use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
-use bitcoin::secp256k1;
+use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
use chain;
-use chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, Watch, BestBlock};
-use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
+use chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
+use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
// Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
// construct one themselves.
use ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
-use ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
+use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
+#[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
+use ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, RouteParameters};
use ln::msgs;
-use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
use ln::onion_utils;
-use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT, OptionalField};
+use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
use ln::wire::Encode;
use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner, Recipient};
use util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
-use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
+use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
use util::{byte_utils, events};
+use util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
use util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
use util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
use util::logger::{Level, Logger};
use core::{cmp, mem};
use core::cell::RefCell;
use io::Read;
-use sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
+use sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
use core::time::Duration;
use core::ops::Deref;
-#[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
-use std::time::Instant;
-use util::crypto::sign;
-
// We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
//
// Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
DuplicateClaim,
}
-type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
+type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>);
/// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
/// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
/// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
/// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
/// confirmation depth.
- pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>,
- /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
- ///
- /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
- /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
- /// and via the classic SCID.
- ///
- /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
- /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
- /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
- pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
+ pub(super) short_to_chan_info: HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>,
/// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
/// failed/claimed by the user.
///
/// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
/// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
/// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
+//
+// Lock order:
+// The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
+// `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
+// and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
+// Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
+// create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
+//
+// Lock order tree:
+//
+// `total_consistency_lock`
+// |
+// |__`forward_htlcs`
+// |
+// |__`channel_state`
+// | |
+// | |__`id_to_peer`
+// | |
+// | |__`per_peer_state`
+// | |
+// | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
+// | |
+// | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
+// | |
+// | |__`pending_outbound_payments`
+// | |
+// | |__`best_block`
+// | |
+// | |__`pending_events`
+// | |
+// | |__`pending_background_events`
+//
pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
{
default_configuration: UserConfig,
genesis_hash: BlockHash,
- fee_estimator: F,
+ fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
chain_monitor: M,
tx_broadcaster: T,
+ /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
#[cfg(test)]
pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
#[cfg(not(test))]
best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
+ /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
#[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
#[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
/// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
/// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
/// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
- /// Locked *after* channel_state.
+ ///
+ /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
/// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
///
/// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
///
- /// Locked *after* channel_state.
+ /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment>>,
+ /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
+ ///
+ /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
+ /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
+ /// and via the classic SCID.
+ ///
+ /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
+ /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
+ ///
+ /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
+ #[cfg(not(test))]
+ forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
+
/// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
/// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
/// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
/// active channel list on load.
+ ///
+ /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
+ /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
+ ///
+ /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
+ /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
+ /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
+ ///
+ /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
+ /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
+ /// the handling of the events.
+ ///
+ /// TODO:
+ /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
+ /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
+ /// would break backwards compatability.
+ /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
+ /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
+ /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
+ ///
+ /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
+ id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
+
our_network_key: SecretKey,
our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
/// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
- /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
- /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
- last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
+ /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
+ /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
+ /// keeping additional state.
+ probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
/// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
/// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
/// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
/// new channel.
///
- /// If also holding `channel_state` lock, must lock `channel_state` prior to `per_peer_state`.
+ /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
+ /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
+ /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
/// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
/// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
/// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
/// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
/// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
- /// PersistenceNotifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
+ /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
- persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
+ persistence_notifier: Notifier,
keys_manager: K,
/// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
/// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
- persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
+ persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
should_persist: F,
// We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
_read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
}
impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
- fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
+ fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
}
- fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
+ fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
PersistenceNotifierGuard {
/// in over-/re-payment.
///
/// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
- /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
- /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
+ /// send_payment, and any `Err`s which are not [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] can be
+ /// safely retried via [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`].
///
- /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
- /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
- /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
- /// with the latest update_id.
+ /// Any entries which contain `Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInprogress)` or `Ok(())` MUST NOT be
+ /// retried as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent
+ /// (in the case of `Ok(())`) or will send once a [`MonitorEvent::Completed`] is provided for
+ /// the next-hop channel with the latest update_id.
PartialFailure {
/// The errors themselves, in the same order as the route hops.
results: Vec<Result<(), APIError>>,
}
macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
- ($self: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr) => {
+ ($self: expr, $short_to_chan_info: expr, $channel: expr) => {
if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
- $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
+ $short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
} else {
// If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
// outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
debug_assert!(alias_removed);
}
- $short_to_id.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
+ $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
+ $short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
}
}
/// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
- ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
+ ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_chan_info: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
match $err {
ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
(false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
},
ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
- update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $short_to_id, $channel);
+ update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $short_to_chan_info, $channel);
let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
(true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
match $res {
Ok(res) => res,
Err(e) => {
- let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
+ let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_chan_info, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
if drop {
$entry.remove_entry();
}
match $res {
Ok(res) => res,
Err(e) => {
- let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
+ let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_chan_info, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
if drop {
$entry.remove_entry();
}
($self: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
{
let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
- update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel_state.short_to_id, channel);
+ update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel_state.short_to_chan_info, channel);
channel
}
}
}
-macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
- ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
+macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_res {
+ ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_chan_info: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
match $err {
- ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
- log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
- update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $short_to_id, $chan);
+ ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
+ log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
+ update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $short_to_chan_info, $chan);
// TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
// chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
// will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
// given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
// retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
- $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
+ $chan.force_shutdown(false), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
(res, true)
},
- ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
- log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
+ ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
+ log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update in progress. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
match $action_type {
if !$resend_raa {
debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
}
- $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
+ $chan.monitor_updating_paused($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
(Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
},
+ ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
+ (Ok(()), false)
+ },
}
};
($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
- let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
+ let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_chan_info, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
if drop {
$entry.remove_entry();
}
} };
($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY) => { {
debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
- handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
+ handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
} };
($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, NO_UPDATE) => {
- handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
+ handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
};
($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_channel_ready: expr, OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED) => {
- handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, false, $resend_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
+ handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, false, $resend_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
};
($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
- handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
+ handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
};
($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
- handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
+ handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
};
}
-macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
- ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
- return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
- };
- ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
- return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
- }
-}
-
-// Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
-macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
- ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
- match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
- (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
- break e;
- },
- (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
- }
- }
-}
-
macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
- ($short_to_id: expr, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {
+ ($short_to_chan_info: expr, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {
$pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
msg: $channel_ready_msg,
});
// Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
// we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
- let outbound_alias_insert = $short_to_id.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
+ let outbound_alias_insert = $short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
"SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
- let scid_insert = $short_to_id.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
+ let scid_insert = $short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
"SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
}
// Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the channel_ready fly
// before it should be allowed to.
assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
- send_channel_ready!($channel_state.short_to_id, $channel_state.pending_msg_events, $channel_entry.get(), msg);
+ send_channel_ready!($channel_state.short_to_chan_info, $channel_state.pending_msg_events, $channel_entry.get(), msg);
}
if let Some(msg) = $announcement_sigs {
$channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
// only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
// have some commitment updates to send as well.
assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
- if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
- // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
- // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
- // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
- let mut order = $order;
- if $raa.is_none() {
- order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
+ match $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
+ ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
+ e => {
+ // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
+ // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
+ // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
+ let mut order = $order;
+ if $raa.is_none() {
+ order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
+ }
+ break handle_monitor_update_res!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
}
- break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
}
}
ChannelManager {
default_configuration: config.clone(),
genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
- fee_estimator: fee_est,
+ fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
chain_monitor,
tx_broadcaster,
channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
by_id: HashMap::new(),
- short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
- forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
+ short_to_chan_info: HashMap::new(),
claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
}),
outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
+ forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
+ id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap()),
inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
fake_scid_rand_bytes: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
- last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
+ probing_cookie_secret: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
+
highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
- persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
+ persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
keys_manager,
}
}
- /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels, as
+ /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
&self.default_configuration
}
// Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
- if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
- let (result, is_permanent) =
- handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
- if is_permanent {
- remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
- break result;
- }
+ let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
+ let (result, is_permanent) =
+ handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, channel_state.short_to_chan_info, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
+ if is_permanent {
+ remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
+ break result;
}
}
};
for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
- self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
+ let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
+ self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
}
let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
- self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
+ let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
+ let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id: channel_id };
+ self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
}
if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
// There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
})
}
- fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
+ fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
{
log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
- return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
+ return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
channel_id: msg.channel_id,
htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
failure_code: $err_code,
- })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
+ }));
}
}
}
//node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
}
-
- let mut channel_state = None;
macro_rules! return_err {
($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
{
log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
- if channel_state.is_none() {
- channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
- }
- return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
+ return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
channel_id: msg.channel_id,
htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
- })), channel_state.unwrap());
+ }));
}
}
}
- let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
+ let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
Ok(res) => res,
Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
}
};
- channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
// If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
// with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
// short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
- let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
+ let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let id_option = channel_state.short_to_chan_info.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
let forwarding_id_opt = match id_option {
None => { // unknown_next_peer
// Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => Some(chan_id.clone()),
};
let chan_update_opt = if let Some(forwarding_id) = forwarding_id_opt {
- let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
+ let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
// Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
// should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
}
}
- (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
+ pending_forward_info
}
/// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
- htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
+ htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
excess_data: Vec::new(),
}
}
- let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
+ let id = match channel_lock.short_to_chan_info.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
};
channel_state, chan)
} {
Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
- if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
- maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
- // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
- // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
- // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
- // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
- // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
- insert_outbound_payment!(); // Only do this after possibly break'ing on Perm failure above.
- return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
+ let update_err = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
+ let chan_id = chan.get().channel_id();
+ match (update_err,
+ handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_err, channel_state, chan,
+ RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true))
+ {
+ (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure, Err(e)) => break Err(e),
+ (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed, Ok(())) => {
+ insert_outbound_payment!();
+ },
+ (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress, Err(_)) => {
+ // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
+ // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
+ // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
+ // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
+ // which we do in the send_payment check for
+ // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
+ insert_outbound_payment!(); // Only do this after possibly break'ing on Perm failure above.
+ return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
+ },
+ _ => unreachable!(),
}
- insert_outbound_payment!();
- log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan_id));
channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
/// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
///
/// In general, a path may raise:
- /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
+ /// * [`APIError::RouteError`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
/// node public key) is specified.
- /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
+ /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
/// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
/// failure).
- /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
+ /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
/// relevant updates.
///
/// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
for (res, path) in results.iter().zip(route.paths.iter()) {
if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
- if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
- // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
+ if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress) = res {
+ // MonitorUpdateInProgress is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
// PartialFailure.
has_err = true;
has_ok = true;
}
}
+ /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
+ /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
+ /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
+ pub fn send_probe(&self, hops: Vec<RouteHop>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
+ let payment_id = PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
+
+ let payment_hash = self.probing_cookie_from_id(&payment_id);
+
+ if hops.len() < 2 {
+ return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
+ err: "No need probing a path with less than two hops".to_string()
+ }))
+ }
+
+ let route = Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None };
+
+ match self.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &None, None, Some(payment_id), None) {
+ Ok(payment_id) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
+ Err(e) => Err(e)
+ }
+ }
+
+ /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
+ /// payment probe.
+ pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
+ let target_payment_hash = self.probing_cookie_from_id(payment_id);
+ target_payment_hash == *payment_hash
+ }
+
+ /// Returns the 'probing cookie' for the given [`PaymentId`].
+ fn probing_cookie_from_id(&self, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> PaymentHash {
+ let mut preimage = [0u8; 64];
+ preimage[..32].copy_from_slice(&self.probing_cookie_secret);
+ preimage[32..].copy_from_slice(&payment_id.0);
+ PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage).into_inner())
+ }
+
/// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
/// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
+ let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
+ if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
+ panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
+ }
e.insert(chan);
}
}
// Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools at the next block. However, the modules
// constituting our Lightning node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if
// the wallet module is in advance on the LDK view, allow one more block of headroom.
- // TODO: updated if/when https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-bitcoin/pull/994 landed and rust-bitcoin bumped.
- if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == 0xffffffff) && funding_transaction.lock_time < 500_000_000 && funding_transaction.lock_time > height + 2 {
+ if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 2 {
return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
});
})
}
- #[allow(dead_code)]
- // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
- // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 100 (our stated public contract on when
- // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
- // message...
- const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::core::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
- #[deny(const_err)]
- #[allow(dead_code)]
- // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
- // smaller than 100:
- const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 100;
-
- /// Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given
- /// arguments, providing them in corresponding events via
- /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed
- /// on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node
- /// announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and
- /// our network addresses.
- ///
- /// `rgb` is a node "color" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this
- /// node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
- ///
- /// `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node
- /// accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly
- /// tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy,
- /// addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses.
- ///
- /// Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 100).
- ///
- /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
- pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
-
- if addresses.len() > 100 {
- panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
- }
-
- // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
- // addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
- addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
-
- let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
- features: NodeFeatures::known(),
- timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
- node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
- rgb, alias, addresses,
- excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
- excess_data: Vec::new(),
- };
- let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
- let node_announce_sig = sign(&self.secp_ctx, &msghash, &self.our_network_key);
-
- let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
-
- let mut announced_chans = false;
- for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
- if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()) {
- channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
- msg,
- update_msg: match self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
- Ok(msg) => msg,
- Err(_) => continue,
- },
- });
- announced_chans = true;
- } else {
- // If the channel is not public or has not yet reached channel_ready, check the
- // next channel. If we don't yet have any public channels, we'll skip the broadcast
- // below as peers may not accept it without channels on chain first.
- }
- }
-
- if announced_chans {
- channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
- msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
- signature: node_announce_sig,
- contents: announcement
- },
- });
- }
- }
-
/// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
///
/// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
{
- let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
+ let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
+ mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
- for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
+ for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
+ let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
if short_chan_id != 0 {
- let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
+ let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_chan_info.get(&short_chan_id) {
Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
None => {
for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
prev_funding_outpoint } => {
+ macro_rules! failure_handler {
+ ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
+ log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
+
+ let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
+ short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
+ outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
+ htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
+ incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
+ phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
+ });
+
+ let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
+ HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
+ } else {
+ HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
+ };
+
+ failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
+ HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: $err_code, data: $err_data },
+ reason
+ ));
+ continue;
+ }
+ }
macro_rules! fail_forward {
($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
{
- log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
- let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
- short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
- outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
- htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
- incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
- phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
- });
- failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
- HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: $err_code, data: $err_data }
- ));
- continue;
+ failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ macro_rules! failed_payment {
+ ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
+ {
+ failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
}
}
}
let phantom_secret_res = self.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::PhantomNode);
if phantom_secret_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id) {
let phantom_shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &phantom_secret_res.unwrap()).secret_bytes();
- let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
+ let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
Ok(res) => res,
Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
// `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
// if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
// of the onion.
- fail_forward!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
+ failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
},
Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
- fail_forward!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
+ failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
},
};
match next_hop {
onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
- Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => fail_forward!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
+ Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
}
},
_ => panic!(),
}
let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
- HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data }
+ HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data },
+ HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
));
continue;
},
continue;
}
};
- if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
- handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
- continue;
+ match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
+ ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
+ e => {
+ handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
+ continue;
+ }
}
log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
};
macro_rules! fail_htlc {
- ($htlc: expr) => {
+ ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
&byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
phantom_shared_secret,
}), payment_hash,
- HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
+ HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data },
+ HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
));
}
}
if htlcs.len() == 1 {
if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
- fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
+ fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
continue
}
}
if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data.total_msat {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data.total_msat);
- fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
+ fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
} else if total_value == $payment_data.total_msat {
htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
let payment_preimage = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
Err(()) => {
- fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
+ fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
continue
}
};
},
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
- fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
+ fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
}
}
}
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
if payment_data.is_none() {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
- fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
+ fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
continue
};
let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
- fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
+ fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
} else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
- fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
+ fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
} else {
let payment_received_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
if payment_received_generated {
}
}
- for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
- self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
+ for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
+ self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason, destination);
}
self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
self.process_background_events();
}
- fn update_channel_fee(&self, short_to_id: &mut HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
+ fn update_channel_fee(&self, short_to_chan_info: &mut HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
// If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
Ok(res) => Ok(res),
Err(e) => {
- let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
+ let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_chan_info, chan, chan_id);
if drop { retain_channel = false; }
Err(res)
}
};
let ret_err = match res {
Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
- if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
- let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
- if drop { retain_channel = false; }
- res
- } else {
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
- node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
- updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
- update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fee: Some(update_fee),
- commitment_signed,
- },
- });
- Ok(())
+ match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
+ ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
+ node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
+ update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fee: Some(update_fee),
+ commitment_signed,
+ },
+ });
+ Ok(())
+ },
+ e => {
+ let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, short_to_chan_info, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
+ if drop { retain_channel = false; }
+ res
+ }
}
},
Ok(None) => Ok(()),
PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
- let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
+ let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
{
let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
- let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
+ let short_to_chan_info = &mut channel_state.short_to_chan_info;
channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
- let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
+ let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_chan_info, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
if err.is_err() {
handle_errors.push(err);
let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
- let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
+ let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
- let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
+ let short_to_chan_info = &mut channel_state.short_to_chan_info;
channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
- let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
+ let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_chan_info, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
if err.is_err() {
handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
if !retain_channel { return false; }
if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
- let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
+ let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_chan_info, chan, chan_id);
handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
if needs_close { return false; }
}
}
for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
- self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0), &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 23, data: Vec::new() });
+ let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
+ self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone()), &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 23, data: Vec::new() }, receiver );
}
for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
- let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
- let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
+ let removed_source = {
+ let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ channel_state.claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash)
+ };
if let Some((_, mut sources)) = removed_source {
for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
- if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
- self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
+ self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(
HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
- HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
+ HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data },
+ HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash });
}
}
}
if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
- // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
+ // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
+ // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
}
(upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
// be surfaced to the user.
fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
- _counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
+ counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
) {
for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
- match htlc_src {
- HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
- let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
- match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
- self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
- },
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
- };
- let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
- htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
- },
- HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, payment_params, .. } => {
- let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
- session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
- let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
- if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
- if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) && !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
- let retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
- let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
- Some(RouteParameters {
- payment_params: payment_params_data,
- final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
- final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
- })
- } else { None };
- let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
- pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
- payment_id: Some(payment_id),
- payment_hash,
- rejected_by_dest: false,
- network_update: None,
- all_paths_failed: payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0,
- path: path.clone(),
- short_channel_id: None,
- retry,
- #[cfg(test)]
- error_code: None,
- #[cfg(test)]
- error_data: None,
- });
- if payment.get().abandoned() && payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
- pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
- payment_id,
- payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
- });
- payment.remove();
- }
- }
- } else {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
- }
- },
- };
+ let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
+ match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
+ self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
+ },
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
+ };
+
+ let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
+ self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data }, receiver);
}
}
/// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
- /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
- /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
- /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
- /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
- /// still-available channels.
- fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
+ /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
+ fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason,destination: HTLCDestination) {
+ #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
+ {
+ // Ensure that the `channel_state` lock is not held when calling this function.
+ // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock_order requirement for
+ // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `channel_state` lock, which calling this
+ // function with the `channel_state` locked would.
+ assert!(self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
+ }
+
//TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
//identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
//between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
return;
}
- mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
- let retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
+ let mut retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
Some(RouteParameters {
payment_params: payment_params_data.clone(),
let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
#[cfg(not(test))]
let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
- // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
- // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
- // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
- events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
- payment_id: Some(payment_id),
- payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
- rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
- network_update,
- all_paths_failed,
- path: path.clone(),
- short_channel_id,
- retry,
-#[cfg(test)]
- error_code: onion_error_code,
-#[cfg(test)]
- error_data: onion_error_data
+
+ if self.payment_is_probe(payment_hash, &payment_id) {
+ if !payment_retryable {
+ events::Event::ProbeSuccessful {
+ payment_id,
+ payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
+ path: path.clone(),
+ }
+ } else {
+ events::Event::ProbeFailed {
+ payment_id: payment_id,
+ payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
+ path: path.clone(),
+ short_channel_id,
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
+ // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
+ // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
+ if let Some(scid) = short_channel_id {
+ retry.as_mut().map(|r| r.payment_params.previously_failed_channels.push(scid));
+ }
+ events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
+ payment_id: Some(payment_id),
+ payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
+ payment_failed_permanently: !payment_retryable,
+ network_update,
+ all_paths_failed,
+ path: path.clone(),
+ short_channel_id,
+ retry,
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ error_code: onion_error_code,
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ error_data: onion_error_data
+ }
}
},
&HTLCFailReason::Reason {
// ChannelDetails.
// TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
// channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
- events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
- payment_id: Some(payment_id),
- payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
- rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
- network_update: None,
- all_paths_failed,
- path: path.clone(),
- short_channel_id: Some(path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id),
- retry,
+ let scid = path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id;
+ retry.as_mut().map(|r| r.payment_params.previously_failed_channels.push(scid));
+
+ if self.payment_is_probe(payment_hash, &payment_id) {
+ events::Event::ProbeFailed {
+ payment_id: payment_id,
+ payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
+ path: path.clone(),
+ short_channel_id: Some(scid),
+ }
+ } else {
+ events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
+ payment_id: Some(payment_id),
+ payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
+ payment_failed_permanently: false,
+ network_update: None,
+ all_paths_failed,
+ path: path.clone(),
+ short_channel_id: Some(scid),
+ retry,
#[cfg(test)]
- error_code: Some(*failure_code),
+ error_code: Some(*failure_code),
#[cfg(test)]
- error_data: Some(data.clone()),
+ error_data: Some(data.clone()),
+ }
}
}
};
pending_events.push(path_failure);
if let Some(ev) = full_failure_ev { pending_events.push(ev); }
},
- HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret, .. }) => {
+ HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret, outpoint }) => {
let err_packet = match onion_error {
HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
};
let mut forward_event = None;
- if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
+ let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
+ if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
}
- match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
+ match forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
},
entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
}
}
- mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
+ mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
+ let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
if let Some(time) = forward_event {
- let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
time_forwardable: time
});
}
+ pending_events.push(events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
+ prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
+ failed_next_destination: destination
+ });
},
}
}
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
- let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
- let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
+ let removed_source = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
if let Some((payment_purpose, mut sources)) = removed_source {
assert!(!sources.is_empty());
let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
let mut valid_mpp = true;
+ let mut errs = Vec::new();
+ let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
+ let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
for htlc in sources.iter() {
- if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
+ if let None = channel_state.short_to_chan_info.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
valid_mpp = false;
break;
}
expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
return;
}
-
- let mut errs = Vec::new();
- let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
- for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
- if !valid_mpp {
- if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
- let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
- htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
- self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
- self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
- HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
- HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
- } else {
- match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
+ if valid_mpp {
+ for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
+ match self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
// We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
}
}
}
+ mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
+ if !valid_mpp {
+ for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
+ let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
+ htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
+ self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
+ self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(
+ HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
+ HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data },
+ HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash } );
+ }
+ }
if claimed_any_htlcs {
self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
});
}
- // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
- // which were generated.
- channel_state.take();
-
+ // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
//TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
- let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
+ let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_chan_info.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
None => {
return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed
match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
- if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
- log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
- "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
- payment_preimage, e);
- return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
- chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
- handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
- Some(htlc_value_msat)
- );
+ match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
+ ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
+ e => {
+ log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
+ "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
+ payment_preimage, e);
+ return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
+ chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
+ Some(htlc_value_msat)
+ );
+ }
}
if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
}
},
Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
- if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
- log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
- "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
- payment_preimage, e);
+ match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
+ ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
+ e => {
+ log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
+ "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
+ payment_preimage, e);
+ },
}
let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
- let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
+ let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_chan_info, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
if drop {
chan.remove_entry();
}
// We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
// receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
// event being update_fulfill_htlc).
- if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
+ let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update);
+ if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
+ // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
+ // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
+ // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
+ // again on restart.
log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
- payment_preimage, e);
+ payment_preimage, update_res);
}
// Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
// totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
let chan_restoration_res;
- let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims) = {
+ let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims, counterparty_node_id) = {
let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
return;
}
+ let counterparty_node_id = channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() {
// We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
}
- (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs)
+
+ (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs, counterparty_node_id)
};
post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
- self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
+ let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id: funding_txo.to_channel_id() };
+ self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2, receiver);
}
}
};
// Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
// lock before watch_channel
- if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
- match e {
- ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
- // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
- // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
- // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
- // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
- // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
- // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
- // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
- let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
- assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
- return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
- },
- ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
- // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
- // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
- // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
- // until we have persisted our monitor.
- chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, channel_ready.is_some(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
- channel_ready = None; // Don't send the channel_ready now
- },
- }
+ match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
+ ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
+ ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
+ // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
+ // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
+ // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
+ // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
+ // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
+ // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
+ // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
+ let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(false);
+ assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
+ },
+ ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
+ // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
+ // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
+ // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
+ // until we have persisted our monitor.
+ chan.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, channel_ready.is_some(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
+ channel_ready = None; // Don't send the channel_ready now
+ },
}
let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
+ let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
+ match id_to_peer.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
+ "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
+ funding_msg.channel_id))
+ },
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
+ i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
+ }
+ }
channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
msg: funding_msg,
});
if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
- send_channel_ready!(channel_state.short_to_id, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
+ send_channel_ready!(channel_state.short_to_chan_info, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
}
e.insert(chan);
}
Ok(update) => update,
Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
};
- if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
- let mut res = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, channel_ready.is_some(), OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED);
- if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
- // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
- // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
- // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
- if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
- shutdown_finish.0.take();
+ match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
+ ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
+ e => {
+ let mut res = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, channel_ready.is_some(), OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED);
+ if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
+ // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
+ // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
+ // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
+ if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
+ shutdown_finish.0.take();
+ }
}
- }
- return res
+ return res
+ },
}
if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
- send_channel_ready!(channel_state.short_to_id, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get(), msg);
+ send_channel_ready!(channel_state.short_to_chan_info, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get(), msg);
}
funding_tx
},
// Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
- if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
- let (result, is_permanent) =
- handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
- if is_permanent {
- remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
- break result;
- }
+ let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
+ let (result, is_permanent) =
+ handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, channel_state.short_to_chan_info, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
+ if is_permanent {
+ remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
+ break result;
}
}
}
};
for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
- self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
+ let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
+ self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
}
let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
//encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
//but we should prevent it anyway.
- let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
+ let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
+ let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
},
Ok(res) => res
};
- if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
- return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
+ let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
+ if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some()) {
+ return Err(e);
}
+
channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
msg: revoke_and_ack,
for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
let mut forward_event = None;
if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
- let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
+ let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
+ if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
}
for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
- match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
+ match forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
}
- let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
+ let was_paused_for_mon_update = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
- if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update) {
- if was_frozen_for_monitor {
- assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
- assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
- break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
- } else {
- if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan,
- RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
- raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(), false,
- raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
- raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
- break Err(e);
- } else { unreachable!(); }
- }
+ let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update);
+ if was_paused_for_mon_update {
+ assert!(update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
+ assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
+ assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Existing pending monitor update prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
+ }
+ if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
+ if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, channel_state, chan,
+ RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
+ raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(), false,
+ raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
+ raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
+ break Err(e);
+ } else { unreachable!(); }
}
if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) =>
{
for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
- self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
+ let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: channel_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
+ self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2, receiver);
}
self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
- let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
+ let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_chan_info.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
None => {
// It's not a local channel
if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
} else {
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
}
},
let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
- for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
+ for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
match monitor_event {
MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
} else {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
- self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
+ let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
+ self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
}
},
MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
});
}
},
- MonitorEvent::UpdateCompleted { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
+ MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
},
}
let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
- let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
+ let short_to_chan_info = &mut channel_state.short_to_chan_info;
let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
));
}
if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
- if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
- has_monitor_update = true;
- let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, channel_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
- handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
- if close_channel { return false; }
- } else {
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
- node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
- updates: commitment_update,
- });
+ match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
+ ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
+ node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ updates: commitment_update,
+ });
+ },
+ e => {
+ has_monitor_update = true;
+ let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, short_to_chan_info, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, channel_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
+ handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
+ if close_channel { return false; }
+ },
}
}
true
},
Err(e) => {
- let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
+ let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_chan_info, chan, channel_id);
handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
// ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
!close_channel
let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
- let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
+ let short_to_chan_info = &mut channel_state.short_to_chan_info;
let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
- update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_id, chan);
+ update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_chan_info, chan);
false
} else { true }
},
Err(e) => {
has_update = true;
- let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
+ let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_chan_info, chan, channel_id);
handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
!close_channel
}
loop {
let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block.height(), &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
// Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
- match channel_state.short_to_id.entry(scid_candidate) {
+ match channel_state.short_to_chan_info.entry(scid_candidate) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => continue,
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return scid_candidate
}
///
/// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
/// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
- ///
- /// Pending events are persisted as part of [`ChannelManager`]. While these events are cleared
- /// when processed, an [`EventHandler`] must be able to handle previously seen events when
- /// restarting from an old state.
fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
}
}
}
- max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
+ let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_chan_info.len());
for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
res.push(funding_txo.txid);
{
let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
- let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
+ let short_to_chan_info = &mut channel_state.short_to_chan_info;
let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
let res = f(channel);
let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
failure_code, data,
- }));
+ }, HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
}
if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
- send_channel_ready!(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
+ send_channel_ready!(short_to_chan_info, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
if channel.is_usable() {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
// If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
- // to the short_to_id map here. Note that we check whether we can relay
- // using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e. enforce option_scid_alias
- // then), and if the funding tx is ever un-confirmed we force-close the
- // channel, ensuring short_to_id is always consistent.
- let scid_insert = short_to_id.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
+ // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
+ // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
+ // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
+ // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
+ // is always consistent.
+ let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
"SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
}
}
} else if let Err(reason) = res {
- update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_id, channel);
+ update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_chan_info, channel);
// It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
// reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
+
timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
data: htlc_msat_height_data
- }));
+ }, HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
false
} else { true }
});
self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
- for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
- self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
+ for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
+ self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(source, &payment_hash, reason, destination);
}
}
self.persistence_notifier.wait()
}
+ /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when a persistable update is available. Note that
+ /// callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this [`ChannelManager`] and
+ /// should instead register actions to be taken later.
+ pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
+ self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
+ }
+
#[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
- let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
- let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
- let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
- *guard
+ self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
}
/// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
- let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
+ let short_to_chan_info = &mut channel_state.short_to_chan_info;
log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates. We believe we {} make future connections to this peer.",
log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id), if no_connection_possible { "cannot" } else { "can" });
channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
if chan.is_shutdown() {
- update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_id, chan);
+ update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_chan_info, chan);
self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
return false;
} else {
&events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
&events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
&events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
+ &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
&events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
- &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
&events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
&events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
&events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
}
}
- fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
+ fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) -> Result<(), ()> {
+ if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting with no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
+ return Err(());
+ }
+
log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
- if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
+ let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
if !chan.have_received_message() {
// If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
// peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
});
true
}
- } else { true }
+ } else { true };
+ if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
+ if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()) {
+ if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
+ node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
+ msg, update_msg,
+ });
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ retain
});
//TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
+ Ok(())
}
fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
}
}
-}
-
-/// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
-/// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
-struct PersistenceNotifier {
- /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
- /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
- persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
-}
-impl PersistenceNotifier {
- fn new() -> Self {
- Self {
- persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
- }
+ fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
+ provided_node_features()
}
- fn wait(&self) {
- loop {
- let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
- let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
- if *guard {
- *guard = false;
- return;
- }
- guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
- let result = *guard;
- if result {
- *guard = false;
- return
- }
- }
+ fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
+ provided_init_features()
}
+}
- #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
- fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
- let current_time = Instant::now();
- loop {
- let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
- let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
- if *guard {
- *guard = false;
- return true;
- }
- guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
- // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
- // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
- // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
- // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
- // 1.42.0.
- let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
- let result = *guard;
- if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
- *guard = false;
- return result;
- }
- match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
- None => return result,
- Some(_) => continue
- }
- }
- }
+/// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
+/// [`ChannelManager`].
+pub fn provided_node_features() -> NodeFeatures {
+ provided_init_features().to_context()
+}
- // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
- fn notify(&self) {
- let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
- let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
- *persistence_lock = true;
- mem::drop(persistence_lock);
- cnd.notify_all();
- }
+/// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
+/// [`ChannelManager`].
+///
+/// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
+/// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
+#[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
+pub fn provided_invoice_features() -> InvoiceFeatures {
+ provided_init_features().to_context()
+}
+
+/// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
+/// [`ChannelManager`].
+pub fn provided_channel_features() -> ChannelFeatures {
+ provided_init_features().to_context()
+}
+
+/// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
+/// [`ChannelManager`].
+pub fn provided_init_features() -> InitFeatures {
+ // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
+ // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the ChannelMessageHandler impl for
+ // ErroringMessageHandler.
+ let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
+ features.set_data_loss_protect_optional();
+ features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
+ features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
+ features.set_static_remote_key_required();
+ features.set_payment_secret_required();
+ features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
+ features.set_wumbo_optional();
+ features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
+ features.set_channel_type_optional();
+ features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
+ features.set_zero_conf_optional();
+ features
}
const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
}
- let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
- for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
- if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
- unfunded_channels += 1;
+ {
+ // Take `channel_state` lock temporarily to avoid creating a lock order that requires
+ // that the `forward_htlcs` lock is taken after `channel_state`
+ let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
+ for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
+ if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
+ unfunded_channels += 1;
+ }
}
- }
- ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
- for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
- if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
- channel.write(writer)?;
+ ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
+ for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
+ if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
+ channel.write(writer)?;
+ }
}
}
- (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
- for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
- short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
- (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
- for forward in pending_forwards {
- forward.write(writer)?;
+ {
+ let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
+ (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
+ for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
+ short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
+ (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
+ for forward in pending_forwards {
+ forward.write(writer)?;
+ }
}
}
+ let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
(channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
for (payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops)) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
}
}
- (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
+ // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
+ // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
+ // likely to be identical.
+ (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
(self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
(pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
(5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
(7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
(9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
+ (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
});
Ok(())
let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
- let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
+ let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
+ let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
for _ in 0..channel_count {
let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (&args.keys_manager, best_block_height))?;
} else {
log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
- short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
+ short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
+ }
+ if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
+ id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
}
by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
}
}
}
- let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
+ let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
(1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
(5, received_network_pubkey, option),
(7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
(9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
+ (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
});
if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
}
+ if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
+ probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
+ }
+
if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
} else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
}
if chan.is_usable() {
- if short_to_id.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
+ if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
// Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
// channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
}
}
+ let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
+
for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
if let Some((payment_purpose, claimable_htlcs)) = claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
}
if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
- previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &args.fee_estimator, &args.logger);
+ previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
}
}
pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
genesis_hash,
- fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
+ fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
by_id,
- short_to_id,
- forward_htlcs,
+ short_to_chan_info,
claimable_htlcs,
pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
}),
pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
+ forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
+ id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
+ probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
+
our_network_key,
our_network_pubkey,
secp_ctx,
- last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
- persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
+ persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
logger: args.logger,
};
for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
- channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
+ let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
+ let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
+ channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
}
//TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
use core::time::Duration;
use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
- use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
- use ln::channelmanager::inbound_payment;
- use ln::features::InitFeatures;
+ use ln::channelmanager::{self, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
use ln::msgs;
use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
use util::errors::APIError;
- use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
+ use util::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
use util::test_utils;
use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
- #[cfg(feature = "std")]
- #[test]
- fn test_wait_timeout() {
- use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
- use sync::Arc;
- use core::sync::atomic::AtomicBool;
- use std::thread;
-
- let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
- let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
-
- let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
- let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
- thread::spawn(move || {
- loop {
- let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
- let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
- *persistence_lock = true;
- cnd.notify_all();
-
- if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
- break
- }
- }
- });
-
- // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
- let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
-
- // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
- // available.
- loop {
- if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
- break
- }
- }
-
- exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
-
- // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
- // are available.
- loop {
- if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
- break
- }
- }
- }
-
#[test]
fn test_notify_limits() {
// Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
- let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
+ let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
// We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
// to connect messages with new values
let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
// First, send a partial MPP payment.
let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
+ // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
+ // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
- nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
- nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
+ nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
- let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
+ let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
let route_params = RouteParameters {
payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
final_value_msat: 10000,
let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
- nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
- nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
+ nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
- let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
+ let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
let route_params = RouteParameters {
payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
final_value_msat: 10000,
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
- let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
- let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
- let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
- let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
+ let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
+ let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
+ let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
+ let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
// Marshall an MPP route.
let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
// Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
}
+
+ #[test]
+ fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
+ // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
+ // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
+ // the channel is successfully closed.
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
+ let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel);
+ let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
+
+ let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
+ let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
+ {
+ // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
+ // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
+ assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
+ }
+
+ nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
+ {
+ // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
+ // as it has the funding transaction.
+ let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
+ assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
+
+ assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
+ }
+
+ let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
+ {
+ let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
+ assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
+
+ // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
+ // as it has the funding transaction.
+ let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
+ assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
+ }
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
+ let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
+ update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
+
+ nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
+ let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
+
+ let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
+ {
+ // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
+ // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
+ // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
+ // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
+ let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
+ assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
+
+ // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
+ // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
+ // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
+ // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
+ let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
+ assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
+ }
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
+ {
+ // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
+ // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
+ // closing transaction).
+ // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
+ // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
+
+ // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
+ // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
+ let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
+ assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
+ }
+
+ let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
+ {
+ // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
+ // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
+ assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
+ }
+ let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
+ }
}
#[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
use chain::Listen;
use chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, KeysInterface, InMemorySigner};
- use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
+ use ln::channelmanager::{self, BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
- use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
+ use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
});
let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
- node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
- node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
+ node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
+ node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
- node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
- node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
+ node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
+ node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
let tx;
if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
- tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
+ tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
}]};
node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
let block = Block {
- header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
+ header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
txdata: vec![tx],
};
Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id())
- .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
+ .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
let seed = [3u8; 32];
let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42);
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff