makes it out to the relevant monitor we can claim on-chain.
+ //
+ // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
+ // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
+ // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
+ // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
+ // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
+ // it.
+ let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
+ let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
+ let mut valid_mpp = true;
+ let mut errs = Vec::new();
+ let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
+ for htlc in sources.iter() {
+ let chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
+ Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
+ None => {
valid_mpp = false;
break;
}
- expected_amt_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
- if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
- // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
- // that there's one payment here and move on.
- if sources.len() != 1 {
- log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
- debug_assert!(false);
- valid_mpp = false;
- break;
- }
- }
- let phantom_shared_secret = htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
- if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
- let phantom_pubkey = self.keys_manager.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
- .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
- receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
- }
+ };
- claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
- }
- if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
- log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
- return;
+ if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_id) {
+ valid_mpp = false;
+ break;
}
- if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
- log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
- expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
- return;
+
+ if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
+ log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
+ debug_assert!(false);
+ valid_mpp = false;
+ break;
}
- if valid_mpp {
- for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
- match self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
- ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
- if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
- // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
- // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
- log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
- claimed_any_htlcs = true;
- } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
- },
- ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
- ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
- // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
- // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
- // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
- // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
- },
- ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
- }
+ expected_amt_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
+ if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
+ // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
+ // that there's one payment here and move on.
+ if sources.len() != 1 {
+ log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
+ debug_assert!(false);
+ valid_mpp = false;
+ break;
}
}
- mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
- if !valid_mpp {
- for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
- let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
- htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
- self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
- self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(
- HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
- HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data },
- HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash } );
+
+ claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
+ }
+ if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
+ mem::drop(channel_state);
+ self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
+ log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
+ return;
+ }
+ if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
+ mem::drop(channel_state);
+ self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
+ log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
+ expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
+ return;
+ }
+ if valid_mpp {
+ for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
+ if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
+ if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.take().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop,
+ payment_preimage,
+ |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
+ {
+ if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
+ // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
+ // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
+ log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
+ } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
}
}
-
- if claimed_any_htlcs {
- self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
- receiver_node_id,
- payment_hash,
- purpose: payment_purpose,
- amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
- });
+ }
+ mem::drop(channel_state);
+ if !valid_mpp {
+ for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
+ let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
+ htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
+ let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
+ let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
+ let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
+ self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
}
+ self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
+ }
- // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
- for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
- let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
- let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
- }
+ // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
+ for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
+ let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
+ let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
}
}
- fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
+ fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
+ mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>,
+ prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
+ -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
//TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
- let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
+ let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
+ let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
"Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
payment_preimage, e);
- return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
- chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
- handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
- Some(htlc_value_msat)
- );
+ let err = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err();
+ mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
+ self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)));
+ return Err((counterparty_node_id, err));
}
}
if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
}
});
}
- return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
+ mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
+ self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)));
+ Ok(())
} else {
- return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
+ Ok(())
}
},
Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
e => {
+ // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
+ // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
+ // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same update and try
+ // again on restart.
log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
"Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
payment_preimage, e);
},
}
- let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
if drop {
chan.remove_entry();
}
- return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
+ mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
+ self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
+ Err((counterparty_node_id, res))
},
}
- } else { return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed }
+ } else {
+ let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
+ update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
+ updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
+ payment_preimage,
+ }],
+ };
+ // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
+ // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
+ let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update);
+ if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
+ // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
+ // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
+ // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
+ // again on restart.
+ log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
+ payment_preimage, update_res);
+ }
+ mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
+ // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
+ // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
+ // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
+ // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
+ // `PaymentForwarded`).
+ self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
+ Ok(())
+ }
}
fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
}
}
- fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
+ fn claim_funds_internal(&self, channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
match source {
HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
},
HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
- let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
- let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
- let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
- ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
- ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
- _ => None,
- };
- if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
- let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
- update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
- updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
- payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
- }],
- };
- // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
- // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
- // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
- let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update);
- if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
- // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
- // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
- // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
- // again on restart.
- log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
- payment_preimage, update_res);
- }
- // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
- // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
- // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
- // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
- // can happen.
- }
- mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
- if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
+ let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage,
+ |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
+ if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
+ let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
+ Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
+ } else { None };
+
+ let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
+ let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
+
+ Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
+ fee_earned_msat,
+ claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
+ prev_channel_id,
+ next_channel_id,
+ }})
+ } else { None }
+ });
+ if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
}
-
- if claimed_htlc {
- if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
- let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
- Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
- } else { None };
-
- let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
- let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
- let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
-
- pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
- fee_earned_msat,
- claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
- prev_channel_id,
- next_channel_id,
- });
- }
- }
},
}
}
self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
}
+ fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
+ for action in actions.into_iter() {
+ match action {
+ MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
+ let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
+ if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
+ self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
+ payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
+ });
+ }
+ },
+ MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event } => {
+ self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(event);
+ },
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
/// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
/// update completion.
fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id: funding_txo.to_channel_id() };
- self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2, receiver);
+ self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
}
}
if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
}
- (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
+ (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.keys_manager, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
}
if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
}
- let (monitor, funding_tx, channel_ready) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
+ let (monitor, funding_tx, channel_ready) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.keys_manager, &self.logger) {
Ok(update) => update,
Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan),
};
};
for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
- self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
+ let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
+ self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
}
let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
- onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, real_code, &error_data)
+ HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
} else {
- onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
- };
+ HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
+ }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
channel_id: msg.channel_id,
htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
}
- try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), chan);
+ try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
}
let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
}
- try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), chan);
+ try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
Ok(())
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
});
failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
- HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() },
+ HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
));
}
}
for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
- self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason, destination);
+ self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
}
if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
{
for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: channel_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
- self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2, receiver);
+ self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
}
self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, user_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
} else {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
- self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
+ let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
+ self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
}
},
MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
/// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
/// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
/// update was applied.
- ///
- /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
- /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
- /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
- /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
let mut has_monitor_update = false;
let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
/// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
/// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
///
- /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
- /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
+ /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
+ /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
/// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
///
/// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
/// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
///
/// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
- /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
- /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
+ /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
+ /// [`PaymentClaimable::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::payment_preimage
/// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, &self.keys_manager, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
/// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
/// stored external to LDK.
///
- /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
+ /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
/// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
/// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
///
///
/// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
/// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
- /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
+ /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
/// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
///
/// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
///
/// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
/// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
- /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
+ /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
/// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
- /// [`PaymentReceived`].
+ /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
///
/// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
/// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
/// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
///
/// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
- /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
+ /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
}
let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
for chan in self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.values() {
- for htlc_source in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
+ for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
}
events.into_inner()
}
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
+ let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
+ if events.is_empty() { None } else { Some(events.remove(0)) }
+ }
+
#[cfg(test)]
pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
!self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty()
if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
- timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
- failure_code, data,
- }, HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
+ timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
+ HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
}
if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
}
if let Some(height) = height_opt {
- self.claimable_htlcs.lock().unwrap().retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
+ self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
// If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
// our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
// number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
// just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
- let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
- htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
- timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
- failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
- data: htlc_msat_height_data
- }, HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
+ let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
+ htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
+
+ timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
+ HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
+ HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
false
} else { true }
});
_ => unreachable!(),
};
timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
- HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x2000 | 2, data: Vec::new() },
+ HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
false
self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
- self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(source, &payment_hash, reason, destination);
+ self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
}
}
}
}
-impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
- (0, LightningError) => {
- (0, err, required),
- },
- (1, Reason) => {
- (0, failure_code, required),
- (2, data, vec_type),
- },
-;);
-
impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
(0, forward_info, required),
(1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
}
let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
- let claimable_htlcs = self.claimable_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
+ let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
- (claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
- for (payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops)) in claimable_htlcs.iter() {
+ (claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
+ for (payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops)) in claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
payment_hash.write(writer)?;
(previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
}
+
+ let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
+ if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
+ // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
+ // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
+ pending_claiming_payments = None;
+ } else {
+ debug_assert!(false, "While we have code to serialize pending_claiming_payments, the map should always be empty until a later PR");
+ }
+
write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
(1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
(2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
(3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
+ (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
(5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
(7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
(9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
});
+ for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
+ let mut found_htlc = false;
+ for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
+ if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
+ }
+ if !found_htlc {
+ // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
+ // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
+ // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
+ // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
+ // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
+ // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
+ // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
+ log_info!(args.logger,
+ "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
+ log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
+ failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
+ }
+ }
} else {
log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
None => continue,
}
}
- if forward_htlcs_count > 0 {
- // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
- // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
- // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
- // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
- // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
- pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
- time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
- });
- }
let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
+ let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
(1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
(2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
(3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
+ (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
(5, received_network_pubkey, option),
(7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
(9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
}
}
}
+ for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
+ if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) = htlc_source {
+ // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
+ // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
+ // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs`, we were
+ // apparently not persisted after the monitor was when forwarding
+ // the payment.
+ forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
+ forwards.retain(|forward| {
+ if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
+ if htlc_info.prev_short_channel_id == prev_hop_data.short_channel_id &&
+ htlc_info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
+ {
+ log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
+ log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
+ false
+ } else { true }
+ } else { true }
+ });
+ !forwards.is_empty()
+ })
+ }
+ }
}
}
}
+ if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
+ // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
+ // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
+ // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
+ // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
+ // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
+ pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
+ time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
+ });
+ }
+
let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
- claimable_htlcs: Mutex::new(claimable_htlcs),
+ claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
- channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
+ let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
+ channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
}
//TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
$node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
- expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
+ expect_payment_claimable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
$node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
expect_payment_claimed!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff