use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
#[cfg(test)]
use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
-use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{Bolt12PaymentError, OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs, StaleExpiration};
+use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs, StaleExpiration};
use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
use crate::offers::invoice::{BlindedPayInfo, Bolt12Invoice, DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY, DerivedSigningPubkey, ExplicitSigningPubkey, InvoiceBuilder, UnsignedBolt12Invoice};
use crate::offers::invoice_error::InvoiceError;
use core::ops::Deref;
// Re-export this for use in the public API.
-pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
+pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{Bolt12PaymentError, PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
// We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
}
} else {
let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
- shutdown_result = Some(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
+ shutdown_result = Some(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed { broadcasted_latest_txn: Some(false) }));
}
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
} else {
- ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
+ ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed { broadcasted_latest_txn: Some(broadcast) }
};
let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*peer_node_id), Some(*channel_id), None);
if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
}
- pub(super) fn send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&self, invoice: &Bolt12Invoice, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), Bolt12PaymentError> {
+ /// Pays the [`Bolt12Invoice`] associated with the `payment_id` encoded in its `payer_metadata`.
+ ///
+ /// The invoice's `payer_metadata` is used to authenticate that the invoice was indeed requested
+ /// before attempting a payment. [`Bolt12PaymentError::UnexpectedInvoice`] is returned if this
+ /// fails or if the encoded `payment_id` is not recognized. The latter may happen once the
+ /// payment is no longer tracked because the payment was attempted after:
+ /// - an invoice for the `payment_id` was already paid,
+ /// - one full [timer tick] has elapsed since initially requesting the invoice when paying an
+ /// offer, or
+ /// - the refund corresponding to the invoice has already expired.
+ ///
+ /// To retry the payment, request another invoice using a new `payment_id`.
+ ///
+ /// Attempting to pay the same invoice twice while the first payment is still pending will
+ /// result in a [`Bolt12PaymentError::DuplicateInvoice`].
+ ///
+ /// Otherwise, either [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`] are used to indicate
+ /// whether or not the payment was successful.
+ ///
+ /// [timer tick]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
+ pub fn send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&self, invoice: &Bolt12Invoice) -> Result<(), Bolt12PaymentError> {
+ let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
+ let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
+ match invoice.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
+ Ok(payment_id) => self.send_payment_for_verified_bolt12_invoice(invoice, payment_id),
+ Err(()) => Err(Bolt12PaymentError::UnexpectedInvoice),
+ }
+ }
+
+ fn send_payment_for_verified_bolt12_invoice(&self, invoice: &Bolt12Invoice, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), Bolt12PaymentError> {
let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
self.pending_outbound_payments
log_error!(logger,
"Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
- shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
+ shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed { broadcasted_latest_txn: Some(false) }));
pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
node_id: counterparty_node_id,
action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
log_trace!(logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
remaining_in_flight);
- if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
+ if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || remaining_in_flight != 0 {
return;
}
handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
let reason = if let MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo { reason, .. } = monitor_event {
reason
} else {
- ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
+ ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed { broadcasted_latest_txn: Some(true) }
};
failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false, reason.clone()));
if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
return ResponseInstruction::NoResponse;
} else {
- self.send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&invoice, payment_id)
+ self.send_payment_for_verified_bolt12_invoice(&invoice, payment_id)
.map_err(|e| {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed paying invoice: {:?}", e);
InvoiceError::from_string(format!("{:?}", e))
},
}
},
+ #[cfg(async_payments)]
+ OffersMessage::StaticInvoice(_invoice) => {
+ match responder {
+ Some(responder) => {
+ responder.respond(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
+ InvoiceError::from_string("Static invoices not yet supported".to_string())
+ ))
+ },
+ None => return ResponseInstruction::NoResponse,
+ }
+ },
OffersMessage::InvoiceError(invoice_error) => {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Received invoice_error: {}", invoice_error);
ResponseInstruction::NoResponse
nodes[0].node.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, true).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed { broadcasted_latest_txn: Some(true) }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
// Confirm that the channel_update was not sent immediately to node[1] but was cached.
let node_1_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), error_message.to_string()).unwrap();
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed { broadcasted_latest_txn: Some(true) }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
{
// Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), error_message.to_string()).unwrap();
check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
- check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed { broadcasted_latest_txn: Some(true) }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
{
let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff