use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
-use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
use bitcoin::secp256k1;
use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
use ln::onion_utils;
use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT, OptionalField};
+use ln::wire::Encode;
use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner, Recipient};
use util::config::UserConfig;
use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
});
}
- fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
- let counterparty_node_id;
let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
- counterparty_node_id = chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
+ if *counterparty_node_id != chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(){
+ return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
+ }
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
Some(peer_state) => {
}
channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
- node_id: counterparty_node_id,
+ node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
msg: shutdown_msg
});
self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
}
- let _ = handle_error!(self, result, counterparty_node_id);
+ let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
Ok(())
}
/// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
/// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
/// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
- pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
- self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, None)
+ pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
}
/// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
/// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
/// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
/// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
- pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
- self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
+ pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
}
#[inline]
}
}
- /// `peer_node_id` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
+ /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
/// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
- fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>, peer_msg: Option<&String>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
+ fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
let mut chan = {
let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
- if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
- if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
- return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
- }
+ if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *peer_node_id {
+ return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
}
- if peer_node_id.is_some() {
- if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
- self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
- }
+ if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
+ self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
} else {
self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
}
}
/// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
- /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
- pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
+ /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
+ /// channel.
+ pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
- match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None, None) {
+ match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None) {
Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
/// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
for chan in self.list_channels() {
- let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
+ let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
}
}
return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
}
- let shared_secret = {
- let mut arr = [0; 32];
- arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
- arr
- };
+ let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key).secret_bytes();
if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
//TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
break None;
}
{
- let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 8 + 2));
+ let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
// TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
}
- (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
+ (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
+ msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
}
return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
};
let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
- let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
+ let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
signature: sig,
/// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
/// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
- fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>
- (&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
+ &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], _counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
+ ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
let (chan, msg) = {
let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
Some(mut chan) => {
}
#[cfg(test)]
- pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
- self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
+ pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
})
}
///
/// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
/// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
- pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
});
}
}
- self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
+ self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
let mut output_index = None;
let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
let phantom_secret_res = self.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::PhantomNode);
if phantom_secret_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id) {
- let phantom_shared_secret = {
- let mut arr = [0; 32];
- arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &phantom_secret_res.unwrap())[..]);
- arr
- };
+ let phantom_shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &phantom_secret_res.unwrap()).secret_bytes();
let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
Ok(res) => res,
Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
- let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 4));
+ let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
// TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
}
- (upd.serialized_length() as u16).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
+ (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
+ msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
(desired_err_code, enc.0)
} else {
}
}
- fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool) {
+ fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
match source {
HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
} else { None };
let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
+ let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
+ let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
- let source_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
- source_channel_id,
fee_earned_msat,
claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
+ prev_channel_id,
+ next_channel_id,
});
}
}
/// Called to accept a request to open a channel after [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`] has been
/// triggered.
///
- /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted.
+ /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
+ /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
+ /// the channel.
///
/// For inbound channels, the `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
/// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
///
/// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
/// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
- pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], user_channel_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
}
+ if *counterparty_node_id != channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id() {
+ return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
+ }
channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
+ counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
channel_value_satoshis: value,
output_script,
user_channel_id: user_id,
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
}
};
- self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false);
+ self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
Ok(())
}
let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
- for monitor_event in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
- match monitor_event {
- MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
- if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
- self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.onchain_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true);
- } else {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
- self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
- }
- },
- MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
- MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
- let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
- let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
- let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
- if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
- let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
- failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
- if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
- msg: update
+ for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
+ for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
+ match monitor_event {
+ MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
+ if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
+ self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.onchain_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
+ } else {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
+ self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
+ }
+ },
+ MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
+ MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
+ let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
+ let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
+ let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
+ if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
+ let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
+ failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
+ if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
+ msg: update
+ });
+ }
+ let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
+ ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
+ } else {
+ ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
+ };
+ self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
+ node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
+ msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
+ },
});
}
- let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
- ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
- } else {
- ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
- };
- self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
- node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
- action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
- msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
- },
- });
- }
- },
- MonitorEvent::UpdateCompleted { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
- self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
- },
+ },
+ MonitorEvent::UpdateCompleted { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
+ self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
+ },
+ }
}
}
let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
- if no_connection_possible {
- log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
- channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
- if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates. We believe we {} make future connections to this peer.",
+ log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id), if no_connection_possible { "cannot" } else { "can" });
+ channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
+ if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
+ chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
+ if chan.is_shutdown() {
update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_id, chan);
- failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
- if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
- msg: update
- });
- }
self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
- false
+ return false;
} else {
- true
- }
- });
- } else {
- log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
- channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
- if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
- chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
- if chan.is_shutdown() {
- update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_id, chan);
- self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
- return false;
- } else {
- no_channels_remain = false;
- }
+ no_channels_remain = false;
}
- true
- })
- }
+ }
+ true
+ });
pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
match msg {
&events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
for chan in self.list_channels() {
if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
// Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
- let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
+ let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data));
}
}
} else {
}
// Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
- let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
+ let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data));
}
}
}
tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
}]};
- node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
+ node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
} else { panic!(); }
node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));