use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, EcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource};
use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PathFailure, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
-use crate::ln::channel::{commitment_tx_base_weight, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT};
+use crate::ln::channel::{commitment_tx_base_weight, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel};
use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS, DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA};
-use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
+use crate::ln::channel::{DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS, ChannelError};
use crate::ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
use crate::ln::chan_utils::{OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
use crate::routing::gossip::{NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate};
use crate::routing::router::{Path, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, find_route, get_route};
-use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures};
+use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, NodeFeatures};
use crate::ln::msgs;
use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
use crate::util::errors::APIError;
use crate::util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
-use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
+use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
// Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
// funding satoshis
let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
- let channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat, &cfg);
+ let channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat, &cfg);
let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
// Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
// Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
let feerate_per_kw = 253;
- let opt_anchors = false;
- push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 4 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
- push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
+ let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
+ push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 4 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
+ push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, if send_from_initiator { 0 } else { push_amt }, 42, None).unwrap();
let mut open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
let counterparty_node = if send_from_initiator { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
let mut sender_node_per_peer_lock;
let mut sender_node_peer_state_lock;
- let mut chan = get_channel_ref!(sender_node, counterparty_node, sender_node_per_peer_lock, sender_node_peer_state_lock, temp_channel_id);
- chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
- chan.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
+ if send_from_initiator {
+ let chan = get_inbound_v1_channel_ref!(sender_node, counterparty_node, sender_node_per_peer_lock, sender_node_peer_state_lock, temp_channel_id);
+ chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
+ chan.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
+ } else {
+ let chan = get_outbound_v1_channel_ref!(sender_node, counterparty_node, sender_node_per_peer_lock, sender_node_peer_state_lock, temp_channel_id);
+ chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
+ chan.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
+ }
}
let funding_tx = sign_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100_000, temp_channel_id);
// Note that for outbound channels we have to consider the commitment tx fee and the
// "fee spike buffer", which is currently a multiple of the total commitment tx fee as
// well as an additional HTLC.
- - FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, 2, opt_anchors));
+ - FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, 2, &channel_type_features));
} else {
send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], push_amt);
}
let channel_id = chan.2;
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
let default_config = UserConfig::default();
- let bs_channel_reserve_sats = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value, &default_config);
+ let bs_channel_reserve_sats = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value, &default_config);
- let opt_anchors = false;
+ let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
// Calculate the maximum feerate that A can afford. Note that we don't send an update_fee
// CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER HTLCs before actually running out of local balance, so we
// calculate two different feerates here - the expected local limit as well as the expected
// remote limit.
- let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
- let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors)) as u32;
+ let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
+ let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features)) as u32;
{
let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
*feerate_lock = feerate;
//We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here
assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2);
- let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000;
+ let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0, &channel_type_features) / 1000;
let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
push_sats,
- channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000,
- opt_anchors, local_funding, remote_funding,
+ channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0, &channel_type_features) / 1000,
+ local_funding, remote_funding,
commit_tx_keys.clone(),
non_buffer_feerate + 4,
&mut htlcs,
- &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
+ &local_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
);
local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
};
create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
+ // Fetch a route in advance as we will be unable to once we're unable to send.
+ let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
+
let mut payments = Vec::new();
for _ in 0..50 {
let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
// There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
// the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
// another HTLC.
- let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
{
unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_1,
RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)
- ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
- assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
+ ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs", 1);
}
// This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
// The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
- let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2), 1 + 1, get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2));
+ let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2), 1 + 1, &get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2));
let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
- let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send + 1);
+ let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) =
+ get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
+ route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).err().unwrap();
match err {
PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedResendSafe(ref fails) => {
- match &fails[0] {
- &APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ref err} =>
- assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)),
- _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
- }
+ if let &APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. } = &fails[0] {}
+ else { panic!("Unexpected error variant"); }
},
_ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
}
assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value", 1);
send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
}
let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
- let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460001);
+ let (mut route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) =
+ get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460000);
+ route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat += 1;
// Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
payment_hash: payment_hash,
cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
+ skimmed_fee_msat: None,
};
nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
commitment_number,
95000,
local_chan_balance,
- local_chan.opt_anchors(), local_funding, remote_funding,
+ local_funding, remote_funding,
commit_tx_keys.clone(),
feerate_per_kw,
&mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
- &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
+ &local_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
);
local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
};
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
let default_config = UserConfig::default();
- let opt_anchors = false;
+ let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
- push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
+ push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, &channel_type_features);
- push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
+ push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt);
+ // Fetch a route in advance as we will be unable to once we're unable to send.
+ let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
// Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
}
// However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
- let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
- ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
- assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
+ ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
}
#[test]
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
let default_config = UserConfig::default();
- let opt_anchors = false;
+ let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
// Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
// channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
// transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
- push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
- push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
+ push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, &channel_type_features);
+ push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt);
// Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
}
- let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 700_000);
+ let (mut route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) =
+ get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1000);
+ route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = 700_000;
// Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
payment_hash: payment_hash,
cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
+ skimmed_fee_msat: None,
};
nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
let default_config = UserConfig::default();
- let opt_anchors = false;
+ let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
// Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
// channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
// transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
- push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
- push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
+ push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, &channel_type_features);
+ push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt);
let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
- + feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
+ + feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
// In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
// reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
// commitment transaction fee.
}
// One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
- let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt + 1);
+ let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) =
+ get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt);
+ route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat += 1;
unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
- ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
- assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
+ ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
}
#[test]
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
let default_config = UserConfig::default();
- let opt_anchors = false;
+ let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
// Set the push_msat amount such that nodes[0] will not be able to afford to add even a single
// HTLC.
let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
- push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
+ push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, &channel_type_features);
assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None).unwrap_err(),
APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding amount (356) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of 357.".to_string() });
// During open, we don't have a "counterparty channel reserve" to check against, so that
// requirement only comes into play on the open_channel handling side.
- push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
+ push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None).unwrap();
let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
open_channel_msg.push_msat += 1;
let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
- let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
+ let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
// Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
- let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
+ let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, &channel_type_features);
let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
// Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
- let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2, opt_anchors);
+ let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2, &channel_type_features);
let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
- let (route_2, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_2);
+ let mut route_2 = route_1.clone();
+ route_2.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat = amt_msat_2;
// Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
+ skimmed_fee_msat: None,
};
nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
- let reserve = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config);
+ let reserve = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config);
assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
}
-fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
- (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
+fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
+ (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
}
#[test]
let feemsat = 239; // set above
let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
- let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
+ let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
- ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
- assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
+ ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept", 1);
}
// channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
// 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
// Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
// ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
- let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
+ let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, &channel_type_features);
let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
break;
// the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
// is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
// policy.
- let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
+ let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, &channel_type_features);
let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
// channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
{
- let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_2 + 1);
+ let mut route = route_1.clone();
+ route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat = recv_value_2 + 1;
+ let (_, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[2]);
unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
- ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
- assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
+ ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
}
// split the rest to test holding cell
- let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
+ let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, &channel_type_features);
let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
// test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
{
- let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22+1);
+ let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) =
+ get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
+ route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
- ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
- assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
+ ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value", 2);
}
let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
- let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1, opt_anchors);
+ let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1, &channel_type_features);
let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
- let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
+ let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, &channel_type_features);
let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
// The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
// well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
nodes[2].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
- .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
+ .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
} else { 3000000 };
let (_, first_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
payment_hash,
cltv_expiry,
onion_routing_packet,
+ skimmed_fee_msat: None,
};
nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
}
nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
- check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
+ check_closed_event(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer, false);
+ check_closed_event(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer, false);
}
#[test]
nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
+ features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, true).unwrap();
let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
- nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
+ features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, false).unwrap();
let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id())
- .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan_2_3.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
+ .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan_2_3.2).unwrap().context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
// 0th HTLC:
let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
// 1st HTLC:
let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
- let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
+ let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
// 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
- let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
+ let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, &channel_type_features);
let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
// Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
- let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
- hex::encode(our_payment_hash.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
- nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
// Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
- let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
+ let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
// 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
let amt_1 = 20000;
- let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors) - amt_1;
+ let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, &channel_type_features) - amt_1;
let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
- let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
- hex::encode(payment_hash_2.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
- nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
// Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
- // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
- // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
+ // Avoid having to include routing fees in calculations
let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
- config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
+ config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 0;
+ config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = 0;
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
- let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
+ let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
// Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
- let feemsat = 239;
- let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
- let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors) - total_routing_fee_msat;
+ let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, &channel_type_features);
let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
let payment_event = {
nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
- ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
- assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
+ ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value", 1);
}
#[test]
let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0);
let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
- .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
+ .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
+ // Fetch a route in advance as we will be unable to once we're unable to send.
+ let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
let payment_event = {
expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
}
- let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
- ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
- assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
+ ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs", 1);
}
#[test]
route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = max_in_flight + 1;
unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
- ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
- assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
-
+ ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept", 1);
send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
}
let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
let channel = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
- htlc_minimum_msat = channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
+ htlc_minimum_msat = channel.context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
}
let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
- let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
+ let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
// The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
- let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
+ let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, &channel_type_features);
let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
- let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3999999);
+ let send_amt = 3999999;
+ let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) =
+ get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000);
+ route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = send_amt;
let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(
- &route.paths[0], 3999999, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
+ &route.paths[0], send_amt, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash).unwrap();
let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
+ skimmed_fee_msat: None,
};
for i in 0..50 {
//Disconnect and Reconnect
nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
+ features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, true).unwrap();
let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
- nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
+ features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, false).unwrap();
let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
- .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
+ .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
// We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
- .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
+ .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, _payment_secret_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
- // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_outbound()
- if let Err(error) = Channel::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
+ // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in OutboundV1Channel::new()
+ if let Err(error) = OutboundV1Channel::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
&nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), 1000000, 1000000, 0,
&low_our_to_self_config, 0, 42)
{
}
} else { assert!(false) }
- // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
+ // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in InboundV1Channel::new()
nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
- if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
+ if let Err(error) = InboundV1Channel::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
&nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].node.channel_type_features(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
&low_our_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
{
} else { panic!(); }
check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg });
- // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
+ // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in InboundV1Channel::new()
nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
- if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
+ if let Err(error) = InboundV1Channel::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
&nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].node.channel_type_features(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
&high_their_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
{
}
}
// Reconnect peers
- nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
+ features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, true).unwrap();
let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
- nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
+ features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, false).unwrap();
let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
}
}
-#[test]
-fn test_pending_claimed_htlc_no_balance_underflow() {
- // Tests that if we have a pending outbound HTLC as well as a claimed-but-not-fully-removed
- // HTLC we will not underflow when we call `Channel::get_balance_msat()`.
- let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
- let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
- let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
- let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0);
-
- let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_010_000);
- nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
- expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_010_000);
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- let fulfill_ev = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
-
- nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
- expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
- nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.commitment_signed);
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- let (_raa, _cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
-
- // At this point nodes[1] has received 1,010k msat (10k msat more than their reserve) and can
- // send an HTLC back (though it will go in the holding cell). Send an HTLC back and check we
- // can get our balance.
-
- // Get a route from nodes[1] to nodes[0] by getting a route going the other way and then flip
- // the public key of the only hop. This works around ChannelDetails not showing the
- // almost-claimed HTLC as available balance.
- let (mut route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000);
- route.payment_params = None; // This is all wrong, but unnecessary
- route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
- let (_, payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
- nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_2,
- RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
-
- assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].balance_msat, 1_000_000);
-}
-
#[test]
fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
// Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
let accept_chan_msg = {
let mut node_1_per_peer_lock;
let mut node_1_peer_state_lock;
- let channel = get_channel_ref!(&nodes[1], nodes[0], node_1_per_peer_lock, node_1_peer_state_lock, temp_channel_id);
+ let channel = get_inbound_v1_channel_ref!(&nodes[1], nodes[0], node_1_per_peer_lock, node_1_peer_state_lock, temp_channel_id);
channel.get_accept_channel_message()
};
nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan_msg);
}
}
-#[test]
-#[allow(deprecated)]
-fn test_secret_timeout() {
- // Simple test of payment secret storage time outs. After
- // `create_inbound_payment(_for_hash)_legacy` is removed, this test will be removed as well.
- let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
- let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
- let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
- let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
-
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
-
- let (payment_hash, payment_secret_1) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_legacy(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
-
- // We should fail to register the same payment hash twice, at least until we've connected a
- // block with time 7200 + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1.
- if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
- assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
- } else { panic!(); }
- let mut block = {
- let node_1_blocks = nodes[1].blocks.lock().unwrap();
- create_dummy_block(node_1_blocks.last().unwrap().0.block_hash(), node_1_blocks.len() as u32 + 7200, Vec::new())
- };
- connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
- if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
- assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
- } else { panic!(); }
-
- // If we then connect the second block, we should be able to register the same payment hash
- // again (this time getting a new payment secret).
- block.header.prev_blockhash = block.header.block_hash();
- block.header.time += 1;
- connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
- let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
- assert_ne!(payment_secret_1, our_payment_secret);
-
- {
- let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
- nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
- RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
- nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
- commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
- }
- // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
- // values from previous calls.
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
- let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- match events[0] {
- Event::PaymentClaimable { purpose: PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret }, .. } => {
- assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
- assert_eq!(payment_secret, our_payment_secret);
- // We don't actually have the payment preimage with which to claim this payment!
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
-}
-
#[test]
fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
// Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
- let funding_created = {
+ let (_, funding_created) = {
let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let mut a_peer_state = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
// Once we call `get_outbound_funding_created` the channel has a duplicate channel_id as
// another channel in the ChannelManager - an invalid state. Thus, we'd panic later when we
// try to create another channel. Instead, we drop the channel entirely here (leaving the
// channelmanager in a possibly nonsense state instead).
- let mut as_chan = a_peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
+ let mut as_chan = a_peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.remove(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
- as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap()
+ as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap()
};
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
let route_params = RouteParameters {
- payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
+ payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false),
final_value_msat: 10000,
};
let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
let route_params = RouteParameters {
- payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
+ payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false),
final_value_msat: 10000,
};
let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
}
-fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool) {
+fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool, multiplier_dust_limit: bool) {
// Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
// policy.
//
let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
- config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = 5_000_000; // default setting value
+ config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = if multiplier_dust_limit {
+ // Default test fee estimator rate is 253 sat/kw, so we set the multiplier to 5_000_000 / 253
+ // to get roughly the same initial value as the default setting when this test was
+ // originally written.
+ MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253)
+ } else { MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(5_000_000) }; // initial default setting value
let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
- let opt_anchors = false;
+ let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
if on_holder_tx {
let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
- let mut chan = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, temporary_channel_id);
- chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
+ let mut chan = get_outbound_v1_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, temporary_channel_id);
+ chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
}
nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
- let dust_buffer_feerate = {
+ // Fetch a route in advance as we will be unable to once we're unable to send.
+ let (mut route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) =
+ get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000);
+
+ let (dust_buffer_feerate, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat) = {
let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
let chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
- chan.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64
+ (chan.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64,
+ chan.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator(nodes[0].fee_estimator)))
};
- let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
- let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
+ let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
+ let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
- let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
- let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
+ let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
+ let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
- let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 25;
- let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
+ let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 4;
+ let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
if on_holder_tx {
if dust_outbound_balance {
if dust_outbound_balance {
// Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
// Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
- for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
+ for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx - 1 {
let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
} else {
// Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
// Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
- for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
+ for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx - 1 {
route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
}
}
}
- let dust_overflow = dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx + 1);
if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
- let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
- let mut config = UserConfig::default();
+ route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat =
+ if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat + 1 };
// With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
if on_holder_tx {
- let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
- let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)
- ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
- assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
+ ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
} else {
unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)
- ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
- assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
+ ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
}
} else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
- let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
+ let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat + 4 });
nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
// Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
- nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
+ nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
} else {
// Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
- nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
+ nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
+ format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
+ dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx - 1) + dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat + 4,
+ max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
}
} else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
- let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 2_500_000);
- nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
- RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
+ route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat = 2_500_000;
+ // For the multiplier dust exposure limit, since it scales with feerate,
+ // we need to add a lot of HTLCs that will become dust at the new feerate
+ // to cross the threshold.
+ for _ in 0..20 {
+ let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash(&nodes[1], Some(1_000), None);
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
+ RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
+ }
{
let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
*feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
added_monitors.clear();
}
+fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure_by_threshold_type(multiplier_dust_limit: bool) {
+ do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true, multiplier_dust_limit);
+ do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true, multiplier_dust_limit);
+ do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true, multiplier_dust_limit);
+ do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false, multiplier_dust_limit);
+ do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false, multiplier_dust_limit);
+ do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false, multiplier_dust_limit);
+ do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true, multiplier_dust_limit);
+ do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false, multiplier_dust_limit);
+ do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true, multiplier_dust_limit);
+ do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false, multiplier_dust_limit);
+ do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false, multiplier_dust_limit);
+ do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true, multiplier_dust_limit);
+}
+
#[test]
fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
- do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
- do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
- do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
- do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
- do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
- do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
- do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
- do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
- do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
- do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
- do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
- do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
+ do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure_by_threshold_type(false);
+ do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure_by_threshold_type(true);
}
#[test]
do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(true, false);
do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(true, true);
}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_disconnects_peer_awaiting_response_ticks() {
+ // Tests that nodes which are awaiting on a response critical for channel responsiveness
+ // disconnect their counterparty after `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
+ let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ // Asserts a disconnect event is queued to the user.
+ let check_disconnect_event = |node: &Node, should_disconnect: bool| {
+ let disconnect_event = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().iter().find_map(|event|
+ if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action, .. } = event {
+ if let msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning { .. } = action {
+ Some(())
+ } else {
+ None
+ }
+ } else {
+ None
+ }
+ );
+ assert_eq!(disconnect_event.is_some(), should_disconnect);
+ };
+
+ // Fires timer ticks ensuring we only attempt to disconnect peers after reaching
+ // `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
+ let check_disconnect = |node: &Node| {
+ // No disconnect without any timer ticks.
+ check_disconnect_event(node, false);
+
+ // No disconnect with 1 timer tick less than required.
+ for _ in 0..DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS - 1 {
+ node.node.timer_tick_occurred();
+ check_disconnect_event(node, false);
+ }
+
+ // Disconnect after reaching the required ticks.
+ node.node.timer_tick_occurred();
+ check_disconnect_event(node, true);
+
+ // Disconnect again on the next tick if the peer hasn't been disconnected yet.
+ node.node.timer_tick_occurred();
+ check_disconnect_event(node, true);
+ };
+
+ create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
+
+ // We'll start by performing a fee update with Alice (nodes[0]) on the channel.
+ *nodes[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
+ nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
+ check_added_monitors!(&nodes[0], 1);
+ let alice_fee_update = get_htlc_update_msgs(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), alice_fee_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &alice_fee_update.commitment_signed);
+ check_added_monitors!(&nodes[1], 1);
+
+ // This will prompt Bob (nodes[1]) to respond with his `CommitmentSigned` and `RevokeAndACK`.
+ let (bob_revoke_and_ack, bob_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revoke_and_ack);
+ check_added_monitors!(&nodes[0], 1);
+ nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_commitment_signed);
+ check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
+
+ // Alice then needs to send her final `RevokeAndACK` to complete the commitment dance. We
+ // pretend Bob hasn't received the message and check whether he'll disconnect Alice after
+ // reaching `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
+ let alice_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ check_disconnect(&nodes[1]);
+
+ // Now, we'll reconnect them to test awaiting a `ChannelReestablish` message.
+ //
+ // Note that since the commitment dance didn't complete above, Alice is expected to resend her
+ // final `RevokeAndACK` to Bob to complete it.
+ nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ let bob_init = msgs::Init {
+ features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ };
+ nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_init, true).unwrap();
+ let alice_init = msgs::Init {
+ features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ };
+ nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &alice_init, true).unwrap();
+
+ // Upon reconnection, Alice sends her `ChannelReestablish` to Bob. Alice, however, hasn't
+ // received Bob's yet, so she should disconnect him after reaching
+ // `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
+ let alice_channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
+ nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()
+ );
+ nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &alice_channel_reestablish);
+ check_disconnect(&nodes[0]);
+
+ // Bob now sends his `ChannelReestablish` to Alice to resume the channel and consider it "live".
+ let bob_channel_reestablish = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().iter().find_map(|event|
+ if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = event {
+ assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ Some(msg.clone())
+ } else {
+ None
+ }
+ ).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_channel_reestablish);
+
+ // Sanity check that Alice won't disconnect Bob since she's no longer waiting for any messages.
+ for _ in 0..DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS {
+ nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
+ check_disconnect_event(&nodes[0], false);
+ }
+
+ // However, Bob is still waiting on Alice's `RevokeAndACK`, so he should disconnect her after
+ // reaching `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
+ check_disconnect(&nodes[1]);
+
+ // Finally, have Bob process the last message.
+ nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &alice_revoke_and_ack);
+ check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
+
+ // At this point, neither node should attempt to disconnect each other, since they aren't
+ // waiting on any messages.
+ for node in &nodes {
+ for _ in 0..DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS {
+ node.node.timer_tick_occurred();
+ check_disconnect_event(node, false);
+ }
+ }
+}
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff