use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterfaceUtil};
-use chain::keysinterface::{KeysInterface, SpendableOutputDescriptor, KeysManager};
-use chain::keysinterface;
+use chain::keysinterface::{KeysInterface, SpendableOutputDescriptor};
use ln::channel::{COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC};
use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,ChannelManagerReadArgs,HTLCForwardInfo,RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ManyChannelMonitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop};
use ln::msgs;
use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler,HTLCFailChannelUpdate, LocalFeatures, ErrorAction};
+use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingChannelKeys;
use util::test_utils;
use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
use util::errors::APIError;
// Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
// funding satoshis
let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
- let channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat);
+ let channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<EnforcingChannelKeys>::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat);
let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
// Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
// nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
// HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
+ let node2_commitment_txid;
{
let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
+ node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
// Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1, 3_000_000);
nodes[3].block_notifier.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
}
+ // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
+ {
+ let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ node_txn.retain(|tx| {
+ if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
+ false
+ } else { true }
+ });
+ }
+
let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
// Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
node_txn.swap_remove(0);
+ node_txn.truncate(1);
}
test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
nodes[1].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
- test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone());
+ test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
}
get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
// We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
// Create some new channels:
let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ {
+ let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ node_txn.clear();
+ }
// A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
nodes[0].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
- test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone());
+ test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
}
get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
}
let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 22); // ChannelManager : 2, ChannelMontitor: 8 (1 standard revoked output, 2 revocation htlc tx, 1 local commitment tx + 1 htlc timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan) + 5 * (1 local commitment tx + 1 htlc timeout tx)
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 29); // ChannelManager : 2, ChannelMontitor: 8 (1 standard revoked output, 2 revocation htlc tx, 1 local commitment tx + 1 htlc timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan) + 5 * (1 local commitment tx + 1 htlc timeout tx)
assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[7]);
assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[8]);
assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[5]); //local commitment tx + htlc timeout tx broadcasted by ChannelManger
assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[6]);
- for i in 12..22 {
- if i % 2 == 0 { assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[i]); } else { assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[i]); }
- }
-
assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
- let as_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
- let bs_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
+ let as_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &as_chan.get_local_keys().inner.funding_key);
+ let bs_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().inner.funding_key);
let as_network_key = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
let bs_network_key = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
macro_rules! sign_msg {
($unsigned_msg: expr) => {
let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::hash(&$unsigned_msg.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
- let as_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
- let bs_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
+ let as_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &as_chan.get_local_keys().inner.funding_key);
+ let bs_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().inner.funding_key);
let as_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[0].keys_manager.get_node_secret());
let bs_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[1].keys_manager.get_node_secret());
chan_announcement = msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = {
let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &chan_0_monitor);
- <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
+ <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingChannelKeys>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
default_config: config,
keys_manager,
fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }),
let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = {
let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &chan_0_monitor);
- <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
+ <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingChannelKeys>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
default_config: UserConfig::default(),
keys_manager,
fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }),
let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
let keys_manager = Arc::new(test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
- let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
+ let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingChannelKeys>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
default_config: UserConfig::default(),
keys_manager,
fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }),
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]);
let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5);
assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone());
let nodes = create_network(2, &cfgs);
// We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_outbound()
- let keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface> = Arc::new(KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()), 10, 20));
+ let keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = EnforcingChannelKeys>> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
if let Err(error) = Channel::new_outbound(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }, &keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 0, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()), &low_our_to_self_config) {
match error {
APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert_eq!(err, "Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay putting user funds at risks"); },
let monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), logger.clone(), feeest.clone()));
let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
channel_monitors.insert(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, &chan_monitor);
- let node_state_0 = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut ::std::io::Cursor::new(previous_node_state), ChannelManagerReadArgs {
- keys_manager: Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger), 42, 21)),
+ let node_state_0 = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingChannelKeys>)>::read(&mut ::std::io::Cursor::new(previous_node_state), ChannelManagerReadArgs {
+ keys_manager: Arc::new(test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger))),
fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
monitor: monitor.clone(),
logger: Arc::clone(&logger),
let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 0);
}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
+ // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
+ // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
+
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
+ let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 3000000, 30).unwrap();
+ send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
+
+ let revoked_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+ // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
+ assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
+ assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
+ let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
+
+ let mut penalty_sum = 0;
+ for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
+ if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
+ penalty_sum += outp.value;
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
+ let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1].block_notifier, 114, 0, false, Default::default());
+
+ // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage, 3_000_000);
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_114, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ nodes[1].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()] }, 115);
+
+ // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
+ let penalty_1;
+ let feerate_1;
+ {
+ let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor) * 2 (block-reparsing) + local commitment tx + local HTLC-timeout (broadcasted from ChannelManager)
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0].clone());
+ let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
+ feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
+ penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
+ node_txn.clear();
+ };
+
+ // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
+ let header = connect_blocks(&nodes[1].block_notifier, 3, 115, true, header.bitcoin_hash());
+ let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
+ let mut feerate_2 = 0;
+ {
+ let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
+ if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0].clone());
+ penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
+ // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
+ assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
+ let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
+ feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
+ // Verify 25% bump heuristic
+ assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
+ node_txn.clear();
+ }
+ }
+ assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
+
+ // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1].block_notifier, 3, 118, true, header);
+ let penalty_3;
+ let mut feerate_3 = 0;
+ {
+ let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
+ if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0].clone());
+ penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
+ // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
+ assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
+ let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
+ feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
+ // Verify 25% bump heuristic
+ assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
+ node_txn.clear();
+ }
+ }
+ assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
+
+ nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
+ // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
+ // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
+
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ // Lock HTLC in both directions
+ let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3_000_000).0;
+ route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000).0;
+
+ let revoked_local_txn = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+ assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
+
+ // Revoke local commitment tx
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage, 3_000_000);
+
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
+ nodes[1].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]);
+
+ let mut received = ::std::usize::MAX;
+ let mut offered = ::std::usize::MAX;
+ let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 6);
+ if revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len() == ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT {
+ assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
+ assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
+ received = 0;
+ offered = 1;
+ } else if revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len() == ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT {
+ assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
+ assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
+ received = 1;
+ offered = 0;
+ }
+
+ // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
+ let header_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0].block_notifier, 128, 0, true, header.bitcoin_hash());
+ let header_129 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_128, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ nodes[0].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header: header_129, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()] }, 129);
+ let first;
+ let second;
+ let feerate_1;
+ let feerate_2;
+ {
+ let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 9); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx * 2 (block-rescan) + A commitment tx + 2 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
+ // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[7].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[7].output.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[7], revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone());
+ first = node_txn[7].txid();
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[8].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[8].output.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[8], revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone());
+ second = node_txn[8].txid();
+ // Store both feerates for later comparison
+ let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value - node_txn[7].output[0].value;
+ feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[7].get_weight() as u64;
+ let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[1].output[0].value - node_txn[8].output[0].value;
+ feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[8].get_weight() as u64;
+ node_txn.clear();
+ }
+
+ // Connect three more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
+ let header_132 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0].block_notifier, 3, 129, true, header_129.bitcoin_hash());
+ let node_txn = {
+ let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // 2 bumped penalty txn on offered/received HTLC outputs of revoked commitment tx + 1 penalty tx on to_local of revoked commitment tx + 2 bumped penalty tx on revoked HTLC txn
+
+ check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
+ check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
+
+ let mut penalty_local = ::std::usize::MAX;
+ let mut penalty_offered = ::std::usize::MAX;
+ let mut penalty_received = ::std::usize::MAX;
+
+ {
+ let iter_txn = node_txn[2..].iter();
+ for (i, tx) in iter_txn.enumerate() {
+ if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_local_txn[0].txid() {
+ penalty_local = 2 + i;
+ } else if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[offered].txid() {
+ penalty_offered = 2+ i;
+ } else if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[received].txid() {
+ penalty_received = 2 + i;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ check_spends!(node_txn[penalty_local], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
+
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[penalty_received].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[penalty_received].output.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[penalty_offered].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[penalty_offered].output.len(), 1);
+ // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
+ check_spends!(node_txn[penalty_offered], revoked_htlc_txn[offered].clone());
+ assert_ne!(first, node_txn[penalty_offered].txid());
+ let fee = revoked_htlc_txn[offered].output[0].value - node_txn[penalty_offered].output[0].value;
+ let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[penalty_offered].get_weight() as u64;
+ assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
+
+ check_spends!(node_txn[penalty_received], revoked_htlc_txn[received].clone());
+ assert_ne!(second, node_txn[penalty_received].txid());
+ let fee = revoked_htlc_txn[received].output[0].value - node_txn[penalty_received].output[0].value;
+ let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[penalty_received].get_weight() as u64;
+ assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_2 * 125);
+ let txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone(), node_txn[3].clone(), node_txn[4].clone()];
+ node_txn.clear();
+ txn
+ };
+ // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
+ let header_133 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_132, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ nodes[0].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header: header_133, txdata: node_txn }, 133);
+ let header_140 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0].block_notifier, 6, 134, true, header_133.bitcoin_hash());
+ {
+ let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ node_txn.clear();
+ }
+
+ // Connect few more blocks and check only penalty transaction for to_local output have been issued
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0].block_notifier, 7, 140, true, header_140);
+ {
+ let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); //TODO: should be zero when we fix check_spend_remote_htlc
+ node_txn.clear();
+ }
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0]);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
+ // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
+ // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
+
+ // Create 2 HTLCs
+ // Provide preimage for one
+ // Check aggregation
+
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
+ route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
+
+ // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
+ let remote_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+ assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
+ assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
+
+ // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
+ nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage, 3_000_000);
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ nodes[1].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![remote_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
+ let timeout;
+ let preimage;
+ let feerate_timeout;
+ let feerate_preimage;
+ {
+ let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 6); // 2 * claim tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor) * 2 (block-reparsing) + local commitment tx + local HTLC-timeout (broadcasted from ChannelManager)
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[4]);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[5]);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0].clone());
+ check_spends!(node_txn[1], remote_txn[0].clone());
+ if node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len() == ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT {
+ timeout = node_txn[0].txid();
+ let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
+ let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
+ feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
+
+ preimage = node_txn[1].txid();
+ let index = node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout;
+ let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[1].output[0].value;
+ feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[1].get_weight() as u64;
+ } else {
+ timeout = node_txn[1].txid();
+ let index = node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout;
+ let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[1].output[0].value;
+ feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / node_txn[1].get_weight() as u64;
+
+ preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
+ let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
+ let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
+ feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
+ }
+ node_txn.clear();
+ };
+ assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
+ assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
+
+ // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1].block_notifier, 15, 1, true, header.bitcoin_hash());
+ {
+ let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0].clone());
+ check_spends!(node_txn[1], remote_txn[0].clone());
+ if node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len() == ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT {
+ let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
+ let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
+ let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
+ assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
+ assert_ne!(timeout, node_txn[0].txid());
+
+ let index = node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout;
+ let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[1].output[0].value;
+ let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[1].get_weight() as u64;
+ assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
+ assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[1].txid());
+ } else {
+ let index = node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout;
+ let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[1].output[0].value;
+ let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[1].get_weight() as u64;
+ assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
+ assert_ne!(timeout, node_txn[1].txid());
+
+ let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
+ let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
+ let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
+ assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
+ assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
+ }
+ node_txn.clear();
+ }
+
+ nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_set_outpoints_partial_claiming() {
+ // - remote party claim tx, new bump tx
+ // - disconnect remote claiming tx, new bump
+ // - disconnect tx, see no tx anymore
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000).0;
+ let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000).0;
+
+ // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs: to_local, to_remote, 2 outgoing HTLC
+ let remote_txn = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+ assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
+ assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
+
+ // Connect blocks on node A to advance height towards TEST_FINAL_CLTV
+ let prev_header_100 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1].block_notifier, 100, 0, false, Default::default());
+ // Provide node A with both preimage
+ nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1, 3_000_000);
+ nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2, 3_000_000);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
+ nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+
+ // Connect blocks on node A commitment transaction
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: prev_header_100, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ nodes[0].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![remote_txn[0].clone()] }, 101);
+ // Verify node A broadcast tx claiming both HTLCs
+ {
+ let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0].clone());
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
+ node_txn.clear();
+ }
+ nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+
+ // Connect blocks on node B
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1].block_notifier, 135, 0, false, Default::default());
+ // Verify node B broadcast 2 HTLC-timeout txn
+ let partial_claim_tx = {
+ let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0].clone());
+ check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[0].clone());
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
+ node_txn[1].clone()
+ };
+ nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+
+ // Broadcast partial claim on node A, should regenerate a claiming tx with HTLC dropped
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ nodes[0].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![partial_claim_tx.clone()] }, 102);
+ {
+ let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0].clone());
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); //dropped HTLC
+ node_txn.clear();
+ }
+ nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+
+ // Disconnect last block on node A, should regenerate a claiming tx with HTLC dropped
+ nodes[0].block_notifier.block_disconnected(&header, 102);
+ {
+ let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0].clone());
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); //resurrected HTLC
+ node_txn.clear();
+ }
+
+ //// Disconnect one more block and then reconnect multiple no transaction should be generated
+ nodes[0].block_notifier.block_disconnected(&header, 101);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1].block_notifier, 15, 101, false, prev_header_100);
+ {
+ let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
+ node_txn.clear();
+ }
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
+ // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
+ // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
+
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ // Lock HTLC in both directions
+ let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
+ route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000).0;
+
+ let revoked_local_txn = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+ assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
+
+ // Revoke local commitment tx
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage, 9_000_000);
+
+ // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
+ let header_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0].block_notifier, 128, 0, false, Default::default());
+ let header_129 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_128, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ nodes[0].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header: header_129, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 129);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0]);
+ let penalty_txn = {
+ let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 7);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
+ check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
+ check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
+ let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
+ node_txn.clear();
+ penalty_txn
+ };
+ let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_129.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ nodes[0].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn }, 130);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0].block_notifier, 5, 130, false, header_130.bitcoin_hash());
+ {
+ let monitors = nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap();
+ if let Some(monitor) = monitors.get(&OutPoint::new(chan.3.txid(), 0)) {
+ assert!(monitor.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
+ assert!(monitor.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
+ }
+ }
+}
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff