let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 0);
}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
+ // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
+ // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
+
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
+ let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 3000000, 30).unwrap();
+ send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
+
+ let revoked_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+ // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
+ assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
+ assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
+ let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
+
+ let mut penalty_sum = 0;
+ for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
+ if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
+ penalty_sum += outp.value;
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
+ let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1].block_notifier, 114, 0, false, Default::default());
+
+ // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage, 3_000_000);
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_114, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ nodes[1].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()] }, 115);
+
+ // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
+ let penalty_1;
+ let feerate_1;
+ {
+ let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor) * 2 (block-reparsing) + local commitment tx + local HTLC-timeout (broadcasted from ChannelManager)
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0].clone());
+ let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
+ feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
+ penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
+ node_txn.clear();
+ };
+
+ // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
+ let header = connect_blocks(&nodes[1].block_notifier, 3, 115, true, header.bitcoin_hash());
+ let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
+ let mut feerate_2 = 0;
+ {
+ let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
+ if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0].clone());
+ penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
+ // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
+ assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
+ let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
+ feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
+ // Verify 25% bump heuristic
+ assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
+ node_txn.clear();
+ }
+ }
+ assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
+
+ // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1].block_notifier, 3, 118, true, header);
+ let penalty_3;
+ let mut feerate_3 = 0;
+ {
+ let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
+ if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0].clone());
+ penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
+ // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
+ assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
+ let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
+ feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
+ // Verify 25% bump heuristic
+ assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
+ node_txn.clear();
+ }
+ }
+ assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
+
+ nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
+ // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
+ // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
+
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ // Lock HTLC in both directions
+ let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3_000_000).0;
+ route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000).0;
+
+ let revoked_local_txn = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+ assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
+
+ // Revoke local commitment tx
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage, 3_000_000);
+
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
+ nodes[1].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]);
+
+ let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 6);
+ if revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len() == ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT {
+ assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
+ assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
+ } else {
+ assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
+ assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
+ }
+
+ // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
+ let header_129 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0].block_notifier, 128, 1, true, header.bitcoin_hash());
+ let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_129, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ nodes[0].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header: header_130, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()] }, 130);
+ let first;
+ let second;
+ let feerate_1;
+ let feerate_2;
+ {
+ let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 9); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx * 2 (block-rescan) + A commitment tx + 2 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
+ // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[7].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[7].output.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[7], revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone());
+ first = node_txn[7].txid();
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[8].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[8].output.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[8], revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone());
+ second = node_txn[8].txid();
+ // Store both feerates for later comparison
+ let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value - node_txn[7].output[0].value;
+ feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[7].get_weight() as u64;
+ let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[1].output[0].value - node_txn[8].output[0].value;
+ feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[8].get_weight() as u64;
+ node_txn.clear();
+ }
+
+ // Connect three more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
+ let header_133 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0].block_notifier, 3, 130, true, header_130.bitcoin_hash());
+ let node_txn = {
+ let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); // 2 first tx : bumped claiming txn on Revoked Commitment Tx + 2 last tx : bumped claiming txn on Revoked HTLCs Txn
+ check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
+ check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[3].output.len(), 1);
+ // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
+ if node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
+ check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone());
+ assert_ne!(first, node_txn[2].txid());
+ let fee = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value - node_txn[2].output[0].value;
+ let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[2].get_weight() as u64;
+ assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
+
+ check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone());
+ assert_ne!(second, node_txn[3].txid());
+ let fee = revoked_htlc_txn[1].output[0].value - node_txn[3].output[0].value;
+ let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[3].get_weight() as u64;
+ assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_2 * 125);
+ } else if node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid() {
+ check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone());
+ assert_ne!(second, node_txn[2].txid());
+ let fee = revoked_htlc_txn[1].output[0].value - node_txn[2].output[0].value;
+ let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[2].get_weight() as u64;
+ assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_2 * 125);
+
+ check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone());
+ assert_ne!(first, node_txn[3].txid());
+ let fee = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value - node_txn[3].output[0].value;
+ let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[3].get_weight() as u64;
+ assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
+ } else { assert!(false) }
+ let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone(), node_txn[3].clone()];
+ node_txn.clear();
+ txn
+ };
+ // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
+ let header_134 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_133, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ nodes[0].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header: header_134, txdata: node_txn }, 134);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0].block_notifier, 6, 134, true, header_134.bitcoin_hash());
+ {
+ let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ node_txn.clear();
+ }
+
+ // Connect few more blocks and check only penalty transaction for to_local output have been issued
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0].block_notifier, 5, 140, true, header_134.bitcoin_hash());
+ {
+ let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
+ node_txn.clear();
+ }
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0]);
+}
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff