//! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
//! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
-use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
+use bitcoin::blockdata::block::Header;
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
-use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::{genesis_block, ChainHash};
+use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
+use bitcoin::key::constants::SECRET_KEY_SIZE;
use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
-use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
+use bitcoin::{secp256k1, Sequence};
+use crate::blinded_path::BlindedPath;
+use crate::blinded_path::payment::{PaymentConstraints, ReceiveTlvs};
use crate::chain;
use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
-use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
+use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, WithChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
use crate::events;
use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
// Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
// construct one themselves.
use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
-use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel};
-use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
+use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, WithChannelContext};
+use crate::ln::features::{Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
#[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
+use crate::ln::onion_payment::{check_incoming_htlc_cltv, create_recv_pending_htlc_info, create_fwd_pending_htlc_info, decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion, InboundOnionErr, NextPacketDetails};
use crate::ln::msgs;
use crate::ln::onion_utils;
-use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
+use crate::ln::onion_utils::{HTLCFailReason, INVALID_ONION_BLINDING};
use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
#[cfg(test)]
use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
-use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs};
+use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{Bolt12PaymentError, OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs, StaleExpiration};
use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
-use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
+use crate::offers::invoice::{BlindedPayInfo, Bolt12Invoice, DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY, DerivedSigningPubkey, InvoiceBuilder};
+use crate::offers::invoice_error::InvoiceError;
+use crate::offers::merkle::SignError;
+use crate::offers::offer::{DerivedMetadata, Offer, OfferBuilder};
+use crate::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
+use crate::offers::refund::{Refund, RefundBuilder};
+use crate::onion_message::{Destination, OffersMessage, OffersMessageHandler, PendingOnionMessage, new_pending_onion_message};
+use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider};
+use crate::sign::ecdsa::WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner;
use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
-use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
+use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger, WithContext};
use crate::util::errors::APIError;
use alloc::collections::{btree_map, BTreeMap};
// Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
// our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
+/// Information about where a received HTLC('s onion) has indicated the HTLC should go.
#[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
-pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
+#[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
+pub enum PendingHTLCRouting {
+ /// An HTLC which should be forwarded on to another node.
Forward {
+ /// The onion which should be included in the forwarded HTLC, telling the next hop what to
+ /// do with the HTLC.
onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
- /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
- /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
+ /// The short channel ID of the channel which we were instructed to forward this HTLC to.
+ ///
+ /// This could be a real on-chain SCID, an SCID alias, or some other SCID which has meaning
+ /// to the receiving node, such as one returned from
+ /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] or [`ChannelManager::get_phantom_scid`].
short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
+ /// Set if this HTLC is being forwarded within a blinded path.
+ blinded: Option<BlindedForward>,
},
+ /// The onion indicates that this is a payment for an invoice (supposedly) generated by us.
+ ///
+ /// Note that at this point, we have not checked that the invoice being paid was actually
+ /// generated by us, but rather it's claiming to pay an invoice of ours.
Receive {
+ /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and (potential) proof that this
+ /// is a payment for an invoice we generated. This proof of payment is is also used for
+ /// linking MPP parts of a larger payment.
payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
+ /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
+ ///
+ /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
+ /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
+ /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
- incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
+ /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
+ ///
+ /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
+ incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
+ /// If the onion had forwarding instructions to one of our phantom node SCIDs, this will
+ /// provide the onion shared secret used to decrypt the next level of forwarding
+ /// instructions.
phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
- /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
+ /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
+ ///
+ /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
+ /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
+ /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
+ /// Set if this HTLC is the final hop in a multi-hop blinded path.
+ requires_blinded_error: bool,
},
+ /// The onion indicates that this is for payment to us but which contains the preimage for
+ /// claiming included, and is unrelated to any invoice we'd previously generated (aka a
+ /// "keysend" or "spontaneous" payment).
ReceiveKeysend {
- /// This was added in 0.0.116 and will break deserialization on downgrades.
+ /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and possibly a token to
+ /// associate MPP parts of a larger payment.
+ ///
+ /// This will only be filled in if receiving MPP keysend payments is enabled, and it being
+ /// present will cause deserialization to fail on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.116.
payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
+ /// Preimage for this onion payment. This preimage is provided by the sender and will be
+ /// used to settle the spontaneous payment.
payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
+ /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
+ ///
+ /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately bubble back up as
+ /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
- incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
- /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
+ /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
+ ///
+ /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
+ incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
+ /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
+ ///
+ /// For HTLCs received by LDK, these will ultimately bubble back up as
+ /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
},
}
+/// Information used to forward or fail this HTLC that is being forwarded within a blinded path.
+#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub struct BlindedForward {
+ /// The `blinding_point` that was set in the inbound [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC`], or in the inbound
+ /// onion payload if we're the introduction node. Useful for calculating the next hop's
+ /// [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC::blinding_point`].
+ pub inbound_blinding_point: PublicKey,
+ // Another field will be added here when we support forwarding as a non-intro node.
+}
+
+impl PendingHTLCRouting {
+ // Used to override the onion failure code and data if the HTLC is blinded.
+ fn blinded_failure(&self) -> Option<BlindedFailure> {
+ // TODO: needs update when we support forwarding blinded HTLCs as non-intro node
+ match self {
+ Self::Forward { blinded: Some(_), .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode),
+ Self::Receive { requires_blinded_error: true, .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode),
+ _ => None,
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/// Information about an incoming HTLC, including the [`PendingHTLCRouting`] describing where it
+/// should go next.
#[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
-pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
- pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
- pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
- payment_hash: PaymentHash,
- /// Amount received
- pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
- /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
- /// may overshoot this in either case)
- pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
- pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
- /// The fee being skimmed off the top of this HTLC. If this is a forward, it'll be the fee we are
- /// skimming. If we're receiving this HTLC, it's the fee that our counterparty skimmed.
- pub(super) skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
+#[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
+pub struct PendingHTLCInfo {
+ /// Further routing details based on whether the HTLC is being forwarded or received.
+ pub routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
+ /// The onion shared secret we build with the sender used to decrypt the onion.
+ ///
+ /// This is later used to encrypt failure packets in the event that the HTLC is failed.
+ pub incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
+ /// Hash of the payment preimage, to lock the payment until the receiver releases the preimage.
+ pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
+ /// Amount received in the incoming HTLC.
+ ///
+ /// This field was added in LDK 0.0.113 and will be `None` for objects written by prior
+ /// versions.
+ pub incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>,
+ /// The amount the sender indicated should be forwarded on to the next hop or amount the sender
+ /// intended for us to receive for received payments.
+ ///
+ /// If the received amount is less than this for received payments, an intermediary hop has
+ /// attempted to steal some of our funds and we should fail the HTLC (the sender should retry
+ /// it along another path).
+ ///
+ /// Because nodes can take less than their required fees, and because senders may wish to
+ /// improve their own privacy, this amount may be less than [`Self::incoming_amt_msat`] for
+ /// received payments. In such cases, recipients must handle this HTLC as if it had received
+ /// [`Self::outgoing_amt_msat`].
+ pub outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
+ /// The CLTV the sender has indicated we should set on the forwarded HTLC (or has indicated
+ /// should have been set on the received HTLC for received payments).
+ pub outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
+ /// The fee taken for this HTLC in addition to the standard protocol HTLC fees.
+ ///
+ /// If this is a payment for forwarding, this is the fee we are taking before forwarding the
+ /// HTLC.
+ ///
+ /// If this is a received payment, this is the fee that our counterparty took.
+ ///
+ /// This is used to allow LSPs to take fees as a part of payments, without the sender having to
+ /// shoulder them.
+ pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
}
#[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
}
+#[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
prev_user_channel_id: u128,
}
+#[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
FailHTLC {
htlc_id: u64,
err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
},
+ FailMalformedHTLC {
+ htlc_id: u64,
+ failure_code: u16,
+ sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
+ },
+}
+
+// Used for failing blinded HTLCs backwards correctly.
+#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
+enum BlindedFailure {
+ FromIntroductionNode,
+ FromBlindedNode,
}
/// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
htlc_id: u64,
incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
+ blinded_failure: Option<BlindedFailure>,
// This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
// channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
value_msat: val.value,
+ counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: val.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0),
}
}
}
/// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
- OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
+ OutboundRoute { session_priv: [u8; SECRET_KEY_SIZE] },
}
impl SentHTLCId {
pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
},
HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
- Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
+ Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: session_priv.secret_bytes() },
}
}
}
}
}
-struct InboundOnionErr {
- err_code: u16,
- err_data: Vec<u8>,
- msg: &'static str,
-}
-
/// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
/// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
///
}
#[inline]
fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, channel_capacity: u64) -> Self {
+ let err_msg = msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: err.clone() };
+ let action = if shutdown_res.monitor_update.is_some() {
+ // We have a closing `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, which means the channel was funded and we
+ // should disconnect our peer such that we force them to broadcast their latest
+ // commitment upon reconnecting.
+ msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(err_msg) }
+ } else {
+ msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: err_msg }
+ };
Self {
- err: LightningError {
- err: err.clone(),
- action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
- msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
- channel_id,
- data: err
- },
- },
- },
+ err: LightningError { err, action },
chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
channel_capacity: Some(channel_capacity)
/// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
/// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
/// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
+#[derive(Debug)]
enum BackgroundEvent {
/// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
/// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
event: events::Event,
downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
},
+ /// Indicates we should immediately resume the operation of another channel, unless there is
+ /// some other reason why the channel is blocked. In practice this simply means immediately
+ /// removing the [`RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction`] provided from the blocking set.
+ ///
+ /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
+ /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
+ /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. However, we use this variant
+ /// instead of [`Self::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel`] when we discover that the claim was in
+ /// fact duplicative and we simply want to resume the outbound edge channel immediately.
+ ///
+ /// This variant should thus never be written to disk, as it is processed inline rather than
+ /// stored for later processing.
+ FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
+ downstream_counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
+ downstream_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
+ blocking_action: RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
+ },
}
impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
(0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
+ // Note that FreeOtherChannelImmediately should never be written - we were supposed to free
+ // *immediately*. However, for simplicity we implement read/write here.
+ (1, FreeOtherChannelImmediately) => {
+ (0, downstream_counterparty_node_id, required),
+ (2, downstream_funding_outpoint, required),
+ (4, blocking_action, required),
+ },
(2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
(0, event, upgradable_required),
// LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
/// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
/// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
///
-/// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
+/// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
+#[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
Arc<M>,
Arc<T>,
/// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
/// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
///
-/// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
+/// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
+#[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
ChannelManager<
&'a M,
/// A type implementing [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`].
type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
/// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
- type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<Signer = Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
+ type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<EcdsaSigner= Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
/// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
/// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
where
- M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
+ M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
ES::Target: EntropySource,
NS::Target: NodeSigner,
type ES = ES;
type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
type NS = NS;
- type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer;
+ type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner;
type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
type SP = SP;
type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
//
// Lock order tree:
//
+// `pending_offers_messages`
+//
// `total_consistency_lock`
// |
// |__`forward_htlcs`
// | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
// |
// |__`per_peer_state`
-// | |
-// | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
-// | |
-// | |__`claimable_payments`
-// | |
-// | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
-// | |
-// | |__`peer_state`
-// | |
-// | |__`id_to_peer`
-// | |
-// | |__`short_to_chan_info`
-// | |
-// | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
-// | |
-// | |__`best_block`
-// | |
-// | |__`pending_events`
-// | |
-// | |__`pending_background_events`
+// |
+// |__`pending_inbound_payments`
+// |
+// |__`claimable_payments`
+// |
+// |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
+// |
+// |__`peer_state`
+// |
+// |__`id_to_peer`
+// |
+// |__`short_to_chan_info`
+// |
+// |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
+// |
+// |__`best_block`
+// |
+// |__`pending_events`
+// |
+// |__`pending_background_events`
//
pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
where
- M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
+ M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
ES::Target: EntropySource,
NS::Target: NodeSigner,
L::Target: Logger,
{
default_configuration: UserConfig,
- genesis_hash: BlockHash,
+ chain_hash: ChainHash,
fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
chain_monitor: M,
tx_broadcaster: T,
event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
+ pending_offers_messages: Mutex<Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>>>,
+
entropy_source: ES,
node_signer: NS,
signer_provider: SP,
// then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
// failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
// LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
-#[deny(const_err)]
#[allow(dead_code)]
const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
// Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
-#[deny(const_err)]
#[allow(dead_code)]
const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
}
}
- log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
+ let logger = WithContext::from(
+ &$self.logger, Some($counterparty_node_id), chan_id.map(|(chan_id, _)| chan_id)
+ );
+ log_error!(logger, "{}", err.err);
if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
} else {
msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
},
}
} };
- ($self: ident, $internal: expr) => {
- match $internal {
- Ok(res) => Ok(res),
- Err((chan, msg_handle_err)) => {
- let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
- handle_error!($self, Err(msg_handle_err), counterparty_node_id).map_err(|err| (chan, err))
- },
- }
- };
}
macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
(false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
},
ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
- log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$channel.context);
+ log_error!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
let user_id = $channel.context.get_user_id();
macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
- let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
- &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
+ let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&&logger,
+ &$self.node_signer, $self.chain_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
$self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
match $update_res {
ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
- log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err_str);
+ log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
panic!("{}", err_str);
},
ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
- log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
+ log_debug!(logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
&$chan.context.channel_id());
false
},
impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
where
- M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
+ M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
ES::Target: EntropySource,
NS::Target: NodeSigner,
let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
ChannelManager {
default_configuration: config.clone(),
- genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
+ chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(params.network),
fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
chain_monitor,
tx_broadcaster,
needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
+ pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
+
entropy_source,
node_signer,
signer_provider,
if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
outbound_scid_alias += 1;
} else {
- outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
+ outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
}
if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
break;
/// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
/// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
///
+ /// If `temporary_channel_id` is specified, it will be used as the temporary channel ID of the
+ /// channel. Otherwise, a random one will be generated for you.
+ ///
/// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
/// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
/// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
/// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
/// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
/// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
- pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
+ pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
}
.ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
+
+ if let Some(temporary_channel_id) = temporary_channel_id {
+ if peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temporary_channel_id) {
+ return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Channel with temporary channel ID {} already exists!", temporary_channel_id)});
+ }
+ }
+
let channel = {
let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
- self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
+ self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias, temporary_channel_id)
{
Ok(res) => res,
Err(e) => {
},
}
};
- let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
+ let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash);
let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
- let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
+ let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
let mut shutdown_result = None;
- loop {
+
+ {
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
- let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) =
chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
failed_htlcs = htlcs;
if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
- break;
}
-
- if chan.is_shutdown() {
- if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
- if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
- peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
- msg: channel_update
- });
- }
- self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
- shutdown_result = Some((None, Vec::new(), unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid));
- }
- }
- break;
+ } else {
+ self.issue_channel_close_events(chan_phase_entry.get().context(), ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
+ let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
+ shutdown_result = Some(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
}
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
- // If we reach this point, it means that the channel_id either refers to an unfunded channel or
- // it does not exist for this peer. Either way, we can attempt to force-close it.
- //
- // An appropriate error will be returned for non-existence of the channel if that's the case.
- mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
- mem::drop(per_peer_state);
- return self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, false).map(|_| ())
+ return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
+ err: format!(
+ "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
+ channel_id, counterparty_node_id,
+ )
+ });
},
}
}
/// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
/// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
///
- /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
- /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
- /// estimate.
+ /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and
+ /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
+ /// fee estimate.
/// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
- /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
+ /// transaction feerate of at least our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] feerate or the feerate which
/// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
/// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
///
/// channel.
///
/// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
- /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
- /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
+ /// [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum
+ /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
/// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
/// the channel being closed or not:
/// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
/// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
- /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
- /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
+ /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
+ /// fee estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
/// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
/// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
/// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
/// channel.
///
/// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
- /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
- /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
+ /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
/// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
}
- fn finish_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
+ fn finish_close_channel(&self, mut shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
#[cfg(debug_assertions)]
for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
}
- let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs, unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid) = shutdown_res;
- log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
- for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
+ let logger = WithContext::from(
+ &self.logger, Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id), Some(shutdown_res.channel_id),
+ );
+ log_debug!(logger, "Finishing closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.len());
+ for htlc_source in shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
}
- if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
+ if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = shutdown_res.monitor_update {
// There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
// force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
// the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
}
let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
- if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
+ if let Some(txid) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
let mut funding_batch_states = self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
let affected_channels = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
} else {
ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
};
+ let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*peer_node_id), Some(*channel_id));
if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
- log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
+ log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_phase_entry.get().context(), closure_reason);
let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
mem::drop(peer_state);
},
}
} else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
- log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
+ log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
// N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
// don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
// events anyway.
peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
node_id: counterparty_node_id,
- action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
- msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
+ action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
+ msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
},
}
);
}
}
- fn construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(
- &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, hop_hmac: [u8; 32],
- new_packet_bytes: [u8; onion_utils::ONION_DATA_LEN], shared_secret: [u8; 32],
- next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
- ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
- debug_assert!(next_packet_pubkey_opt.is_some());
- let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
- version: 0,
- public_key: next_packet_pubkey_opt.unwrap_or(Err(secp256k1::Error::InvalidPublicKey)),
- hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
- hmac: hop_hmac,
- };
-
- let (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value) = match hop_data {
- msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value } =>
- (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value),
- msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. } | msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive { .. } =>
- return Err(InboundOnionErr {
- msg: "Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node",
- err_code: 0x4000 | 22,
- err_data: Vec::new(),
- }),
- };
-
- Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
- routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
- onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
- short_channel_id,
- },
- payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
- incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
- incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
- outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward,
- outgoing_cltv_value,
- skimmed_fee_msat: None,
- })
- }
-
- fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(
- &self, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, shared_secret: [u8; 32], payment_hash: PaymentHash,
- amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>, allow_underpay: bool,
- counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
- ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
- let (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, onion_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata) = match hop_data {
- msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
- payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata, ..
- } =>
- (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata),
- msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive {
- amt_msat, total_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_secret, ..
- } => {
- let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData { payment_secret, total_msat };
- (Some(payment_data), None, Vec::new(), amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, None)
- }
- msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { .. } => {
- return Err(InboundOnionErr {
- err_code: 0x4000|22,
- err_data: Vec::new(),
- msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
- })
- },
- };
- // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
- if outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
- return Err(InboundOnionErr {
- msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
- err_code: 18,
- err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
- })
- }
- // final_expiry_too_soon
- // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
- // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
- //
- // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
- // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
- // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
- let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
- if (outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
- let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
- err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
- err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
- return Err(InboundOnionErr {
- err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
- msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
- });
- }
- if (!allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat > amt_msat) ||
- (allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat >
- amt_msat.saturating_add(counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)))
- {
- return Err(InboundOnionErr {
- err_code: 19,
- err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
- msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
- });
- }
-
- let routing = if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
- // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
- // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
- // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
- // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
- // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
- let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
- if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
- return Err(InboundOnionErr {
- err_code: 0x4000|22,
- err_data: Vec::new(),
- msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
- });
- }
- if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && payment_data.is_some() {
- return Err(InboundOnionErr {
- err_code: 0x4000|22,
- err_data: Vec::new(),
- msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
- });
- }
- PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
- payment_data,
- payment_preimage,
- payment_metadata,
- incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
- custom_tlvs,
- }
- } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
- PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
- payment_data: data,
- payment_metadata,
- incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
- phantom_shared_secret,
- custom_tlvs,
- }
- } else {
- return Err(InboundOnionErr {
- err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
- err_data: Vec::new(),
- msg: "We require payment_secrets",
- });
- };
- Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
- routing,
- payment_hash,
- incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
- incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
- outgoing_amt_msat: onion_amt_msat,
- outgoing_cltv_value,
- skimmed_fee_msat: counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
- })
- }
-
fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
- &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC
- ) -> Result<(onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg> {
- macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
- ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
- {
- log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
- return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
- channel_id: msg.channel_id,
- htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
- sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
- failure_code: $err_code,
- }));
- }
- }
- }
-
- if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
- return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
- }
-
- let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
- Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
- ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
+ &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey,
+ ) -> Result<
+ (onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg
+ > {
+ let (next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(
+ msg, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx
+ )?;
+
+ let is_intro_node_forward = match next_hop {
+ onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
+ // TODO: update this when we support blinded forwarding as non-intro node
+ next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedForward { .. }, ..
+ } => true,
+ _ => false,
+ };
- if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
- //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
- //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
- //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
- //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
- //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
- //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
- return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
- }
macro_rules! return_err {
($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
{
- log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
+ log_info!(
+ WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id)),
+ "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg
+ );
+ // If `msg.blinding_point` is set, we must always fail with malformed.
+ if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
+ return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
+ channel_id: msg.channel_id,
+ htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
+ sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
+ failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
+ }));
+ }
+
+ let (err_code, err_data) = if is_intro_node_forward {
+ (INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, &[0; 32][..])
+ } else { ($err_code, $data) };
return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
channel_id: msg.channel_id,
htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
- reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
+ reason: HTLCFailReason::reason(err_code, err_data.to_vec())
.get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
}));
}
}
}
- let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
- shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac,
- msg.payment_hash, &self.node_signer
- ) {
- Ok(res) => res,
- Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
- return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
- },
- Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
- return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
- },
- };
- let (outgoing_scid, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, next_packet_pk_opt) = match next_hop {
- onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
- next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward {
- short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value
- }, ..
- } => {
- let next_packet_pk = onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx,
- msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &shared_secret);
- (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(next_packet_pk))
- },
- // We'll do receive checks in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] so we have access to the
- // inbound channel's state.
- onion_utils::Hop::Receive { .. } => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
- onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. }, .. } |
- onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive { .. }, .. } =>
- {
- return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0; 0]);
- }
+ let NextPacketDetails {
+ next_packet_pubkey, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_scid, outgoing_cltv_value
+ } = match next_packet_details_opt {
+ Some(next_packet_details) => next_packet_details,
+ // it is a receive, so no need for outbound checks
+ None => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
};
// Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
// Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
// phantom or an intercept.
if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
- fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
- fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.genesis_hash)
+ fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)) ||
+ fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)
{
None
} else {
}
chan_update_opt
} else {
- if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
- // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
- // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
- // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
- break Some((
- "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
- 0x2000 | 2, None,
- ));
- }
None
};
let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
- // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
- // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
- // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
- if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
- break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
- }
- if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
- break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
- }
- // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
- // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
- // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
- // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
- // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
- // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
- // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
- // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
- if (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
- break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
+
+ if let Err((err_msg, code)) = check_incoming_htlc_cltv(
+ cur_height, outgoing_cltv_value, msg.cltv_expiry
+ ) {
+ if code & 0x1000 != 0 && chan_update_opt.is_none() {
+ // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
+ // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
+ // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
+ break Some((err_msg, 0x2000 | 2, None))
+ }
+ let chan_update_opt = if code & 0x1000 != 0 { chan_update_opt } else { None };
+ break Some((err_msg, code, chan_update_opt));
}
break None;
}
return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
}
- Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt))
+ Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, Some(next_packet_pubkey)))
}
fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
- &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, shared_secret: [u8; 32], decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop,
- allow_underpay: bool, next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
+ &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
+ decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop, allow_underpay: bool,
+ next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>,
) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
macro_rules! return_err {
($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
{
- log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
+ let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
+ log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
+ if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
+ return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
+ msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
+ channel_id: msg.channel_id,
+ htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
+ sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
+ failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
+ }
+ ))
+ }
return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
channel_id: msg.channel_id,
htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
match decoded_hop {
onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
// OUR PAYMENT!
- match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
- msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat)
+ let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
+ match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
+ msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat,
+ current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
{
Ok(info) => {
// Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
}
},
onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
- match self.construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
+ match create_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
}
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
+ log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
}
/// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
/// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
+ log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
Some(id) => id,
}
fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
+ log_trace!(logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
};
let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
- chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
+ chain_hash: self.chain_hash,
short_channel_id,
timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
} = args;
// The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
-
- log_trace!(self.logger,
- "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
- payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
- let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
- .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
- let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
-
- let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash)
- .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute { err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()})?;
+ let (onion_packet, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::create_payment_onion(
+ &self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height,
+ payment_hash, keysend_preimage, prng_seed
+ ).map_err(|e| {
+ let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
+ log_error!(logger, "Failed to build an onion for path for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
+ e
+ })?;
let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
- None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
+ None => {
+ let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
+ log_error!(logger, "Failed to find first-hop for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
+ return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()})
+ },
Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
};
+ let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(id));
+ log_trace!(logger,
+ "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
+ payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
+
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
.ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
}
let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
path: path.clone(),
session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
payment_id,
- }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
+ }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
Some(monitor_update) => {
match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
}
return Ok(());
};
-
match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
Err(e) => {
self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
}
+ pub(super) fn send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&self, invoice: &Bolt12Invoice, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), Bolt12PaymentError> {
+ let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
+ self.pending_outbound_payments
+ .send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(
+ invoice, payment_id, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
+ || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
+ best_block_height, &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
+ |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args)
+ )
+ }
/// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
/// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
/// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
/// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
///
+ /// # Requested Invoices
+ ///
+ /// In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`] via [`ChannelManager::pay_for_offer`], abandoning
+ /// the payment prior to receiving the invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`]
+ /// and prevent any attempts at paying it once received. The other events may only be generated
+ /// once the invoice has been received.
+ ///
/// # Restart Behavior
///
/// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
- /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
+ /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for
+ /// [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
+ ///
+ /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
- let (chan, msg) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
- Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) => {
+ let (chan, msg_opt) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
+ Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(mut chan)) => {
let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
- let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &self.logger)
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
+ let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &&logger)
.map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
let user_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
(chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, channel_capacity))
} else { unreachable!(); });
match funding_res {
- Ok((chan, funding_msg)) => (chan, funding_msg),
+ Ok(funding_msg) => (chan, funding_msg),
Err((chan, err)) => {
mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
mem::drop(per_peer_state);
-
let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
}),
};
- peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
- node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
- msg,
- });
+ if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
+ peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
+ node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ msg,
+ });
+ }
match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
if id_to_peer.insert(chan.context.channel_id(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
}
- e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
+ e.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan));
}
}
Ok(())
/// Return values are identical to [`Self::funding_transaction_generated`], respective to
/// each individual channel and transaction output.
///
- /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transcaction
+ /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transaction
/// will only be broadcast when we have safely received and persisted the counterparty's
/// signature for each channel.
///
// lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
// node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
// module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
- if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 1 {
+ if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) &&
+ funding_transaction.lock_time.is_block_height() &&
+ funding_transaction.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() > height + 1
+ {
result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
}));
btree_map::Entry::Vacant(vacant) => Some(vacant.insert(Vec::new())),
}
});
- for &(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in temporary_channels.iter() {
+ for &(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in temporary_channels {
result = result.and_then(|_| self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(
temporary_channel_id,
counterparty_node_id,
err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
}),
- None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
- err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
- next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
- })
+ None => {
+ let error = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
+ next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id);
+ let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(next_node_id), Some(*next_hop_channel_id));
+ log_error!(logger, "{} when attempting to forward intercepted HTLC", error);
+ return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
+ err: error
+ })
+ }
}
};
})?;
let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
- PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
- PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
+ PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, blinded, .. } => {
+ PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
+ onion_packet, blinded, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid
+ }
},
_ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
};
htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
phantom_shared_secret: None,
+ blinded_failure: payment.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
});
let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
if short_chan_id != 0 {
+ let mut forwarding_counterparty = None;
macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
() => {
for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
}) => {
macro_rules! failure_handler {
($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
- log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
+ let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, forwarding_counterparty, Some(prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()));
+ log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
+ blinded_failure: routing.blinded_failure(),
});
let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
}
}
}
- if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
+ if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, .. } = routing {
let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
- if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
+ if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.chain_hash) {
let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
- payment_hash, &self.node_signer
+ payment_hash, None, &self.node_signer
) {
Ok(res) => res,
Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
- let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
+ let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).to_byte_array();
// In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
// `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
// if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
};
match next_hop {
onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
- match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
+ let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
+ match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
- outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None)
+ outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None,
+ current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
{
Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
}
},
- HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
+ HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
// Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
// the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
// trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
}
}
}
- let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
- Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
+ let chan_info_opt = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id).cloned();
+ let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match chan_info_opt {
+ Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id, chan_id),
None => {
forwarding_channel_not_found!();
continue;
}
};
+ forwarding_counterparty = Some(counterparty_node_id);
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
match forward_info {
HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
- routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
+ routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
+ onion_packet, blinded, ..
+ }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
},
}) => {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
+ log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
// Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
phantom_shared_secret: None,
+ blinded_failure: blinded.map(|_| BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode),
+ });
+ let next_blinding_point = blinded.and_then(|b| {
+ let encrypted_tlvs_ss = self.node_signer.ecdh(
+ Recipient::Node, &b.inbound_blinding_point, None
+ ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
+ onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(
+ &self.secp_ctx, b.inbound_blinding_point, &encrypted_tlvs_ss
+ ).ok()
});
if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
- onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, &self.fee_estimator,
- &self.logger)
+ onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, next_blinding_point, &self.fee_estimator,
+ &&logger)
{
if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
+ log_trace!(logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
} else {
panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
}
panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
},
HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
+ log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
if let Err(e) = chan.queue_fail_htlc(
- htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
+ htlc_id, err_packet, &&logger
) {
if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
+ log_trace!(logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
} else {
panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
}
continue;
}
},
+ HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing malformed HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
+ if let Err(e) = chan.queue_fail_malformed_htlc(htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion, &self.logger) {
+ if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
+ } else {
+ panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_malformed_htlc() were not met");
+ }
+ // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
+ // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
+ // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
+ continue;
+ }
+ },
}
}
} else {
skimmed_fee_msat, ..
}
}) => {
+ let blinded_failure = routing.blinded_failure();
let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
- PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret, custom_tlvs } => {
+ PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
+ payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret,
+ custom_tlvs, requires_blinded_error: _
+ } => {
let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
phantom_shared_secret,
+ blinded_failure,
},
// We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
// if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
phantom_shared_secret,
+ blinded_failure,
}), payment_hash,
HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
},
};
},
- HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
+ HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
}
}
fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
+
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
+
// If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
if new_feerate != chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
+ log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
}
return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
}
if !chan.context.is_live() {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
+ log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
}
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
+ log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
&chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
- chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
+ chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
NotifyOption::DoPersist
}
PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
- let normal_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
- let min_mempool_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum);
+ let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
+ let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
|(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
) {
let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
- min_mempool_feerate
+ anchor_feerate
} else {
- normal_feerate
+ non_anchor_feerate
};
let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
/// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
/// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
/// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
+ /// * Forgetting about stale outbound payments, either those that have already been fulfilled
+ /// or those awaiting an invoice that hasn't been delivered in the necessary amount of time.
+ /// The latter is determined using the system clock in `std` and the highest seen block time
+ /// minus two hours in `no-std`.
///
/// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
/// estimate fetches.
PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
- let normal_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
- let min_mempool_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum);
+ let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
+ let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
| {
context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
- log_error!(self.logger,
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
+ log_error!(logger,
"Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
match phase {
ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
- min_mempool_feerate
+ anchor_feerate
} else {
- normal_feerate
+ non_anchor_feerate
};
let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
- log_debug!(self.logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
+ log_debug!(logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
node_id: counterparty_node_id,
for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
- log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
+ let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(*chan_id));
+ log_error!(logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
node_id: counterparty_node_id,
self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
}
- self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(&self.pending_events);
+ #[cfg(feature = "std")]
+ let duration_since_epoch = std::time::SystemTime::now()
+ .duration_since(std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
+ .expect("SystemTime::now() should come after SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH");
+ #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
+ let duration_since_epoch = Duration::from_secs(
+ self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire).saturating_sub(7200) as u64
+ );
+
+ self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(
+ duration_since_epoch, &self.pending_events
+ );
// Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
// channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
&self.pending_events, &self.logger)
{ self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
},
- HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint, .. }) => {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", &payment_hash, onion_error);
- let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
+ HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
+ ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret,
+ ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint, ref blinded_failure, ..
+ }) => {
+ log_trace!(
+ WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(outpoint.to_channel_id())),
+ "Failing {}HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us: {:?}",
+ if blinded_failure.is_some() { "blinded " } else { "" }, &payment_hash, onion_error
+ );
+ let failure = match blinded_failure {
+ Some(BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode) => {
+ let blinded_onion_error = HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32]);
+ let err_packet = blinded_onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
+ incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
+ );
+ HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
+ },
+ Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode) => {
+ HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC {
+ htlc_id: *htlc_id,
+ failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
+ sha256_of_onion: [0; 32]
+ }
+ },
+ None => {
+ let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
+ incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
+ );
+ HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
+ }
+ };
let mut push_forward_ev = false;
let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
}
match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
- entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
+ entry.get_mut().push(failure);
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
- entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
+ entry.insert(vec!(failure));
}
}
mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
}
fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
- let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
+ let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
}
if valid_mpp {
for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
+ let prev_hop_chan_id = htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
- |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
- {
+ |_, definitely_duplicate| {
+ debug_assert!(!definitely_duplicate, "We shouldn't claim duplicatively from a payment");
+ Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash })
+ }
+ ) {
if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
// We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
// HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
- log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
+ let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop_chan_id));
+ log_error!(logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
} else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
}
}
}
}
- fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
+ fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>, bool) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
-> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
//TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
// `BackgroundEvent`s.
let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
+ // As we may call handle_monitor_update_completion_actions in rather rare cases, check that
+ // the required mutexes are not held before we start.
+ debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
+ debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
+
{
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
- let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
+ let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
+
+ match fulfill_res {
+ UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } => {
+ if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat), false) {
+ log_trace!(logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
+ chan_id, action);
+ peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
+ }
+ if !during_init {
+ handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
+ peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
+ } else {
+ // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
+ // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
+ // monitor update as a background event.
+ self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
+ BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
+ counterparty_node_id,
+ funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
+ update: monitor_update.clone(),
+ });
+ }
+ }
+ UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => {
+ let action = if let Some(action) = completion_action(None, true) {
+ action
+ } else {
+ return Ok(());
+ };
+ mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
- if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
- if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
+ log_trace!(logger, "Completing monitor update completion action for channel {} as claim was redundant: {:?}",
chan_id, action);
- peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
- }
- if !during_init {
- handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
- peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
- } else {
- // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
- // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
- // monitor update as a background event.
- self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
- BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
- counterparty_node_id,
- funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
- update: monitor_update.clone(),
- });
+ let (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker) =
+ if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
+ downstream_counterparty_node_id: node_id,
+ downstream_funding_outpoint: funding_outpoint,
+ blocking_action: blocker,
+ } = action {
+ (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)
+ } else {
+ debug_assert!(false,
+ "Duplicate claims should always free another channel immediately");
+ return Ok(());
+ };
+ if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
+ let mut peer_state = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
+ if let Some(blockers) = peer_state
+ .actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
+ .get_mut(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
+ {
+ let mut found_blocker = false;
+ blockers.retain(|iter| {
+ // Note that we could actually be blocked, in
+ // which case we need to only remove the one
+ // blocker which was added duplicatively.
+ let first_blocker = !found_blocker;
+ if *iter == blocker { found_blocker = true; }
+ *iter != blocker || !first_blocker
+ });
+ debug_assert!(found_blocker);
+ }
+ } else {
+ debug_assert!(false);
+ }
}
}
}
// with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
// channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
// again on restart.
- log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
+ log_error!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id())), "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
payment_preimage, update_res);
}
} else {
// `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
// generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
// `PaymentForwarded`).
- self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
+ self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None, false));
Ok(())
}
}
fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
- forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool,
+ forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, startup_replay: bool,
next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>, next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint
) {
match source {
HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
+ #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
+ let claiming_chan_funding_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
- |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
- if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
- let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
- Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
- } else { None };
+ |htlc_claim_value_msat, definitely_duplicate| {
+ let chan_to_release =
+ if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
+ Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, completed_blocker))
+ } else {
+ // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
+ // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
+ // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
+ // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
+ // closed.
+ None
+ };
+ if definitely_duplicate && startup_replay {
+ // On startup we may get redundant claims which are related to
+ // monitor updates still in flight. In that case, we shouldn't
+ // immediately free, but instead let that monitor update complete
+ // in the background.
+ #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
+ let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
+ // There should be a `BackgroundEvent` pending...
+ assert!(background_events.iter().any(|ev| {
+ match ev {
+ // to apply a monitor update that blocked the claiming channel,
+ BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
+ funding_txo, update, ..
+ } => {
+ if *funding_txo == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint {
+ assert!(update.updates.iter().any(|upd|
+ if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
+ payment_preimage: update_preimage
+ } = upd {
+ payment_preimage == *update_preimage
+ } else { false }
+ ), "{:?}", update);
+ true
+ } else { false }
+ },
+ // or the channel we'd unblock is already closed,
+ BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup(
+ (funding_txo, monitor_update)
+ ) => {
+ if *funding_txo == next_channel_outpoint {
+ assert_eq!(monitor_update.updates.len(), 1);
+ assert!(matches!(
+ monitor_update.updates[0],
+ ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. }
+ ));
+ true
+ } else { false }
+ },
+ // or the monitor update has completed and will unblock
+ // immediately once we get going.
+ BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
+ channel_id, ..
+ } =>
+ *channel_id == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(),
+ }
+ }), "{:?}", *background_events);
+ }
+ None
+ } else if definitely_duplicate {
+ if let Some(other_chan) = chan_to_release {
+ Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
+ downstream_counterparty_node_id: other_chan.0,
+ downstream_funding_outpoint: other_chan.1,
+ blocking_action: other_chan.2,
+ })
+ } else { None }
+ } else {
+ let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
+ if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
+ Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
+ } else { None }
+ } else { None };
Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
fee_earned_msat,
next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
},
- downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
- if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
- Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, completed_blocker))
- } else {
- // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
- // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
- // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
- // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
- // closed.
- None
- },
+ downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: chan_to_release,
})
- } else { None }
+ }
});
if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
}
fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
+ debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
+ debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
+ debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
+
for action in actions.into_iter() {
match action {
MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
}
},
+ MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
+ downstream_counterparty_node_id, downstream_funding_outpoint, blocking_action,
+ } => {
+ self.handle_monitor_update_release(
+ downstream_counterparty_node_id,
+ downstream_funding_outpoint,
+ Some(blocking_action),
+ );
+ },
}
}
}
pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
-> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
+ log_trace!(logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
&channel.context.channel_id(),
if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
}
if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
- log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
+ log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
}
pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
pending.len()
} else { 0 };
- log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
+ log_trace!(logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
remaining_in_flight);
if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
// Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
// likely to be lost on restart!
- if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
+ if msg.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
}
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
- let (chan, funding_msg, monitor) =
+ let (chan, funding_msg_opt, monitor) =
match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
- match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger) {
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &inbound_chan.context);
+ match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger) {
Ok(res) => res,
Err((mut inbound_chan, err)) => {
// We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
};
- match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
+ match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
- Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
+ Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
+ "Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(),
+ chan.context.channel_id()
+ ))
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
let mut id_to_peer_lock = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
"The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
- funding_msg.channel_id))
+ chan.context.channel_id()))
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
// hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
// accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
// until we have persisted our monitor.
- peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
- node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
- msg: funding_msg,
- });
+ if let Some(msg) = funding_msg_opt {
+ peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
+ node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
+ msg,
+ });
+ }
if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
}
Ok(())
} else {
- log_error!(self.logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
+ log_error!(logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
+ let channel_id = match funding_msg_opt {
+ Some(msg) => msg.channel_id,
+ None => chan.context.channel_id(),
+ };
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
"The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
- funding_msg.channel_id));
+ channel_id));
}
}
}
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
- match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
- ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => {
- let monitor = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
- chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
- if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
- handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
- Ok(())
- } else {
- try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned())), chan_phase_entry)
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
+ if matches!(chan_phase_entry.get(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) {
+ let chan = if let ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) = chan_phase_entry.remove() { chan } else { unreachable!() };
+ let logger = WithContext::from(
+ &self.logger,
+ Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
+ Some(chan.context.channel_id())
+ );
+ let res =
+ chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger);
+ match res {
+ Ok((chan, monitor)) => {
+ if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
+ // We really should be able to insert here without doing a second
+ // lookup, but sadly rust stdlib doesn't currently allow keeping
+ // the original Entry around with the value removed.
+ let mut chan = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id).or_insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
+ if let ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) = &mut chan {
+ handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
+ } else { unreachable!(); }
+ Ok(())
+ } else {
+ let e = ChannelError::Close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned());
+ return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::Funded(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
+ }
+ },
+ Err((chan, e)) => {
+ debug_assert!(matches!(e, ChannelError::Close(_)),
+ "We don't have a channel anymore, so the error better have expected close");
+ // We've already removed this outbound channel from the map in
+ // `PeerState` above so at this point we just need to clean up any
+ // lingering entries concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
+ return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
}
- },
- _ => {
- return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
- },
+ }
+ } else {
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
}
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
- self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
+ self.chain_hash, &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
+ log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
msg: announcement_sigs,
// counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
// channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
// announcement_signatures.
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
+ log_trace!(logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
match phase {
ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
if !chan.received_shutdown() {
- log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
+ log_info!(logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
msg.channel_id,
if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
}
},
ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
let context = phase.context_mut();
- log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
+ log_error!(logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel);
let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
}
fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
- let mut shutdown_result = None;
- let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid;
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
.ok_or_else(|| {
debug_assert!(false);
MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
})?;
- let (tx, chan_option) = {
+ let (tx, chan_option, shutdown_result) = {
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
- unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
- let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
+ let (closing_signed, tx, shutdown_result) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
+ debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
// also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
// fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
// watch for old state broadcasts)!
- (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)))
- } else { (tx, None) }
+ (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)), shutdown_result)
+ } else { (tx, None, shutdown_result) }
} else {
return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
"Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
}
};
if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
- log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
+ let channel_id = chan_option.as_ref().map(|channel| channel.context().channel_id());
+ log_info!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id), "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
}
if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
});
}
self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
- shutdown_result = Some((None, Vec::new(), unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid));
}
mem::drop(per_peer_state);
if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
// Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
// closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
- let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
+ let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg, counterparty_node_id);
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
.ok_or_else(|| {
if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
- self.construct_pending_htlc_status(msg, shared_secret, next_hop,
- chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt),
+ self.construct_pending_htlc_status(
+ msg, counterparty_node_id, shared_secret, next_hop,
+ chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt,
+ ),
Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
};
let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<SP>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
+ if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
+ return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
+ msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
+ channel_id: msg.channel_id,
+ htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
+ sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
+ failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
+ }
+ ))
+ }
// If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
// but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
// want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
match pending_forward_info {
- PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
- let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
+ PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
+ ref incoming_shared_secret, ref routing, ..
+ }) => {
+ let reason = if routing.blinded_failure().is_some() {
+ HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32])
+ } else if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
} else {
_ => pending_forward_info
}
};
- try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
+ try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
} else {
return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
"Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
+ log_trace!(logger,
+ "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
+ msg.channel_id);
peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
.or_insert_with(Vec::new)
.push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
}
};
- self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, Some(*counterparty_node_id), funding_txo);
+ self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, false, Some(*counterparty_node_id), funding_txo);
Ok(())
}
match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
- let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
+ let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
- fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
+ fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.chain_hash)
{
- let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
+ let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).to_byte_array());
let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
},
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
- log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
+ let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()));
+ log_info!(logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
phantom_shared_secret: None,
+ blinded_failure: forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
});
failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
*counterparty_node_id)
} else { false };
let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
- chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
+ chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
.expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
- try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
+ try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
} else {
return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
"Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
- &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
+ &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
msg, &self.default_configuration
), chan_phase_entry),
// Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
} else {
- log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id);
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
+ log_debug!(logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id);
let did_change = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
// If nothing changed after applying their update, we don't need to bother
// persisting.
let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
.ok_or_else(|| {
debug_assert!(false);
- MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
+ MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
+ format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
+ msg.channel_id
+ )
})?;
+ let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
// freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
// add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
- msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
+ msg, &&logger, &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash,
&self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
let mut channel_update = None;
if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
"Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
}
},
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
+ log_debug!(logger, "Sending bogus ChannelReestablish for unknown channel {} to force channel closure",
+ msg.channel_id);
+ // Unfortunately, lnd doesn't force close on errors
+ // (https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/blob/abb1e3463f3a83bbb843d5c399869dbe930ad94f/htlcswitch/link.go#L2119).
+ // One of the few ways to get an lnd counterparty to force close is by
+ // replicating what they do when restoring static channel backups (SCBs). They
+ // send an invalid `ChannelReestablish` with `0` commitment numbers and an
+ // invalid `your_last_per_commitment_secret`.
+ //
+ // Since we received a `ChannelReestablish` for a channel that doesn't exist, we
+ // can assume it's likely the channel closed from our point of view, but it
+ // remains open on the counterparty's side. By sending this bogus
+ // `ChannelReestablish` message now as a response to theirs, we trigger them to
+ // force close broadcasting their latest state. If the closing transaction from
+ // our point of view remains unconfirmed, it'll enter a race with the
+ // counterparty's to-be-broadcast latest commitment transaction.
+ peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
+ node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
+ msg: msgs::ChannelReestablish {
+ channel_id: msg.channel_id,
+ next_local_commitment_number: 0,
+ next_remote_commitment_number: 0,
+ your_last_per_commitment_secret: [1u8; 32],
+ my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_slice(&[2u8; 33]).unwrap(),
+ next_funding_txid: None,
+ },
+ });
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
+ format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}",
+ counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
+ )
+ }
}
};
for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
match monitor_event {
MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
+ let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, counterparty_node_id, Some(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()));
if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
- self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint);
+ log_trace!(logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
+ self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, false, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint);
} else {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
+ log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
- action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
- msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
+ action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
+ msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
},
});
}
let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
- chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
+ chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context));
if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
}
has_update
}
+ /// When a call to a [`ChannelSigner`] method returns an error, this indicates that the signer
+ /// is (temporarily) unavailable, and the operation should be retried later.
+ ///
+ /// This method allows for that retry - either checking for any signer-pending messages to be
+ /// attempted in every channel, or in the specifically provided channel.
+ ///
+ /// [`ChannelSigner`]: crate::sign::ChannelSigner
+ #[cfg(test)] // This is only implemented for one signer method, and should be private until we
+ // actually finish implementing it fully.
+ pub fn signer_unblocked(&self, channel_opt: Option<(PublicKey, ChannelId)>) {
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
+
+ let unblock_chan = |phase: &mut ChannelPhase<SP>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>| {
+ let node_id = phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id();
+ match phase {
+ ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
+ let msgs = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger);
+ if let Some(updates) = msgs.commitment_update {
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
+ node_id,
+ updates,
+ });
+ }
+ if let Some(msg) = msgs.funding_signed {
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
+ node_id,
+ msg,
+ });
+ }
+ if let Some(msg) = msgs.channel_ready {
+ send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
+ }
+ }
+ ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
+ if let Some(msg) = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger) {
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
+ node_id,
+ msg,
+ });
+ }
+ }
+ ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {},
+ }
+ };
+
+ let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
+ if let Some((counterparty_node_id, channel_id)) = channel_opt {
+ if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
+ let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
+ let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
+ if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
+ unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
+ let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
+ let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
+ for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
+ unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
/// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
/// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
/// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
match phase {
ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
- let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
- match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
- Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
+ match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &&logger) {
+ Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt, shutdown_result_opt)) => {
if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
has_update = true;
pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
});
}
+ debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result_opt.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
+ if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result_opt {
+ shutdown_results.push(shutdown_result);
+ }
if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
// We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
// a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
- log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
+ log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
- shutdown_results.push((None, Vec::new(), unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid));
false
} else { true }
},
// Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
// so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
// timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
- if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
+ if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.monitor_update.take() {
assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
assert!(should_broadcast);
}
}
+ /// Creates an [`OfferBuilder`] such that the [`Offer`] it builds is recognized by the
+ /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`InvoiceRequest`] messages for the offer. The offer will
+ /// not have an expiration unless otherwise set on the builder.
+ ///
+ /// # Privacy
+ ///
+ /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the offer with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the
+ /// introduction node and a derived signing pubkey for recipient privacy. As such, currently,
+ /// the node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction
+ /// node in order to send the [`InvoiceRequest`].
+ ///
+ /// # Limitations
+ ///
+ /// Requires a direct connection to the introduction node in the responding [`InvoiceRequest`]'s
+ /// reply path.
+ ///
+ /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
+ ///
+ /// [`Offer`]: crate::offers::offer::Offer
+ /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
+ pub fn create_offer_builder(
+ &self, description: String
+ ) -> OfferBuilder<DerivedMetadata, secp256k1::All> {
+ let node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
+ let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
+ let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
+ let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
+ let path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
+
+ OfferBuilder::deriving_signing_pubkey(description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx)
+ .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)
+ .path(path)
+ }
+
+ /// Creates a [`RefundBuilder`] such that the [`Refund`] it builds is recognized by the
+ /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`Bolt12Invoice`] messages for the refund.
+ ///
+ /// # Payment
+ ///
+ /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the refund.
+ /// See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has been sent.
+ ///
+ /// The builder will have the provided expiration set. Any changes to the expiration on the
+ /// returned builder will not be honored by [`ChannelManager`]. For `no-std`, the highest seen
+ /// block time minus two hours is used for the current time when determining if the refund has
+ /// expired.
+ ///
+ /// To revoke the refund, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
+ /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received before expiration, the payment will fail
+ /// with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
+ ///
+ /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
+ /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
+ ///
+ /// # Privacy
+ ///
+ /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the refund with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as
+ /// the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
+ /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
+ /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
+ ///
+ /// # Limitations
+ ///
+ /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in the responding
+ /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
+ ///
+ /// # Errors
+ ///
+ /// Errors if a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link
+ /// or if `amount_msats` is invalid.
+ ///
+ /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
+ ///
+ /// [`Refund`]: crate::offers::refund::Refund
+ /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
+ /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
+ pub fn create_refund_builder(
+ &self, description: String, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration,
+ payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
+ ) -> Result<RefundBuilder<secp256k1::All>, Bolt12SemanticError> {
+ let node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
+ let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
+ let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
+ let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
+ let path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
+
+ let builder = RefundBuilder::deriving_payer_id(
+ description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, amount_msats, payment_id
+ )?
+ .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)
+ .absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry)
+ .path(path);
+
+ let expiration = StaleExpiration::AbsoluteTimeout(absolute_expiry);
+ self.pending_outbound_payments
+ .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
+ payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat,
+ )
+ .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
+
+ Ok(builder)
+ }
+
+ /// Pays for an [`Offer`] using the given parameters by creating an [`InvoiceRequest`] and
+ /// enqueuing it to be sent via an onion message. [`ChannelManager`] will pay the actual
+ /// [`Bolt12Invoice`] once it is received.
+ ///
+ /// Uses [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`] such that the [`InvoiceRequest`] it builds is recognized by
+ /// the [`ChannelManager`] when handling a [`Bolt12Invoice`] message in response to the request.
+ /// The optional parameters are used in the builder, if `Some`:
+ /// - `quantity` for [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`] which must be set if
+ /// [`Offer::expects_quantity`] is `true`.
+ /// - `amount_msats` if overpaying what is required for the given `quantity` is desired, and
+ /// - `payer_note` for [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`].
+ ///
+ /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
+ /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
+ ///
+ /// # Payment
+ ///
+ /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the request
+ /// when received. See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has
+ /// been sent.
+ ///
+ /// To revoke the request, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
+ /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received in a reasonable amount of time, the
+ /// payment will fail with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
+ ///
+ /// # Privacy
+ ///
+ /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the reply path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`]
+ /// as the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
+ /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
+ /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
+ ///
+ /// # Limitations
+ ///
+ /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Offer::paths`] or to
+ /// [`Offer::signing_pubkey`], if empty. A similar restriction applies to the responding
+ /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
+ ///
+ /// # Errors
+ ///
+ /// Errors if a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link
+ /// or if the provided parameters are invalid for the offer.
+ ///
+ /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
+ /// [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::quantity
+ /// [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::payer_note
+ /// [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequestBuilder
+ /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
+ /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
+ /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
+ pub fn pay_for_offer(
+ &self, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
+ payer_note: Option<String>, payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry,
+ max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
+ ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
+ let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
+ let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
+ let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
+
+ let builder = offer
+ .request_invoice_deriving_payer_id(expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, payment_id)?
+ .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)?;
+ let builder = match quantity {
+ None => builder,
+ Some(quantity) => builder.quantity(quantity)?,
+ };
+ let builder = match amount_msats {
+ None => builder,
+ Some(amount_msats) => builder.amount_msats(amount_msats)?,
+ };
+ let builder = match payer_note {
+ None => builder,
+ Some(payer_note) => builder.payer_note(payer_note),
+ };
+
+ let invoice_request = builder.build_and_sign()?;
+ let reply_path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
+
+ let expiration = StaleExpiration::TimerTicks(1);
+ self.pending_outbound_payments
+ .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
+ payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat
+ )
+ .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
+
+ let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
+ if offer.paths().is_empty() {
+ let message = new_pending_onion_message(
+ OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request),
+ Destination::Node(offer.signing_pubkey()),
+ Some(reply_path),
+ );
+ pending_offers_messages.push(message);
+ } else {
+ // Send as many invoice requests as there are paths in the offer (with an upper bound).
+ // Using only one path could result in a failure if the path no longer exists. But only
+ // one invoice for a given payment id will be paid, even if more than one is received.
+ const REQUEST_LIMIT: usize = 10;
+ for path in offer.paths().into_iter().take(REQUEST_LIMIT) {
+ let message = new_pending_onion_message(
+ OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request.clone()),
+ Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
+ Some(reply_path.clone()),
+ );
+ pending_offers_messages.push(message);
+ }
+ }
+
+ Ok(())
+ }
+
+ /// Creates a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for a [`Refund`] and enqueues it to be sent via an onion
+ /// message.
+ ///
+ /// The resulting invoice uses a [`PaymentHash`] recognized by the [`ChannelManager`] and a
+ /// [`BlindedPath`] containing the [`PaymentSecret`] needed to reconstruct the corresponding
+ /// [`PaymentPreimage`].
+ ///
+ /// # Limitations
+ ///
+ /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Refund::paths`] or to
+ /// [`Refund::payer_id`], if empty. This request is best effort; an invoice will be sent to each
+ /// node meeting the aforementioned criteria, but there's no guarantee that they will be
+ /// received and no retries will be made.
+ ///
+ /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
+ pub fn request_refund_payment(&self, refund: &Refund) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
+ let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
+ let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
+ let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
+
+ let amount_msats = refund.amount_msats();
+ let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
+
+ match self.create_inbound_payment(Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None) {
+ Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
+ let payment_paths = vec![
+ self.create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(payment_secret),
+ ];
+ #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
+ let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys(
+ payment_paths, payment_hash, expanded_key, entropy
+ )?;
+ #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
+ let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
+ self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
+ );
+ #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
+ let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
+ payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at, expanded_key, entropy
+ )?;
+ let invoice = builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)?;
+ let reply_path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
+
+ let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
+ if refund.paths().is_empty() {
+ let message = new_pending_onion_message(
+ OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice),
+ Destination::Node(refund.payer_id()),
+ Some(reply_path),
+ );
+ pending_offers_messages.push(message);
+ } else {
+ for path in refund.paths() {
+ let message = new_pending_onion_message(
+ OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
+ Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
+ Some(reply_path.clone()),
+ );
+ pending_offers_messages.push(message);
+ }
+ }
+
+ Ok(())
+ },
+ Err(()) => Err(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount),
+ }
+ }
+
/// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
/// to pay us.
///
inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
}
+ /// Creates a one-hop blinded path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction
+ /// node.
+ fn create_one_hop_blinded_path(&self) -> BlindedPath {
+ let entropy_source = self.entropy_source.deref();
+ let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
+ BlindedPath::one_hop_for_message(self.get_our_node_id(), entropy_source, secp_ctx).unwrap()
+ }
+
+ /// Creates a one-hop blinded path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction
+ /// node.
+ fn create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(
+ &self, payment_secret: PaymentSecret
+ ) -> (BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath) {
+ let entropy_source = self.entropy_source.deref();
+ let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
+
+ let payee_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
+ let max_cltv_expiry = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
+ let payee_tlvs = ReceiveTlvs {
+ payment_secret,
+ payment_constraints: PaymentConstraints {
+ max_cltv_expiry,
+ htlc_minimum_msat: 1,
+ },
+ };
+ // TODO: Err for overflow?
+ BlindedPath::one_hop_for_payment(
+ payee_node_id, payee_tlvs, entropy_source, secp_ctx
+ ).unwrap()
+ }
+
/// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
/// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
///
let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
loop {
- let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
+ let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
// Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
Some(_) => continue,
let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
loop {
- let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
+ let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
// Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
return scid_candidate
/// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
/// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
+ let logger = WithContext::from(
+ &self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
+ );
loop {
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
-
if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
// Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
// Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
// blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
// update(s) when those blockers complete.
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
+ log_trace!(logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
break;
}
if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
- log_debug!(self.logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
+ log_debug!(logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
continue;
}
} else {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
+ log_trace!(logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
}
}
}
} else {
- log_debug!(self.logger,
+ log_debug!(logger,
"Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
}
impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
where
- M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
+ M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
ES::Target: EntropySource,
NS::Target: NodeSigner,
impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
where
- M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
+ M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
ES::Target: EntropySource,
NS::Target: NodeSigner,
impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
where
- M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
+ M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
ES::Target: EntropySource,
NS::Target: NodeSigner,
R::Target: Router,
L::Target: Logger,
{
- fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
+ fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
{
let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
self.best_block_updated(header, height);
}
- fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
+ fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
let _persistence_guard =
PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
*best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
}
- self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
+ self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
}
}
impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
where
- M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
+ M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
ES::Target: EntropySource,
NS::Target: NodeSigner,
R::Target: Router,
L::Target: Logger,
{
- fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
+ fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
// Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
// during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
// See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
let _persistence_guard =
PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
- self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
+ self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context))
.map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
if height < last_best_block_height {
let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
- self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
+ self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
}
}
- fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
+ fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
// Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
// during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
// See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
*self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
- self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
+ self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
macro_rules! max_time {
($timestamp: expr) => {
});
}
- fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
+ fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> {
let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
- if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.context.get_funding_txo(), chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
- res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
+ let txid_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
+ let height_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmation_height();
+ let hash_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in();
+ if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(conf_height), Some(block_hash)) = (txid_opt, height_opt, hash_opt) {
+ res.push((funding_txo.txid, conf_height, Some(block_hash)));
}
}
}
self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
- channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
+ channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
} else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
} else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
});
impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
where
- M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
+ M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
ES::Target: EntropySource,
NS::Target: NodeSigner,
timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
}
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
if channel.context.is_usable() {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
+ log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
});
}
} else {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
+ log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
}
}
}
if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
+ log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
msg: announcement_sigs,
});
if let Some(height) = height_opt {
- if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
+ if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
msg: announcement,
// Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, reason);
pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
- action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
- channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
- data: reason_message,
- } },
+ action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
+ msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage {
+ channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
+ data: reason_message,
+ })
+ },
});
return false;
}
incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
phantom_shared_secret: None,
outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
+ blinded_failure: htlc.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
});
let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
+ let logger = WithContext::from(
+ &self.logger, None, Some(htlc.prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
+ );
+ log_trace!(logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
false
} else { true }
});
self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
}
- /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
+ /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
/// [`ChannelManager`].
pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
}
- /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
+ /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
/// [`ChannelManager`].
///
/// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
/// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
#[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
- pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
- provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
+ pub fn bolt11_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
+ provided_bolt11_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
}
- /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
+ /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
+ /// [`ChannelManager`].
+ fn bolt12_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
+ provided_bolt12_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
+ }
+
+ /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
/// [`ChannelManager`].
pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
}
- /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
+ /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
/// [`ChannelManager`].
pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
}
- /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
+ /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
/// [`ChannelManager`].
pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
where
- M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
+ M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
ES::Target: EntropySource,
NS::Target: NodeSigner,
});
}
+ fn handle_stfu(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Stfu) {
+ let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
+ "Quiescence not supported".to_owned(),
+ msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
+ }
+
+ fn handle_splice(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Splice) {
+ let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
+ "Splicing not supported".to_owned(),
+ msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
+ }
+
+ fn handle_splice_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceAck) {
+ let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
+ "Splicing not supported (splice_ack)".to_owned(),
+ msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
+ }
+
+ fn handle_splice_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceLocked) {
+ let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
+ "Splicing not supported (splice_locked)".to_owned(),
+ msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
+ }
+
fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
let remove_peer = {
- log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
- log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
+ log_debug!(
+ WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None),
+ "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
+ log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id)
+ );
if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
let context = match phase {
ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
- if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger).is_ok() {
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
+ if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok() {
// We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
return true;
}
// Common Channel Establishment
&events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
&events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
+ // Quiescence
+ &events::MessageSendEvent::SendStfu { .. } => false,
+ // Splicing
+ &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSplice { .. } => false,
+ &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceAck { .. } => false,
+ &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceLocked { .. } => false,
// Interactive Transaction Construction
&events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
&events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
}
fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
+ let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None);
if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
- log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
+ log_debug!(logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
return Err(());
}
}
}
- log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
+ log_debug!(logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
None
}
).for_each(|chan| {
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
- msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
+ msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger),
});
});
}
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
if let Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
- if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
+ if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
msg,
provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
}
- fn get_genesis_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
- Some(vec![ChainHash::from(&self.genesis_hash[..])])
+ fn get_chain_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
+ Some(vec![self.chain_hash])
}
fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
}
}
-/// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
+impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
+OffersMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
+where
+ M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
+ T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
+ ES::Target: EntropySource,
+ NS::Target: NodeSigner,
+ SP::Target: SignerProvider,
+ F::Target: FeeEstimator,
+ R::Target: Router,
+ L::Target: Logger,
+{
+ fn handle_message(&self, message: OffersMessage) -> Option<OffersMessage> {
+ let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
+ let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
+
+ match message {
+ OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request) => {
+ let amount_msats = match InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::amount_msats(
+ &invoice_request
+ ) {
+ Ok(amount_msats) => Some(amount_msats),
+ Err(error) => return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
+ };
+ let invoice_request = match invoice_request.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
+ Ok(invoice_request) => invoice_request,
+ Err(()) => {
+ let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidMetadata;
+ return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
+ },
+ };
+ let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
+
+ match self.create_inbound_payment(amount_msats, relative_expiry, None) {
+ Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) if invoice_request.keys.is_some() => {
+ let payment_paths = vec![
+ self.create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(payment_secret),
+ ];
+ #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
+ let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys(
+ payment_paths, payment_hash
+ );
+ #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
+ let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
+ self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
+ );
+ #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
+ let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
+ payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
+ );
+ match builder.and_then(|b| b.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)) {
+ Ok(invoice) => Some(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
+ Err(error) => Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
+ }
+ },
+ Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
+ let payment_paths = vec![
+ self.create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(payment_secret),
+ ];
+ #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
+ let builder = invoice_request.respond_with(payment_paths, payment_hash);
+ #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
+ let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
+ self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
+ );
+ #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
+ let builder = invoice_request.respond_with_no_std(
+ payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
+ );
+ let response = builder.and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build())
+ .map_err(|e| OffersMessage::InvoiceError(e.into()))
+ .and_then(|invoice|
+ match invoice.sign(|invoice| self.node_signer.sign_bolt12_invoice(invoice)) {
+ Ok(invoice) => Ok(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
+ Err(SignError::Signing(())) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
+ InvoiceError::from_string("Failed signing invoice".to_string())
+ )),
+ Err(SignError::Verification(_)) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
+ InvoiceError::from_string("Failed invoice signature verification".to_string())
+ )),
+ });
+ match response {
+ Ok(invoice) => Some(invoice),
+ Err(error) => Some(error),
+ }
+ },
+ Err(()) => {
+ Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount.into()))
+ },
+ }
+ },
+ OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice) => {
+ match invoice.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
+ Err(()) => {
+ Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string("Unrecognized invoice".to_owned())))
+ },
+ Ok(_) if invoice.invoice_features().requires_unknown_bits_from(&self.bolt12_invoice_features()) => {
+ Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(Bolt12SemanticError::UnknownRequiredFeatures.into()))
+ },
+ Ok(payment_id) => {
+ if let Err(e) = self.send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&invoice, payment_id) {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed paying invoice: {:?}", e);
+ Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string(format!("{:?}", e))))
+ } else {
+ None
+ }
+ },
+ }
+ },
+ OffersMessage::InvoiceError(invoice_error) => {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Received invoice_error: {}", invoice_error);
+ None
+ },
+ }
+ }
+
+ fn release_pending_messages(&self) -> Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>> {
+ core::mem::take(&mut self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap())
+ }
+}
+
+/// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
/// [`ChannelManager`].
pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
node_features
}
-/// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
+/// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
/// [`ChannelManager`].
///
/// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
/// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
#[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
-pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
+pub(crate) fn provided_bolt11_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
provided_init_features(config).to_context()
}
-/// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
+/// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
+/// [`ChannelManager`].
+pub(crate) fn provided_bolt12_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
+ provided_init_features(config).to_context()
+}
+
+/// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
/// [`ChannelManager`].
pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
provided_init_features(config).to_context()
}
-/// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
+/// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
/// [`ChannelManager`].
pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
}
-/// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
+/// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
/// [`ChannelManager`].
pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
// Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
(6, real_node_pubkey, required),
});
+impl_writeable_tlv_based!(BlindedForward, {
+ (0, inbound_blinding_point, required),
+});
+
impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
(0, Forward) => {
(0, onion_packet, required),
+ (1, blinded, option),
(2, short_channel_id, required),
},
(1, Receive) => {
(2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
(3, payment_metadata, option),
(5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
+ (7, requires_blinded_error, (default_value, false)),
},
(2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
(0, payment_preimage, required),
(1, Fail),
);
+impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(BlindedFailure,
+ (0, FromIntroductionNode) => {},
+ (2, FromBlindedNode) => {}, ;
+);
+
impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
(0, short_channel_id, required),
(1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
(2, outpoint, required),
+ (3, blinded_failure, option),
(4, htlc_id, required),
(6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
(7, user_channel_id, option),
(6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
});
-impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
- (1, FailHTLC) => {
- (0, htlc_id, required),
- (2, err_packet, required),
- };
- (0, AddHTLC)
-);
+impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
+ const FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID: u8 = 1;
+ match self {
+ Self::AddHTLC(info) => {
+ 0u8.write(w)?;
+ info.write(w)?;
+ },
+ Self::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
+ FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
+ write_tlv_fields!(w, {
+ (0, htlc_id, required),
+ (2, err_packet, required),
+ });
+ },
+ Self::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
+ // Since this variant was added in 0.0.119, write this as `::FailHTLC` with an empty error
+ // packet so older versions have something to fail back with, but serialize the real data as
+ // optional TLVs for the benefit of newer versions.
+ FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
+ let dummy_err_packet = msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new() };
+ write_tlv_fields!(w, {
+ (0, htlc_id, required),
+ (1, failure_code, required),
+ (2, dummy_err_packet, required),
+ (3, sha256_of_onion, required),
+ });
+ },
+ }
+ Ok(())
+ }
+}
+
+impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo {
+ fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+ let id: u8 = Readable::read(r)?;
+ Ok(match id {
+ 0 => Self::AddHTLC(Readable::read(r)?),
+ 1 => {
+ _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(r, {
+ (0, htlc_id, required),
+ (1, malformed_htlc_failure_code, option),
+ (2, err_packet, required),
+ (3, sha256_of_onion, option),
+ });
+ if let Some(failure_code) = malformed_htlc_failure_code {
+ Self::FailMalformedHTLC {
+ htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
+ failure_code,
+ sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?,
+ }
+ } else {
+ Self::FailHTLC {
+ htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
+ err_packet: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(err_packet, required),
+ }
+ }
+ },
+ _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+ })
+ }
+}
impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
(0, payment_secret, required),
impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
where
- M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
+ M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
ES::Target: EntropySource,
NS::Target: NodeSigner,
write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
- self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
+ self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
{
let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
best_block.height().write(writer)?;
/// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
where
- M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
+ M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
ES::Target: EntropySource,
NS::Target: NodeSigner,
/// this struct.
///
/// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
- pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
+ pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>,
}
impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
where
- M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
+ M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
ES::Target: EntropySource,
NS::Target: NodeSigner,
/// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
/// populate a HashMap directly from C.
pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
- mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
+ mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>) -> Self {
Self {
entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
where
- M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
+ M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
ES::Target: EntropySource,
NS::Target: NodeSigner,
impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
where
- M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
+ M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
ES::Target: EntropySource,
NS::Target: NodeSigner,
fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
- let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
&args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
))?;
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
// But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
- log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
- log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
+ log_error!(logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
+ log_error!(logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
- log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
+ log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
&channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
}
if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
- log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
+ log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
&channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
}
if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
- log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
+ log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
&channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
}
if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
- log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
+ log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
&channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
}
- let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs, batch_funding_txid) = channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
- if batch_funding_txid.is_some() {
+ let mut shutdown_result = channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
+ if shutdown_result.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid.is_some() {
return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
}
- if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = monitor_update {
+ if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = shutdown_result.monitor_update {
close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
});
}
- failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
+ failed_htlcs.append(&mut shutdown_result.dropped_outbound_htlcs);
channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
// claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
// the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
// backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
- log_info!(args.logger,
+ log_info!(logger,
"Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
&channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
}
}
} else {
- log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
+ log_info!(logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
&channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
monitor.get_latest_update_id());
if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
}, None));
} else {
- log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
- log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
- log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
- log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
- log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
+ log_error!(logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
+ log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
+ log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
+ log_error!(logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
+ log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
}
}
- for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
+ for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
- log_info!(args.logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
+ let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
+ log_info!(logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
&funding_txo.to_channel_id());
let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
- $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
+ $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $logger: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
) => { {
let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
$chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
- log_trace!(args.logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
+ log_trace!($logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$funding_txo.to_channel_id());
max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
pending_background_events.push(
});
}
if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
- log_error!(args.logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
+ log_error!($logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
}
max_in_flight_update_id
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
+
// Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
// discarded.
let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
- funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, ""));
+ funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, ""));
}
}
if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
// If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
- log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
- log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
+ log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
+ log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
- log_error!(args.logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
- log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
- log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
- log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
- log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
+ log_error!(logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
+ log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
+ log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
+ log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
+ log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
}
} else {
if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
+ let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(counterparty_id), Some(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
// Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
// still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
});
let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
- funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, "closed ");
+ funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, "closed ");
} else {
- log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
- log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.",
+ log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
+ log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.",
&funding_txo.to_channel_id());
- log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
- log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
- log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
- log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
+ log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
+ log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
+ log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
+ log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
}
}
for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
let counterparty_opt = id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
+ let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
if path.hops.is_empty() {
- log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
+ log_error!(logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
}
match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
- log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
- if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), &htlc.payment_hash);
+ log_info!(logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
+ if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), htlc.payment_hash);
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
starting_block_height: best_block_height,
remaining_max_total_routing_fee_msat: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
});
- log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
+ log_info!(logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
}
}
forwards.retain(|forward| {
if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
- log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
+ log_info!(logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
&htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
false
} else { true }
});
pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
- log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
+ log_info!(logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
&htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
};
pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
- path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &args.logger);
+ path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &&logger);
pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
}
},
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
let mut outbound_scid_alias;
loop {
outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
- .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
+ .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &chain_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
}
chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
} else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
// Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
// channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
- log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
+ log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
}
if chan.context.is_usable() {
if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
// Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
// channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
- log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
+ log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
}
}
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
- channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
+ channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
}
}
if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
- for (_, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
+ for (channel_id, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
+ let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), Some(*channel_id));
for action in actions.iter() {
if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
} = action {
if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
+ log_trace!(logger,
+ "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
+ blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id());
blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
.entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
.or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
// anymore.
}
}
+ if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately { .. } = action {
+ debug_assert!(false, "Non-event-generating channel freeing should not appear in our queue");
+ }
}
}
peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
} else {
- log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
+ log_error!(WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), None), "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
}
}
let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
- genesis_hash,
+ chain_hash,
fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
+ pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
+
entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
node_signer: args.node_signer,
signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
// don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
// channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value),
- downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding);
+ downstream_closed, true, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding);
}
//TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
use crate::ln::ChannelId;
- use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
+ use crate::ln::channelmanager::{create_recv_pending_htlc_info, HTLCForwardInfo, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
+ use crate::prelude::*;
use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
use crate::util::errors::APIError;
+ use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
use crate::util::test_utils;
use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
use crate::sign::EntropySource;
let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
- let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
+ let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
- let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
+ let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
- let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
+ let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
- nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
- let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().into_inner());
+ let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().to_byte_array());
{
// Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
// funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
// Test the API functions.
- check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
+ check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None), unkown_public_key);
check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
// Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
- nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
let mut funding_tx = None;
open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
// Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
- nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
// If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
// Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
- nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
// but we can still open an outbound channel.
- nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
// but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
// Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
- nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
// First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
};
// Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
// intended amount, we fail the payment.
+ let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundOnionErr { err_code, .. }) =
- node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
- sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat))
+ create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
+ sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
+ current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
{
assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
} else { panic!(); }
}),
custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
};
- assert!(node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
- sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat)).is_ok());
+ let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
+ assert!(create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
+ sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
+ current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend).is_ok());
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn test_final_incorrect_cltv(){
+ let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
+ let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
+ let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
+ let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
+
+ let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
+ let result = create_recv_pending_htlc_info(msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
+ amt_msat: 100,
+ outgoing_cltv_value: 22,
+ payment_metadata: None,
+ keysend_preimage: None,
+ payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
+ payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: 100,
+ }),
+ custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
+ }, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), 100, 23, None, true, None, current_height,
+ node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend);
+
+ // Should not return an error as this condition:
+ // https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/4dcc377209509b13cf89a4b91fde7d478f5b46d8/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L334
+ // is not satisfied.
+ assert!(result.is_ok());
}
#[test]
&[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
- nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
- nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None, None).unwrap();
let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
}
+
+ #[test]
+ fn test_trigger_lnd_force_close() {
+ let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
+ let user_config = test_default_channel_config();
+ let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
+
+ // Open a channel, immediately disconnect each other, and broadcast Alice's latest state.
+ let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
+ check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
+ check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
+ {
+ let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
+ assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
+ }
+
+ // Since they're disconnected, Bob won't receive Alice's `Error` message. Reconnect them
+ // such that Bob sends a `ChannelReestablish` to Alice since the channel is still open from
+ // their side.
+ nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
+ features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, true).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
+ features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, false).unwrap();
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ let channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
+ nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
+ );
+ nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channel_reestablish);
+
+ // Alice should respond with an error since the channel isn't known, but a bogus
+ // `ChannelReestablish` should be sent first, such that we actually trigger Bob to force
+ // close even if it was an lnd node.
+ let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
+ if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = &msg_events[0] {
+ assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 0);
+ assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
+ nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
+ } else { panic!() };
+ check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
+ check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
+ let expected_close_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
+ err: "Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_string()
+ };
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, expected_close_reason, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
+ {
+ let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
+ assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
+ }
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn test_malformed_forward_htlcs_ser() {
+ // Ensure that `HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC`s are (de)serialized properly.
+ let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
+ let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
+ let persister;
+ let chain_monitor;
+ let chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
+ let deserialized_chanmgr;
+ let mut nodes = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &chanmgrs);
+
+ let dummy_failed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
+ HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: vec![42] }, }
+ };
+ let dummy_malformed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
+ HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code: 0x4000, sha256_of_onion: [0; 32] }
+ };
+
+ let dummy_htlcs_1: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
+ if htlc_id % 2 == 0 {
+ dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
+ } else {
+ dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
+ }
+ }).collect();
+
+ let dummy_htlcs_2: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
+ if htlc_id % 2 == 1 {
+ dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
+ } else {
+ dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
+ }
+ }).collect();
+
+
+ let (scid_1, scid_2) = (42, 43);
+ let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
+ forward_htlcs.insert(scid_1, dummy_htlcs_1.clone());
+ forward_htlcs.insert(scid_2, dummy_htlcs_2.clone());
+
+ let mut chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
+ *chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = forward_htlcs.clone();
+ core::mem::drop(chanmgr_fwd_htlcs);
+
+ reload_node!(nodes[0], nodes[0].node.encode(), &[], persister, chain_monitor, deserialized_chanmgr);
+
+ let mut deserialized_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
+ for scid in [scid_1, scid_2].iter() {
+ let deserialized_htlcs = deserialized_fwd_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(forward_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap(), deserialized_htlcs);
+ }
+ assert!(deserialized_fwd_htlcs.is_empty());
+ core::mem::drop(deserialized_fwd_htlcs);
+
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
+ }
}
#[cfg(ldk_bench)]
use crate::util::test_utils;
use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
+ use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
- use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
+ use bitcoin::{Block, Transaction, TxOut};
use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
}, false).unwrap();
- node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
+ node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
let tx;
if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
- tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
+ tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
}]};
node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
macro_rules! send_payment {
($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
- .with_bolt11_features($node_b.invoice_features()).unwrap();
+ .with_bolt11_features($node_b.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
payment_count += 1;
- let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
+ let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
$node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),