+// This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
+// history.
+//
+// This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
+// or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
+// <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
+// You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
+// licenses.
+
//! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
//! here.
//!
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
-use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
use ln::chan_utils;
-use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, HTLCOutputInCommitment, LocalCommitmentTransaction, HTLCType};
+use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HolderCommitmentTransaction, HTLCType};
use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
use ln::onchaintx::{OnchainTxHandler, InputDescriptors};
-use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator};
+use chain;
+use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, ChainWatchedUtil, BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator};
use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
use chain::keysinterface::{SpendableOutputDescriptor, ChannelKeys};
use util::logger::Logger;
use util::ser::{Readable, MaybeReadable, Writer, Writeable, U48};
use util::{byte_utils, events};
+use util::events::Event;
-use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map};
+use std::collections::{HashMap, HashSet, hash_map};
use std::sync::Mutex;
use std::{hash,cmp, mem};
use std::ops::Deref;
+use std::io::Error;
/// An update generated by the underlying Channel itself which contains some new information the
/// ChannelMonitor should be made aware of.
/// our state failed, but is expected to succeed at some point in the future).
///
/// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
- /// submitting new commitment transactions to the remote party. Once the update(s) which failed
+ /// submitting new commitment transactions to the counterparty. Once the update(s) which failed
/// have been successfully applied, ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated can be used to
/// restore the channel to an operational state.
///
TemporaryFailure,
/// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
/// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
- /// of this channel). This will force-close the channel in question (which will generate one
- /// final ChannelMonitorUpdate which must be delivered to at least one ChannelMonitor copy).
+ /// of this channel).
+ ///
+ /// At reception of this error, ChannelManager will force-close the channel and return at
+ /// least a final ChannelMonitorUpdate::ChannelForceClosed which must be delivered to at
+ /// least one ChannelMonitor copy. Revocation secret MUST NOT be released and offchain channel
+ /// update must be rejected.
+ ///
+ /// This failure may also signal a failure to update the local persisted copy of one of
+ /// the channel monitor instance.
///
- /// Should also be used to indicate a failure to update the local persisted copy of the channel
- /// monitor.
+ /// Note that even when you fail a holder commitment transaction update, you must store the
+ /// update to ensure you can claim from it in case of a duplicate copy of this ChannelMonitor
+ /// broadcasts it (e.g distributed channel-monitor deployment)
PermanentFailure,
}
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct MonitorUpdateError(pub &'static str);
+/// An event to be processed by the ChannelManager.
+#[derive(PartialEq)]
+pub enum MonitorEvent {
+ /// A monitor event containing an HTLCUpdate.
+ HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate),
+
+ /// A monitor event that the Channel's commitment transaction was broadcasted.
+ CommitmentTxBroadcasted(OutPoint),
+}
+
/// Simple structure send back by ManyChannelMonitor in case of HTLC detected onchain from a
/// forward channel and from which info are needed to update HTLC in a backward channel.
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
}
impl_writeable!(HTLCUpdate, 0, { payment_hash, payment_preimage, source });
-/// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between
-/// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing
-/// events to it, while also taking any add/update_monitor events and passing them to some remote
-/// server(s).
-///
-/// In general, you must always have at least one local copy in memory, which must never fail to
-/// update (as it is responsible for broadcasting the latest state in case the channel is closed),
-/// and then persist it to various on-disk locations. If, for some reason, the in-memory copy fails
-/// to update (eg out-of-memory or some other condition), you must immediately shut down without
-/// taking any further action such as writing the current state to disk. This should likely be
-/// accomplished via panic!() or abort().
-///
-/// Note that any updates to a channel's monitor *must* be applied to each instance of the
-/// channel's monitor everywhere (including remote watchtowers) *before* this function returns. If
-/// an update occurs and a remote watchtower is left with old state, it may broadcast transactions
-/// which we have revoked, allowing our counterparty to claim all funds in the channel!
-///
-/// User needs to notify implementors of ManyChannelMonitor when a new block is connected or
-/// disconnected using their `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods. However, rather
-/// than calling these methods directly, the user should register implementors as listeners to the
-/// BlockNotifier and call the BlockNotifier's `block_(dis)connected` methods, which will notify
-/// all registered listeners in one go.
-pub trait ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys>: Send + Sync {
- /// Adds a monitor for the given `funding_txo`.
- ///
- /// Implementer must also ensure that the funding_txo txid *and* outpoint are registered with
- /// any relevant ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected
- /// callbacks with the funding transaction, or any spends of it.
- ///
- /// Further, the implementer must also ensure that each output returned in
- /// monitor.get_outputs_to_watch() is registered to ensure that the provided monitor learns about
- /// any spends of any of the outputs.
- ///
- /// Any spends of outputs which should have been registered which aren't passed to
- /// ChannelMonitors via block_connected may result in FUNDS LOSS.
- fn add_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
-
- /// Updates a monitor for the given `funding_txo`.
- ///
- /// Implementer must also ensure that the funding_txo txid *and* outpoint are registered with
- /// any relevant ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected
- /// callbacks with the funding transaction, or any spends of it.
- ///
- /// Further, the implementer must also ensure that each output returned in
- /// monitor.get_watch_outputs() is registered to ensure that the provided monitor learns about
- /// any spends of any of the outputs.
- ///
- /// Any spends of outputs which should have been registered which aren't passed to
- /// ChannelMonitors via block_connected may result in FUNDS LOSS.
- fn update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
-
- /// Used by ChannelManager to get list of HTLC resolved onchain and which needed to be updated
- /// with success or failure.
- ///
- /// You should probably just call through to
- /// ChannelMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated() for each ChannelMonitor and return
- /// the full list.
- fn get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate>;
-}
-
/// A simple implementation of a ManyChannelMonitor and ChainListener. Can be used to create a
/// watchtower or watch our own channels.
///
///
/// If you're using this for local monitoring of your own channels, you probably want to use
/// `OutPoint` as the key, which will give you a ManyChannelMonitor implementation.
+///
+/// (C-not exported) due to an unconstrained generic in `Key`
pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref, C: Deref>
where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
F::Target: FeeEstimator,
L::Target: Logger,
C::Target: ChainWatchInterface,
{
- #[cfg(test)] // Used in ChannelManager tests to manipulate channels directly
+ /// The monitors
pub monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>>>,
- #[cfg(not(test))]
- monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>>>,
+ watch_events: Mutex<WatchEventQueue>,
chain_monitor: C,
broadcaster: T,
logger: L,
fee_estimator: F
}
+struct WatchEventQueue {
+ watched: ChainWatchedUtil,
+ events: Vec<chain::WatchEvent>,
+}
+
+impl WatchEventQueue {
+ fn new() -> Self {
+ Self {
+ watched: ChainWatchedUtil::new(),
+ events: Vec::new(),
+ }
+ }
+
+ fn watch_tx(&mut self, txid: &Txid, script_pubkey: &Script) {
+ if self.watched.register_tx(txid, script_pubkey) {
+ self.events.push(chain::WatchEvent::WatchTransaction {
+ txid: *txid,
+ script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone()
+ });
+ }
+ }
+
+ fn watch_output(&mut self, outpoint: (&Txid, usize), script_pubkey: &Script) {
+ let (txid, index) = outpoint;
+ if self.watched.register_outpoint((*txid, index as u32), script_pubkey) {
+ self.events.push(chain::WatchEvent::WatchOutput {
+ outpoint: OutPoint {
+ txid: *txid,
+ index: index as u16,
+ },
+ script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
+ });
+ }
+ }
+
+ fn dequeue_events(&mut self) -> Vec<chain::WatchEvent> {
+ let mut pending_events = Vec::with_capacity(self.events.len());
+ pending_events.append(&mut self.events);
+ pending_events
+ }
+
+ fn filter_block<'a>(&self, txdata: &[(usize, &'a Transaction)]) -> Vec<(usize, &'a Transaction)> {
+ let mut matched_txids = HashSet::new();
+ txdata.iter().filter(|&&(_, tx)| {
+ // A tx matches the filter if it either matches the filter directly (via does_match_tx)
+ // or if it is a descendant of another matched transaction within the same block.
+ let mut matched = self.watched.does_match_tx(tx);
+ for input in tx.input.iter() {
+ if matched || matched_txids.contains(&input.previous_output.txid) {
+ matched = true;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if matched {
+ matched_txids.insert(tx.txid());
+ }
+ matched
+ }).map(|e| *e).collect()
+ }
+}
+
impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref + Sync + Send, F: Deref + Sync + Send, L: Deref + Sync + Send, C: Deref + Sync + Send>
ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key, ChanSigner, T, F, L, C>
where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
L::Target: Logger,
C::Target: ChainWatchInterface,
{
- fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
- let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
+ fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &[(usize, &Transaction)], height: u32) {
+ let mut watch_events = self.watch_events.lock().unwrap();
+ let matched_txn = watch_events.filter_block(txdata);
{
let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
- let txn_outputs = monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator, &*self.logger);
+ let txn_outputs = monitor.block_connected(header, &matched_txn, height, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator, &*self.logger);
for (ref txid, ref outputs) in txn_outputs {
for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
- self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((txid.clone(), idx as u32), &output.script_pubkey);
+ watch_events.watch_output((txid, idx), &output.script_pubkey);
}
}
}
}
fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, disconnected_height: u32) {
- let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
- monitor.block_disconnected(disconnected_height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator, &*self.logger);
+ monitor.block_disconnected(header, disconnected_height, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator, &*self.logger);
}
}
}
pub fn new(chain_monitor: C, broadcaster: T, logger: L, feeest: F) -> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key, ChanSigner, T, F, L, C> {
let res = SimpleManyChannelMonitor {
monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
+ watch_events: Mutex::new(WatchEventQueue::new()),
chain_monitor,
broadcaster,
logger,
/// Adds or updates the monitor which monitors the channel referred to by the given key.
pub fn add_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
+ let mut watch_events = self.watch_events.lock().unwrap();
let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
let entry = match monitors.entry(key) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Channel monitor for given key is already present")),
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => e,
};
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Got new Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_bytes!(monitor.funding_info.0.to_channel_id()[..]));
- self.chain_monitor.install_watch_tx(&monitor.funding_info.0.txid, &monitor.funding_info.1);
- self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((monitor.funding_info.0.txid, monitor.funding_info.0.index as u32), &monitor.funding_info.1);
- for (txid, outputs) in monitor.get_outputs_to_watch().iter() {
- for (idx, script) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
- self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((*txid, idx as u32), script);
+ {
+ let funding_txo = monitor.get_funding_txo();
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Got new Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.0.to_channel_id()[..]));
+ watch_events.watch_tx(&funding_txo.0.txid, &funding_txo.1);
+ watch_events.watch_output((&funding_txo.0.txid, funding_txo.0.index as usize), &funding_txo.1);
+ for (txid, outputs) in monitor.get_outputs_to_watch().iter() {
+ for (idx, script) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
+ watch_events.watch_output((txid, idx), script);
+ }
}
}
entry.insert(monitor);
}
}
-impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref + Sync + Send, F: Deref + Sync + Send, L: Deref + Sync + Send, C: Deref + Sync + Send> ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<OutPoint, ChanSigner, T, F, L, C>
+impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref + Sync + Send, F: Deref + Sync + Send, L: Deref + Sync + Send, C: Deref + Sync + Send> ManyChannelMonitor for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<OutPoint, ChanSigner, T, F, L, C>
where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
F::Target: FeeEstimator,
L::Target: Logger,
C::Target: ChainWatchInterface,
{
+ type Keys = ChanSigner;
+
fn add_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
match self.add_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, monitor) {
Ok(_) => Ok(()),
}
}
- fn get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate> {
- let mut pending_htlcs_updated = Vec::new();
+ fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
+ let mut pending_monitor_events = Vec::new();
for chan in self.monitors.lock().unwrap().values_mut() {
- pending_htlcs_updated.append(&mut chan.get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated());
+ pending_monitor_events.append(&mut chan.get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events());
}
- pending_htlcs_updated
+ pending_monitor_events
}
}
L::Target: Logger,
C::Target: ChainWatchInterface,
{
- fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
+ fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<Event> {
let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
for chan in self.monitors.lock().unwrap().values_mut() {
pending_events.append(&mut chan.get_and_clear_pending_events());
}
}
+impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref, C: Deref> chain::WatchEventProvider for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key, ChanSigner, T, F, L, C>
+ where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
+ F::Target: FeeEstimator,
+ L::Target: Logger,
+ C::Target: ChainWatchInterface,
+{
+ fn release_pending_watch_events(&self) -> Vec<chain::WatchEvent> {
+ self.watch_events.lock().unwrap().dequeue_events()
+ }
+}
+
/// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
/// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
pub(crate) const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER: u32 = CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
-struct LocalSignedTx {
+struct HolderSignedTx {
/// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
txid: Txid,
revocation_key: PublicKey,
b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
- feerate_per_kw: u64,
+ feerate_per_kw: u32,
htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
}
-/// We use this to track remote commitment transactions and htlcs outputs and
+/// We use this to track counterparty commitment transactions and htlcs outputs and
/// use it to generate any justice or 2nd-stage preimage/timeout transactions.
#[derive(PartialEq)]
-struct RemoteCommitmentTransaction {
- remote_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
- remote_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
- on_remote_tx_csv: u16,
+struct CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction {
+ counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
+ counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
+ on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16,
per_htlc: HashMap<Txid, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>>
}
-impl Writeable for RemoteCommitmentTransaction {
+impl Writeable for CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction {
fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
- self.remote_delayed_payment_base_key.write(w)?;
- self.remote_htlc_base_key.write(w)?;
- w.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.on_remote_tx_csv))?;
+ self.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key.write(w)?;
+ self.counterparty_htlc_base_key.write(w)?;
+ w.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.on_counterparty_tx_csv))?;
w.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.per_htlc.len() as u64))?;
for (ref txid, ref htlcs) in self.per_htlc.iter() {
w.write_all(&txid[..])?;
Ok(())
}
}
-impl Readable for RemoteCommitmentTransaction {
+impl Readable for CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction {
fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
- let remote_commitment_transaction = {
- let remote_delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(r)?;
- let remote_htlc_base_key = Readable::read(r)?;
- let on_remote_tx_csv: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
+ let counterparty_commitment_transaction = {
+ let counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(r)?;
+ let counterparty_htlc_base_key = Readable::read(r)?;
+ let on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
let per_htlc_len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
let mut per_htlc = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(per_htlc_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
for _ in 0..per_htlc_len {
return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
}
}
- RemoteCommitmentTransaction {
- remote_delayed_payment_base_key,
- remote_htlc_base_key,
- on_remote_tx_csv,
+ CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction {
+ counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
+ counterparty_htlc_base_key,
+ on_counterparty_tx_csv,
per_htlc,
}
};
- Ok(remote_commitment_transaction)
+ Ok(counterparty_commitment_transaction)
}
}
pub(crate) enum InputMaterial {
Revoked {
per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
- remote_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
- remote_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
+ counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
+ counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
per_commitment_key: SecretKey,
input_descriptor: InputDescriptors,
amount: u64,
htlc: Option<HTLCOutputInCommitment>,
- on_remote_tx_csv: u16,
+ on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16,
},
- RemoteHTLC {
+ CounterpartyHTLC {
per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
- remote_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
- remote_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
+ counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
+ counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment
},
- LocalHTLC {
+ HolderHTLC {
preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
amount: u64,
},
impl Writeable for InputMaterial {
fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
match self {
- &InputMaterial::Revoked { ref per_commitment_point, ref remote_delayed_payment_base_key, ref remote_htlc_base_key, ref per_commitment_key, ref input_descriptor, ref amount, ref htlc, ref on_remote_tx_csv} => {
+ &InputMaterial::Revoked { ref per_commitment_point, ref counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, ref counterparty_htlc_base_key, ref per_commitment_key, ref input_descriptor, ref amount, ref htlc, ref on_counterparty_tx_csv} => {
writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
per_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
- remote_delayed_payment_base_key.write(writer)?;
- remote_htlc_base_key.write(writer)?;
+ counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key.write(writer)?;
+ counterparty_htlc_base_key.write(writer)?;
writer.write_all(&per_commitment_key[..])?;
input_descriptor.write(writer)?;
writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
htlc.write(writer)?;
- on_remote_tx_csv.write(writer)?;
+ on_counterparty_tx_csv.write(writer)?;
},
- &InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { ref per_commitment_point, ref remote_delayed_payment_base_key, ref remote_htlc_base_key, ref preimage, ref htlc} => {
+ &InputMaterial::CounterpartyHTLC { ref per_commitment_point, ref counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, ref counterparty_htlc_base_key, ref preimage, ref htlc} => {
writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
per_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
- remote_delayed_payment_base_key.write(writer)?;
- remote_htlc_base_key.write(writer)?;
+ counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key.write(writer)?;
+ counterparty_htlc_base_key.write(writer)?;
preimage.write(writer)?;
htlc.write(writer)?;
},
- &InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { ref preimage, ref amount } => {
+ &InputMaterial::HolderHTLC { ref preimage, ref amount } => {
writer.write_all(&[2; 1])?;
preimage.write(writer)?;
writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
let input_material = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
0 => {
let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let remote_delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let remote_htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let counterparty_htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
let per_commitment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
let input_descriptor = Readable::read(reader)?;
let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
let htlc = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let on_remote_tx_csv = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let on_counterparty_tx_csv = Readable::read(reader)?;
InputMaterial::Revoked {
per_commitment_point,
- remote_delayed_payment_base_key,
- remote_htlc_base_key,
+ counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
+ counterparty_htlc_base_key,
per_commitment_key,
input_descriptor,
amount,
htlc,
- on_remote_tx_csv
+ on_counterparty_tx_csv
}
},
1 => {
let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let remote_delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let remote_htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let counterparty_htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
let htlc = Readable::read(reader)?;
- InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC {
+ InputMaterial::CounterpartyHTLC {
per_commitment_point,
- remote_delayed_payment_base_key,
- remote_htlc_base_key,
+ counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
+ counterparty_htlc_base_key,
preimage,
htlc
}
2 => {
let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
- InputMaterial::LocalHTLC {
+ InputMaterial::HolderHTLC {
preimage,
amount,
}
#[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialEq))]
#[derive(Clone)]
pub(super) enum ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
- LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo {
- commitment_tx: LocalCommitmentTransaction,
+ LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
+ commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
},
- LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo {
+ LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
unsigned_commitment_tx: Transaction, // TODO: We should actually only need the txid here
htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
commitment_number: u64,
idx: u64,
secret: [u8; 32],
},
- /// Used to indicate that the no future updates will occur, and likely that the latest local
+ /// Used to indicate that the no future updates will occur, and likely that the latest holder
/// commitment transaction(s) should be broadcast, as the channel has been force-closed.
ChannelForceClosed {
- /// If set to false, we shouldn't broadcast the latest local commitment transaction as we
+ /// If set to false, we shouldn't broadcast the latest holder commitment transaction as we
/// think we've fallen behind!
should_broadcast: bool,
},
impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
match self {
- &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo { ref commitment_tx, ref htlc_outputs } => {
+ &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { ref commitment_tx, ref htlc_outputs } => {
0u8.write(w)?;
commitment_tx.write(w)?;
(htlc_outputs.len() as u64).write(w)?;
source.write(w)?;
}
}
- &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { ref unsigned_commitment_tx, ref htlc_outputs, ref commitment_number, ref their_revocation_point } => {
+ &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { ref unsigned_commitment_tx, ref htlc_outputs, ref commitment_number, ref their_revocation_point } => {
1u8.write(w)?;
unsigned_commitment_tx.write(w)?;
commitment_number.write(w)?;
fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
match Readable::read(r)? {
0u8 => {
- Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo {
+ Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
commitment_tx: Readable::read(r)?,
htlc_outputs: {
let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
})
},
1u8 => {
- Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo {
+ Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
unsigned_commitment_tx: Readable::read(r)?,
commitment_number: Readable::read(r)?,
their_revocation_point: Readable::read(r)?,
/// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
///
/// Pending Events or updated HTLCs which have not yet been read out by
-/// get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated or get_and_clear_pending_events are serialized to disk and
+/// get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events or get_and_clear_pending_events are serialized to disk and
/// reloaded at deserialize-time. Thus, you must ensure that, when handling events, all events
/// gotten are fully handled before re-serializing the new state.
pub struct ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
destination_script: Script,
- broadcasted_local_revokable_script: Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>,
- remote_payment_script: Script,
+ broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>,
+ counterparty_payment_script: Script,
shutdown_script: Script,
keys: ChanSigner,
funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
- current_remote_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
- prev_remote_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
+ current_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
+ prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
- remote_tx_cache: RemoteCommitmentTransaction,
+ counterparty_tx_cache: CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction,
funding_redeemscript: Script,
channel_value_satoshis: u64,
// first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
- on_local_tx_csv: u16,
+ on_holder_tx_csv: u16,
commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
- remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>>,
+ counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>>,
/// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
/// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
- /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the remote
+ /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the counterparty
/// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
/// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
- remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Txid, (u64, Vec<Script>)>,
+ counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Txid, (u64, Vec<Script>)>,
/// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
- /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for remote transactions for non-revoked
- /// remote transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
+ /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for counterparty transactions for non-revoked
+ /// counterparty transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
/// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
-
remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<PaymentHash, u64>,
+
counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<PaymentHash, u64>,
- // We store two local commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
+ // We store two holder commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
// some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
- // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a local
+ // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a holder
// transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
- prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
- current_local_commitment_tx: LocalSignedTx,
+ prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: Option<HolderSignedTx>,
+ current_holder_commitment_tx: HolderSignedTx,
// Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
// deserialization
- current_remote_commitment_number: u64,
+ current_counterparty_commitment_number: u64,
// Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
// deserialization
- current_local_commitment_number: u64,
+ current_holder_commitment_number: u64,
payment_preimages: HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage>,
- pending_htlcs_updated: Vec<HTLCUpdate>,
- pending_events: Vec<events::Event>,
+ pending_monitor_events: Vec<MonitorEvent>,
+ pending_events: Vec<Event>,
// Used to track onchain events, i.e transactions parts of channels confirmed on chain, on which
// we have to take actions once they reach enough confs. Key is a block height timer, i.e we enforce
onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<ChanSigner>,
// This is set when the Channel[Manager] generated a ChannelMonitorUpdate which indicated the
- // channel has been force-closed. After this is set, no further local commitment transaction
+ // channel has been force-closed. After this is set, no further holder commitment transaction
// updates may occur, and we panic!() if one is provided.
lockdown_from_offchain: bool,
- // Set once we've signed a local commitment transaction and handed it over to our
- // OnchainTxHandler. After this is set, no future updates to our local commitment transactions
+ // Set once we've signed a holder commitment transaction and handed it over to our
+ // OnchainTxHandler. After this is set, no future updates to our holder commitment transactions
// may occur, and we fail any such monitor updates.
- local_tx_signed: bool,
+ //
+ // In case of update rejection due to a locally already signed commitment transaction, we
+ // nevertheless store update content to track in case of concurrent broadcast by another
+ // remote monitor out-of-order with regards to the block view.
+ holder_tx_signed: bool,
// We simply modify last_block_hash in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
// consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
// (we do *not*, however, update them in update_monitor to ensure any local user copies keep
// their last_block_hash from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
// the full block_connected).
- pub(crate) last_block_hash: BlockHash,
+ last_block_hash: BlockHash,
secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
}
+/// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between
+/// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing
+/// events to it, while also taking any add/update_monitor events and passing them to some remote
+/// server(s).
+///
+/// In general, you must always have at least one local copy in memory, which must never fail to
+/// update (as it is responsible for broadcasting the latest state in case the channel is closed),
+/// and then persist it to various on-disk locations. If, for some reason, the in-memory copy fails
+/// to update (eg out-of-memory or some other condition), you must immediately shut down without
+/// taking any further action such as writing the current state to disk. This should likely be
+/// accomplished via panic!() or abort().
+///
+/// Note that any updates to a channel's monitor *must* be applied to each instance of the
+/// channel's monitor everywhere (including remote watchtowers) *before* this function returns. If
+/// an update occurs and a remote watchtower is left with old state, it may broadcast transactions
+/// which we have revoked, allowing our counterparty to claim all funds in the channel!
+///
+/// User needs to notify implementors of ManyChannelMonitor when a new block is connected or
+/// disconnected using their `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods. However, rather
+/// than calling these methods directly, the user should register implementors as listeners to the
+/// BlockNotifier and call the BlockNotifier's `block_(dis)connected` methods, which will notify
+/// all registered listeners in one go.
+pub trait ManyChannelMonitor: Send + Sync {
+ /// The concrete type which signs for transactions and provides access to our channel public
+ /// keys.
+ type Keys: ChannelKeys;
+
+ /// Adds a monitor for the given `funding_txo`.
+ ///
+ /// Implementations must ensure that `monitor` receives block_connected calls for blocks with
+ /// the funding transaction or any spends of it, as well as any spends of outputs returned by
+ /// get_outputs_to_watch. Not doing so may result in LOST FUNDS.
+ fn add_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor<Self::Keys>) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
+
+ /// Updates a monitor for the given `funding_txo`.
+ ///
+ /// TODO(jkczyz): Determine where this should go from e73036c6845fd3cc16479a1b497db82a5ebb3897.
+ ///
+ /// In case of distributed watchtowers deployment, even if an Err is return, the new version
+ /// must be written to disk, as state may have been stored but rejected due to a block forcing
+ /// a commitment broadcast. This storage is used to claim outputs of rejected state confirmed
+ /// onchain by another watchtower, lagging behind on block processing.
+ fn update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
+
+ /// Used by ChannelManager to get list of HTLC resolved onchain and which needed to be updated
+ /// with success or failure.
+ ///
+ /// You should probably just call through to
+ /// ChannelMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events() for each ChannelMonitor and return
+ /// the full list.
+ fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent>;
+}
+
#[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
/// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
/// underlying object
if self.latest_update_id != other.latest_update_id ||
self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
self.destination_script != other.destination_script ||
- self.broadcasted_local_revokable_script != other.broadcasted_local_revokable_script ||
- self.remote_payment_script != other.remote_payment_script ||
+ self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script != other.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script ||
+ self.counterparty_payment_script != other.counterparty_payment_script ||
self.keys.pubkeys() != other.keys.pubkeys() ||
self.funding_info != other.funding_info ||
- self.current_remote_commitment_txid != other.current_remote_commitment_txid ||
- self.prev_remote_commitment_txid != other.prev_remote_commitment_txid ||
- self.remote_tx_cache != other.remote_tx_cache ||
+ self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid != other.current_counterparty_commitment_txid ||
+ self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid != other.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid ||
+ self.counterparty_tx_cache != other.counterparty_tx_cache ||
self.funding_redeemscript != other.funding_redeemscript ||
self.channel_value_satoshis != other.channel_value_satoshis ||
self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
- self.on_local_tx_csv != other.on_local_tx_csv ||
+ self.on_holder_tx_csv != other.on_holder_tx_csv ||
self.commitment_secrets != other.commitment_secrets ||
- self.remote_claimable_outpoints != other.remote_claimable_outpoints ||
- self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain ||
- self.remote_hash_commitment_number != other.remote_hash_commitment_number ||
- self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
- self.current_remote_commitment_number != other.current_remote_commitment_number ||
- self.current_local_commitment_number != other.current_local_commitment_number ||
- self.current_local_commitment_tx != other.current_local_commitment_tx ||
+ self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints != other.counterparty_claimable_outpoints ||
+ self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain ||
+ self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number != other.counterparty_hash_commitment_number ||
+ self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx ||
+ self.current_counterparty_commitment_number != other.current_counterparty_commitment_number ||
+ self.current_holder_commitment_number != other.current_holder_commitment_number ||
+ self.current_holder_commitment_tx != other.current_holder_commitment_tx ||
self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
- self.pending_htlcs_updated != other.pending_htlcs_updated ||
+ self.pending_monitor_events != other.pending_monitor_events ||
self.pending_events.len() != other.pending_events.len() || // We trust events to round-trip properly
self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf != other.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf ||
self.outputs_to_watch != other.outputs_to_watch ||
self.lockdown_from_offchain != other.lockdown_from_offchain ||
- self.local_tx_signed != other.local_tx_signed
+ self.holder_tx_signed != other.holder_tx_signed
{
false
} else {
/// the "reorg path" (ie disconnecting blocks until you find a common ancestor from both the
/// returned block hash and the the current chain and then reconnecting blocks to get to the
/// best chain) upon deserializing the object!
- pub fn write_for_disk<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+ pub fn write_for_disk<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
//TODO: We still write out all the serialization here manually instead of using the fancy
//serialization framework we have, we should migrate things over to it.
writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
- if let Some(ref broadcasted_local_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_local_revokable_script {
+ if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
- broadcasted_local_revokable_script.0.write(writer)?;
- broadcasted_local_revokable_script.1.write(writer)?;
- broadcasted_local_revokable_script.2.write(writer)?;
+ broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0.write(writer)?;
+ broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1.write(writer)?;
+ broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.2.write(writer)?;
} else {
writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
}
- self.remote_payment_script.write(writer)?;
+ self.counterparty_payment_script.write(writer)?;
self.shutdown_script.write(writer)?;
self.keys.write(writer)?;
writer.write_all(&self.funding_info.0.txid[..])?;
writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.funding_info.0.index))?;
self.funding_info.1.write(writer)?;
- self.current_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
- self.prev_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
+ self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
+ self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
- self.remote_tx_cache.write(writer)?;
+ self.counterparty_tx_cache.write(writer)?;
self.funding_redeemscript.write(writer)?;
self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
},
}
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.on_local_tx_csv))?;
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.on_holder_tx_csv))?;
self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
}
}
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
- for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
+ for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?;
for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
}
}
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
- for (ref txid, &(commitment_number, ref txouts)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
+ for (ref txid, &(commitment_number, ref txouts)) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(commitment_number))?;
(txouts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
}
}
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
- for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.remote_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
+ for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?;
writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
}
- macro_rules! serialize_local_tx {
- ($local_tx: expr) => {
- $local_tx.txid.write(writer)?;
- writer.write_all(&$local_tx.revocation_key.serialize())?;
- writer.write_all(&$local_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize())?;
- writer.write_all(&$local_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize())?;
- writer.write_all(&$local_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize())?;
- writer.write_all(&$local_tx.per_commitment_point.serialize())?;
+ macro_rules! serialize_holder_tx {
+ ($holder_tx: expr) => {
+ $holder_tx.txid.write(writer)?;
+ writer.write_all(&$holder_tx.revocation_key.serialize())?;
+ writer.write_all(&$holder_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize())?;
+ writer.write_all(&$holder_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize())?;
+ writer.write_all(&$holder_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize())?;
+ writer.write_all(&$holder_tx.per_commitment_point.serialize())?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.feerate_per_kw))?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
- for &(ref htlc_output, ref sig, ref htlc_source) in $local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($holder_tx.feerate_per_kw))?;
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
+ for &(ref htlc_output, ref sig, ref htlc_source) in $holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
if let &Some(ref their_sig) = sig {
1u8.write(writer)?;
}
}
- if let Some(ref prev_local_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
+ if let Some(ref prev_holder_tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
- serialize_local_tx!(prev_local_tx);
+ serialize_holder_tx!(prev_holder_tx);
} else {
writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
}
- serialize_local_tx!(self.current_local_commitment_tx);
+ serialize_holder_tx!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_remote_commitment_number))?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_local_commitment_number))?;
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_counterparty_commitment_number))?;
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_holder_commitment_number))?;
writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?;
}
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_htlcs_updated.len() as u64))?;
- for data in self.pending_htlcs_updated.iter() {
- data.write(writer)?;
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_monitor_events.len() as u64))?;
+ for event in self.pending_monitor_events.iter() {
+ match event {
+ MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(upd) => {
+ 0u8.write(writer)?;
+ upd.write(writer)?;
+ },
+ MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?
+ }
}
writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_events.len() as u64))?;
self.onchain_tx_handler.write(writer)?;
self.lockdown_from_offchain.write(writer)?;
- self.local_tx_signed.write(writer)?;
+ self.holder_tx_signed.write(writer)?;
Ok(())
}
impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
pub(super) fn new(keys: ChanSigner, shutdown_pubkey: &PublicKey,
- on_remote_tx_csv: u16, destination_script: &Script, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
- remote_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey, remote_delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey,
- on_local_tx_csv: u16, funding_redeemscript: Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64,
+ on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16, destination_script: &Script, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
+ counterparty_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey,
+ on_holder_tx_csv: u16, funding_redeemscript: Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64,
commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
- initial_local_commitment_tx: LocalCommitmentTransaction) -> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
+ initial_holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction) -> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor <= (1 << 48));
let our_channel_close_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
let shutdown_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script();
let payment_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&keys.pubkeys().payment_point.serialize());
- let remote_payment_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_key_hash[..]).into_script();
-
- let remote_tx_cache = RemoteCommitmentTransaction { remote_delayed_payment_base_key: *remote_delayed_payment_base_key, remote_htlc_base_key: *remote_htlc_base_key, on_remote_tx_csv, per_htlc: HashMap::new() };
-
- let mut onchain_tx_handler = OnchainTxHandler::new(destination_script.clone(), keys.clone(), on_local_tx_csv);
-
- let local_tx_sequence = initial_local_commitment_tx.unsigned_tx.input[0].sequence as u64;
- let local_tx_locktime = initial_local_commitment_tx.unsigned_tx.lock_time as u64;
- let local_commitment_tx = LocalSignedTx {
- txid: initial_local_commitment_tx.txid(),
- revocation_key: initial_local_commitment_tx.local_keys.revocation_key,
- a_htlc_key: initial_local_commitment_tx.local_keys.a_htlc_key,
- b_htlc_key: initial_local_commitment_tx.local_keys.b_htlc_key,
- delayed_payment_key: initial_local_commitment_tx.local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key,
- per_commitment_point: initial_local_commitment_tx.local_keys.per_commitment_point,
- feerate_per_kw: initial_local_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw,
+ let counterparty_payment_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_key_hash[..]).into_script();
+
+ let counterparty_tx_cache = CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction { counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: *counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key: *counterparty_htlc_base_key, on_counterparty_tx_csv, per_htlc: HashMap::new() };
+
+ let mut onchain_tx_handler = OnchainTxHandler::new(destination_script.clone(), keys.clone(), on_holder_tx_csv);
+
+ let holder_tx_sequence = initial_holder_commitment_tx.unsigned_tx.input[0].sequence as u64;
+ let holder_tx_locktime = initial_holder_commitment_tx.unsigned_tx.lock_time as u64;
+ let holder_commitment_tx = HolderSignedTx {
+ txid: initial_holder_commitment_tx.txid(),
+ revocation_key: initial_holder_commitment_tx.keys.revocation_key,
+ a_htlc_key: initial_holder_commitment_tx.keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
+ b_htlc_key: initial_holder_commitment_tx.keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
+ delayed_payment_key: initial_holder_commitment_tx.keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
+ per_commitment_point: initial_holder_commitment_tx.keys.per_commitment_point,
+ feerate_per_kw: initial_holder_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw,
htlc_outputs: Vec::new(), // There are never any HTLCs in the initial commitment transactions
};
- // Returning a monitor error before updating tracking points means in case of using
- // a concurrent watchtower implementation for same channel, if this one doesn't
- // reject update as we do, you MAY have the latest local valid commitment tx onchain
- // for which you want to spend outputs. We're NOT robust again this scenario right
- // now but we should consider it later.
- onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_local_tx(initial_local_commitment_tx).unwrap();
+ onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_holder_tx(initial_holder_commitment_tx);
ChannelMonitor {
latest_update_id: 0,
commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
destination_script: destination_script.clone(),
- broadcasted_local_revokable_script: None,
- remote_payment_script,
+ broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: None,
+ counterparty_payment_script,
shutdown_script,
keys,
funding_info,
- current_remote_commitment_txid: None,
- prev_remote_commitment_txid: None,
+ current_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
+ prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
- remote_tx_cache,
+ counterparty_tx_cache,
funding_redeemscript,
channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis,
their_cur_revocation_points: None,
- on_local_tx_csv,
+ on_holder_tx_csv,
commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
- remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
- remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
- remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
+ counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
+ counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
+ counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
- prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
- current_local_commitment_tx: local_commitment_tx,
- current_remote_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
- current_local_commitment_number: 0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((local_tx_sequence & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx_locktime as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor),
+ prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: None,
+ current_holder_commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
+ current_counterparty_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
+ current_holder_commitment_number: 0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((holder_tx_sequence & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (holder_tx_locktime as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor),
payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
- pending_htlcs_updated: Vec::new(),
+ pending_monitor_events: Vec::new(),
pending_events: Vec::new(),
onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap::new(),
onchain_tx_handler,
lockdown_from_offchain: false,
- local_tx_signed: false,
+ holder_tx_signed: false,
last_block_hash: Default::default(),
secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
}
/// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
- /// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote
- /// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
+ /// needed by holder commitment transactions HTCLs nor by counterparty ones. Unless we haven't already seen
+ /// counterparty commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
if let Err(()) = self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(idx, secret) {
return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Previous secret did not match new one"));
}
- // Prune HTLCs from the previous remote commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill
+ // Prune HTLCs from the previous counterparty commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill
// events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs.
- if let Some(txid) = self.prev_remote_commitment_txid.take() {
- for &mut (_, ref mut source) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() {
+ if let Some(txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.take() {
+ for &mut (_, ref mut source) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() {
*source = None;
}
}
if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
- let cur_local_signed_commitment_tx = &self.current_local_commitment_tx;
- let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
+ let cur_holder_signed_commitment_tx = &self.current_holder_commitment_tx;
+ let prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
- let remote_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.remote_hash_commitment_number;
+ let counterparty_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number;
self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
- for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
+ for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_holder_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
if k == htlc.payment_hash {
return true
}
}
- if let Some(prev_local_commitment_tx) = prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
- for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
+ if let Some(prev_holder_commitment_tx) = prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
+ for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
if k == htlc.payment_hash {
return true
}
}
}
- let contains = if let Some(cn) = remote_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
+ let contains = if let Some(cn) = counterparty_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
if *cn < min_idx {
return true
}
true
} else { false };
if contains {
- remote_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
+ counterparty_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
}
false
});
Ok(())
}
- /// Informs this monitor of the latest remote (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
+ /// Informs this monitor of the latest counterparty (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
/// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
/// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
/// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
- pub(super) fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info<L: Deref>(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_revocation_point: PublicKey, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
+ pub(super) fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx_info<L: Deref>(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_revocation_point: PublicKey, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
// TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
// so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
// (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
// timeouts)
for &(ref htlc, _) in &htlc_outputs {
- self.remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
+ self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
}
let new_txid = unsigned_commitment_tx.txid();
- log_trace!(logger, "Tracking new remote commitment transaction with txid {} at commitment number {} with {} HTLC outputs", new_txid, commitment_number, htlc_outputs.len());
- log_trace!(logger, "New potential remote commitment transaction: {}", encode::serialize_hex(unsigned_commitment_tx));
- self.prev_remote_commitment_txid = self.current_remote_commitment_txid.take();
- self.current_remote_commitment_txid = Some(new_txid);
- self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(new_txid, htlc_outputs.clone());
- self.current_remote_commitment_number = commitment_number;
- //TODO: Merge this into the other per-remote-transaction output storage stuff
+ log_trace!(logger, "Tracking new counterparty commitment transaction with txid {} at commitment number {} with {} HTLC outputs", new_txid, commitment_number, htlc_outputs.len());
+ log_trace!(logger, "New potential counterparty commitment transaction: {}", encode::serialize_hex(unsigned_commitment_tx));
+ self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.take();
+ self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid = Some(new_txid);
+ self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(new_txid, htlc_outputs.clone());
+ self.current_counterparty_commitment_number = commitment_number;
+ //TODO: Merge this into the other per-counterparty-transaction output storage stuff
match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
Some(old_points) => {
if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
htlcs.push(htlc.0);
}
}
- self.remote_tx_cache.per_htlc.insert(new_txid, htlcs);
+ self.counterparty_tx_cache.per_htlc.insert(new_txid, htlcs);
}
- /// Informs this monitor of the latest local (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
+ /// Informs this monitor of the latest holder (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
/// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
/// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
- /// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated.
- /// Panics if set_on_local_tx_csv has never been called.
- pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, commitment_tx: LocalCommitmentTransaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
- if self.local_tx_signed {
- return Err(MonitorUpdateError("A local commitment tx has already been signed, no new local commitment txn can be sent to our counterparty"));
- }
+ /// up-to-date as our holder commitment transaction is updated.
+ /// Panics if set_on_holder_tx_csv has never been called.
+ pub(super) fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
let sequence = commitment_tx.unsigned_tx.input[0].sequence as u64;
let locktime = commitment_tx.unsigned_tx.lock_time as u64;
- let mut new_local_commitment_tx = LocalSignedTx {
+ let mut new_holder_commitment_tx = HolderSignedTx {
txid,
- revocation_key: commitment_tx.local_keys.revocation_key,
- a_htlc_key: commitment_tx.local_keys.a_htlc_key,
- b_htlc_key: commitment_tx.local_keys.b_htlc_key,
- delayed_payment_key: commitment_tx.local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key,
- per_commitment_point: commitment_tx.local_keys.per_commitment_point,
+ revocation_key: commitment_tx.keys.revocation_key,
+ a_htlc_key: commitment_tx.keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
+ b_htlc_key: commitment_tx.keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
+ delayed_payment_key: commitment_tx.keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
+ per_commitment_point: commitment_tx.keys.per_commitment_point,
feerate_per_kw: commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw,
htlc_outputs: htlc_outputs,
};
- // Returning a monitor error before updating tracking points means in case of using
- // a concurrent watchtower implementation for same channel, if this one doesn't
- // reject update as we do, you MAY have the latest local valid commitment tx onchain
- // for which you want to spend outputs. We're NOT robust again this scenario right
- // now but we should consider it later.
- if let Err(_) = self.onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_local_tx(commitment_tx) {
- return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Local commitment signed has already been signed, no further update of LOCAL commitment transaction is allowed"));
- }
- self.current_local_commitment_number = 0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((sequence & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (locktime as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
- mem::swap(&mut new_local_commitment_tx, &mut self.current_local_commitment_tx);
- self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(new_local_commitment_tx);
+ self.onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_holder_tx(commitment_tx);
+ self.current_holder_commitment_number = 0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((sequence & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (locktime as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
+ mem::swap(&mut new_holder_commitment_tx, &mut self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
+ self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = Some(new_holder_commitment_tx);
+ if self.holder_tx_signed {
+ return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Latest holder commitment signed has already been signed, update is rejected"));
+ }
Ok(())
}
self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
}
- pub(super) fn broadcast_latest_local_commitment_txn<B: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, broadcaster: &B, logger: &L)
+ pub(super) fn broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn<B: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, broadcaster: &B, logger: &L)
where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
L::Target: Logger,
{
- for tx in self.get_latest_local_commitment_txn(logger).iter() {
+ for tx in self.get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger).iter() {
broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
}
- }
-
- /// Used in Channel to cheat wrt the update_ids since it plays games, will be removed soon!
- pub(super) fn update_monitor_ooo<L: Deref>(&mut self, mut updates: ChannelMonitorUpdate, logger: &L) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> where L::Target: Logger {
- for update in updates.updates.drain(..) {
- match update {
- ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, htlc_outputs } => {
- if self.lockdown_from_offchain { panic!(); }
- self.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(commitment_tx, htlc_outputs)?
- },
- ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point } =>
- self.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point, logger),
- ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } =>
- self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage),
- ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } =>
- self.provide_secret(idx, secret)?,
- ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. } => {},
- }
- }
- self.latest_update_id = updates.update_id;
- Ok(())
+ self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(self.funding_info.0));
}
/// Updates a ChannelMonitor on the basis of some new information provided by the Channel
}
for update in updates.updates.drain(..) {
match update {
- ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, htlc_outputs } => {
+ ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, htlc_outputs } => {
if self.lockdown_from_offchain { panic!(); }
- self.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(commitment_tx, htlc_outputs)?
+ self.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx_info(commitment_tx, htlc_outputs)?
},
- ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point } =>
- self.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point, logger),
+ ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point } =>
+ self.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx_info(&unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point, logger),
ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } =>
self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage),
ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } =>
ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } => {
self.lockdown_from_offchain = true;
if should_broadcast {
- self.broadcast_latest_local_commitment_txn(broadcaster, logger);
+ self.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(broadcaster, logger);
} else {
- log_error!(logger, "You have a toxic local commitment transaction avaible in channel monitor, read comment in ChannelMonitor::get_latest_local_commitment_txn to be informed of manual action to take");
+ log_error!(logger, "You have a toxic holder commitment transaction avaible in channel monitor, read comment in ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn to be informed of manual action to take");
}
}
}
}
/// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
- pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> OutPoint {
- self.funding_info.0
+ pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> &(OutPoint, Script) {
+ &self.funding_info
}
/// Gets a list of txids, with their output scripts (in the order they appear in the
/// transaction), which we must learn about spends of via block_connected().
+ ///
+ /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> &HashMap<Txid, Vec<Script>> {
&self.outputs_to_watch
}
/// Generally useful when deserializing as during normal operation the return values of
/// block_connected are sufficient to ensure all relevant outpoints are being monitored (note
/// that the get_funding_txo outpoint and transaction must also be monitored for!).
+ ///
+ /// (C-not exported) as there is no practical way to track lifetimes of returned values.
pub fn get_monitored_outpoints(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, &Script)> {
- let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() * 2);
- for (ref txid, &(_, ref outputs)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
+ let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() * 2);
+ for (ref txid, &(_, ref outputs)) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
res.push(((*txid).clone(), idx as u32, output));
}
}
/// Get the list of HTLCs who's status has been updated on chain. This should be called by
- /// ChannelManager via ManyChannelMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated().
- pub fn get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated(&mut self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate> {
+ /// ChannelManager via ManyChannelMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events().
+ pub fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&mut self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
let mut ret = Vec::new();
- mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_htlcs_updated);
+ mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_monitor_events);
ret
}
/// This is called by ManyChannelMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_events() and is equivalent to
/// EventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_events() except that it requires &mut self as we do
/// no internal locking in ChannelMonitors.
- pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&mut self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
+ pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&mut self) -> Vec<Event> {
let mut ret = Vec::new();
mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_events);
ret
self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret()
}
- pub(super) fn get_cur_remote_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
- self.current_remote_commitment_number
+ pub(super) fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
+ self.current_counterparty_commitment_number
}
- pub(super) fn get_cur_local_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
- self.current_local_commitment_number
+ pub(super) fn get_cur_holder_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
+ self.current_holder_commitment_number
}
- /// Attempts to claim a remote commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
- /// data in remote_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
+ /// Attempts to claim a counterparty commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
+ /// data in counterparty_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
/// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
/// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
/// Return updates for HTLC pending in the channel and failed automatically by the broadcast of
- /// revoked remote commitment tx
- fn check_spend_remote_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, (Txid, Vec<TxOut>)) where L::Target: Logger {
+ /// revoked counterparty commitment tx
+ fn check_spend_counterparty_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, (Txid, Vec<TxOut>)) where L::Target: Logger {
// Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
// a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
- let per_commitment_option = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
+ let per_commitment_option = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
macro_rules! ignore_error {
( $thing : expr ) => {
let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
let revocation_pubkey = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint));
- let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.remote_tx_cache.remote_delayed_payment_base_key));
+ let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key));
- let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.remote_tx_cache.on_remote_tx_csv, &delayed_key);
+ let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv, &delayed_key);
let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
- // First, process non-htlc outputs (to_local & to_remote)
+ // First, process non-htlc outputs (to_holder & to_counterparty)
for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
- let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { per_commitment_point, remote_delayed_payment_base_key: self.remote_tx_cache.remote_delayed_payment_base_key, remote_htlc_base_key: self.remote_tx_cache.remote_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, input_descriptor: InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, amount: outp.value, htlc: None, on_remote_tx_csv: self.remote_tx_cache.on_remote_tx_csv};
- claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height + self.remote_tx_cache.on_remote_tx_csv as u32, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 }, witness_data});
+ let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { per_commitment_point, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, input_descriptor: InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, amount: outp.value, htlc: None, on_counterparty_tx_csv: self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv};
+ claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height + self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 }, witness_data});
}
}
tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
}
- let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { per_commitment_point, remote_delayed_payment_base_key: self.remote_tx_cache.remote_delayed_payment_base_key, remote_htlc_base_key: self.remote_tx_cache.remote_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, input_descriptor: if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC }, amount: tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value, htlc: Some(htlc.clone()), on_remote_tx_csv: self.remote_tx_cache.on_remote_tx_csv};
+ let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { per_commitment_point, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, input_descriptor: if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC }, amount: tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value, htlc: Some(htlc.clone()), on_counterparty_tx_csv: self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv};
claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: transaction_output_index }, witness_data });
}
}
// Last, track onchain revoked commitment transaction and fail backward outgoing HTLCs as payment path is broken
if !claimable_outpoints.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
- // We're definitely a remote commitment transaction!
- log_trace!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, going to generate general spend tx with {} inputs", claimable_outpoints.len());
+ // We're definitely a counterparty commitment transaction!
+ log_trace!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked counterparty commitment transaction, going to generate general spend tx with {} inputs", claimable_outpoints.len());
watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
- self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
+ self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
- if let Some(ref outpoints) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
+ if let Some(ref outpoints) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in outpoints.iter() {
if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
- log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
+ log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} counterparty commitment tx due to broadcast of revoked counterparty commitment transaction, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
let e = entry.get_mut();
}
}
}
- if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_remote_commitment_txid {
+ if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current");
}
- if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_remote_commitment_txid {
- check_htlc_fails!(txid, "remote");
+ if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
+ check_htlc_fails!(txid, "counterparty");
}
- // No need to check local commitment txn, symmetric HTLCSource must be present as per-htlc data on remote commitment tx
+ // No need to check holder commitment txn, symmetric HTLCSource must be present as per-htlc data on counterparty commitment tx
}
} else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
// While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
// revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
// confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
// upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
- // already processed the block, resulting in the remote_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
+ // already processed the block, resulting in the counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
// not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
// insert it here.
watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
- self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
+ self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
- log_trace!(logger, "Got broadcast of non-revoked remote commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
+ log_trace!(logger, "Got broadcast of non-revoked counterparty commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $id: tt) => {
- if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
+ if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
$id: for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
// Check if the HTLC is present in the commitment transaction that was
continue $id;
}
}
- log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of remote commitment transaction", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx);
+ log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} counterparty commitment tx due to broadcast of counterparty commitment transaction", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx);
match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
let e = entry.get_mut();
}
}
}
- if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_remote_commitment_txid {
+ if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current", 'current_loop);
}
- if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_remote_commitment_txid {
+ if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous", 'prev_loop);
}
if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
} else { None };
if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
- self.remote_payment_script = {
+ self.counterparty_payment_script = {
// Note that the Network here is ignored as we immediately drop the address for the
// script_pubkey version
- let payment_hash160 = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.keys.payment_key()).serialize());
+ let payment_hash160 = WPubkeyHash::hash(&self.keys.pubkeys().payment_point.serialize());
Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_hash160[..]).into_script()
};
let preimage = if htlc.offered { if let Some(p) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { Some(*p) } else { None } } else { None };
let aggregable = if !htlc.offered { false } else { true };
if preimage.is_some() || !htlc.offered {
- let witness_data = InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { per_commitment_point: *revocation_point, remote_delayed_payment_base_key: self.remote_tx_cache.remote_delayed_payment_base_key, remote_htlc_base_key: self.remote_tx_cache.remote_htlc_base_key, preimage, htlc: htlc.clone() };
+ let witness_data = InputMaterial::CounterpartyHTLC { per_commitment_point: *revocation_point, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_htlc_base_key, preimage, htlc: htlc.clone() };
claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, aggregable, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: transaction_output_index }, witness_data });
}
}
(claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
}
- /// Attempts to claim a remote HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
- fn check_spend_remote_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, Option<(Txid, Vec<TxOut>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
+ /// Attempts to claim a counterparty HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
+ fn check_spend_counterparty_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, Option<(Txid, Vec<TxOut>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
let htlc_txid = tx.txid();
if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 || tx.input[0].witness.len() != 5 {
return (Vec::new(), None)
let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
- log_trace!(logger, "Remote HTLC broadcast {}:{}", htlc_txid, 0);
- let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { per_commitment_point, remote_delayed_payment_base_key: self.remote_tx_cache.remote_delayed_payment_base_key, remote_htlc_base_key: self.remote_tx_cache.remote_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, input_descriptor: InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, amount: tx.output[0].value, htlc: None, on_remote_tx_csv: self.remote_tx_cache.on_remote_tx_csv };
- let claimable_outpoints = vec!(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height + self.remote_tx_cache.on_remote_tx_csv as u32, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: htlc_txid, vout: 0}, witness_data });
+ log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty HTLC broadcast {}:{}", htlc_txid, 0);
+ let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { per_commitment_point, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, input_descriptor: InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, amount: tx.output[0].value, htlc: None, on_counterparty_tx_csv: self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv };
+ let claimable_outpoints = vec!(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height + self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: htlc_txid, vout: 0}, witness_data });
(claimable_outpoints, Some((htlc_txid, tx.output.clone())))
}
- fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, commitment_tx: &Transaction, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, Vec<TxOut>, Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>) {
- let mut claim_requests = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
- let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
+ fn broadcast_by_holder_state(&self, commitment_tx: &Transaction, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, Vec<TxOut>, Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>) {
+ let mut claim_requests = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
+ let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
- let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.on_local_tx_csv, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key);
- let broadcasted_local_revokable_script = Some((redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh(), local_tx.per_commitment_point.clone(), local_tx.revocation_key.clone()));
+ let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&holder_tx.revocation_key, self.on_holder_tx_csv, &holder_tx.delayed_payment_key);
+ let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = Some((redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh(), holder_tx.per_commitment_point.clone(), holder_tx.revocation_key.clone()));
- for &(ref htlc, _, _) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
+ for &(ref htlc, _, _) in holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
- claim_requests.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: ::std::u32::MAX, aggregable: false, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: local_tx.txid, vout: transaction_output_index as u32 },
- witness_data: InputMaterial::LocalHTLC {
+ claim_requests.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: ::std::u32::MAX, aggregable: false, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: holder_tx.txid, vout: transaction_output_index as u32 },
+ witness_data: InputMaterial::HolderHTLC {
preimage: if !htlc.offered {
if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
Some(preimage.clone())
}
}
- (claim_requests, watch_outputs, broadcasted_local_revokable_script)
+ (claim_requests, watch_outputs, broadcasted_holder_revokable_script)
}
/// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
- /// revoked using data in local_claimable_outpoints.
+ /// revoked using data in holder_claimable_outpoints.
/// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
- fn check_spend_local_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, (Txid, Vec<TxOut>)) where L::Target: Logger {
+ fn check_spend_holder_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, (Txid, Vec<TxOut>)) where L::Target: Logger {
let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
let mut claim_requests = Vec::new();
let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
macro_rules! wait_threshold_conf {
($height: expr, $source: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
- log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} local commitment tx due to broadcast of transaction, waiting confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!($payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
+ log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} holder commitment tx due to broadcast of transaction, waiting confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!($payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry($height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
let e = entry.get_mut();
($updates: expr) => {
claim_requests = $updates.0;
watch_outputs.append(&mut $updates.1);
- self.broadcasted_local_revokable_script = $updates.2;
+ self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = $updates.2;
}
}
- // HTLCs set may differ between last and previous local commitment txn, in case of one them hitting chain, ensure we cancel all HTLCs backward
- let mut is_local_tx = false;
+ // HTLCs set may differ between last and previous holder commitment txn, in case of one them hitting chain, ensure we cancel all HTLCs backward
+ let mut is_holder_tx = false;
- if self.current_local_commitment_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
- is_local_tx = true;
- log_trace!(logger, "Got latest local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
- let mut res = self.broadcast_by_local_state(tx, &self.current_local_commitment_tx);
+ if self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
+ is_holder_tx = true;
+ log_trace!(logger, "Got latest holder commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
+ let mut res = self.broadcast_by_holder_state(tx, &self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
append_onchain_update!(res);
- } else if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
- if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
- is_local_tx = true;
- log_trace!(logger, "Got previous local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
- let mut res = self.broadcast_by_local_state(tx, local_tx);
+ } else if let &Some(ref holder_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
+ if holder_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
+ is_holder_tx = true;
+ log_trace!(logger, "Got previous holder commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
+ let mut res = self.broadcast_by_holder_state(tx, holder_tx);
append_onchain_update!(res);
}
}
macro_rules! fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf {
- ($local_tx: expr) => {
- for &(ref htlc, _, ref source) in &$local_tx.htlc_outputs {
+ ($holder_tx: expr) => {
+ for &(ref htlc, _, ref source) in &$holder_tx.htlc_outputs {
if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() {
if let &Some(ref source) = source {
wait_threshold_conf!(height, source.clone(), "lastest", htlc.payment_hash.clone());
}
}
- if is_local_tx {
- fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(self.current_local_commitment_tx);
- if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
- fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(local_tx);
+ if is_holder_tx {
+ fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
+ if let &Some(ref holder_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
+ fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(holder_tx);
}
}
(claim_requests, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
}
- /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest local state if its copy of
- /// the Channel was out-of-date. You may use it to get a broadcastable local toxic tx in case of
- /// fallen-behind, i.e when receiving a channel_reestablish with a proof that our remote side knows
- /// a higher revocation secret than the local commitment number we are aware of. Broadcasting these
- /// transactions are UNSAFE, as they allow remote side to punish you. Nevertheless you may want to
- /// broadcast them if remote don't close channel with his higher commitment transaction after a
+ /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest holder state if its copy of
+ /// the Channel was out-of-date. You may use it to get a broadcastable holder toxic tx in case of
+ /// fallen-behind, i.e when receiving a channel_reestablish with a proof that our counterparty side knows
+ /// a higher revocation secret than the holder commitment number we are aware of. Broadcasting these
+ /// transactions are UNSAFE, as they allow counterparty side to punish you. Nevertheless you may want to
+ /// broadcast them if counterparty don't close channel with his higher commitment transaction after a
/// substantial amount of time (a month or even a year) to get back funds. Best may be to contact
/// out-of-band the other node operator to coordinate with him if option is available to you.
/// In any-case, choice is up to the user.
- pub fn get_latest_local_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
- log_trace!(logger, "Getting signed latest local commitment transaction!");
- self.local_tx_signed = true;
- if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_local_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript) {
+ pub fn get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
+ log_trace!(logger, "Getting signed latest holder commitment transaction!");
+ self.holder_tx_signed = true;
+ if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript) {
let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
let mut res = vec![commitment_tx];
- for htlc in self.current_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
+ for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
}
}
// We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
- // The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_local_transaction if we get a confirmation.
+ // The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_holder_transaction if we get a confirmation.
return res
}
Vec::new()
}
- /// Unsafe test-only version of get_latest_local_commitment_txn used by our test framework
- /// to bypass LocalCommitmentTransaction state update lockdown after signature and generate
+ /// Unsafe test-only version of get_latest_holder_commitment_txn used by our test framework
+ /// to bypass HolderCommitmentTransaction state update lockdown after signature and generate
/// revoked commitment transaction.
- #[cfg(test)]
- pub fn unsafe_get_latest_local_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
- log_trace!(logger, "Getting signed copy of latest local commitment transaction!");
- if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_copy_local_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript) {
+ #[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
+ pub fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
+ log_trace!(logger, "Getting signed copy of latest holder commitment transaction!");
+ if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_copy_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript) {
let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
let mut res = vec![commitment_tx];
- for htlc in self.current_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
+ for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
/// Eventually this should be pub and, roughly, implement ChainListener, however this requires
/// &mut self, as well as returns new spendable outputs and outpoints to watch for spending of
/// on-chain.
- fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, block_hash: &BlockHash, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L)-> Vec<(Txid, Vec<TxOut>)>
+ fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, txn_matched: &[(usize, &Transaction)], height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L)-> Vec<(Txid, Vec<TxOut>)>
where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
F::Target: FeeEstimator,
L::Target: Logger,
{
- for tx in txn_matched {
+ for &(_, tx) in txn_matched {
let mut output_val = 0;
for out in tx.output.iter() {
if out.value > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
}
}
+ let block_hash = header.block_hash();
log_trace!(logger, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", block_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
+
let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
- for tx in txn_matched {
+ for &(_, tx) in txn_matched {
if tx.input.len() == 1 {
// Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
// commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
if prevout.txid == self.funding_info.0.txid && prevout.vout == self.funding_info.0.index as u32 {
if (tx.input[0].sequence >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 {
- let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(&tx, height, &logger);
+ let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_counterparty_transaction(&tx, height, &logger);
if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
}
if new_outpoints.is_empty() {
- let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_local_transaction(&tx, height, &logger);
+ let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_holder_transaction(&tx, height, &logger);
if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
}
claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
}
} else {
- if let Some(&(commitment_number, _)) = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
- let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs_option) = self.check_spend_remote_htlc(&tx, commitment_number, height, &logger);
+ if let Some(&(commitment_number, _)) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
+ let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs_option) = self.check_spend_counterparty_htlc(&tx, commitment_number, height, &logger);
claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
if let Some(new_outputs) = new_outputs_option {
watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height, aggregable: false, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), vout: self.funding_info.0.index as u32 }, witness_data: InputMaterial::Funding { funding_redeemscript: self.funding_redeemscript.clone() }});
}
if should_broadcast {
- if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_local_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript) {
- let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs, _) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&commitment_tx, &self.current_local_commitment_tx);
+ self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(self.funding_info.0));
+ if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript) {
+ self.holder_tx_signed = true;
+ let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs, _) = self.broadcast_by_holder_state(&commitment_tx, &self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
- watch_outputs.push((self.current_local_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
+ watch_outputs.push((self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
}
claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
}
match ev {
OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update } => {
log_trace!(logger, "HTLC {} failure update has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_bytes!((htlc_update.1).0));
- self.pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate {
+ self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
payment_hash: htlc_update.1,
payment_preimage: None,
source: htlc_update.0,
- });
+ }));
},
OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor } => {
log_trace!(logger, "Descriptor {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_spendable!(descriptor));
- self.pending_events.push(events::Event::SpendableOutputs {
+ self.pending_events.push(Event::SpendableOutputs {
outputs: vec![descriptor]
});
}
}
}
}
+
self.onchain_tx_handler.block_connected(txn_matched, claimable_outpoints, height, &*broadcaster, &*fee_estimator, &*logger);
- self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
+ self.last_block_hash = block_hash;
for &(ref txid, ref output_scripts) in watch_outputs.iter() {
self.outputs_to_watch.insert(txid.clone(), output_scripts.iter().map(|o| o.script_pubkey.clone()).collect());
}
watch_outputs
}
- fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, block_hash: &BlockHash, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L)
+ fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L)
where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
F::Target: FeeEstimator,
L::Target: Logger,
{
+ let block_hash = header.block_hash();
log_trace!(logger, "Block {} at height {} disconnected", block_hash, height);
+
if let Some(_) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1)) {
//We may discard:
//- htlc update there as failure-trigger tx (revoked commitment tx, non-revoked commitment tx, HTLC-timeout tx) has been disconnected
self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
- self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
+ self.last_block_hash = block_hash;
}
- pub(super) fn would_broadcast_at_height<L: Deref>(&self, height: u32, logger: &L) -> bool where L::Target: Logger {
+ fn would_broadcast_at_height<L: Deref>(&self, height: u32, logger: &L) -> bool where L::Target: Logger {
// We need to consider all HTLCs which are:
- // * in any unrevoked remote commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
+ // * in any unrevoked counterparty commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
// transactions and we'd end up in a race, or
- // * are in our latest local commitment transaction, as this is the thing we will
+ // * are in our latest holder commitment transaction, as this is the thing we will
// broadcast if we go on-chain.
// Note that we consider HTLCs which were below dust threshold here - while they don't
// strictly imply that we need to fail the channel, we need to go ahead and fail them back
// updates that peer sends us are update_fails, failing the channel if not. It's probably
// easier to just fail the channel as this case should be rare enough anyway.
macro_rules! scan_commitment {
- ($htlcs: expr, $local_tx: expr) => {
+ ($htlcs: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
for ref htlc in $htlcs {
// For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
// chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
// LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
// The final, above, condition is checked for statically in channelmanager
// with CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2.
- let htlc_outbound = $local_tx == htlc.offered;
+ let htlc_outbound = $holder_tx == htlc.offered;
if ( htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS <= height) ||
(!htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
log_info!(logger, "Force-closing channel due to {} HTLC timeout, HTLC expiry is {}", if htlc_outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound "}, htlc.cltv_expiry);
}
}
- scan_commitment!(self.current_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), true);
+ scan_commitment!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), true);
- if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_remote_commitment_txid {
- if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
+ if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
+ if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
}
}
- if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_remote_commitment_txid {
- if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
+ if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
+ if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
}
}
false
}
- /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a local
- /// or remote commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC
+ /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a holder
+ /// or counterparty commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC
fn is_resolving_htlc_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
let mut payment_data = None;
let offered_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC);
macro_rules! log_claim {
- ($tx_info: expr, $local_tx: expr, $htlc: expr, $source_avail: expr) => {
+ ($tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr, $htlc: expr, $source_avail: expr) => {
// We found the output in question, but aren't failing it backwards
- // as we have no corresponding source and no valid remote commitment txid
+ // as we have no corresponding source and no valid counterparty commitment txid
// to try a weak source binding with same-hash, same-value still-valid offered HTLC.
// This implies either it is an inbound HTLC or an outbound HTLC on a revoked transaction.
- let outbound_htlc = $local_tx == $htlc.offered;
- if ($local_tx && revocation_sig_claim) ||
+ let outbound_htlc = $holder_tx == $htlc.offered;
+ if ($holder_tx && revocation_sig_claim) ||
(outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) {
log_error!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
$tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
}
}
- macro_rules! check_htlc_valid_remote {
- ($remote_txid: expr, $htlc_output: expr) => {
- if let Some(txid) = $remote_txid {
- for &(ref pending_htlc, ref pending_source) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
+ macro_rules! check_htlc_valid_counterparty {
+ ($counterparty_txid: expr, $htlc_output: expr) => {
+ if let Some(txid) = $counterparty_txid {
+ for &(ref pending_htlc, ref pending_source) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
if pending_htlc.payment_hash == $htlc_output.payment_hash && pending_htlc.amount_msat == $htlc_output.amount_msat {
if let &Some(ref source) = pending_source {
- log_claim!("revoked remote commitment tx", false, pending_htlc, true);
+ log_claim!("revoked counterparty commitment tx", false, pending_htlc, true);
payment_data = Some(((**source).clone(), $htlc_output.payment_hash));
break;
}
}
macro_rules! scan_commitment {
- ($htlcs: expr, $tx_info: expr, $local_tx: expr) => {
+ ($htlcs: expr, $tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
for (ref htlc_output, source_option) in $htlcs {
if Some(input.previous_output.vout) == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
if let Some(ref source) = source_option {
- log_claim!($tx_info, $local_tx, htlc_output, true);
+ log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, true);
// We have a resolution of an HTLC either from one of our latest
- // local commitment transactions or an unrevoked remote commitment
+ // holder commitment transactions or an unrevoked counterparty commitment
// transaction. This implies we either learned a preimage, the HTLC
// has timed out, or we screwed up. In any case, we should now
// resolve the source HTLC with the original sender.
payment_data = Some(((*source).clone(), htlc_output.payment_hash));
- } else if !$local_tx {
- check_htlc_valid_remote!(self.current_remote_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
+ } else if !$holder_tx {
+ check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
if payment_data.is_none() {
- check_htlc_valid_remote!(self.prev_remote_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
+ check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
}
}
if payment_data.is_none() {
- log_claim!($tx_info, $local_tx, htlc_output, false);
+ log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, false);
continue 'outer_loop;
}
}
}
}
- if input.previous_output.txid == self.current_local_commitment_tx.txid {
- scan_commitment!(self.current_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
- "our latest local commitment tx", true);
+ if input.previous_output.txid == self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
+ scan_commitment!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
+ "our latest holder commitment tx", true);
}
- if let Some(ref prev_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
- if input.previous_output.txid == prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
- scan_commitment!(prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
- "our previous local commitment tx", true);
+ if let Some(ref prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
+ if input.previous_output.txid == prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
+ scan_commitment!(prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
+ "our previous holder commitment tx", true);
}
}
- if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
+ if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, ref b)| (a, (b.as_ref().clone()).map(|boxed| &**boxed))),
- "remote commitment tx", false);
+ "counterparty commitment tx", false);
}
// Check that scan_commitment, above, decided there is some source worth relaying an
if let Some((source, payment_hash)) = payment_data {
let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
if accepted_preimage_claim {
- if !self.pending_htlcs_updated.iter().any(|update| update.source == source) {
+ if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
+ |update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update { upd.source == source } else { false }) {
payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[3]);
- self.pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate {
+ self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
source,
payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
payment_hash
- });
+ }));
}
} else if offered_preimage_claim {
- if !self.pending_htlcs_updated.iter().any(|update| update.source == source) {
+ if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
+ |update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update {
+ upd.source == source
+ } else { false }) {
payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[1]);
- self.pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate {
+ self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
source,
payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
payment_hash
- });
+ }));
}
} else {
log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
fn is_paying_spendable_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
let mut spendable_output = None;
for (i, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() { // There is max one spendable output for any channel tx, including ones generated by us
+ if i > ::std::u16::MAX as usize {
+ // While it is possible that an output exists on chain which is greater than the
+ // 2^16th output in a given transaction, this is only possible if the output is not
+ // in a lightning transaction and was instead placed there by some third party who
+ // wishes to give us money for no reason.
+ // Namely, any lightning transactions which we pre-sign will never have anywhere
+ // near 2^16 outputs both because such transactions must have ~2^16 outputs who's
+ // scripts are not longer than one byte in length and because they are inherently
+ // non-standard due to their size.
+ // Thus, it is completely safe to ignore such outputs, and while it may result in
+ // us ignoring non-lightning fund to us, that is only possible if someone fills
+ // nearly a full block with garbage just to hit this case.
+ continue;
+ }
if outp.script_pubkey == self.destination_script {
spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
- outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: i as u32 },
+ outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
output: outp.clone(),
});
break;
- } else if let Some(ref broadcasted_local_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_local_revokable_script {
- if broadcasted_local_revokable_script.0 == outp.script_pubkey {
+ } else if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
+ if broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0 == outp.script_pubkey {
spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH {
- outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: i as u32 },
- per_commitment_point: broadcasted_local_revokable_script.1,
- to_self_delay: self.on_local_tx_csv,
+ outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
+ per_commitment_point: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1,
+ to_self_delay: self.on_holder_tx_csv,
output: outp.clone(),
key_derivation_params: self.keys.key_derivation_params(),
- remote_revocation_pubkey: broadcasted_local_revokable_script.2.clone(),
+ revocation_pubkey: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.2.clone(),
});
break;
}
- } else if self.remote_payment_script == outp.script_pubkey {
- spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutputRemotePayment {
- outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: i as u32 },
+ } else if self.counterparty_payment_script == outp.script_pubkey {
+ spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutputCounterpartyPayment {
+ outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
output: outp.clone(),
key_derivation_params: self.keys.key_derivation_params(),
});
break;
} else if outp.script_pubkey == self.shutdown_script {
spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
- outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: i as u32 },
+ outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
output: outp.clone(),
});
}
let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let broadcasted_local_revokable_script = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
+ let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
0 => {
let revokable_address = Readable::read(reader)?;
let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
1 => { None },
_ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
};
- let remote_payment_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let counterparty_payment_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
let shutdown_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
let keys = Readable::read(reader)?;
index: Readable::read(reader)?,
};
let funding_info = (outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?);
- let current_remote_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let prev_remote_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let current_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let prev_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let remote_tx_cache = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let counterparty_tx_cache = Readable::read(reader)?;
let funding_redeemscript = Readable::read(reader)?;
let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
}
};
- let on_local_tx_csv: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let on_holder_tx_csv: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
}
}
- let remote_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut remote_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
- for _ in 0..remote_claimable_outpoints_len {
+ let counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut counterparty_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
+ for _ in 0..counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len {
let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
htlcs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable>::read(reader)?.map(|o: HTLCSource| Box::new(o))));
}
- if let Some(_) = remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs) {
+ if let Some(_) = counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs) {
return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
}
}
- let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
- for _ in 0..remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
+ let counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
+ for _ in 0..counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
let outputs_count = <u64 as Readable>::read(reader)?;
for _ in 0..outputs_count {
outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
}
- if let Some(_) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, (commitment_number, outputs)) {
+ if let Some(_) = counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, (commitment_number, outputs)) {
return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
}
}
- let remote_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut remote_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
- for _ in 0..remote_hash_commitment_number_len {
+ let counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut counterparty_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
+ for _ in 0..counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len {
let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
- if let Some(_) = remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(payment_hash, commitment_number) {
+ if let Some(_) = counterparty_hash_commitment_number.insert(payment_hash, commitment_number) {
return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
}
}
- macro_rules! read_local_tx {
+ macro_rules! read_holder_tx {
() => {
{
let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
let b_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
let delayed_payment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let feerate_per_kw: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let feerate_per_kw: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
let htlcs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
htlcs.push((htlc, sigs, Readable::read(reader)?));
}
- LocalSignedTx {
+ HolderSignedTx {
txid,
revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, per_commitment_point, feerate_per_kw,
htlc_outputs: htlcs
}
}
- let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
+ let prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
0 => None,
1 => {
- Some(read_local_tx!())
+ Some(read_holder_tx!())
},
_ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
};
- let current_local_commitment_tx = read_local_tx!();
+ let current_holder_commitment_tx = read_holder_tx!();
- let current_remote_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
- let current_local_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
+ let current_counterparty_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
+ let current_holder_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
}
}
- let pending_htlcs_updated_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut pending_htlcs_updated = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_htlcs_updated_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (32 + 8*3)));
- for _ in 0..pending_htlcs_updated_len {
- pending_htlcs_updated.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
+ let pending_monitor_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut pending_monitor_events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_monitor_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (32 + 8*3)));
+ for _ in 0..pending_monitor_events_len {
+ let ev = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
+ 0 => MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(Readable::read(reader)?),
+ 1 => MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(funding_info.0),
+ _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
+ };
+ pending_monitor_events.push(ev);
}
let pending_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut pending_events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
+ let mut pending_events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<Event>()));
for _ in 0..pending_events_len {
if let Some(event) = MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
pending_events.push(event);
let onchain_tx_handler = Readable::read(reader)?;
let lockdown_from_offchain = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let local_tx_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let holder_tx_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), ChannelMonitor {
latest_update_id,
commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
destination_script,
- broadcasted_local_revokable_script,
- remote_payment_script,
+ broadcasted_holder_revokable_script,
+ counterparty_payment_script,
shutdown_script,
keys,
funding_info,
- current_remote_commitment_txid,
- prev_remote_commitment_txid,
+ current_counterparty_commitment_txid,
+ prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
- remote_tx_cache,
+ counterparty_tx_cache,
funding_redeemscript,
channel_value_satoshis,
their_cur_revocation_points,
- on_local_tx_csv,
+ on_holder_tx_csv,
commitment_secrets,
- remote_claimable_outpoints,
- remote_commitment_txn_on_chain,
- remote_hash_commitment_number,
+ counterparty_claimable_outpoints,
+ counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain,
+ counterparty_hash_commitment_number,
- prev_local_signed_commitment_tx,
- current_local_commitment_tx,
- current_remote_commitment_number,
- current_local_commitment_number,
+ prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx,
+ current_holder_commitment_tx,
+ current_counterparty_commitment_number,
+ current_holder_commitment_number,
payment_preimages,
- pending_htlcs_updated,
+ pending_monitor_events,
pending_events,
onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf,
onchain_tx_handler,
lockdown_from_offchain,
- local_tx_signed,
+ holder_tx_signed,
last_block_hash,
secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
use ln::onchaintx::{OnchainTxHandler, InputDescriptors};
use ln::chan_utils;
- use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, LocalCommitmentTransaction};
+ use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, HolderCommitmentTransaction};
use util::test_utils::TestLogger;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
- use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
use std::sync::Arc;
use chain::keysinterface::InMemoryChannelKeys;
let mut preimages = Vec::new();
{
- let mut rng = thread_rng();
- for _ in 0..20 {
- let mut preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
- rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage.0[..]);
+ for i in 0..20 {
+ let preimage = PaymentPreimage([i; 32]);
let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
preimages.push((preimage, hash));
}
}
}
}
- macro_rules! preimages_to_local_htlcs {
+ macro_rules! preimages_to_holder_htlcs {
($preimages_slice: expr) => {
{
let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
(0, 0)
);
- // Prune with one old state and a local commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
+ // Prune with one old state and a holder commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
// old state.
let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(keys,
&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap()), 0, &Script::new(),
(OutPoint { txid: Txid::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }, Script::new()),
&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap()),
&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()),
- 10, Script::new(), 46, 0, LocalCommitmentTransaction::dummy());
+ 10, Script::new(), 46, 0, HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy());
- monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(LocalCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10])).unwrap();
- monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key, &logger);
- monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key, &logger);
- monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key, &logger);
- monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key, &logger);
+ monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx_info(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..10])).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key, &logger);
+ monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key, &logger);
+ monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key, &logger);
+ monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key, &logger);
for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage);
}
test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
- // Now update local commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
+ // Now update holder commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
// previous commitment tx's preimages too
- monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(LocalCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5])).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx_info(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..5])).unwrap();
secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12);
test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
// But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
- monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(LocalCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3])).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx_info(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..3])).unwrap();
secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5);
let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
macro_rules! sign_input {
- ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $idx: expr, $amount: expr, $input_type: expr, $sum_actual_sigs: expr) => {
+ ($sighash_parts: expr, $idx: expr, $amount: expr, $input_type: expr, $sum_actual_sigs: expr) => {
let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
offered: if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC { true } else { false },
amount_msat: 0,
cltv_expiry: 2 << 16,
payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
- transaction_output_index: Some($idx),
+ transaction_output_index: Some($idx as u32),
};
let redeem_script = if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput { chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&pubkey, 256, &pubkey) } else { chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &pubkey, &pubkey, &pubkey) };
- let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeem_script, $amount)[..]);
+ let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.signature_hash($idx, &redeem_script, $amount, SigHashType::All)[..]);
let sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &privkey);
- $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
- $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
- sum_actual_sigs += $input.witness[0].len();
+ $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
+ $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
+ sum_actual_sigs += $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[0].len();
if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput {
- $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
+ $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(vec!(1));
} else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC {
- $input.witness.push(pubkey.clone().serialize().to_vec());
+ $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(pubkey.clone().serialize().to_vec());
} else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC {
- $input.witness.push(vec![0]);
+ $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(vec![0]);
} else {
- $input.witness.push(PaymentPreimage([1; 32]).0.to_vec());
+ $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(PaymentPreimage([1; 32]).0.to_vec());
}
- $input.witness.push(redeem_script.into_bytes());
- println!("witness[0] {}", $input.witness[0].len());
- println!("witness[1] {}", $input.witness[1].len());
- println!("witness[2] {}", $input.witness[2].len());
+ $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(redeem_script.into_bytes());
+ println!("witness[0] {}", $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[0].len());
+ println!("witness[1] {}", $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[1].len());
+ println!("witness[2] {}", $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[2].len());
}
}
let script_pubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script();
let txid = Txid::from_hex("56944c5d3f98413ef45cf54545538103cc9f298e0575820ad3591376e2e0f65d").unwrap();
- // Justice tx with 1 to_local, 2 revoked offered HTLCs, 1 revoked received HTLCs
+ // Justice tx with 1 to_holder, 2 revoked offered HTLCs, 1 revoked received HTLCs
let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
for i in 0..4 {
claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
value: 0,
});
let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
- let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC];
- for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
- sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
+ {
+ let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
+ for (idx, inp) in inputs_des.iter().enumerate() {
+ sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs);
+ }
}
assert_eq!(base_weight + OnchainTxHandler::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
});
}
let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
- let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC];
- for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
- sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
+ {
+ let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
+ for (idx, inp) in inputs_des.iter().enumerate() {
+ sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs);
+ }
}
assert_eq!(base_weight + OnchainTxHandler::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
witness: Vec::new(),
});
let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
- let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput];
- for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
- sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
+ {
+ let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
+ for (idx, inp) in inputs_des.iter().enumerate() {
+ sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs);
+ }
}
assert_eq!(base_weight + OnchainTxHandler::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
}
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff