use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
#[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
-use crate::routing::router::{InFlightHtlcs, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, RouteParameters};
+use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
+use crate::routing::router::{DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, Router};
+use crate::routing::scoring::ProbabilisticScorer;
use crate::ln::msgs;
use crate::ln::onion_utils;
+use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
+#[cfg(test)]
+use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
+use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PendingOutboundPayment};
use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
-use crate::chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, Recipient};
+use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysInterface, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, Sign, SignerProvider};
use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
use crate::util::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
use crate::util::events;
use core::time::Duration;
use core::ops::Deref;
+// Re-export this for use in the public API.
+pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::PaymentSendFailure;
+
// We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
//
// Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
}
}
-#[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
-pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
- LightningError {
- err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
- },
- Reason {
- failure_code: u16,
- data: Vec<u8>,
- }
-}
-
-impl HTLCFailReason {
- pub(super) fn reason(failure_code: u16, data: Vec<u8>) -> Self {
- Self::Reason { failure_code, data }
- }
-
- pub(super) fn from_failure_code(failure_code: u16) -> Self {
- Self::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }
- }
-}
-
struct ReceiveError {
err_code: u16,
err_data: Vec<u8>,
msg: &'static str,
}
-/// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
-enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
- PrevHopForceClosed,
- MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
- Success(u64),
- DuplicateClaim,
-}
-
type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>);
-/// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
+/// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
/// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
/// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
-/// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
+/// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
/// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
}
// Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
-pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
- pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
+pub(super) struct ChannelHolder {
/// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
/// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
}
-/// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
-/// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
-struct PeerState {
+pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
+ /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
+ /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
+ /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
+ /// event can be generated.
+ PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
+ /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user.
+ EmitEvent { event: events::Event },
+}
+
+/// State we hold per-peer.
+pub(super) struct PeerState<Signer: Sign> {
+ /// `temporary_channel_id` or `channel_id` -> `channel`.
+ ///
+ /// Holds all channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once a channel has been assigned a
+ /// `channel_id`, the `temporary_channel_id` key in the map is updated and is replaced by the
+ /// `channel_id`.
+ pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
+ /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
latest_features: InitFeatures,
}
min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
}
-/// Stores the session_priv for each part of a payment that is still pending. For versions 0.0.102
-/// and later, also stores information for retrying the payment.
-pub(crate) enum PendingOutboundPayment {
- Legacy {
- session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
- },
- Retryable {
- session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
- payment_hash: PaymentHash,
- payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
- pending_amt_msat: u64,
- /// Used to track the fee paid. Only present if the payment was serialized on 0.0.103+.
- pending_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
- /// The total payment amount across all paths, used to verify that a retry is not overpaying.
- total_msat: u64,
- /// Our best known block height at the time this payment was initiated.
- starting_block_height: u32,
- },
- /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
- /// been resolved. This ensures we don't look up pending payments in ChannelMonitors on restart
- /// and add a pending payment that was already fulfilled.
- Fulfilled {
- session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
- payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
- timer_ticks_without_htlcs: u8,
- },
- /// When a payer gives up trying to retry a payment, they inform us, letting us generate a
- /// `PaymentFailed` event when all HTLCs have irrevocably failed. This avoids a number of race
- /// conditions in MPP-aware payment retriers (1), where the possibility of multiple
- /// `PaymentPathFailed` events with `all_paths_failed` can be pending at once, confusing a
- /// downstream event handler as to when a payment has actually failed.
- ///
- /// (1) https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1164
- Abandoned {
- session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
- payment_hash: PaymentHash,
- },
-}
-
-impl PendingOutboundPayment {
- fn is_fulfilled(&self) -> bool {
- match self {
- PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => true,
- _ => false,
- }
- }
- fn abandoned(&self) -> bool {
- match self {
- PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => true,
- _ => false,
- }
- }
- fn get_pending_fee_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
- match self {
- PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { pending_fee_msat, .. } => pending_fee_msat.clone(),
- _ => None,
- }
- }
-
- fn payment_hash(&self) -> Option<PaymentHash> {
- match self {
- PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None,
- PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
- PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => *payment_hash,
- PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
- }
- }
-
- fn mark_fulfilled(&mut self) {
- let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
- core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
- PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
- PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
- PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
- PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. }
- => session_privs,
- });
- let payment_hash = self.payment_hash();
- *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, payment_hash, timer_ticks_without_htlcs: 0 };
- }
-
- fn mark_abandoned(&mut self) -> Result<(), ()> {
- let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
- let our_payment_hash;
- core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
- PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } |
- PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } =>
- return Err(()),
- PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } |
- PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } => {
- our_payment_hash = *payment_hash;
- session_privs
- },
- });
- *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash: our_payment_hash };
- Ok(())
- }
-
- /// panics if path is None and !self.is_fulfilled
- fn remove(&mut self, session_priv: &[u8; 32], path: Option<&Vec<RouteHop>>) -> bool {
- let remove_res = match self {
- PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
- PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
- PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
- PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
- session_privs.remove(session_priv)
- }
- };
- if remove_res {
- if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
- let path = path.expect("Fulfilling a payment should always come with a path");
- let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
- *pending_amt_msat -= path_last_hop.fee_msat;
- if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
- *fee_msat -= path.get_path_fees();
- }
- }
- }
- remove_res
- }
-
- fn insert(&mut self, session_priv: [u8; 32], path: &Vec<RouteHop>) -> bool {
- let insert_res = match self {
- PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
- PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
- session_privs.insert(session_priv)
- }
- PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => false,
- PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => false,
- };
- if insert_res {
- if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
- let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
- *pending_amt_msat += path_last_hop.fee_msat;
- if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
- *fee_msat += path.get_path_fees();
- }
- }
- }
- insert_res
- }
-
- fn remaining_parts(&self) -> usize {
- match self {
- PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
- PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
- PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
- PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
- session_privs.len()
- }
- }
- }
-}
-
/// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
/// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
/// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
/// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
-/// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
-/// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
-/// concrete type of the KeysManager.
+/// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
+/// that implements KeysInterface or Router for its keys manager and router, respectively, but this
+/// type alias chooses the concrete types of KeysManager and DefaultRouter.
///
/// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
-pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
+pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
+ Arc<M>,
+ Arc<T>,
+ Arc<KeysManager>,
+ Arc<F>,
+ Arc<DefaultRouter<
+ Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
+ Arc<L>,
+ Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>
+ >>,
+ Arc<L>
+>;
/// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
/// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
/// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
/// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
/// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
-/// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
-/// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
-/// concrete type of the KeysManager.
+/// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
+/// that implements KeysInterface or Router for its keys manager and router, respectively, but this
+/// type alias chooses the concrete types of KeysManager and DefaultRouter.
///
/// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
-pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
+pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e DefaultRouter<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L, &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>>, &'g L>;
/// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
/// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
// | |
// | |__`claimable_payments`
// | |
-// | |__`pending_outbound_payments`
+// | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
// | |
// | |__`channel_state`
// | |
-// | |__`id_to_peer`
-// | |
-// | |__`short_to_chan_info`
-// | |
// | |__`per_peer_state`
// | |
-// | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
-// | |
-// | |__`best_block`
-// | |
-// | |__`pending_events`
+// | |__`peer_state`
+// | |
+// | |__`id_to_peer`
+// | |
+// | |__`short_to_chan_info`
+// | |
+// | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
+// | |
+// | |__`best_block`
// | |
-// | |__`pending_background_events`
+// | |__`pending_events`
+// | |
+// | |__`pending_background_events`
//
-pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
- where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
- T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
- K::Target: KeysInterface,
- F::Target: FeeEstimator,
- L::Target: Logger,
+pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
+where
+ M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
+ T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
+ K::Target: KeysInterface,
+ F::Target: FeeEstimator,
+ R::Target: Router,
+ L::Target: Logger,
{
default_configuration: UserConfig,
genesis_hash: BlockHash,
fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
chain_monitor: M,
tx_broadcaster: T,
+ #[allow(unused)]
+ router: R,
/// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
#[cfg(test)]
/// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
#[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
- pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>,
+ pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
#[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
- channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>,
+ channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
/// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
/// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
/// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
///
/// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
- pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment>>,
+ pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
/// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
///
/// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
- /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
+ /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (message queues and the like). Currently
+ /// the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer basis, as well as the peer's latest
+ /// features.
+ ///
/// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
/// are currently open with that peer.
+ ///
/// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
- /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
- /// new channel.
+ /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
+ /// channels.
+ ///
+ /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
///
/// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
- per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
+ #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
+ per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
+ #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
+ pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
/// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
/// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
/// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
-/// [`ChannelManager::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
+/// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
/// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
}
}
-/// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
-/// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
-/// states for more.
-#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
-pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
- /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
- /// send the payment at all.
- ///
- /// You can freely resend the payment in full (with the parameter error fixed).
- ///
- /// Because the payment failed outright, no payment tracking is done, you do not need to call
- /// [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] and [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`] will *not* work
- /// for this payment.
- ParameterError(APIError),
- /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
- /// from attempting to send the payment at all.
- ///
- /// You can freely resend the payment in full (with the parameter error fixed).
- ///
- /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
- /// send_payment.
- ///
- /// Because the payment failed outright, no payment tracking is done, you do not need to call
- /// [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] and [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`] will *not* work
- /// for this payment.
- PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
- /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
- /// You can freely resend the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
- /// paths than the ones selected).
- ///
- /// Because the payment failed outright, no payment tracking is done, you do not need to call
- /// [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] and [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`] will *not* work
- /// for this payment.
- AllFailedResendSafe(Vec<APIError>),
- /// Indicates that a payment for the provided [`PaymentId`] is already in-flight and has not
- /// yet completed (i.e. generated an [`Event::PaymentSent`]) or been abandoned (via
- /// [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]).
- ///
- /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
- DuplicatePayment,
- /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
- /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
- /// in over-/re-payment.
- ///
- /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
- /// send_payment, and any `Err`s which are not [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] can be
- /// safely retried via [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`].
- ///
- /// Any entries which contain `Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInprogress)` or `Ok(())` MUST NOT be
- /// retried as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent
- /// (in the case of `Ok(())`) or will send once a [`MonitorEvent::Completed`] is provided for
- /// the next-hop channel with the latest update_id.
- PartialFailure {
- /// The errors themselves, in the same order as the route hops.
- results: Vec<Result<(), APIError>>,
- /// If some paths failed without irrevocably committing to the new HTLC(s), this will
- /// contain a [`RouteParameters`] object which can be used to calculate a new route that
- /// will pay all remaining unpaid balance.
- failed_paths_retry: Option<RouteParameters>,
- /// The payment id for the payment, which is now at least partially pending.
- payment_id: PaymentId,
- },
-}
-
/// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
///
/// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
}
}
-impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
- where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
- T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
- K::Target: KeysInterface,
- F::Target: FeeEstimator,
- L::Target: Logger,
+impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, R, L>
+where
+ M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
+ T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
+ K::Target: KeysInterface,
+ F::Target: FeeEstimator,
+ R::Target: Router,
+ L::Target: Logger,
{
/// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
///
/// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
/// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
/// from after `params.latest_hash`.
- pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
+ pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
let inbound_pmt_key_material = keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
chain_monitor,
tx_broadcaster,
+ router,
best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
- by_id: HashMap::new(),
pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
}),
outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
- pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
+ pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
- per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
+ per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
}
- let channel = {
- let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
- match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
- Some(peer_state) => {
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
+ debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
+
+ let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
+
+ match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
+ None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
+ Some(peer_state_mutex) => {
+ let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
+ let channel = {
let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
- let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key,
return Err(e);
},
}
- },
- None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
- }
- };
- let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
-
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
- // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
- debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
+ };
+ let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
- let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
- let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
- if cfg!(fuzzing) {
- return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
- } else {
- panic!("RNG is bad???");
+ let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
+ match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
+ if cfg!(fuzzing) {
+ return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
+ } else {
+ panic!("RNG is bad???");
+ }
+ },
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
}
+
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
+ node_id: their_network_key,
+ msg: res,
+ });
+ Ok(temporary_channel_id)
},
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
}
- channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
- node_id: their_network_key,
- msg: res,
- });
- Ok(temporary_channel_id)
}
- fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
+ fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
let mut res = Vec::new();
+ // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
+ // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
+ // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
+ // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
+ // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
+ // the same channel.
+ res.reserve(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
{
- let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
- res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
- for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
- let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
- let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
- channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
- res.push(ChannelDetails {
- channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
- counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
- node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
- features: InitFeatures::empty(),
- unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
- forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
- // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
- // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
- // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
- // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
- // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
- outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
- Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
- outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
- },
- funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
- // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
- // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
- channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
- short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
- outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
- inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
- channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
- unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
- balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
- inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
- outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
- next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
- user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
- confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
- confirmations: Some(channel.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
- force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
- is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
- is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
- is_usable: channel.is_live(),
- is_public: channel.should_announce(),
- inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
- inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
- config: Some(channel.config()),
- });
- }
- }
- let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
- for chan in res.iter_mut() {
- if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
- chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
+ let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
+ for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
+ let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
+ let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
+ for (channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
+ let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
+ let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
+ channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
+ res.push(ChannelDetails {
+ channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
+ counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
+ node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ features: peer_state.latest_features.clone(),
+ unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
+ forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
+ // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
+ // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
+ // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
+ // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
+ // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
+ outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
+ Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
+ outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
+ },
+ funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
+ // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
+ // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
+ channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
+ short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
+ outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
+ inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
+ channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
+ unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
+ balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
+ inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
+ outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
+ next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
+ user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
+ confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
+ confirmations: Some(channel.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
+ force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
+ is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
+ is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
+ is_usable: channel.is_live(),
+ is_public: channel.should_announce(),
+ inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
+ inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
+ config: Some(channel.config()),
+ });
+ }
}
}
res
}
/// Helper function that issues the channel close events
- fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
+ fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
Some(transaction) => {
let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
- match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
- if *counterparty_node_id != chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(){
- return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
- }
- let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = {
- let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
- match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
- Some(peer_state) => {
- let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
- let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
- chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
- },
- None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
+ let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
+ if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
+ let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
+ let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
+ match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
+ if *counterparty_node_id != chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(){
+ return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
}
- };
- failed_htlcs = htlcs;
-
- // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
- if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
- let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
- let (result, is_permanent) =
- handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
- if is_permanent {
- remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
- break result;
+ let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &peer_state.latest_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?;
+ failed_htlcs = htlcs;
+
+ // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
+ if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
+ let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
+ let (result, is_permanent) =
+ handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
+ if is_permanent {
+ remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
+ break result;
+ }
}
- }
- channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
- node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
- msg: shutdown_msg
- });
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
+ node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
+ msg: shutdown_msg
+ });
- if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
- let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
- if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
- channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
- msg: channel_update
- });
+ if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
+ let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
+ if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
+ msg: channel_update
+ });
+ }
+ self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
}
- self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
- }
- break Ok(());
- },
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
+ break Ok(());
+ },
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() })
+ }
+ } else {
+ return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) });
}
};
fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
-> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
let mut chan = {
- let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
- if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
- if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *peer_node_id {
- return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
- }
- if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
- self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
+ let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
+ if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id) {
+ let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
+ let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
+ if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
+ if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *peer_node_id {
+ return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
+ }
+ if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
+ self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
+ } else {
+ self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
+ }
+ remove_channel!(self, chan)
} else {
- self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
+ return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
}
- remove_channel!(self, chan)
} else {
- return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
+ return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Can't find a peer with a node_id matching the passed counterparty_node_id {}", peer_node_id) });
}
};
log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
// Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
// payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
// channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
- if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
+ let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
+ if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
+ let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
+ err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
+ err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
return Err(ReceiveError {
- err_code: 17,
- err_data: Vec::new(),
+ err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
});
}
return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
channel_id: msg.channel_id,
htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
- reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
+ reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
+ .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
}));
}
}
// with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
// short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
- if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
+ if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
- let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let forwarding_id_opt = match id_option {
+ let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
None => { // unknown_next_peer
// Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
// phantom or an intercept.
break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
}
},
- Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => Some(chan_id.clone()),
+ Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
};
- let chan_update_opt = if let Some(forwarding_id) = forwarding_id_opt {
- let chan = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
+ let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
+ let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
+ if let None = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
+ break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
+ }
+ let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id).unwrap();
+ let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
+ let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
+ let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
None => {
- // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and by_id maps have
- // no consistency guarantees.
+ // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
+ // have no consistency guarantees.
break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
},
Some(chan) => chan
}
chan_update_opt
} else {
- if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
+ if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
+ // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
+ // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
+ // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
break Some((
"Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
- 0x1000 | 13, None,
+ 0x2000 | 2, None,
));
}
None
(chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
+ } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
+ // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
+ // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
+ // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
+ // instead.
+ code = 0x2000 | 2;
}
return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
}
/// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
/// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
///
- /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
- fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
+ /// May be called with peer_state already locked!
+ fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
if !chan.should_announce() {
return Err(LightningError {
err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
/// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
/// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
/// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
- /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
- fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
+ /// May be called with peer_state already locked!
+ fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
}
- fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
+ fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
- let id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
+ let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
- Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
+ Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
};
let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
- if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
- match {
- if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
- return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
- }
- if !chan.get().is_live() {
- return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
- }
- break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
- htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
- path: path.clone(),
- session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
- first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
- payment_id,
- payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
- payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
- }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
- chan)
- } {
- Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
- let update_err = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
- let chan_id = chan.get().channel_id();
- match (update_err,
- handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_err, chan,
- RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true))
- {
- (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure, Err(e)) => break Err(e),
- (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed, Ok(())) => {},
- (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress, Err(_)) => {
- // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
- // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
- // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
- // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
- // which we do in the send_payment check for
- // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
- return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
- },
- _ => unreachable!(),
+ let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
+ if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
+ let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
+ let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
+ if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
+ match {
+ if !chan.get().is_live() {
+ return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
}
+ break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
+ htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
+ path: path.clone(),
+ session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
+ first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
+ payment_id,
+ payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
+ payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
+ }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
+ chan)
+ } {
+ Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
+ let update_err = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
+ let chan_id = chan.get().channel_id();
+ match (update_err,
+ handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_err, chan,
+ RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true))
+ {
+ (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure, Err(e)) => break Err(e),
+ (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed, Ok(())) => {},
+ (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress, Err(_)) => {
+ // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
+ // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
+ // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
+ // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
+ // which we do in the send_payment check for
+ // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
+ return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
+ },
+ _ => unreachable!(),
+ }
- log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan_id));
- channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
- node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
- updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
- update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
- update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fee: None,
- commitment_signed,
- },
- });
- },
- None => { },
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan_id));
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
+ node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
+ updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
+ update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
+ update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fee: None,
+ commitment_signed,
+ },
+ });
+ },
+ None => { },
+ }
+ } else {
+ // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
+ // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
+ // `channel_by_id` map.
+ // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
+ return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
}
- } else {
- // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
- // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the `by_id` map.
- // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
- return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
- }
+ } else { return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!" })}
return Ok(());
};
/// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
/// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
- let onion_session_privs = self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, *payment_secret, payment_id, route)?;
- self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, payment_id, None, onion_session_privs)
+ let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
+ self.pending_outbound_payments
+ .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, &self.keys_manager, best_block_height,
+ |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
+ self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
}
#[cfg(test)]
- pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
- self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, route)
+ fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
+ let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
+ self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.keys_manager, best_block_height,
+ |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
+ self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
}
- fn add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
- let mut onion_session_privs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
- for _ in 0..route.paths.len() {
- onion_session_privs.push(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
- }
-
- let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
- match pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => Err(PaymentSendFailure::DuplicatePayment),
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
- let payment = entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
- session_privs: HashSet::new(),
- pending_amt_msat: 0,
- pending_fee_msat: Some(0),
- payment_hash,
- payment_secret,
- starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
- total_msat: route.get_total_amount(),
- });
-
- for (path, session_priv_bytes) in route.paths.iter().zip(onion_session_privs.iter()) {
- assert!(payment.insert(*session_priv_bytes, path));
- }
-
- Ok(onion_session_privs)
- },
- }
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
+ let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
+ self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, route, &self.keys_manager, best_block_height)
}
- fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
- if route.paths.len() < 1 {
- return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
- }
- if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
- return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
- }
- let mut total_value = 0;
- let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
- let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
- 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
- if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
- path_errs.push(Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
- continue 'path_check;
- }
- for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
- if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
- path_errs.push(Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
- continue 'path_check;
- }
- }
- total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
- path_errs.push(Ok(()));
- }
- if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
- return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
- }
- if let Some(amt_msat) = recv_value_msat {
- debug_assert!(amt_msat >= total_value);
- total_value = amt_msat;
- }
-
- let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
- let mut results = Vec::new();
- debug_assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), onion_session_privs.len());
- for (path, session_priv) in route.paths.iter().zip(onion_session_privs.into_iter()) {
- let mut path_res = self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &route.payment_params, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage, session_priv);
- match path_res {
- Ok(_) => {},
- Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress) => {
- // While a MonitorUpdateInProgress is an Err(_), the payment is still
- // considered "in flight" and we shouldn't remove it from the
- // PendingOutboundPayment set.
- },
- Err(_) => {
- let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
- if let Some(payment) = pending_outbounds.get_mut(&payment_id) {
- let removed = payment.remove(&session_priv, Some(path));
- debug_assert!(removed, "This can't happen as the payment has an entry for this path added by callers");
- } else {
- debug_assert!(false, "This can't happen as the payment was added by callers");
- path_res = Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Internal error: payment disappeared during processing. Please report this bug!".to_owned() });
- }
- }
- }
- results.push(path_res);
- }
- let mut has_ok = false;
- let mut has_err = false;
- let mut pending_amt_unsent = 0;
- let mut max_unsent_cltv_delta = 0;
- for (res, path) in results.iter().zip(route.paths.iter()) {
- if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
- if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
- if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress) = res {
- // MonitorUpdateInProgress is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
- // PartialFailure.
- has_err = true;
- has_ok = true;
- } else if res.is_err() {
- pending_amt_unsent += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
- max_unsent_cltv_delta = cmp::max(max_unsent_cltv_delta, path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta);
- }
- }
- if has_err && has_ok {
- Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure {
- results,
- payment_id,
- failed_paths_retry: if pending_amt_unsent != 0 {
- if let Some(payment_params) = &route.payment_params {
- Some(RouteParameters {
- payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
- final_value_msat: pending_amt_unsent,
- final_cltv_expiry_delta: max_unsent_cltv_delta,
- })
- } else { None }
- } else { None },
- })
- } else if has_err {
- // If we failed to send any paths, we should remove the new PaymentId from the
- // `pending_outbound_payments` map, as the user isn't expected to `abandon_payment`.
- let removed = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&payment_id).is_some();
- debug_assert!(removed, "We should always have a pending payment to remove here");
- Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedResendSafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
- } else {
- Ok(())
- }
- }
/// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
///
/// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
/// [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]
pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
- const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10;
- for path in route.paths.iter() {
- if path.len() == 0 {
- return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
- err: "length-0 path in route".to_string()
- }))
- }
- }
-
- let mut onion_session_privs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
- for _ in 0..route.paths.len() {
- onion_session_privs.push(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
- }
-
- let (total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret) = {
- let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
- match outbounds.get_mut(&payment_id) {
- Some(payment) => {
- let res = match payment {
- PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
- total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, ..
- } => {
- let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum();
- if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 {
- return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
- err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string()
- }))
- }
- (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret)
- },
- PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => {
- return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
- err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string()
- }))
- },
- PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {
- return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
- err: "Payment already completed".to_owned()
- }));
- },
- PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {
- return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
- err: "Payment already abandoned (with some HTLCs still pending)".to_owned()
- }));
- },
- };
- for (path, session_priv_bytes) in route.paths.iter().zip(onion_session_privs.iter()) {
- assert!(payment.insert(*session_priv_bytes, path));
- }
- res
- },
- None =>
- return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
- err: format!("Payment with ID {} not found", log_bytes!(payment_id.0)),
- })),
- }
- };
- self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, payment_id, Some(total_msat), onion_session_privs)
+ let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
+ self.pending_outbound_payments.retry_payment_with_route(route, payment_id, &self.keys_manager, best_block_height,
+ |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
+ self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
}
/// Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur.
///
- /// After this method returns, any future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id`
- /// will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`]. If no such event has been generated,
- /// an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event will be generated as soon as there are no remaining
- /// pending HTLCs for this payment.
+ /// After this method returns, no future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id`
+ /// are allowed. If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be
+ /// generated as soon as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
///
/// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
/// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
/// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
///
+ /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
+ /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, the payment may still be in the pending state
+ /// upon restart. This allows further calls to [`retry_payment`] (and requiring a second call
+ /// to [`abandon_payment`] to mark the payment as failed again). Otherwise, future calls to
+ /// [`retry_payment`] will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`].
+ ///
+ /// [`abandon_payment`]: Self::abandon_payment
/// [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment
/// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
/// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
-
- let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
- if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
- if let Ok(()) = payment.get_mut().mark_abandoned() {
- if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
- self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
- payment_id,
- payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
- });
- payment.remove();
- }
- }
+ if let Some(payment_failed_ev) = self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id) {
+ self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(payment_failed_ev);
}
}
///
/// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
- let preimage = match payment_preimage {
- Some(p) => p,
- None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
- };
- let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
- let onion_session_privs = self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, None, payment_id, &route)?;
-
- match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), payment_id, None, onion_session_privs) {
- Ok(()) => Ok(payment_hash),
- Err(e) => Err(e)
- }
+ let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
+ self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(route, payment_preimage, payment_id, &self.keys_manager, best_block_height,
+ |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
+ self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
}
/// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
/// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
/// us to easily discern them from real payments.
pub fn send_probe(&self, hops: Vec<RouteHop>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
- let payment_id = PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
-
- let payment_hash = self.probing_cookie_from_id(&payment_id);
-
- if hops.len() < 2 {
- return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
- err: "No need probing a path with less than two hops".to_string()
- }))
- }
-
- let route = Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None };
- let onion_session_privs = self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, None, payment_id, &route)?;
-
- match self.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &None, None, payment_id, None, onion_session_privs) {
- Ok(()) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
- Err(e) => Err(e)
- }
- }
+ let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
+ self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(hops, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.keys_manager, best_block_height,
+ |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
+ self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
+ }
/// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
/// payment probe.
+ #[cfg(test)]
pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
- let target_payment_hash = self.probing_cookie_from_id(payment_id);
- target_payment_hash == *payment_hash
- }
-
- /// Returns the 'probing cookie' for the given [`PaymentId`].
- fn probing_cookie_from_id(&self, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> PaymentHash {
- let mut preimage = [0u8; 64];
- preimage[..32].copy_from_slice(&self.probing_cookie_secret);
- preimage[32..].copy_from_slice(&payment_id.0);
- PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage).into_inner())
+ outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
}
/// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
/// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
- fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
- &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], _counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
+ fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
+ &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
) -> Result<(), APIError> {
- let (chan, msg) = {
- let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
- Some(mut chan) => {
- let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
-
- (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
- .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
- MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
- } else { unreachable!(); })
- , chan)
- },
- None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
+ let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
+ if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
+ let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
+ let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
+ let (chan, msg) = {
+ let (res, chan) = {
+ match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
+ Some(mut chan) => {
+ let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
+
+ (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
+ .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
+ MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
+ } else { unreachable!(); })
+ , chan)
+ },
+ None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
+ }
+ };
+ match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
+ Ok(funding_msg) => {
+ (chan, funding_msg)
+ },
+ Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
+ err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
+ }) },
+ }
};
- match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
- Ok(funding_msg) => {
- (chan, funding_msg)
- },
- Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
- err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
- }) },
- }
- };
- let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
- node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
- msg,
- });
- match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
- panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
- },
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
- let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
- if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
- panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
+ node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ msg,
+ });
+ mem::drop(channel_state);
+ match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
+ panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
+ },
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
+ let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
+ if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
+ panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
+ }
+ e.insert(chan);
}
- e.insert(chan);
}
+ Ok(())
+ } else {
+ return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Can't find a peer with a node_id matching the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })
}
- Ok(())
}
#[cfg(test)]
{
let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
- for channel_id in channel_ids {
- let channel_counterparty_node_id = channel_state.by_id.get(channel_id)
- .ok_or(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
- err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found", log_bytes!(*channel_id)),
- })?
- .get_counterparty_node_id();
- if channel_counterparty_node_id != *counterparty_node_id {
- return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
- err: "counterparty node id mismatch".to_owned(),
- });
- }
- }
- for channel_id in channel_ids {
- let channel = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
- if !channel.update_config(config) {
- continue;
+ let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
+ if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
+ let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
+ let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
+ for channel_id in channel_ids {
+ if !peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) {
+ return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
+ err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found", log_bytes!(*channel_id)),
+ });
+ }
}
- if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
- channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
- } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
- channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
- node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
- msg,
- });
+ for channel_id in channel_ids {
+ let channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
+ if !channel.update_config(config) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
+ } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
+ node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ msg,
+ });
+ }
}
+ } else {
+ return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Can't find a peer with a node_id matching the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) });
}
}
Ok(())
/// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
// TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
// `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
- pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], _next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
- let next_hop_scid = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
- Some(chan) => {
- if !chan.is_usable() {
- return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
- err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
+ let next_hop_scid = {
+ let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
+ if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id) {
+ let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
+ let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
+ match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
+ Some(chan) => {
+ if !chan.is_usable() {
+ return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
+ err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
+ })
+ }
+ chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.outbound_scid_alias())
+ },
+ None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
+ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
})
}
- chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.outbound_scid_alias())
- },
- None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
- err: format!("Channel with id {} not found", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
- })
+ } else {
+ return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Can't find a peer with a node_id matching the passed counterparty_node_id {}", next_node_id) });
+ }
};
let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
let mut new_events = Vec::new();
let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
- let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
{
let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
}
}
}
- let forward_chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
- Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
+ let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
+ Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
None => {
forwarding_channel_not_found!();
continue;
}
};
- let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
- match channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
+ let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
+ if let None = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
+ forwarding_channel_not_found!();
+ continue;
+ }
+ let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id).unwrap();
+ let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
+ let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
+ match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
forwarding_channel_not_found!();
continue;
},
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
- let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
- let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
match forward_info {
HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
// Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
phantom_shared_secret: None,
});
- match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet, &self.logger) {
- Err(e) => {
- if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
- } else {
- panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
- }
- let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
- failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
- HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
- HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
- ));
- continue;
- },
- Ok(update_add) => {
- match update_add {
- Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
- None => {
- // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
- // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
- // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
- // commitment_signed messages when we can.
- // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
- // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
- // this channel currently :/.
- }
- }
+ if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
+ payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
+ onion_packet, &self.logger)
+ {
+ if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
+ } else {
+ panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
}
+ let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
+ failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
+ HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
+ HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
+ ));
+ continue;
}
},
HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
},
HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
- match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
- Err(e) => {
- if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
- } else {
- panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
- }
- // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
- // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
- // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
- continue;
- },
- Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
- Ok(None) => {
- // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
- // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
- // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
- // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
- // messages when we can.
- // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
- // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
- // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
+ if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
+ htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
+ ) {
+ if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
+ } else {
+ panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
}
+ // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
+ // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
+ // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
+ continue;
}
},
}
}
-
- if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
- let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
- Ok(res) => res,
- Err(e) => {
- // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
- // close channel and then send error message to peer.
- let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
- let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
- ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
- panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
- }
- ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
- let mut channel = remove_channel!(self, chan);
- // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
- Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel.channel_id(), channel.get_user_id(), channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
- },
- };
- handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
- continue;
- }
- };
- match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
- ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
- e => {
- handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
- continue;
- }
- }
- log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
- add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
- channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
- node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
- updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
- update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
- update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
- update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fee: None,
- commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
- },
- });
- }
}
}
} else {
macro_rules! check_total_value {
($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
- let mut payment_received_generated = false;
+ let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
let purpose = || {
events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
});
- payment_received_generated = true;
+ payment_claimable_generated = true;
} else {
// Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
// payment value yet, wait until we receive more
// MPP parts.
htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
}
- payment_received_generated
+ payment_claimable_generated
}}
}
log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
} else {
- let payment_received_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
- if payment_received_generated {
+ let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
+ if payment_claimable_generated {
inbound_payment.remove_entry();
}
}
}
self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
- for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
- let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
- }
+ // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
+ // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
+ // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
+ // network stack.
+ self.check_free_holding_cells();
if new_events.is_empty() { return }
let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
self.process_background_events();
}
- fn update_channel_fee(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
- if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
+ fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
+ if !chan.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
// If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
- return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
+ return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
}
if !chan.is_live() {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
- return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
+ return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
}
log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
- let mut retain_channel = true;
- let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
- Ok(res) => Ok(res),
- Err(e) => {
- let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
- if drop { retain_channel = false; }
- Err(res)
- }
- };
- let ret_err = match res {
- Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
- match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
- ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
- node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
- updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
- update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fee: Some(update_fee),
- commitment_signed,
- },
- });
- Ok(())
- },
- e => {
- let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
- if drop { retain_channel = false; }
- res
- }
- }
- },
- Ok(None) => Ok(()),
- Err(e) => Err(e),
- };
- (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
+ chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.logger);
+ NotifyOption::DoPersist
}
#[cfg(fuzzing)]
let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
- let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
- {
- let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
- let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
- channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
- let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
+ let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
+ for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
+ let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
+ let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
+ for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
+ let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
- if err.is_err() {
- handle_errors.push(err);
- }
- retain_channel
- });
+ }
}
should_persist
});
}
- fn remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self) {
- // If an outbound payment was completed, and no pending HTLCs remain, we should remove it
- // from the map. However, if we did that immediately when the last payment HTLC is claimed,
- // this could race the user making a duplicate send_payment call and our idempotency
- // guarantees would be violated. Instead, we wait a few timer ticks to do the actual
- // removal. This should be more than sufficient to ensure the idempotency of any
- // `send_payment` calls that were made at the same time the `PaymentSent` event was being
- // processed.
- let mut pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
- let pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
- pending_outbound_payments.retain(|payment_id, payment| {
- if let PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, timer_ticks_without_htlcs, .. } = payment {
- let mut no_remaining_entries = session_privs.is_empty();
- if no_remaining_entries {
- for ev in pending_events.iter() {
- match ev {
- events::Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: Some(ev_payment_id), .. } |
- events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ev_payment_id, .. } |
- events::Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_id: Some(ev_payment_id), .. } => {
- if payment_id == ev_payment_id {
- no_remaining_entries = false;
- break;
- }
- },
- _ => {},
- }
- }
- }
- if no_remaining_entries {
- *timer_ticks_without_htlcs += 1;
- *timer_ticks_without_htlcs <= IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS
- } else {
- *timer_ticks_without_htlcs = 0;
- true
- }
- } else { true }
- });
- }
-
/// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
///
/// This currently includes:
let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
- let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
+ let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
{
let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
- channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
- let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
- let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
- if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
- if err.is_err() {
- handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
- }
- if !retain_channel { return false; }
-
- if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
- let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
- handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
- if needs_close { return false; }
- }
+ let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
+ for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
+ let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
+ let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
+ peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
+ let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
+ if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
+
+ if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
+ let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
+ handle_errors.push((Err(err), *counterparty_node_id));
+ if needs_close { return false; }
+ }
- match chan.channel_update_status() {
- ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
- ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
- ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
- ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
- ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
- if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
- msg: update
- });
- }
- should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
- chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
- },
- ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
- if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
- msg: update
- });
- }
- should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
- chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
- },
- _ => {},
- }
+ match chan.channel_update_status() {
+ ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
+ ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
+ ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
+ ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
+ ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
+ if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
+ msg: update
+ });
+ }
+ should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
+ chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
+ },
+ ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
+ if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
+ msg: update
+ });
+ }
+ should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
+ chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
+ },
+ _ => {},
+ }
- chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
+ chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
- true
- });
+ true
+ });
+ }
}
self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
}
- self.remove_stale_resolved_payments();
+ self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
+
+ // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
+ // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
+ // than block the message queueing pipeline.
+ if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
+ should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
+ }
should_persist
});
///
/// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
/// forwarding
- fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
+ fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
// We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
// guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
// we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
/// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
/// that we want to return and a channel.
- fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
+ fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
) {
- let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
- match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
- self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
- },
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
- };
+ let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
+ let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
+ if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
+ let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
+ let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
+ match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
+ self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
+ },
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
+ }
+ } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
+ };
for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
/// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
/// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
- #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
+ #[cfg(all(debug_assertions, feature = "std"))]
{
- // Ensure that the `channel_state` lock is not held when calling this function.
+ // Ensure that the `channel_state` and no peer state channel storage lock is not held
+ // when calling this function.
// This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock_order requirement for
- // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `channel_state` lock, which calling this
- // function with the `channel_state` locked would.
+ // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `channel_state` and `per_peer_state` locks,
+ // which calling this function with the locks aquired would.
assert!(self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
+ assert!(self.per_peer_state.try_write().is_ok());
}
//TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
// being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
match source {
HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => {
- let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
- session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
- let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
- let mut all_paths_failed = false;
- let mut full_failure_ev = None;
- if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(*payment_id) {
- if !payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
- return;
- }
- if payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Received failure of HTLC with payment_hash {} after payment completion", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
- return;
- }
- if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
- all_paths_failed = true;
- if payment.get().abandoned() {
- full_failure_ev = Some(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
- payment_id: *payment_id,
- payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
- });
- payment.remove();
- }
- }
- } else {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
- return;
- }
- let mut retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
- let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
- Some(RouteParameters {
- payment_params: payment_params_data.clone(),
- final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
- final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
- })
- } else { None };
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
-
- let path_failure = match &onion_error {
- &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
-#[cfg(test)]
- let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
-#[cfg(not(test))]
- let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
-
- if self.payment_is_probe(payment_hash, &payment_id) {
- if !payment_retryable {
- events::Event::ProbeSuccessful {
- payment_id: *payment_id,
- payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
- path: path.clone(),
- }
- } else {
- events::Event::ProbeFailed {
- payment_id: *payment_id,
- payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
- path: path.clone(),
- short_channel_id,
- }
- }
- } else {
- // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
- // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
- // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
- if let Some(scid) = short_channel_id {
- retry.as_mut().map(|r| r.payment_params.previously_failed_channels.push(scid));
- }
- events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
- payment_id: Some(*payment_id),
- payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
- payment_failed_permanently: !payment_retryable,
- network_update,
- all_paths_failed,
- path: path.clone(),
- short_channel_id,
- retry,
- #[cfg(test)]
- error_code: onion_error_code,
- #[cfg(test)]
- error_data: onion_error_data
- }
- }
- },
- &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
-#[cfg(test)]
- ref failure_code,
-#[cfg(test)]
- ref data,
- .. } => {
- // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
- // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
- // failures here, but that would be insufficient as find_route
- // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
- // ChannelDetails.
- // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
- // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
- let scid = path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id;
- retry.as_mut().map(|r| r.payment_params.previously_failed_channels.push(scid));
-
- if self.payment_is_probe(payment_hash, &payment_id) {
- events::Event::ProbeFailed {
- payment_id: *payment_id,
- payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
- path: path.clone(),
- short_channel_id: Some(scid),
- }
- } else {
- events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
- payment_id: Some(*payment_id),
- payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
- payment_failed_permanently: false,
- network_update: None,
- all_paths_failed,
- path: path.clone(),
- short_channel_id: Some(scid),
- retry,
-#[cfg(test)]
- error_code: Some(*failure_code),
-#[cfg(test)]
- error_data: Some(data.clone()),
- }
- }
- }
- };
- let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
- pending_events.push(path_failure);
- if let Some(ev) = full_failure_ev { pending_events.push(ev); }
+ self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_params, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
},
HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
- let err_packet = match onion_error {
- HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
- if let Some(phantom_ss) = phantom_shared_secret {
- let phantom_packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(phantom_ss, *failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
- let encrypted_phantom_packet = onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(phantom_ss, &phantom_packet);
- onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, &encrypted_phantom_packet.data[..])
- } else {
- let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, *failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
- onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
- }
- },
- HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
- onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
- }
- };
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
+ let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
let mut forward_event = None;
let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
/// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
/// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
/// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
- /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
};
debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
- // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
- // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
- // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
- // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
+ // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we check that all channels which contain a claimable
+ // HTLC still exist. While this isn't guaranteed to remain true if a channel closes while
+ // we're claiming (or even after we claim, before the commitment update dance completes),
+ // it should be a relatively rare race, and we'd rather not claim HTLCs that require us to
+ // go on-chain (and lose the on-chain fee to do so) than just reject the payment.
+ //
+ // Note that we'll still always get our funds - as long as the generated
+ // `ChannelMonitorUpdate` makes it out to the relevant monitor we can claim on-chain.
//
// If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
// channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
let mut valid_mpp = true;
let mut errs = Vec::new();
- let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
- let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
+ let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
+ let mut per_peer_state = Some(self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap());
for htlc in sources.iter() {
- let chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
- Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
+ let (counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
+ Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
None => {
valid_mpp = false;
break;
}
};
- if let None = channel_state.by_id.get(&chan_id) {
+ if let None = per_peer_state.as_ref().unwrap().get(&counterparty_node_id) {
+ valid_mpp = false;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.as_ref().unwrap().get(&counterparty_node_id).unwrap();
+ let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
+ let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
+
+ if let None = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&chan_id) {
valid_mpp = false;
break;
}
valid_mpp = false;
break;
}
+
expected_amt_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
// We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
}
if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
mem::drop(channel_state);
+ mem::drop(per_peer_state);
self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
return;
}
if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
mem::drop(channel_state);
+ mem::drop(per_peer_state);
self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
}
if valid_mpp {
for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
- match self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
- ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
- if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
- // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
- // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
- log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
- claimed_any_htlcs = true;
- } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
- },
- ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
- ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
- // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
- // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
- // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
- // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
- },
- ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
+ if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
+ if per_peer_state.is_none() { per_peer_state = Some(self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap()); }
+ if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.take().unwrap(), per_peer_state.take().unwrap(),
+ htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
+ |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
+ {
+ if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
+ // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
+ // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
+ log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
+ } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
}
}
}
- mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
+ mem::drop(channel_state);
+ mem::drop(per_peer_state);
if !valid_mpp {
for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
}
- }
-
- let ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id } =
- self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash).unwrap();
- if claimed_any_htlcs {
- self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
- payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
- });
+ self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
}
// Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
}
}
- fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
+ fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
+ mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>,
+ per_peer_state_lock: RwLockReadGuard<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
+ prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
+ -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
//TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
- let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
- if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
- match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
- Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
- if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
+ let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
+
+ let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
+ Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
+ None => None
+ };
+
+ let (found_channel, mut peer_state_opt) = if counterparty_node_id_opt.is_some() && per_peer_state_lock.get(&counterparty_node_id_opt.unwrap()).is_some() {
+ let peer_mutex = per_peer_state_lock.get(&counterparty_node_id_opt.unwrap()).unwrap();
+ let peer_state = peer_mutex.lock().unwrap();
+ let found_channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(&chan_id);
+ (found_channel, Some(peer_state))
+ } else { (false, None) };
+
+ if found_channel {
+ if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state_opt.as_mut().unwrap().channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
+ let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
+ match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
+ Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
+ if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
+ match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
+ ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
+ e => {
+ log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
+ "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
+ payment_preimage, e);
+ let err = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err();
+ mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
+ mem::drop(peer_state_opt);
+ mem::drop(per_peer_state_lock);
+ self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)));
+ return Err((counterparty_node_id, err));
+ }
+ }
+ if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
+ log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
+ node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
+ update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
+ update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fee: None,
+ commitment_signed,
+ }
+ });
+ }
+ mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
+ mem::drop(peer_state_opt);
+ mem::drop(per_peer_state_lock);
+ self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)));
+ Ok(())
+ } else {
+ Ok(())
+ }
+ },
+ Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
e => {
- log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
- "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
+ // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
+ // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
+ // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same update and try
+ // again on restart.
+ log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
+ "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
payment_preimage, e);
- return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
- chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
- handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
- Some(htlc_value_msat)
- );
- }
+ },
}
- if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
- log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
- log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
- channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
- node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
- updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
- update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
- update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fee: None,
- commitment_signed,
- }
- });
+ let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
+ if drop {
+ chan.remove_entry();
}
- return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
- } else {
- return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
- }
- },
- Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
- match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
- ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
- e => {
- log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
- "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
- payment_preimage, e);
- },
- }
- let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
- let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
- if drop {
- chan.remove_entry();
- }
- return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
- },
+ mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
+ mem::drop(peer_state_opt);
+ mem::drop(per_peer_state_lock);
+ self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
+ Err((counterparty_node_id, res))
+ },
+ }
+ } else {
+ // We've held the peer_state mutex since finding the channel and setting
+ // found_channel to true, so the channel can't have been dropped.
+ unreachable!()
}
- } else { return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed }
- }
-
- fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
- let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
- let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
- for source in sources.drain(..) {
- if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } = source {
- let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
- session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
- if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
- assert!(payment.get().is_fulfilled());
- if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None) {
- pending_events.push(
- events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
- payment_id,
- payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash(),
- path,
- }
- );
- }
- }
+ } else {
+ let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
+ update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
+ updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
+ payment_preimage,
+ }],
+ };
+ // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
+ // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
+ let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update);
+ if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
+ // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
+ // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
+ // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
+ // again on restart.
+ log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
+ payment_preimage, update_res);
}
+ mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
+ mem::drop(peer_state_opt);
+ mem::drop(per_peer_state_lock);
+ // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
+ // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
+ // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
+ // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
+ // `PaymentForwarded`).
+ self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
+ Ok(())
}
}
- fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
+ fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
+ self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
+ }
+
+ fn claim_funds_internal(&self, channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
match source {
HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
- let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
- session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
- let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
- if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
- let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
- if !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
- let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
- let fee_paid_msat = payment.get().get_pending_fee_msat();
- pending_events.push(
- events::Event::PaymentSent {
- payment_id: Some(payment_id),
- payment_preimage,
- payment_hash,
- fee_paid_msat,
- }
- );
- payment.get_mut().mark_fulfilled();
- }
-
- if from_onchain {
- // We currently immediately remove HTLCs which were fulfilled on-chain.
- // This could potentially lead to removing a pending payment too early,
- // with a reorg of one block causing us to re-add the fulfilled payment on
- // restart.
- // TODO: We should have a second monitor event that informs us of payments
- // irrevocably fulfilled.
- if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
- let payment_hash = Some(PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()));
- pending_events.push(
- events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
- payment_id,
- payment_hash,
- path,
- }
- );
- }
- }
- } else {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
- }
+ self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
},
HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
- let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
- let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
- let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
- ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
- ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
- _ => None,
- };
- if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
- let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
- update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
- updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
- payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
- }],
- };
- // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
- // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
- // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
- let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update);
- if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
- // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
- // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
- // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
- // again on restart.
- log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
- payment_preimage, update_res);
- }
- // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
- // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
- // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
- // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
- // can happen.
- }
- mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
- if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
+ let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state_lock, self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(), hop_data, payment_preimage,
+ |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
+ if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
+ let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
+ Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
+ } else { None };
+
+ let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
+ let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
+
+ Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
+ fee_earned_msat,
+ claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
+ prev_channel_id,
+ next_channel_id,
+ }})
+ } else { None }
+ });
+ if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
}
-
- if claimed_htlc {
- if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
- let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
- Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
- } else { None };
-
- let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
- let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
- let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
-
- pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
- fee_earned_msat,
- claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
- prev_channel_id,
- next_channel_id,
- });
- }
- }
},
}
}
self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
}
+ fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
+ for action in actions.into_iter() {
+ match action {
+ MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
+ let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
+ if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
+ self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
+ payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
+ });
+ }
+ },
+ MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event } => {
+ self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(event);
+ },
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
/// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
/// update completion.
fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
- channel: &mut Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
+ channel: &mut Channel<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
htlc_forwards
}
- fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
+ fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
let htlc_forwards;
let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims, counterparty_node_id) = {
let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
- let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
+ let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
+ Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
+ None => {
+ // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
+ // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
+ let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
+ match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
+ Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
+ None => return,
+ }
+ }
+ };
+ let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
+ let mut peer_state_lock;
+ let mut channel = {
+ if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
+ peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
+ let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
+ match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()){
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
+ }
+ } else { return }
};
if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
return;
}
- let counterparty_node_id = channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() {
// We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
- match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
- if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
- return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
- }
- if *counterparty_node_id != channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id() {
- return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
- }
- if accept_0conf {
- channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
- } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
- let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
+ let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
+ if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
+ let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
+ let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
+ match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
+ if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
+ return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
+ }
+ if *counterparty_node_id != channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id() {
+ return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
+ }
+ if accept_0conf {
+ channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
+ } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
+ let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
+ node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
+ msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
+ }
+ };
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
+ let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
+ return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
+ }
+
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
- action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
- msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
- }
- };
- channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
- let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
- return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
+ msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
+ });
+ }
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
+ return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist".to_owned() });
}
-
- channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
- node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
- msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
- });
- }
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
- return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist".to_owned() });
}
+ } else {
+ return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Can't find a peer with a node_id matching the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) });
}
Ok(())
}
};
let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
- match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
- self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
- return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
- },
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
- if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
- if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
- return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
- }
- channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
- node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
- msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
- });
- } else {
- let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
- pending_events.push(
- events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
- temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
- counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
- funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
- push_msat: msg.push_msat,
- channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
+ let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
+ if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
+ let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
+ let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
+ match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
+ self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
+ },
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
+ if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
+ if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
}
- );
- }
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
+ node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
+ msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
+ });
+ } else {
+ let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
+ pending_events.push(
+ events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
+ temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
+ counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
+ funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
+ push_msat: msg.push_msat,
+ channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
+ }
+ );
+ }
- entry.insert(channel);
+ entry.insert(channel);
+ }
}
+ } else {
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer with a node_id matching the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
}
Ok(())
}
fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
- let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
- match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
- if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
- return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
- }
- try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &their_features), chan);
- (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
- },
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
+ let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
+ if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
+ let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
+ let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
+ match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
+ if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
+ }
+ try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &their_features), chan);
+ (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
+ },
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
+ }
+ } else {
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer with a node_id matching the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
}
};
let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
}
fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
+ let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
+ let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let ((funding_msg, monitor, mut channel_ready), mut chan) = {
let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
- let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
- match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
- if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
- return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
- }
- (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.keys_manager, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
- },
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
+ if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
+ let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
+ let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
+ match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
+ if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
+ }
+ (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.keys_manager, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
+ },
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
+ }
+ } else {
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer with a node_id matching the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
}
};
- // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
+ // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the peer_state
// lock before watch_channel
match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
channel_ready = None; // Don't send the channel_ready now
},
}
- let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
- match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
+ // It's safe to unwrap as we've held the `per_peer_state` read lock since checking that the
+ // peer exists, despite the inner PeerState potentially having no channels after removing
+ // the channel above.
+ let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id).unwrap();
+ let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
+ let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
+ match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
},
let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
- match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
- if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
- return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
- }
- let (monitor, funding_tx, channel_ready) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.keys_manager, &self.logger) {
- Ok(update) => update,
- Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan),
- };
- match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
- ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
- e => {
- let mut res = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, channel_ready.is_some(), OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED);
- if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
- // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
- // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
- // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
- if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
- shutdown_finish.0.take();
+ let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
+ if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
+ let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
+ let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
+ match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
+ if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
+ }
+ let (monitor, funding_tx, channel_ready) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.keys_manager, &self.logger) {
+ Ok(update) => update,
+ Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan),
+ };
+ match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
+ ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
+ e => {
+ let mut res = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, channel_ready.is_some(), OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED);
+ if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
+ // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
+ // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
+ // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
+ if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
+ shutdown_finish.0.take();
+ }
}
- }
- return res
- },
- }
- if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
- send_channel_ready!(self, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get(), msg);
- }
- funding_tx
- },
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
+ return res
+ },
+ }
+ if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
+ send_channel_ready!(self, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get(), msg);
+ }
+ funding_tx
+ },
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
+ }
+ } else {
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer with a node_id matching the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
}
};
log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
- match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
- if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
- return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
- }
- let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, self.get_our_node_id(),
- self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
- if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
- channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
- node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
- msg: announcement_sigs,
- });
- } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
- // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
- // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
- // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
- // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
- // announcement_signatures.
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
- if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
- channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
+ let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
+ if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
+ let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
+ let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
+ match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
+ if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
+ }
+ let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, self.get_our_node_id(),
+ self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
+ if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
- msg,
+ msg: announcement_sigs,
});
+ } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
+ // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
+ // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
+ // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
+ // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
+ // announcement_signatures.
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
+ if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
+ node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
+ msg,
+ });
+ }
}
- }
- emit_channel_ready_event!(self, chan.get_mut());
+ emit_channel_ready_event!(self, chan.get_mut());
- Ok(())
- },
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
+ Ok(())
+ },
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
+ }
+ } else {
+ Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer with a node_id matching the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
}
}
let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
+ let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
+ if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
+ let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
+ let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
+ match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
+ if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
+ }
- match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
- if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
- return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
- }
-
- if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
- log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
- log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
- if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
- }
+ if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
+ log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
+ log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
+ if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
+ }
- let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), chan_entry);
- dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
-
- // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
- if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
- let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
- let (result, is_permanent) =
- handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
- if is_permanent {
- remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
- break result;
+ let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), chan_entry);
+ dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
+
+ // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
+ if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
+ let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
+ let (result, is_permanent) =
+ handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
+ if is_permanent {
+ remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
+ break result;
+ }
}
- }
- if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
- channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
- node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
- msg,
- });
- }
+ if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
+ node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
+ msg,
+ });
+ }
- break Ok(());
- },
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
+ break Ok(());
+ },
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
+ }
+ } else {
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer with a node_id matching the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
}
};
for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
let (tx, chan_option) = {
let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
- match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
- if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
- return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
- }
- let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
- if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
- channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
- node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
- msg,
- });
- }
- if tx.is_some() {
- // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
- // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
- // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
- // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
- // watch for old state broadcasts)!
- (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
- } else { (tx, None) }
- },
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
+ let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
+ if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
+ let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
+ let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
+ match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
+ if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
+ }
+ let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
+ if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
+ node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
+ msg,
+ });
+ }
+ if tx.is_some() {
+ // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
+ // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
+ // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
+ // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
+ // watch for old state broadcasts)!
+ (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
+ } else { (tx, None) }
+ },
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
+ }
+ } else {
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer with a node_id matching the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
}
};
if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
//but we should prevent it anyway.
let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
- let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
-
- match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
- if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
- return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
- }
-
- let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
- // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
- // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
- // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
- match pending_forward_info {
- PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
- let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
- let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
- onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, real_code, &error_data)
- } else {
- onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
- };
- let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
- channel_id: msg.channel_id,
- htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
- reason
- };
- PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
- },
- _ => pending_forward_info
+ let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
+ if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
+ let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
+ let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
+ match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
+ if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
}
- };
- try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
- },
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
+
+ let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
+ // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
+ // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
+ // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
+ match pending_forward_info {
+ PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
+ let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
+ let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
+ HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
+ } else {
+ HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
+ }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
+ let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
+ channel_id: msg.channel_id,
+ htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
+ reason
+ };
+ PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
+ },
+ _ => pending_forward_info
+ }
+ };
+ try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
+ },
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
+ }
+ } else {
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer with a node_id matching the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
}
Ok(())
}
fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
- let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
- let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
- match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
+ let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
+ if let None = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer with a node_id matching the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id));
+ }
+ let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id).unwrap();
+ let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
+ let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
+ match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
}
fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
- let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
- match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
- if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
- return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
- }
- try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), chan);
- },
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
+ let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
+ if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
+ let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
+ let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
+ match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
+ if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
+ }
+ try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
+ },
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
+ }
+ } else {
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer with a node_id matching the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id));
}
Ok(())
}
fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
- let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
- match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
- if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
- return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
- }
- if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
- let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
- try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
- }
- try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(msg.failure_code)), chan);
- Ok(())
- },
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
+ let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
+ if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
+ let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
+ let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
+ match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
+ if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
+ }
+ if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
+ let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
+ try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
+ }
+ try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
+ Ok(())
+ },
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
+ }
+ } else {
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer with a node_id matching the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
}
}
fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
- match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
- if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
- return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
- }
- let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
- match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
- Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan),
- Err((Some(update), e)) => {
- assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
- let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
- try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan);
- unreachable!();
- },
- Ok(res) => res
- };
- let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
- if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some()) {
- return Err(e);
- }
+ let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
+ if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
+ let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
+ let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
+ match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
+ if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
+ }
+ let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
+ match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
+ Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan),
+ Err((Some(update), e)) => {
+ assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
+ let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
+ try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan);
+ unreachable!();
+ },
+ Ok(res) => res
+ };
+ let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
+ if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some()) {
+ return Err(e);
+ }
- channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
- node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
- msg: revoke_and_ack,
- });
- if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
- channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
- updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
- update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fee: None,
- commitment_signed: msg,
- },
+ msg: revoke_and_ack,
});
- }
- Ok(())
- },
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
+ if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
+ node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
+ updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
+ update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fee: None,
+ commitment_signed: msg,
+ },
+ });
+ }
+ Ok(())
+ },
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
+ }
+ } else {
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer with a node_id matching the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
}
}
let res = loop {
let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
- match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
- if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
- break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
- }
- let was_paused_for_mon_update = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
- let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
- chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
- htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
- let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update);
- if was_paused_for_mon_update {
- assert!(update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
- assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
- assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
- break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Existing pending monitor update prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
- }
- if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
- if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan,
- RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
- raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(), false,
- raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
- raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
- break Err(e);
- } else { unreachable!(); }
- }
- if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
- channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
- node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
- updates,
- });
- }
- break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
- raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
- chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
- .unwrap_or(chan.get().outbound_scid_alias()),
- chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
- chan.get().get_user_id()))
- },
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
+ let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
+ if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
+ let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
+ let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
+ match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
+ if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
+ break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
+ }
+ let was_paused_for_mon_update = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
+ let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
+ chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
+ htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
+ let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update);
+ if was_paused_for_mon_update {
+ assert!(update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
+ assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
+ assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Existing pending monitor update prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
+ }
+ if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
+ if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan,
+ RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
+ raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(), false,
+ raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
+ raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
+ break Err(e);
+ } else { unreachable!(); }
+ }
+ if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
+ node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
+ updates,
+ });
+ }
+ break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
+ raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
+ chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
+ .unwrap_or(chan.get().outbound_scid_alias()),
+ chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
+ chan.get().get_user_id()))
+ },
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
+ }
+ } else {
+ break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer with a node_id matching the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
}
};
self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
}
fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
- let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
- match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
- if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
- return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
- }
- try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
- },
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
+ let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
+ if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
+ let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
+ let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
+ match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
+ if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
+ }
+ try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
+ },
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
+ }
+ } else {
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer with a node_id matching the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id));
}
Ok(())
}
fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
+ let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
+ if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
+ let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
+ let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
+ match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
+ if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
+ }
+ if !chan.get().is_usable() {
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
+ }
- match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
- if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
- return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
- }
- if !chan.get().is_usable() {
- return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
- }
-
- channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
- msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
- self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), msg), chan),
- // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
- // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
- update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
- });
- },
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
+ msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
+ self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), msg), chan),
+ // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
+ // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
+ update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
+ });
+ },
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
+ }
+ } else {
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer with a node_id matching the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id));
}
Ok(())
}
/// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
- let chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
- Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
+ let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
+ Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
None => {
// It's not a local channel
return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
}
};
- let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
- match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
- if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
- if chan.get().should_announce() {
- // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
- // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
- // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
+ let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
+ if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id) {
+ let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
+ let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
+ match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
+ if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
+ if chan.get().should_announce() {
+ // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
+ // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
+ // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
+ return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
+ }
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
+ }
+ let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
+ let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
+ if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
+ } else {
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
+ try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
}
- return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
- }
- let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
- let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
- if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
- return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
- } else {
- log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
- try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
- }
- },
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
+ },
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
+ }
+ } else {
+ return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
}
Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
}
let need_lnd_workaround = {
let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
+ let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
- match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
- if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
- return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
- }
- // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
- // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
- // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
- // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
- let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
- msg, &self.logger, self.our_network_pubkey.clone(), self.genesis_hash,
- &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
- let mut channel_update = None;
- if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
- channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
- node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
- msg,
- });
- } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
- // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
- // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
- // they have the latest channel parameters.
- if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
- channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
- node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
+ let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
+ let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
+ match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
+ if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
+ }
+ // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
+ // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
+ // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
+ // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
+ let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
+ msg, &self.logger, self.our_network_pubkey.clone(), self.genesis_hash,
+ &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
+ let mut channel_update = None;
+ if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
+ node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
msg,
});
+ } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
+ // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
+ // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
+ // they have the latest channel parameters.
+ if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
+ channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
+ node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ msg,
+ });
+ }
}
- }
- let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
- htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
- &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
- Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
- if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
- channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
- }
- need_lnd_workaround
- },
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
+ let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
+ htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
+ &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
+ Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
+ if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
+ }
+ need_lnd_workaround
+ },
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
+ }
+ } else {
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer with a node_id matching the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id));
}
};
MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
- let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
- let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
- if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
- let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
- failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
- if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
- msg: update
- });
+ let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
+ Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
+ None => {
+ // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
+ // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
+ let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
+ id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
+ }
+ };
+ if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
+ let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
+ if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
+ let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
+ let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
+ let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
+ if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
+ let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
+ failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
+ if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
+ msg: update
+ });
+ }
+ let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
+ ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
+ } else {
+ ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
+ };
+ self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
+ node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
+ msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
+ },
+ });
+ }
}
- let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
- ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
- } else {
- ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
- };
- self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
- node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
- action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
- msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
- },
- });
}
},
MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
- self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
+ self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
},
}
}
/// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
/// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
/// update was applied.
- ///
- /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
- /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
- /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
- /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
let mut has_monitor_update = false;
let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
{
let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
- let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
+ let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
- by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
- match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
- Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
- if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
- failed_htlcs.push((
- holding_cell_failed_htlcs,
- *channel_id,
- chan.get_counterparty_node_id()
- ));
- }
- if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
- match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
- ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
- node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
- updates: commitment_update,
- });
- },
- e => {
- has_monitor_update = true;
- let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, channel_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
- handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
- if close_channel { return false; }
- },
+ for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
+ let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
+ let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
+ peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
+ match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
+ Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
+ if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
+ failed_htlcs.push((
+ holding_cell_failed_htlcs,
+ *channel_id,
+ chan.get_counterparty_node_id()
+ ));
+ }
+ if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
+ match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
+ ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
+ node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ updates: commitment_update,
+ });
+ },
+ e => {
+ has_monitor_update = true;
+ let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, channel_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
+ handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
+ if close_channel { return false; }
+ },
+ }
}
+ true
+ },
+ Err(e) => {
+ let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
+ handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
+ // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
+ !close_channel
}
- true
- },
- Err(e) => {
- let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
- handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
- // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
- !close_channel
}
- }
- });
+ });
+ }
}
let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
{
let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
- let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
+ let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
- by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
- match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
- Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
- if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
- has_update = true;
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
- node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
- });
- }
- if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
- // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
- // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
- if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
- msg: update
+ for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
+ let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
+ let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
+ peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
+ match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
+ Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
+ if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
+ has_update = true;
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
+ node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
});
}
+ if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
+ // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
+ // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
+ if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
+ msg: update
+ });
+ }
- self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
+ self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
- log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
- self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
- update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
- false
- } else { true }
- },
- Err(e) => {
- has_update = true;
- let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
- handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
- !close_channel
+ log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
+ self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
+ update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
+ false
+ } else { true }
+ },
+ Err(e) => {
+ has_update = true;
+ let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
+ handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
+ !close_channel
+ }
}
- }
- });
+ });
+ }
}
for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
- for chan in self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.values() {
- for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
- if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
- inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
+ let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
+ for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
+ let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
+ let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
+ for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
+ for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
+ if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
+ inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
+ }
}
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
- !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty()
+ self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
}
#[cfg(test)]
pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
- self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().clear()
+ self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
}
/// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
}
}
-impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
- where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
- T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
- K::Target: KeysInterface,
- F::Target: FeeEstimator,
- L::Target: Logger,
+impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, R, L>
+where
+ M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
+ T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
+ K::Target: KeysInterface,
+ F::Target: FeeEstimator,
+ R::Target: Router,
+ L::Target: Logger,
{
fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
}
}
-impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
+impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, R, L>
where
- M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
+ M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
K::Target: KeysInterface,
F::Target: FeeEstimator,
+ R::Target: Router,
L::Target: Logger,
{
/// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
}
}
-impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
+impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, R, L>
where
- M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
+ M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
K::Target: KeysInterface,
F::Target: FeeEstimator,
+ R::Target: Router,
L::Target: Logger,
{
fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
}
}
-impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
+impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, R, L>
where
- M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
+ M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
K::Target: KeysInterface,
F::Target: FeeEstimator,
+ R::Target: Router,
L::Target: Logger,
{
fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
}
fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
- let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
- for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
- if let (Some(funding_txo), block_hash) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
- res.push((funding_txo.txid, block_hash));
+ let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
+ for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
+ let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
+ let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
+ for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
+ if let (Some(funding_txo), block_hash) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
+ res.push((funding_txo.txid, block_hash));
+ }
}
}
res
}
}
-impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
+impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, R, L>
where
- M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
+ M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
K::Target: KeysInterface,
F::Target: FeeEstimator,
+ R::Target: Router,
L::Target: Logger,
{
/// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
/// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
/// the function.
- fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
+ fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
(&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
// Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
// during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
- channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
- let res = f(channel);
- if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
- for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
- let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
- timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
- HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
- }
- if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
- send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
- if channel.is_usable() {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
- if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
- node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
- msg,
- });
+ let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
+ for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
+ let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
+ let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
+ peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
+ let res = f(channel);
+ if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
+ for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
+ let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
+ timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
+ HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
+ }
+ if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
+ send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
+ if channel.is_usable() {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
+ if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
+ node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ msg,
+ });
+ }
+ } else {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
}
- } else {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
}
- }
- emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
+ emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
- if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
- node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
- msg: announcement_sigs,
- });
- if let Some(height) = height_opt {
- if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, height) {
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
- msg: announcement,
- // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
- // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
- update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap(),
- });
+ if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
+ node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ msg: announcement_sigs,
+ });
+ if let Some(height) = height_opt {
+ if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, height) {
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
+ msg: announcement,
+ // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
+ // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
+ update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap(),
+ });
+ }
}
}
- }
- if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
- if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
- // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
- // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
- // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
- // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
- // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
- // is always consistent.
- let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
- let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
- assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
- "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
- fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
+ if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
+ if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
+ // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
+ // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
+ // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
+ // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
+ // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
+ // is always consistent.
+ let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
+ let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
+ assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
+ "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
+ fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
+ }
}
- }
- } else if let Err(reason) = res {
- update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel);
- // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
- // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
- failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
- if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
- msg: update
+ } else if let Err(reason) = res {
+ update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel);
+ // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
+ // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
+ failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
+ if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
+ msg: update
+ });
+ }
+ let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
+ self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
+ node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
+ channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
+ data: reason_message,
+ } },
});
+ return false;
}
- let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
- self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
- node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
- action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
- channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
- data: reason_message,
- } },
- });
- return false;
- }
- true
- });
+ true
+ });
+ }
}
if let Some(height) = height_opt {
}
}
-impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref >
- ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
- where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
- T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
- K::Target: KeysInterface,
- F::Target: FeeEstimator,
- L::Target: Logger,
+impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
+ ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, R, L>
+where
+ M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
+ T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
+ K::Target: KeysInterface,
+ F::Target: FeeEstimator,
+ R::Target: Router,
+ L::Target: Logger,
{
fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
let mut no_channels_remain = true;
+ let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
{
- let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates. We believe we {} make future connections to this peer.",
log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id), if no_connection_possible { "cannot" } else { "can" });
- channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
- if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
- chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
- if chan.is_shutdown() {
- update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
- self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
- return false;
- } else {
- no_channels_remain = false;
+ if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
+ let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
+ let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
+ peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
+ if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
+ chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
+ if chan.is_shutdown() {
+ update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
+ self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
+ return false;
+ } else {
+ no_channels_remain = false;
+ }
}
- }
- true
- });
+ true
+ });
+ }
pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
match msg {
&events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
&events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
}
});
+ mem::drop(channel_state);
}
if no_channels_remain {
- self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
+ per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
}
+ mem::drop(per_peer_state);
for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
+ channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
}));
},
let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
- channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
- let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
- if !chan.have_received_message() {
- // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
- // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
- // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
- // drop it.
- false
- } else {
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
- node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
- msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
- });
- true
- }
- } else { true };
- if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
- if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()) {
- if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
- node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
- msg, update_msg,
+ let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
+
+ for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
+ let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
+ let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
+ peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
+ let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
+ if !chan.have_received_message() {
+ // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
+ // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
+ // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
+ // drop it.
+ false
+ } else {
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
+ node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
});
+ true
+ }
+ } else { true };
+ if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
+ if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()) {
+ if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
+ node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
+ msg, update_msg,
+ });
+ }
}
}
- }
- retain
- });
+ retain
+ });
+ }
//TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
Ok(())
}
{
// First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
- if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
- return;
- }
- if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
- channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
- node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
- msg,
- });
- return;
+ let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
+ if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
+ let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
+ let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
+ if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
+ if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
+ return;
+ }
+ if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
+ node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
+ msg,
+ });
+ return;
+ }
}
- }
+ } else { return; }
}
// Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
}
}
-impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
- (0, LightningError) => {
- (0, err, required),
- },
- (1, Reason) => {
- (0, failure_code, required),
- (2, data, vec_type),
- },
-;);
-
impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
(0, forward_info, required),
(1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
(8, min_value_msat, required),
});
-impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(PendingOutboundPayment,
- (0, Legacy) => {
- (0, session_privs, required),
- },
- (1, Fulfilled) => {
- (0, session_privs, required),
- (1, payment_hash, option),
- (3, timer_ticks_without_htlcs, (default_value, 0)),
- },
- (2, Retryable) => {
- (0, session_privs, required),
- (1, pending_fee_msat, option),
- (2, payment_hash, required),
- (4, payment_secret, option),
- (6, total_msat, required),
- (8, pending_amt_msat, required),
- (10, starting_block_height, required),
- },
- (3, Abandoned) => {
- (0, session_privs, required),
- (2, payment_hash, required),
- },
-);
-
-impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
- where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
- T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
- K::Target: KeysInterface,
- F::Target: FeeEstimator,
- L::Target: Logger,
+impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, R, L>
+where
+ M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
+ T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
+ K::Target: KeysInterface,
+ F::Target: FeeEstimator,
+ R::Target: Router,
+ L::Target: Logger,
{
fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
}
{
- // Take `channel_state` lock temporarily to avoid creating a lock order that requires
- // that the `forward_htlcs` lock is taken after `channel_state`
- let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
- for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
- if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
- unfunded_channels += 1;
+ let mut number_of_channels = 0;
+ for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
+ let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
+ let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
+ number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
+ for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
+ if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
+ unfunded_channels += 1;
+ }
}
}
- ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
- for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
- if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
- channel.write(writer)?;
+
+ ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
+
+ for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
+ let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
+ let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
+ for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
+ if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
+ channel.write(writer)?;
+ }
}
}
}
let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
- let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
+ let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
(claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
/// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
///
/// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
-pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
- where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
- T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
- K::Target: KeysInterface,
- F::Target: FeeEstimator,
- L::Target: Logger,
+pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
+where
+ M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
+ T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
+ K::Target: KeysInterface,
+ F::Target: FeeEstimator,
+ R::Target: Router,
+ L::Target: Logger,
{
/// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
/// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
/// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
/// force-closed during deserialization.
pub tx_broadcaster: T,
+ /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
+ /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
+ ///
+ /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
+ pub router: R,
/// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
/// deserialization.
pub logger: L,
/// this struct.
///
/// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
- pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>,
+ pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
}
-impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
- ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>
- where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
- T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
- K::Target: KeysInterface,
- F::Target: FeeEstimator,
- L::Target: Logger,
- {
+impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
+ ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, R, L>
+where
+ M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
+ T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
+ K::Target: KeysInterface,
+ F::Target: FeeEstimator,
+ R::Target: Router,
+ L::Target: Logger,
+{
/// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
/// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
/// populate a HashMap directly from C.
- pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
- mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>) -> Self {
+ pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
+ mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
Self {
- keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
+ keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
}
}
// Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
// SipmleArcChannelManager type:
-impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
- ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>>)
- where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
- T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
- K::Target: KeysInterface,
- F::Target: FeeEstimator,
- L::Target: Logger,
+impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
+ ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, R, L>>)
+where
+ M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
+ T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
+ K::Target: KeysInterface,
+ F::Target: FeeEstimator,
+ R::Target: Router,
+ L::Target: Logger,
{
- fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
- let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
+ fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+ let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
}
}
-impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
- ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>)
- where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
- T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
- K::Target: KeysInterface,
- F::Target: FeeEstimator,
- L::Target: Logger,
+impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
+ ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, R, L>)
+where
+ M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
+ T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
+ K::Target: KeysInterface,
+ F::Target: FeeEstimator,
+ R::Target: Router,
+ L::Target: Logger,
{
- fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+ fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
- let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
+ let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
for _ in 0..channel_count {
- let mut channel: Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (&args.keys_manager, best_block_height))?;
+ let mut channel: Channel<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (&args.keys_manager, best_block_height))?;
let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
}
- by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
+ match peer_channels.entry(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
+ let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
+ by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
+ },
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
+ let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
+ by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
+ entry.insert(by_id_map);
+ }
+ }
}
} else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
// If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
}
let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
+ let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>)>()));
for _ in 0..peer_count {
let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
let peer_state = PeerState {
+ channel_by_id: peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new()),
latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
};
per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
// We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
// 0.0.102+
for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
- if by_id.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
+ if id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
if path.is_empty() {
}
for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) = htlc_source {
+ let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
+ info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
+ info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
+ };
// The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
// failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
- // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs`, we were
- // apparently not persisted after the monitor was when forwarding
- // the payment.
+ // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
+ // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
+ // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
forwards.retain(|forward| {
if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
- if htlc_info.prev_short_channel_id == prev_hop_data.short_channel_id &&
- htlc_info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
- {
+ if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
false
} else { true }
});
!forwards.is_empty()
- })
+ });
+ pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
+ if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
+ log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
+ log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
+ pending_events_read.retain(|event| {
+ if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
+ intercepted_id != ev_id
+ } else { true }
+ });
+ false
+ } else { true }
+ });
}
}
}
}
let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
- for (chan_id, chan) in by_id.iter_mut() {
- if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
- let mut outbound_scid_alias;
- loop {
- outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
- .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.keys_manager);
- if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
- }
- chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
- } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
- // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
- // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
- log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
- return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
- }
- if chan.is_usable() {
- if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
+ for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
+ let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
+ let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
+ for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
+ if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
+ let mut outbound_scid_alias;
+ loop {
+ outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
+ .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.keys_manager);
+ if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
+ }
+ chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
+ } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
// Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
// channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
}
+ if chan.is_usable() {
+ if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
+ // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
+ // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
+ log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
+ return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
+ }
+ }
}
}
// without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
// restart.
let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
- if let Some(channel) = by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
- channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
+ if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
+ let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
+ let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
+ let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
+ if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
+ channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
+ }
}
if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
+ router: args.router,
best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
- by_id,
pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
}),
inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
- pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
+ pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments { pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()) },
pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
- per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
+ per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
use crate::util::errors::APIError;
use crate::util::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
use crate::util::test_utils;
- use crate::chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
+ use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysInterface};
#[test]
fn test_notify_limits() {
// Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
// indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
- let session_privs = nodes[0].node.add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
+ let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
final_value_msat: 10_000,
final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
};
- let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
+ let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
- let session_privs = nodes[0].node.add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash, None, PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
- nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
+ let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash, None, PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
final_value_msat: 10_000,
final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
};
- let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
+ let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
- let session_privs = nodes[0].node.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, Some(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
- nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
+ let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, Some(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
pub mod bench {
use crate::chain::Listen;
use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
- use crate::chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, KeysInterface, InMemorySigner};
+ use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, KeysInterface, InMemorySigner};
use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId};
use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
&'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
&'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
&'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
- &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>,
+ &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
+ &'a test_utils::TestLogger>,
}
#[cfg(test)]
let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
+ let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
+ let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger_a)));
let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
- let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
- let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
+ let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
network,
best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
});
let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
- let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
+ let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
network,
best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
});
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff