cfg-gate async signing logic
[rust-lightning] / lightning / src / ln / channelmanager.rs
index e8b8f43dae92d2b8a559fca1bbd9e698f72e1b4d..9536a9366e18506fa586d96c325b7d725e677de2 100644 (file)
@@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
 
 /// Information about where a received HTLC('s onion) has indicated the HTLC should go.
 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
+#[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
 pub enum PendingHTLCRouting {
        /// An HTLC which should be forwarded on to another node.
        Forward {
@@ -189,7 +190,7 @@ pub enum PendingHTLCRouting {
 }
 
 /// Information used to forward or fail this HTLC that is being forwarded within a blinded path.
-#[derive(Clone, Copy, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
+#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
 pub struct BlindedForward {
        /// The `blinding_point` that was set in the inbound [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC`], or in the inbound
        /// onion payload if we're the introduction node. Useful for calculating the next hop's
@@ -213,6 +214,7 @@ impl PendingHTLCRouting {
 /// Information about an incoming HTLC, including the [`PendingHTLCRouting`] describing where it
 /// should go next.
 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
+#[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
 pub struct PendingHTLCInfo {
        /// Further routing details based on whether the HTLC is being forwarded or received.
        pub routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
@@ -267,6 +269,7 @@ pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
        Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
 }
 
+#[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
        pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
 
@@ -282,6 +285,7 @@ pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
        prev_user_channel_id: u128,
 }
 
+#[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
        AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
        FailHTLC {
@@ -1528,13 +1532,11 @@ pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
-#[deny(const_err)]
 #[allow(dead_code)]
 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
 
 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
-#[deny(const_err)]
 #[allow(dead_code)]
 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
 
@@ -3025,11 +3027,12 @@ where
                        msg, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx
                )?;
 
-               let is_blinded = match next_hop {
+               let is_intro_node_forward = match next_hop {
                        onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
+                               // TODO: update this when we support blinded forwarding as non-intro node
                                next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedForward { .. }, ..
                        } => true,
-                       _ => false, // TODO: update this when we support receiving to multi-hop blinded paths
+                       _ => false,
                };
 
                macro_rules! return_err {
@@ -3039,7 +3042,17 @@ where
                                                WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id)),
                                                "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg
                                        );
-                                       let (err_code, err_data) = if is_blinded {
+                                       // If `msg.blinding_point` is set, we must always fail with malformed.
+                                       if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
+                                               return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
+                                                       channel_id: msg.channel_id,
+                                                       htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
+                                                       sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
+                                                       failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
+                                               }));
+                                       }
+
+                                       let (err_code, err_data) = if is_intro_node_forward {
                                                (INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, &[0; 32][..])
                                        } else { ($err_code, $data) };
                                        return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
@@ -7309,8 +7322,7 @@ where
        /// attempted in every channel, or in the specifically provided channel.
        ///
        /// [`ChannelSigner`]: crate::sign::ChannelSigner
-       #[cfg(test)] // This is only implemented for one signer method, and should be private until we
-                    // actually finish implementing it fully.
+       #[cfg(async_signing)]
        pub fn signer_unblocked(&self, channel_opt: Option<(PublicKey, ChannelId)>) {
                let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
 
@@ -10609,7 +10621,6 @@ where
                        // 0.0.102+
                        for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
                                let counterparty_opt = id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
-                               let chan_id = monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id();
                                if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
                                        let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
                                        for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
@@ -11045,12 +11056,14 @@ mod tests {
        use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
        use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
        use crate::ln::ChannelId;
-       use crate::ln::channelmanager::{create_recv_pending_htlc_info, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
+       use crate::ln::channelmanager::{create_recv_pending_htlc_info, HTLCForwardInfo, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
        use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
        use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
        use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
+       use crate::prelude::*;
        use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
        use crate::util::errors::APIError;
+       use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
        use crate::util::test_utils;
        use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
        use crate::sign::EntropySource;
@@ -12325,6 +12338,63 @@ mod tests {
                        check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
                }
        }
+
+       #[test]
+       fn test_malformed_forward_htlcs_ser() {
+               // Ensure that `HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC`s are (de)serialized properly.
+               let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
+               let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
+               let persister;
+               let chain_monitor;
+               let chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
+               let deserialized_chanmgr;
+               let mut nodes = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &chanmgrs);
+
+               let dummy_failed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
+                       HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: vec![42] }, }
+               };
+               let dummy_malformed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
+                       HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code: 0x4000, sha256_of_onion: [0; 32] }
+               };
+
+               let dummy_htlcs_1: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
+                       if htlc_id % 2 == 0 {
+                               dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
+                       } else {
+                               dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
+                       }
+               }).collect();
+
+               let dummy_htlcs_2: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
+                       if htlc_id % 2 == 1 {
+                               dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
+                       } else {
+                               dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
+                       }
+               }).collect();
+
+
+               let (scid_1, scid_2) = (42, 43);
+               let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
+               forward_htlcs.insert(scid_1, dummy_htlcs_1.clone());
+               forward_htlcs.insert(scid_2, dummy_htlcs_2.clone());
+
+               let mut chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
+               *chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = forward_htlcs.clone();
+               core::mem::drop(chanmgr_fwd_htlcs);
+
+               reload_node!(nodes[0], nodes[0].node.encode(), &[], persister, chain_monitor, deserialized_chanmgr);
+
+               let mut deserialized_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
+               for scid in [scid_1, scid_2].iter() {
+                       let deserialized_htlcs = deserialized_fwd_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap();
+                       assert_eq!(forward_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap(), deserialized_htlcs);
+               }
+               assert!(deserialized_fwd_htlcs.is_empty());
+               core::mem::drop(deserialized_fwd_htlcs);
+
+               expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
+       }
 }
 
 #[cfg(ldk_bench)]