use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, find_route, get_route};
use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures, NodeFeatures};
use ln::msgs;
-use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
+use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, OptionalField, ErrorAction};
use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
use util::{byte_utils, test_utils};
use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason};
use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
-use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
use regex;
#[test]
fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
// Stand up a network of 2 nodes
+ use ln::channel::TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS;
+ let mut cfg = UserConfig::default();
+ cfg.peer_channel_config_limits.max_funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1;
let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
- let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(cfg)]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
// Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
} else { assert!(false); }
};
- use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
use ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
// Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
- insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than {}. It was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS; msg });
+ insane_open_helper(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2; msg });
+ insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS; msg });
insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
- insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than funding value \d+", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
+ insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than channel amount minus reserve \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
}
+#[test]
+fn test_funding_exceeds_no_wumbo_limit() {
+ // Test that if a peer does not support wumbo channels, we'll refuse to open a wumbo channel to
+ // them.
+ use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO;
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ node_cfgs[1].features = InitFeatures::known().clear_wumbo();
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ match nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1, 0, 42, None) {
+ Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
+ assert_eq!(format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1), err);
+ },
+ _ => panic!()
+ }
+}
+
fn do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(send_from_initiator: bool) {
// A peer providing a channel_reserve_satoshis of 0 (or less than our dust limit) is insecure,
// but only for them. Because some LSPs do it with some level of trust of the clients (for a
expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
}
+#[test]
+fn test_peer_disconnected_before_funding_broadcasted() {
+ // Test that channels are closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` if the peer disconnects
+ // before the funding transaction has been broadcasted.
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ // Open a channel between `nodes[0]` and `nodes[1]`, for which the funding transaction is never
+ // broadcasted, even though it's created by `nodes[0]`.
+ let expected_temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
+ let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
+ let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
+
+ let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 1_000_000, 42);
+ assert_eq!(temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
+
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).is_ok());
+
+ let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert_eq!(funding_created_msg.temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
+
+ // Even though the funding transaction is created by `nodes[0]`, the `FundingCreated` msg is
+ // never sent to `nodes[1]`, and therefore the tx is never signed by either party nor
+ // broadcasted.
+ {
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
+ }
+
+ // Ensure that the channel is closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` when the peers are
+ // disconnected before the funding transaction was broadcasted.
+ nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+ nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
+}
+
#[test]
fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
// Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
// We check funding pubkey are unique
- let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness[3][36..69]));
- let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness[3][36..69]));
+ let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
+ let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
|| from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
|| from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
let mut chain_monitor = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_chain_monitor_state.0), keys_manager).unwrap().1;
chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
- tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
+ tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster { txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new())) };
fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &tx_broadcaster, &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
}
// Check we close channel detecting A is fallen-behind
+ // Check that we sent the warning message when we detected that A has fallen behind,
+ // and give the possibility for A to recover from the warning.
nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
- check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_string() });
- assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction");
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let warn_msg = "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned();
+ assert!(check_warn_msg!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), chan.2).contains(&warn_msg));
// Check A is able to claim to_remote output
- let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
- assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
- check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
- mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
- connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
- check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can\'t do any automated broadcasting".to_string() });
- let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
- assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
- check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
+ let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
+ // The node B should not broadcast the transaction to force close the channel!
+ assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
+ // B should now detect that there is something wrong and should force close the channel.
+ let exp_err = "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can\'t do any automated broadcasting";
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: exp_err.to_string() });
+
+ // after the warning message sent by B, we should not able to
+ // use the channel, or reconnect with success to the channel.
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().is_empty());
+ nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
+ nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
+ let retry_reestablish = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &retry_reestablish[0]);
+ let mut err_msgs_0 = Vec::with_capacity(1);
+ for msg in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
+ if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg {
+ match action {
+ &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
+ assert_eq!(msg.data, "Failed to find corresponding channel");
+ err_msgs_0.push(msg.clone());
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
+ }
+ } else {
+ panic!("Unexpected event!");
+ }
+ }
+ assert_eq!(err_msgs_0.len(), 1);
+ nodes[1].node.handle_error(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &err_msgs_0[0]);
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().is_empty());
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned() });
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
}
#[test]
assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
- feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
+ feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
node_txn.clear();
};
// Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
- feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
+ feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
// Verify 25% bump heuristic
assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
node_txn.clear();
// Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
- feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
+ feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
// Verify 25% bump heuristic
assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
node_txn.clear();
first = node_txn[4].txid();
// Store both feerates for later comparison
let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[4].output[0].value;
- feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[4].get_weight() as u64;
+ feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[4].weight() as u64;
penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
node_txn.clear();
}
// Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
- let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
+ let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
node_txn.clear();
timeout = node_txn[6].txid();
let index = node_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout;
let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[6].output[0].value;
- feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / node_txn[6].get_weight() as u64;
+ feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / node_txn[6].weight() as u64;
preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
- feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
+ feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
node_txn.clear();
};
let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
- let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.get_weight() as u64;
+ let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.weight() as u64;
assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
- let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
+ let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
}
+#[test]
+fn test_channel_update_has_correct_htlc_maximum_msat() {
+ // Tests that the `ChannelUpdate` message has the correct values for `htlc_maximum_msat` set.
+ // Bolt 7 specifies that if present `htlc_maximum_msat`:
+ // 1. MUST be set to less than or equal to the channel capacity. In LDK, this is capped to
+ // 90% of the `channel_value`.
+ // 2. MUST be set to less than or equal to the `max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` received from the peer.
+
+ let mut config_30_percent = UserConfig::default();
+ config_30_percent.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
+ config_30_percent.own_channel_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 30;
+ let mut config_50_percent = UserConfig::default();
+ config_50_percent.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
+ config_50_percent.own_channel_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 50;
+ let mut config_95_percent = UserConfig::default();
+ config_95_percent.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
+ config_95_percent.own_channel_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 95;
+ let mut config_100_percent = UserConfig::default();
+ config_100_percent.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
+ config_100_percent.own_channel_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 100;
+
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config_30_percent), Some(config_50_percent), Some(config_95_percent), Some(config_100_percent)]);
+ let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ let channel_value_satoshis = 100000;
+ let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
+ let channel_value_30_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.3) as u64;
+ let channel_value_50_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.5) as u64;
+ let channel_value_90_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.9) as u64;
+
+ let (node_0_chan_update, node_1_chan_update, _, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value_satoshis, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
+ let (node_2_chan_update, node_3_chan_update, _, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, channel_value_satoshis, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
+
+ // Assert that `node[0]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 50 percent of the `channel_value`, as
+ // that's the value of `node[1]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
+ assert_eq!(node_0_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, OptionalField::Present(channel_value_50_percent_msat));
+ // Assert that `node[1]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 30 percent of the `channel_value`, as
+ // that's the value of `node[0]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
+ assert_eq!(node_1_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, OptionalField::Present(channel_value_30_percent_msat));
+
+ // Assert that `node[2]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
+ // the value of `node[3]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (100%), exceeds 90% of the
+ // `channel_value`.
+ assert_eq!(node_2_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, OptionalField::Present(channel_value_90_percent_msat));
+ // Assert that `node[3]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
+ // the value of `node[2]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (95%), exceeds 90% of the
+ // `channel_value`.
+ assert_eq!(node_3_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, OptionalField::Present(channel_value_90_percent_msat));
+}
+
#[test]
fn test_manually_accept_inbound_channel_request() {
let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage_2);
}
-#[test]
-fn test_dup_htlc_second_fail_panic() {
- // Previously, if we received two HTLCs back-to-back, where the second overran the expected
- // value for the payment, we'd fail back both HTLCs after generating a `PaymentReceived` event.
- // Then, if the user failed the second payment, they'd hit a "tried to fail an already failed
- // HTLC" debug panic. This tests for this behavior, checking that only one HTLC is auto-failed.
+fn do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(test_for_second_fail_panic: bool) {
let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
.with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
- let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
- let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
- let route = get_route(
- &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(),
- Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
- 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
+ let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
- let (_, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
+ let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
{
nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
// the first HTLC delivered above.
}
- // Now we go fail back the first HTLC from the user end.
expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
- nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
- nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
+ if test_for_second_fail_panic {
+ // Now we go fail back the first HTLC from the user end.
+ nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- assert_eq!(fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 2);
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
+ nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
+
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert_eq!(fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 2);
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
- nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
- nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
- commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
+ let failure_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(failure_events.len(), 2);
+ if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
+ if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[1] {} else { panic!(); }
+ } else {
+ // Let the second HTLC fail and claim the first
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
+ nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
+
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
+
+ expect_payment_failed_conditions!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
+
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
+ }
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_dup_htlc_second_fail_panic() {
+ // Previously, if we received two HTLCs back-to-back, where the second overran the expected
+ // value for the payment, we'd fail back both HTLCs after generating a `PaymentReceived` event.
+ // Then, if the user failed the second payment, they'd hit a "tried to fail an already failed
+ // HTLC" debug panic. This tests for this behavior, checking that only one HTLC is auto-failed.
+ do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(true);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_dup_htlc_second_rejected() {
+ // Test that if we receive a second HTLC for an MPP payment that overruns the payment amount we
+ // simply reject the second HTLC but are still able to claim the first HTLC.
+ do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(false);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_inconsistent_mpp_params() {
+ // Test that if we recieve two HTLCs with different payment parameters we fail back the first
+ // such HTLC and allow the second to stay.
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
+ let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
+
+ let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id())
+ .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
+ let mut route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 15_000_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
+ route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
+ // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
+ if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
+ core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
+ });
+ let payment_params_opt = Some(payment_params);
+
+ let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[3]);
+
+ let cur_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
+ let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
+ {
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), false, None);
+ }
+ assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+
+ {
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 14_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
+
+ nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
+
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
+
+ let mut events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
+
+ nodes[3].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg, true, true);
+
+ // At this point, nodes[3] should notice the two HTLCs don't contain the same total payment
+ // amount. It will assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
+ // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC.
+ }
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[3]);
+ nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[3]);
+ nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
+
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
+
+ let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
+
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
+
+ let fail_updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_2.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[2], fail_updates_2.commitment_signed, false);
+
+ expect_payment_failed_conditions!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
+
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), true, None);
- let failure_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(failure_events.len(), 2);
- if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
- if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[1] {} else { panic!(); }
+ claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, our_payment_preimage);
}
#[test]
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff