use crate::chain::{ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Confirm, Listen, Watch};
use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
use crate::chain::channelmonitor;
-use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
+use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
-use crate::sign::{EcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
+use crate::sign::{ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, OutputSpender, SignerProvider};
use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PathFailure, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
use crate::ln::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
use crate::ln::channel::{commitment_tx_base_weight, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, COINBASE_MATURITY, ChannelPhase};
use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
-use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
+use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
+use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, ScriptBuf};
use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
-use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
+use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
-use bitcoin::{PackedLockTime, Sequence, Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, Witness};
+use bitcoin::{Sequence, Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, Witness};
use bitcoin::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
-use regex;
-
use crate::io;
use crate::prelude::*;
use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
-use core::default::Default;
use core::iter::repeat;
use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
// Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
- nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None, None).unwrap();
// Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
use crate::ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
// Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
- insane_open_helper(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2; msg });
- insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS; msg });
+ insane_open_helper(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2; msg });
+ insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS; msg });
- insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
+ insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
- insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than channel amount minus reserve \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
+ insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than channel amount minus reserve \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
- insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
+ insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
- insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
+ insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
- insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
+ insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.common_fields.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
- insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
+ insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
- insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
+ insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
}
#[test]
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
- match nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1, 0, 42, None) {
+ match nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1, 0, 42, None, None) {
Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
assert_eq!(format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1), err);
},
push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 4 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
- let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, if send_from_initiator { 0 } else { push_amt }, 42, None).unwrap();
+ let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, if send_from_initiator { 0 } else { push_amt }, 42, None, None).unwrap();
let mut open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
if !send_from_initiator {
open_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
- open_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
+ open_channel_message.common_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
}
nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
let mut accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
if send_from_initiator {
accept_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
- accept_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
+ accept_channel_message.common_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
}
nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
{
chan_context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
chan_context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
},
- ChannelPhase::Funded(_) => assert!(false),
+ _ => assert!(false),
}
}
}
if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
- nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
*feerate_lock += 4;
}
nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
- nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
+ nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel", format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
&mut htlcs,
&local_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
);
- local_chan_signer.as_ecdsa().unwrap().sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
+ local_chan_signer.as_ecdsa().unwrap().sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
};
let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
//check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
//Should produce and error.
nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
- nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_string(), 1);
+ nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee", 3);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") },
send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
- check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
- check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
}
#[test]
assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
- check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
- check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
}
#[test]
// Close down the channels...
close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
- check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
- check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
- check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
- check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
- check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
- check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
- check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
- check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
}
#[test]
for e in events {
match e {
MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
- MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
+ MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { ref msg } } => {
assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
+ assert_eq!(msg.as_ref().unwrap().data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
},
MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
- let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
+ let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height + 1;
let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0],
cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
skimmed_fee_msat: None,
+ blinding_point: None,
};
nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
&mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
&local_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
);
- local_chan_signer.as_ecdsa().unwrap().sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
+ local_chan_signer.as_ecdsa().unwrap().sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
};
let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
};
- nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
+ nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel",
format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", raa_msg.channel_id), 1);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
// Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
- let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
+ let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height + 1;
let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0],
700_000, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
skimmed_fee_msat: None,
+ blinding_point: None,
};
nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
// Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
- nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
+ nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value", 3);
assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
// HTLC.
let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, &channel_type_features);
- assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None).unwrap_err(),
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None, None).unwrap_err(),
APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding amount (356) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of 357.".to_string() });
// During open, we don't have a "counterparty channel reserve" to check against, so that
// requirement only comes into play on the open_channel handling side.
push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
- nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None, None).unwrap();
let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
open_channel_msg.push_msat += 1;
nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
// Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
- let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
+ let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height + 1;
let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(
&route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
skimmed_fee_msat: None,
+ blinding_point: None,
};
nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
// Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
- nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string(), 1);
+ nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value", 3);
assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
// attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
{
let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
- .with_bolt11_features(nodes[2].node.invoice_features()).unwrap().with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
+ .with_bolt11_features(nodes[2].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap().with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], payment_params, recv_value_0);
route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
assert!(route.paths[0].hops.iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
}
let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
- .with_bolt11_features(nodes[2].node.invoice_features()).unwrap().with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
+ .with_bolt11_features(nodes[2].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap().with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, recv_value_0).unwrap();
let (payment_preimage, ..) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], recv_value_0);
claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), receiver_node_id.unwrap());
assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
match &purpose {
- PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
+ PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
},
- _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
+ _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment")
}
},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), receiver_node_id.unwrap());
assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
match &purpose {
- PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
+ PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
},
- _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
+ _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment")
}
},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_1.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
{
let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
+ if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
+ let _ = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
+ }
+
mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, Some(node_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
- check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
// One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 3_000_000);
connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
- let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
+ let close_chan_update_1 = match events[1] {
MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
msg.clone()
},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
};
- match events[1] {
- MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { .. }, node_id } => {
assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
- let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
+ let close_chan_update_2 = match events[1] {
MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
msg.clone()
},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
};
- match events[1] {
- MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { .. }, node_id } => {
assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
- check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::HTLCsTimedOut, [nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
assert_eq!(nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon),
Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed));
- check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::HTLCsTimedOut, [nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
}
#[test]
fn test_justice_tx_htlc_timeout() {
// Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Timeout tx, against both sides
- let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
+ let mut alice_config = test_default_channel_config();
alice_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
alice_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
alice_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
- let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
+ let mut bob_config = test_default_channel_config();
bob_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
bob_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
bob_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
#[test]
fn test_justice_tx_htlc_success() {
// Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
- let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
+ let mut alice_config = test_default_channel_config();
alice_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
alice_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
alice_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
- let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
+ let mut bob_config = test_default_channel_config();
bob_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
bob_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
bob_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
// that a revoked commitment transaction is broadcasted
// (Similar to `revoked_output_claim` test but we get the justice tx + broadcast manually)
let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
- let destination_script0 = chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.get_destination_script().unwrap();
- let destination_script1 = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_destination_script().unwrap();
+ let destination_script0 = chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.get_destination_script([0; 32]).unwrap();
+ let destination_script1 = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_destination_script([0; 32]).unwrap();
let persisters = vec![WatchtowerPersister::new(destination_script0),
WatchtowerPersister::new(destination_script1)];
let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs_with_persisters(2, &chanmon_cfgs, persisters.iter().collect());
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions(events[0..2].to_vec(), &[HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
match events.last().unwrap() {
Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO);
// Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]));
}
let chan_id = Some(chan_1.2);
match forwarded_events[1] {
- Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id, outbound_amount_forwarded_msat } => {
- assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
+ Event::PaymentForwarded { total_fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx,
+ next_channel_id, outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, ..
+ } => {
+ assert_eq!(total_fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
_ => panic!()
}
match forwarded_events[2] {
- Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id, outbound_amount_forwarded_msat } => {
- assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
+ Event::PaymentForwarded { total_fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx,
+ next_channel_id, outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, ..
+ } => {
+ assert_eq!(total_fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
match nodes_2_event {
- MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
+ MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
// Node[0]: 2 * HTLC-timeout tx
check_spends!(node_txn[0], $commitment_tx);
check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
- assert_ne!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0);
- assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0);
+ assert_ne!(node_txn[0].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO);
+ assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO);
if $htlc_offered {
assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
- assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time.0, nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
+ assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time.to_consensus_u32(), nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
// We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
// we already checked the same situation with A.
let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
match events[0] {
- Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- };
- match events[1] {
Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { .. } => { },
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
+ match events[1] {
+ Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ };
// Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
// block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
}
- let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
+ let mut failed_htlcs = new_hash_set();
assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 3 + nodes.len() - 1 } else { 4 + nodes.len() });
- match events[0] {
- Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => { },
- _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
- }
- match events[1] {
- Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
- assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
- match events[2] {
- Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
- assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
+ assert!(events.iter().any(|ev| matches!(
+ ev,
+ Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. }
+ )));
+ assert!(events.iter().any(|ev| matches!(
+ ev,
+ Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } if *payment_hash == fourth_payment_hash
+ )));
+ assert!(events.iter().any(|ev| matches!(
+ ev,
+ Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } if *payment_hash == fourth_payment_hash
+ )));
nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
match nodes_2_event {
- MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => {
+ MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data }) }, node_id: _ } => {
assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
},
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
- let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
+ let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height + 1;
let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(
&route.paths[0], 50_000, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
cltv_expiry,
onion_routing_packet,
skimmed_fee_msat: None,
+ blinding_point: None,
};
nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
}
// connect_style.
return;
}
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ let funding_tx = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).3;
route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
- let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
- assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0].txid(), node_txn[1].txid());
+ let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[0], funding_tx);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
- let block = create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]);
+ let block = create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![node_txn[0].clone()]);
connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
- let tx = {
+ let commitment_tx = {
let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
// Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
// have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
node_txn.remove(0)
};
- mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx);
// Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
.provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator), &node_cfgs[2].logger);
}
- mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx);
- let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx);
+ let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), if nodes[2].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() { 2 } else { 1 });
+ let htlc_tx = node_txn.pop().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(htlc_tx.input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, commitment_tx.txid());
+ assert_eq!(htlc_tx.lock_time, LockTime::ZERO); // Must be an HTLC-Success
+ assert_eq!(htlc_tx.input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
- check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
+ check_spends!(htlc_tx, commitment_tx);
}
#[test]
#[test]
fn test_peer_disconnected_before_funding_broadcasted() {
// Test that channels are closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` if the peer disconnects
- // before the funding transaction has been broadcasted.
+ // before the funding transaction has been broadcasted, and doesn't reconnect back within time.
let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
// Open a channel between `nodes[0]` and `nodes[1]`, for which the funding transaction is never
// broadcasted, even though it's created by `nodes[0]`.
- let expected_temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
+ let expected_temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
}
- // Ensure that the channel is closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` when the peers are
- // disconnected before the funding transaction was broadcasted.
+ // The peers disconnect before the funding is broadcasted.
nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer, false
+ // The time for peers to reconnect expires.
+ for _ in 0..UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS {
+ nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
+ }
+
+ // Ensure that the channel is closed with `ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed`
+ // when the peers are disconnected and do not reconnect before the funding
+ // transaction is broadcasted.
+ check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, true
, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer, false
, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
assert_eq!(receiver_node_id.unwrap(), nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(channel_id));
match &purpose {
- PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
+ PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
},
- _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
+ _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment")
}
},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
match &purpose {
- PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
+ PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
},
- _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
+ _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment")
}
},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
- match events[1] {
+ match events[2] {
MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
_ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
}
mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- match events[0] {
+ match events[1] {
MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
- assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // HTLC-Timeout
+ assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO); // HTLC-Timeout
// B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()]));
check_spends!(c_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
assert_eq!(c_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
- assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Success tx
+ assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO); // Success tx
// So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), c_txn[0].clone()]));
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
match events[1] {
- Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id, outbound_amount_forwarded_msat } => {
- assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
+ Event::PaymentForwarded { total_fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx,
+ next_channel_id, outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, ..
+ } => {
+ assert_eq!(total_fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, Some(chan_1.2));
assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut msg_events);
match nodes_2_event {
- MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
+ MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
- assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time.0, nodes[1].best_block_info().1); // Success tx
+ assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time.to_consensus_u32(), nodes[1].best_block_info().1); // Success tx
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
// script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
// ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40)
- .with_bolt11_features(nodes[3].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
+ .with_bolt11_features(nodes[3].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], payment_params, 800_000);
send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 800_000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
- match events[1] {
+ match events[2] {
MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
_ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
}
MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
- match events[1] {
+ match events[2] {
MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
_ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
}
connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
if deliver_last_raa {
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[1..2], true);
let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(3).collect();
expect_htlc_handling_failed_destinations!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(), expected_destinations);
let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 10 } else { 6 });
- let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
+ let mut as_faileds = new_hash_set();
let mut as_updates = 0;
for event in as_events.iter() {
if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref failure, .. } = event {
- assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
+ assert!(as_faileds.insert(*payment_hash));
if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
} else {
} else if let &Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = event {
} else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
}
- assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
- assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
+ assert!(as_faileds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
+ assert!(as_faileds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
if announce_latest {
- assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
- assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
+ assert!(as_faileds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
+ assert!(as_faileds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
}
- assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
+ assert!(as_faileds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 8 } else { 6 });
- let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
+ let mut bs_faileds = new_hash_set();
let mut bs_updates = 0;
for event in bs_events.iter() {
if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref failure, .. } = event {
- assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
+ assert!(bs_faileds.insert(*payment_hash));
if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
} else {
} else if let &Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = event {
} else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
}
- assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
- assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
+ assert!(bs_faileds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
+ assert!(bs_faileds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
if announce_latest {
- assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
+ assert!(bs_faileds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
}
- assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
+ assert!(bs_faileds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
// For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
// get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
let network_graph = Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger));
let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
- let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(network_graph.clone(), &scorer);
- let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, router, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph, node_seed: seed, override_init_features: alloc::rc::Rc::new(core::cell::RefCell::new(None)) };
+ let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(network_graph.clone(), &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &scorer);
+ let message_router = test_utils::TestMessageRouter::new(network_graph.clone(), &keys_manager);
+ let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, router, message_router, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph, node_seed: seed, override_init_features: alloc::rc::Rc::new(core::cell::RefCell::new(None)) };
let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
node_cfgs.remove(0);
node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
- check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
- check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HTLCsTimedOut, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
}
fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HTLCsTimedOut, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
}
fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HTLCsTimedOut, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
} else {
expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
}
// BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
let push_msat=10001;
- nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None, None).unwrap();
let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
// Create a second channel with the same random values. This used to panic due to a colliding
// channel_id, but now panics due to a colliding outbound SCID alias.
- assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None, None).is_err());
}
#[test]
// BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
let push_msat=10001;
- assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None, None).is_err());
// BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
// Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
- assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None, None).is_err());
// BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
let push_msat=10001;
- assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
+ assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis);
// BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
// Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
- assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
+ assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.common_fields.channel_flags<=1);
// BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
- assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
+ assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.common_fields.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
// BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
- let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
- assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
+ let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Testnet);
+ assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.common_fields.chain_hash, chain_hash);
// BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
- assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
- assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
- assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
- assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
- assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
+ assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.common_fields.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
+ assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.common_fields.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
+ assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.common_fields.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
+ assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.common_fields.payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
+ assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.common_fields.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
}
#[test]
let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
let push_msat=10001;
- nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None, None).unwrap();
let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
+ node0_to_1_send_open_channel.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
// us to surface its failure to the user.
chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
- nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", chan.2), 1);
+ nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel", format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", chan.2), 1);
// Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
// to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
- nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", chan.2), 1);
+ nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel", format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", chan.2), 1);
// Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
// nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 2);
- match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
+ match &process_htlc_forwards_event[1] {
&Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
}
+#[test]
+fn test_payment_route_reaching_same_channel_twice() {
+ //A route should not go through the same channel twice
+ //It is enforced when constructing a route.
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+ let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0);
+
+ let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0)
+ .with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
+ let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], payment_params, 100000000);
+
+ // Extend the path by itself, essentially simulating route going through same channel twice
+ let cloned_hops = route.paths[0].hops.clone();
+ route.paths[0].hops.extend_from_slice(&cloned_hops);
+
+ unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
+ RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
+ ), false, APIError::InvalidRoute { ref err },
+ assert_eq!(err, &"Path went through the same channel twice"));
+}
+
// BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
// BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
//TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
- nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
+ nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC", 3);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() },
let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0);
let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0)
- .with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
+ .with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], payment_params, 100000000);
route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta = 500000001;
unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000);
route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = send_amt;
let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
- let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
+ let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height + 1;
let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(
&route.paths[0], send_amt, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
skimmed_fee_msat: None,
+ blinding_point: None,
};
for i in 0..50 {
if !revoked {
assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
} else {
- assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].lock_time.0, 11);
+ assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].lock_time.to_consensus_u32(), 11);
}
// We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout/revocation-claim tx
mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
// We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in OutboundV1Channel::new()
if let Err(error) = OutboundV1Channel::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
&nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), 1000000, 1000000, 0,
- &low_our_to_self_config, 0, 42)
+ &low_our_to_self_config, 0, 42, None)
{
match error {
APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
} else { assert!(false) }
// We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in InboundV1Channel::new()
- nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
+ open_channel.common_fields.to_self_delay = 200;
if let Err(error) = InboundV1Channel::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
&nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].node.channel_type_features(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
&low_our_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
} else { assert!(false); }
// We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
- nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
+ accept_channel.common_fields.to_self_delay = 200;
nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
let reason_msg;
if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
// We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in InboundV1Channel::new()
- nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
+ open_channel.common_fields.to_self_delay = 200;
if let Err(error) = InboundV1Channel::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
&nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].node.channel_type_features(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
&high_their_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
- let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
- TEST_FINAL_CLTV).with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
+ let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
+ .with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000);
let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(),
- None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
+ None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200, None).unwrap();
nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+ // Connect a dummy node for proper future events broadcasting
+ connect_dummy_node(&nodes[0]);
+
create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0);
create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
}
let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
- let mut chans_disabled = HashMap::new();
+ let mut chans_disabled = new_hash_map();
for e in msg_events {
match e {
MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 30)
- .with_bolt11_features(nodes[0].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
+ .with_bolt11_features(nodes[0].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_params, 3000000);
send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
- feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
+ feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu();
penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
node_txn.clear();
};
// Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
- feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
+ feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu();
// Verify 25% bump heuristic
assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
node_txn.clear();
// Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
- feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
+ feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu();
// Verify 25% bump heuristic
assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
node_txn.clear();
let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
// Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
- let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 50).with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
+ let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 50).with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 3_000_000);
let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None,
- nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
- let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 50).with_bolt11_features(nodes[0].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
+ let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 50)
+ .with_bolt11_features(nodes[0].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 3_000_000);
let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[1].network_graph.read_only(), None,
- nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
- send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
+ nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
+ let failed_payment_hash = send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000).1;
let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
let block_129 = create_dummy_block(block_11.block_hash(), 42, vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()]);
connect_block(&nodes[0], &block_129);
let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions(events[0..2].to_vec(), &[HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: failed_payment_hash }]);
match events.last().unwrap() {
Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
first = node_txn[3].txid();
// Store both feerates for later comparison
let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[1].output[0].value - node_txn[3].output[0].value;
- feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[3].weight() as u64;
+ feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[3].weight().to_wu();
penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
node_txn.clear();
}
// Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[1].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
- let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
+ let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu();
assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
node_txn.clear();
preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
- feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
+ feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu();
let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output == node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output {
(node_txn[2].clone(), node_txn[1].clone())
timeout = timeout_tx.txid();
let index = timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout;
let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - timeout_tx.output[0].value;
- feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / timeout_tx.weight() as u64;
+ feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / timeout_tx.weight().to_wu();
node_txn.clear();
};
let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
- let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.weight() as u64;
+ let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.weight().to_wu();
assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
- let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
+ let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu();
assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
match close_ev[0] {
- MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
+ MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
+ assert_eq!(msg.as_ref().unwrap().data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
override_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
- nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, None, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
// Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
- assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
+ assert_eq!(res.common_fields.channel_flags, 0);
+ assert_eq!(res.common_fields.to_self_delay, 200);
}
#[test]
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
- nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, None, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
+ assert_eq!(res.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
+ assert_eq!(res.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
}
#[test]
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
- let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
+ let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
- nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
- nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), height + 1, &None).unwrap();
// Edit amt_to_forward to simulate the sender having set
// the final amount and the routing node taking less fee
- if let msgs::OutboundOnionPayload::Receive { ref mut amt_msat, .. } = onion_payloads[1] {
- *amt_msat = 99_000;
+ if let msgs::OutboundOnionPayload::Receive {
+ ref mut sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat, ..
+ } = onion_payloads[1] {
+ *sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat = 99_000;
} else { panic!() }
let new_onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash).unwrap();
payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet = new_onion_packet;
match events[0] {
Event::PaymentClaimable { ref purpose, .. } => {
match &purpose {
- PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, .. } => {
+ PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, .. } => {
claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
},
- _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
+ _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment")
}
},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST);
// Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
- let alice_state = {
+ {
let mut txn = alice_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
- txn.remove(0)
+ check_spends!(txn[0], chan_1.3);
+ check_spends!(txn[1], txn[0]);
};
// Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
let height = HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST + 1;
connect_blocks(&nodes[0], height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
- check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false,
+ check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HTLCsTimedOut, false,
[nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, vec![bob_state_y.clone()]), height);
check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
{
let htlc_txn = alice_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
- assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
+ assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 1);
check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
- // Alice doesn't clean up the old HTLC claim since it hasn't seen a conflicting spend for
- // it. However, she should, because it now has an invalid parent.
- check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], alice_state);
}
}
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
// Create an initial channel
- nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- let channel_id = crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id();
+ let channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index });
nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString("Hi".to_string()) }, true,
- [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(); 2], 100000);
+ [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
}
#[test]
assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
} else {
- assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
+ if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
+ assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 3);
+ assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].txid(), bob_txn[1].txid());
+ } else {
+ assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
+ }
check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
}
}
// If Alice force-closed, Bob only broadcasts a HTLC-output-claiming transaction. Otherwise,
// Bob force-closed and broadcasts the commitment transaction along with a
// HTLC-output-claiming transaction.
- let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
+ let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
if broadcast_alice {
assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
} else {
- assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
- check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
- assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
+ assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() { 3 } else { 2 });
+ let htlc_tx = bob_txn.pop().unwrap();
+ check_spends!(htlc_tx, txn_to_broadcast[0]);
+ assert_eq!(htlc_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
}
}
}
let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
// Create an first channel channel
- nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
let mut open_chan_msg_chan_1_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
// Create an second channel
- nodes[2].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 43, None).unwrap();
+ nodes[2].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 43, None, None).unwrap();
let mut open_chan_msg_chan_2_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
// Modify the `OpenChannel` from `nodes[2]` to `nodes[0]` to ensure that it uses the same
// `temporary_channel_id` as the `OpenChannel` from nodes[1] to nodes[0].
- open_chan_msg_chan_2_0.temporary_channel_id = open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.temporary_channel_id;
+ open_chan_msg_chan_2_0.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.common_fields.temporary_channel_id;
// Assert that `nodes[0]` can accept both `OpenChannel` requests, even though they use the same
// `temporary_channel_id` as they are from different peers.
match &events[0] {
MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { node_id, msg } => {
assert_eq!(node_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- assert_eq!(msg.temporary_channel_id, open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.temporary_channel_id);
+ assert_eq!(msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id, open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
match &events[0] {
MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { node_id, msg } => {
assert_eq!(node_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
- assert_eq!(msg.temporary_channel_id, open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.temporary_channel_id);
+ assert_eq!(msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id, open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
}
}
+#[test]
+fn test_peer_funding_sidechannel() {
+ // Test that if a peer somehow learns which txid we'll use for our channel funding before we
+ // receive `funding_transaction_generated` the peer cannot cause us to crash. We'd previously
+ // assumed that LDK would receive `funding_transaction_generated` prior to our peer learning
+ // the txid and panicked if the peer tried to open a redundant channel to us with the same
+ // funding outpoint.
+ //
+ // While this assumption is generally safe, some users may have out-of-band protocols where
+ // they notify their LSP about a funding outpoint first, or this may be violated in the future
+ // with collaborative transaction construction protocols, i.e. dual-funding.
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
+ let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ let temp_chan_id_ab = exchange_open_accept_chan(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
+ let temp_chan_id_ca = exchange_open_accept_chan(&nodes[2], &nodes[0], 1_000_000, 0);
+
+ let (_, tx, funding_output) =
+ create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
+
+ let cs_funding_events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(cs_funding_events.len(), 1);
+ match cs_funding_events[0] {
+ Event::FundingGenerationReady { .. } => {}
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", cs_funding_events),
+ }
+
+ nodes[2].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temp_chan_id_ca, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone(), funding_output.index).unwrap();
+ let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[0].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
+ get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
+ expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ let res = nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_chan_id_ab, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone());
+ let err_msg = format!("{:?}", res.unwrap_err());
+ assert!(err_msg.contains("An existing channel using outpoint "));
+ assert!(err_msg.contains(" is open with peer"));
+ // Even though the last funding_transaction_generated errored, it still generated a
+ // SendFundingCreated. However, when the peer responds with a funding_signed it will send the
+ // appropriate error message.
+ let as_funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_created);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: format!("An existing channel using outpoint {} is open with peer {}", funding_output, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), };
+ check_closed_events(&nodes[0], &[ExpectedCloseEvent::from_id_reason(ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_output), true, reason)]);
+
+ let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
+ get_err_msg(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_duplicate_conflicting_funding_from_second_peer() {
+ // Test that if a user tries to fund a channel with a funding outpoint they'd previously used
+ // we don't try to remove the previous ChannelMonitor. This is largely a test to ensure we
+ // don't regress in the fuzzer, as such funding getting passed our outpoint-matches checks
+ // implies the user (and our counterparty) has reused cryptographic keys across channels, which
+ // we require the user not do.
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
+ let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ let temp_chan_id = exchange_open_accept_chan(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
+
+ let (_, tx, funding_output) =
+ create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
+
+ // Now that we have a funding outpoint, create a dummy `ChannelMonitor` and insert it into
+ // nodes[0]'s ChainMonitor so that the initial `ChannelMonitor` write fails.
+ let dummy_chan_id = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[2], &nodes[3]).3;
+ let dummy_monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[2], dummy_chan_id).clone();
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(funding_output, dummy_monitor).unwrap();
+
+ nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
+
+ let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
+ let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
+ // At this point, the channel should be closed, after having generated one monitor write (the
+ // watch_channel call which failed), but zero monitor updates.
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ get_err_msg(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ let err_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned() };
+ check_closed_events(&nodes[0], &[ExpectedCloseEvent::from_id_reason(funding_signed_msg.channel_id, true, err_reason)]);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_duplicate_funding_err_in_funding() {
+ // Test that if we have a live channel with one peer, then another peer comes along and tries
+ // to create a second channel with the same txid we'll fail and not overwrite the
+ // outpoint_to_peer map in `ChannelManager`.
+ //
+ // This was previously broken.
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
+ let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ let (_, _, _, real_channel_id, funding_tx) = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
+ let real_chan_funding_txo = chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
+ assert_eq!(ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(real_chan_funding_txo), real_channel_id);
+
+ nodes[2].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
+ let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ let node_c_temp_chan_id = open_chan_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id;
+ open_chan_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = real_channel_id;
+ nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
+ let mut accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
+ accept_chan_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = node_c_temp_chan_id;
+ nodes[2].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan_msg);
+
+ // Now that we have a second channel with the same funding txo, send a bogus funding message
+ // and let nodes[1] remove the inbound channel.
+ let (_, funding_tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[2], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
+
+ nodes[2].node.funding_transaction_generated(&node_c_temp_chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), funding_tx).unwrap();
+
+ let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ funding_created_msg.temporary_channel_id = real_channel_id;
+ // Make the signature invalid by changing the funding output
+ funding_created_msg.funding_output_index += 10;
+ nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
+ get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
+ let err = "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned();
+ let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err };
+ let expected_closing = ExpectedCloseEvent::from_id_reason(real_channel_id, false, reason);
+ check_closed_events(&nodes[1], &[expected_closing]);
+
+ assert_eq!(
+ *nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().get(&real_chan_funding_txo).unwrap(),
+ nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
+ );
+}
+
#[test]
fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
// Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
// Create an initial channel
- nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
// first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
// the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
// move forward with it.
- assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
+ assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
let funding_outpoint = crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
- let channel_id = funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
+ let channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_outpoint);
// Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
// temporary one).
// First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
// Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
// to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
- open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
+ open_chan_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
{
let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
// Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
// channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
- assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
+ assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
// Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
- nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_2_msg);
nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
- let (_, funding_created) = {
+ let funding_created = {
let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let mut a_peer_state = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
// Once we call `get_funding_created` the channel has a duplicate channel_id as
// another channel in the ChannelManager - an invalid state. Thus, we'd panic later when we
// try to create another channel. Instead, we drop the channel entirely here (leaving the
// channelmanager in a possibly nonsense state instead).
- match a_peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap() {
- ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
+ match a_peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&open_chan_2_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id).unwrap() {
+ ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(mut chan) => {
let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
- chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap()
+ chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap()
},
_ => panic!("Unexpected ChannelPhase variant"),
- }
+ }.unwrap()
};
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
// without trying to persist the `ChannelMonitor`.
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
+ check_closed_events(&nodes[1], &[
+ ExpectedCloseEvent::from_id_reason(funding_created.temporary_channel_id, false, ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
+ err: "Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned()
+ })
+ ]);
+
// ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
{
let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
- nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
// a panic as we'd try to extract a 32 byte preimage from a witness element without checking
// its length.
let mut wit_program: Vec<u8> = channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program();
- let wit_program_script: Script = wit_program.into();
+ let wit_program_script: ScriptBuf = wit_program.into();
for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
// Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
- output.script_pubkey = Script::new_v0_p2wsh(&wit_program_script.wscript_hash());
+ output.script_pubkey = ScriptBuf::new_v0_p2wsh(&wit_program_script.wscript_hash());
}
nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- if let msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } = action {
- assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
+ if let msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg } = action {
+ assert_eq!(msg.as_ref().unwrap().data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
} else { panic!(); }
} else { panic!(); }
assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
// long the ChannelMonitor will try to read 32 bytes from the second-to-last element, panicing
// as its not 32 bytes long.
let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
- version: 2i32, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
+ version: 2i32, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
input: tx.output.iter().enumerate().map(|(idx, _)| TxIn {
previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
txid: tx.txid(),
vout: idx as u32,
},
- script_sig: Script::new(),
+ script_sig: ScriptBuf::new(),
sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
- witness: Witness::from_vec(channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness())
+ witness: Witness::from_slice(&channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness())
}).collect(),
output: vec![TxOut {
value: 1000,
- script_pubkey: Script::new(),
+ script_pubkey: ScriptBuf::new(),
}]
};
check_spends!(spend_tx, tx);
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
- nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
// We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
- assert_eq!(spending_txn[0].txid(), node_txn[0].txid());
- check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
+ let htlc_tx = if spending_txn[0].txid() == node_txn[0].txid() {
+ &spending_txn[1]
+ } else {
+ &spending_txn[0]
+ };
+ check_spends!(htlc_tx, node_txn[0]);
// We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
// timelock is up).
let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
// should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
// additional block built on top of the current chain.
nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
- &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
+ &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, htlc_tx)], conf_height + 1);
expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: channel_id }]);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
- .with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
+ .with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 10_000).unwrap();
let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
let chan_2_3 =create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0);
let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
- .with_bolt11_features(nodes[3].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
+ .with_bolt11_features(nodes[3].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
let mut route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 15_000_000).unwrap();
assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
- nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- open_channel.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
- open_channel.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
+ open_channel.common_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
+ open_channel.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
if on_holder_tx {
- open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
+ open_channel.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
}
nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
(chan.context().get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64,
chan.context().get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator(nodes[0].fee_estimator)))
};
- let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
+ let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000 + open_channel.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
- let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
+ // Substract 3 sats for multiplier and 2 sats for fixed limit to make sure we are 50% below the dust limit.
+ // This is to make sure we fully use the dust limit. If we don't, we could end up with `dust_ibd_htlc_on_holder_tx` being 1
+ // while `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat` is not equal to `dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat`.
+ let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000 + open_channel.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis - if multiplier_dust_limit { 3 } else { 2 }) * 1000;
let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 4;
// Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
- nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
+ nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel", format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
} else {
// Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
- nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
+ nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel",
format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx - 1) + dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat + 4,
max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
- let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
+ let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
- let best_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
+ let best_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
let chan_id = *nodes[0].network_chan_count.borrow();
let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- let input = TxIn { previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint::null(), script_sig: bitcoin::Script::new(), sequence: Sequence(1), witness: Witness::from_vec(vec!(vec!(1))) };
+ let input = TxIn { previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint::null(), script_sig: bitcoin::ScriptBuf::new(), sequence: Sequence(1), witness: Witness::from_slice(&[&[1]]) };
assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
let mut tx = match events[0] {
Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } => {
// Timelock the transaction _beyond_ the best client height + 1.
- Transaction { version: chan_id as i32, lock_time: PackedLockTime(best_height + 2), input: vec![input], output: vec![TxOut {
+ Transaction { version: chan_id as i32, lock_time: LockTime::from_height(best_height + 2).unwrap(), input: vec![input], output: vec![TxOut {
value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
}]}
},
},
_ => panic!()
}
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ Event::ChannelClosed { channel_id, .. } => {
+ assert_eq!(channel_id, temp_channel_id);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_non_final_funding_tx_within_headroom() {
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
+ let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
+ let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
+
+ let best_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
+
+ let chan_id = *nodes[0].network_chan_count.borrow();
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ let input = TxIn { previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint::null(), script_sig: bitcoin::ScriptBuf::new(), sequence: Sequence(1), witness: Witness::from_slice(&[[1]]) };
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ let mut tx = match events[0] {
+ Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } => {
+ // Timelock the transaction within a +1 headroom from the best block.
+ Transaction { version: chan_id as i32, lock_time: LockTime::from_consensus(best_height + 1), input: vec![input], output: vec![TxOut {
+ value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
+ }]}
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ };
- // However, transaction should be accepted if it's in a +1 headroom from best block.
- tx.lock_time = PackedLockTime(tx.lock_time.0 - 1);
+ // Transaction should be accepted if it's in a +1 headroom from best block.
assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
}
MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
- err: "Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: 1000. Our expected lower limit: 5000 (- 250)".to_owned() },
+ err: "Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: 1000. Our expected lower limit: 5000".to_owned() },
[nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
- let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
+ let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
- let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
+ let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
check_closed_event(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false, &[nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
}
+#[test]
+fn test_channel_close_when_not_timely_accepted() {
+ // Create network of two nodes
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ // Simulate peer-disconnects mid-handshake
+ // The channel is initiated from the node 0 side,
+ // but the nodes disconnect before node 1 could send accept channel
+ let create_chan_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
+ let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id, create_chan_id);
+
+ nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ // Make sure that we have not removed the OutboundV1Channel from node[0] immediately.
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
+
+ // Since channel was inbound from node[1] perspective, it should have been dropped immediately.
+ assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
+
+ // In the meantime, some time passes.
+ for _ in 0..UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS {
+ nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
+ }
+
+ // Since we disconnected from peer and did not connect back within time,
+ // we should have forced-closed the channel by now.
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
+
+ {
+ // Since accept channel message was never received
+ // The channel should be forced close by now from node 0 side
+ // and the peer removed from per_peer_state
+ let node_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(node_0_per_peer_state.len(), 0);
+ }
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_rebroadcast_open_channel_when_reconnect_mid_handshake() {
+ // Create network of two nodes
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ // Simulate peer-disconnects mid-handshake
+ // The channel is initiated from the node 0 side,
+ // but the nodes disconnect before node 1 could send accept channel
+ let create_chan_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
+ let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id, create_chan_id);
+
+ nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ // Make sure that we have not removed the OutboundV1Channel from node[0] immediately.
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
+
+ // Since channel was inbound from node[1] perspective, it should have been immediately dropped.
+ assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
+
+ // The peers now reconnect
+ nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
+ features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, true).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
+ features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, false).unwrap();
+
+ // Make sure the SendOpenChannel message is added to node_0 pending message events
+ let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
+ match &msg_events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { msg, .. } => assert_eq!(msg, &open_channel_msg),
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected message."),
+ }
+}
+
fn do_test_multi_post_event_actions(do_reload: bool) {
// Tests handling multiple post-Event actions at once.
// There is specific code in ChannelManager to handle channels where multiple post-Event
do_test_multi_post_event_actions(true);
do_test_multi_post_event_actions(false);
}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_batch_channel_open() {
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
+ let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ // Initiate channel opening and create the batch channel funding transaction.
+ let (tx, funding_created_msgs) = create_batch_channel_funding(&nodes[0], &[
+ (&nodes[1], 100_000, 0, 42, None),
+ (&nodes[2], 200_000, 0, 43, None),
+ ]);
+
+ // Go through the funding_created and funding_signed flow with node 1.
+ nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msgs[0]);
+ check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
+ expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
+ check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
+
+ // The transaction should not have been broadcast before all channels are ready.
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
+
+ // Go through the funding_created and funding_signed flow with node 2.
+ nodes[2].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msgs[1]);
+ check_added_monitors(&nodes[2], 1);
+ expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[2], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ chanmon_cfgs[0].persister.set_update_ret(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress);
+ nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
+ check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
+
+ // The transaction should not have been broadcast before persisting all monitors has been
+ // completed.
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().len(), 0);
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
+
+ // Complete the persistence of the monitor.
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.complete_sole_pending_chan_update(
+ &ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 1 })
+ );
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+
+ // The transaction should only have been broadcast now.
+ let broadcasted_txs = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
+ assert_eq!(broadcasted_txs.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(broadcasted_txs[0], tx);
+
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
+ assert!(events.iter().any(|e| matches!(
+ *e,
+ crate::events::Event::ChannelPending {
+ ref counterparty_node_id,
+ ..
+ } if counterparty_node_id == &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
+ )));
+ assert!(events.iter().any(|e| matches!(
+ *e,
+ crate::events::Event::ChannelPending {
+ ref counterparty_node_id,
+ ..
+ } if counterparty_node_id == &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
+ )));
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_close_in_funding_batch() {
+ // This test ensures that if one of the channels
+ // in the batch closes, the complete batch will close.
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
+ let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ // Initiate channel opening and create the batch channel funding transaction.
+ let (tx, funding_created_msgs) = create_batch_channel_funding(&nodes[0], &[
+ (&nodes[1], 100_000, 0, 42, None),
+ (&nodes[2], 200_000, 0, 43, None),
+ ]);
+
+ // Go through the funding_created and funding_signed flow with node 1.
+ nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msgs[0]);
+ check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
+ expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
+ check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
+
+ // The transaction should not have been broadcast before all channels are ready.
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().len(), 0);
+
+ // Force-close the channel for which we've completed the initial monitor.
+ let funding_txo_1 = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
+ let funding_txo_2 = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 1 };
+ let channel_id_1 = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo_1);
+ let channel_id_2 = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo_2);
+
+ nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id_1, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
+
+ // The monitor should become closed.
+ check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
+ {
+ let mut monitor_updates = nodes[0].chain_monitor.monitor_updates.lock().unwrap();
+ let monitor_updates_1 = monitor_updates.get(&channel_id_1).unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(monitor_updates_1.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(monitor_updates_1[0].update_id, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID);
+ }
+
+ let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ match msg_events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => (),
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected message."),
+ }
+
+ // We broadcast the commitment transaction as part of the force-close.
+ {
+ let broadcasted_txs = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
+ assert_eq!(broadcasted_txs.len(), 1);
+ assert!(broadcasted_txs[0].txid() != tx.txid());
+ assert_eq!(broadcasted_txs[0].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(broadcasted_txs[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
+ }
+
+ // All channels in the batch should close immediately.
+ check_closed_events(&nodes[0], &[
+ ExpectedCloseEvent {
+ channel_id: Some(channel_id_1),
+ discard_funding: true,
+ channel_funding_txo: Some(funding_txo_1),
+ user_channel_id: Some(42),
+ ..Default::default()
+ },
+ ExpectedCloseEvent {
+ channel_id: Some(channel_id_2),
+ discard_funding: true,
+ channel_funding_txo: Some(funding_txo_2),
+ user_channel_id: Some(43),
+ ..Default::default()
+ },
+ ]);
+
+ // Ensure the channels don't exist anymore.
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_batch_funding_close_after_funding_signed() {
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
+ let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ // Initiate channel opening and create the batch channel funding transaction.
+ let (tx, funding_created_msgs) = create_batch_channel_funding(&nodes[0], &[
+ (&nodes[1], 100_000, 0, 42, None),
+ (&nodes[2], 200_000, 0, 43, None),
+ ]);
+
+ // Go through the funding_created and funding_signed flow with node 1.
+ nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msgs[0]);
+ check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
+ expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
+ check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
+
+ // Go through the funding_created and funding_signed flow with node 2.
+ nodes[2].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msgs[1]);
+ check_added_monitors(&nodes[2], 1);
+ expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[2], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ chanmon_cfgs[0].persister.set_update_ret(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress);
+ nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
+ check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
+
+ // The transaction should not have been broadcast before all channels are ready.
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().len(), 0);
+
+ // Force-close the channel for which we've completed the initial monitor.
+ let funding_txo_1 = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
+ let funding_txo_2 = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 1 };
+ let channel_id_1 = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo_1);
+ let channel_id_2 = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo_2);
+ nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id_1, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 2);
+ {
+ let mut monitor_updates = nodes[0].chain_monitor.monitor_updates.lock().unwrap();
+ let monitor_updates_1 = monitor_updates.get(&channel_id_1).unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(monitor_updates_1.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(monitor_updates_1[0].update_id, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID);
+ let monitor_updates_2 = monitor_updates.get(&channel_id_2).unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(monitor_updates_2.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(monitor_updates_2[0].update_id, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID);
+ }
+ let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ match msg_events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => (),
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected message."),
+ }
+
+ // We broadcast the commitment transaction as part of the force-close.
+ {
+ let broadcasted_txs = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
+ assert_eq!(broadcasted_txs.len(), 1);
+ assert!(broadcasted_txs[0].txid() != tx.txid());
+ assert_eq!(broadcasted_txs[0].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(broadcasted_txs[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
+ }
+
+ // All channels in the batch should close immediately.
+ check_closed_events(&nodes[0], &[
+ ExpectedCloseEvent {
+ channel_id: Some(channel_id_1),
+ discard_funding: true,
+ channel_funding_txo: Some(funding_txo_1),
+ user_channel_id: Some(42),
+ ..Default::default()
+ },
+ ExpectedCloseEvent {
+ channel_id: Some(channel_id_2),
+ discard_funding: true,
+ channel_funding_txo: Some(funding_txo_2),
+ user_channel_id: Some(43),
+ ..Default::default()
+ },
+ ]);
+
+ // Ensure the channels don't exist anymore.
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
+}
+
+fn do_test_funding_and_commitment_tx_confirm_same_block(confirm_remote_commitment: bool) {
+ // Tests that a node will forget the channel (when it only requires 1 confirmation) if the
+ // funding and commitment transaction confirm in the same block.
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let mut min_depth_1_block_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
+ min_depth_1_block_cfg.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(min_depth_1_block_cfg), Some(min_depth_1_block_cfg)]);
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
+ let chan_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 });
+
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
+
+ let (closing_node, other_node) = if confirm_remote_commitment {
+ (&nodes[1], &nodes[0])
+ } else {
+ (&nodes[0], &nodes[1])
+ };
+
+ closing_node.node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &other_node.node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
+ let mut msg_events = closing_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
+ match msg_events.pop().unwrap() {
+ MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { .. }, .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ check_added_monitors(closing_node, 1);
+ check_closed_event(closing_node, 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false, &[other_node.node.get_our_node_id()], 1_000_000);
+
+ let commitment_tx = {
+ let mut txn = closing_node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
+ assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
+ let commitment_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
+ check_spends!(commitment_tx, funding_tx);
+ commitment_tx
+ };
+
+ mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&funding_tx, &commitment_tx]);
+ mine_transactions(&nodes[1], &[&funding_tx, &commitment_tx]);
+
+ check_closed_broadcast(other_node, 1, true);
+ check_added_monitors(other_node, 1);
+ check_closed_event(other_node, 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false, &[closing_node.node.get_our_node_id()], 1_000_000);
+
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_funding_and_commitment_tx_confirm_same_block() {
+ do_test_funding_and_commitment_tx_confirm_same_block(false);
+ do_test_funding_and_commitment_tx_confirm_same_block(true);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_accept_inbound_channel_errors_queued() {
+ // For manually accepted inbound channels, tests that a close error is correctly handled
+ // and the channel fails for the initiator.
+ let mut config0 = test_default_channel_config();
+ let mut config1 = config0.clone();
+ config1.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay = 1000;
+ config1.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
+ config0.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 2000;
+
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config0), Some(config1)]);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
+ let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
+ let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ match events[0] {
+ Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
+ match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23) {
+ Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }) => (),
+ _ => panic!(),
+ }
+ }
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
+ open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
+}