use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
+use bitcoin::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, Witness};
+use bitcoin::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
// Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
- nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan_1.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_1.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
{
// Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
// broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
- nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan_2.2, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_2.2, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
{
// nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
// HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
- nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&chan_3.2, &nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
+ nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_3.2, &nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
let node2_commitment_txid;
let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
// Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
- send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
// node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
- let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
- let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
+ let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
+ let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
// Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
- expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
- let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment
assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
// Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
+ check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
+
+ // Finally, mine the penalty transaction and check that we get an HTLC failure after
+ // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
+ expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
}
get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
// Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
- send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
// node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
// time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
- let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
- let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
+ let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
+ let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
// Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
}
connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
- expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
- let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
assert!(node_txn.len() == 9 || node_txn.len() == 10);
// Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
+
+ // Finally, mine the penalty transactions and check that we get an HTLC failure after
+ // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[2]);
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[3]);
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[4]);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
+ expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
}
get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
- nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
// state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
// transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
- nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
+ nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
- nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
- nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
+
connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
- timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
+ timeout_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..)
+ .filter(|tx| tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == bs_commitment_tx[0].txid()).collect();
+ check_spends!(timeout_tx[0], bs_commitment_tx[0]);
+ // For both a revoked or non-revoked commitment transaction, after ANTI_REORG_DELAY the
+ // dust HTLC should have been failed.
+ expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
+
if !revoked {
- expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
- // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout tx on remote commitment tx
- mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
- assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
- connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
- expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
} else {
- // If revoked, both dust & non-dust HTLCs should have been failed after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confs of revoked
- // commitment tx
- let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
- let first;
- match events[0] {
- Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
- if payment_hash == dust_hash { first = true; }
- else { first = false; }
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
- match events[1] {
- Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
- if first { assert_eq!(payment_hash, non_dust_hash); }
- else { assert_eq!(payment_hash, dust_hash); }
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
+ assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].lock_time, 0);
}
+ // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout/revocation-claim tx
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
+ expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
}
}
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
- nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
match events[0] {
Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
- nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
}
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
force_closing_node = 1;
counterparty_node = 0;
}
- nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_channel(&chan_ab.2, &nodes[counterparty_node].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
+ nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_ab.2, &nodes[counterparty_node].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_non_final_funding_tx() {
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
+ let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_message);
+ let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel_message);
+
+ let best_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
+
+ let chan_id = *nodes[0].network_chan_count.borrow();
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ let input = TxIn { previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint::null(), script_sig: bitcoin::Script::new(), sequence: 0x1, witness: Witness::from_vec(vec!(vec!(1))) };
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ let mut tx = match events[0] {
+ Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } => {
+ // Timelock the transaction _beyond_ the best client height + 2.
+ Transaction { version: chan_id as i32, lock_time: best_height + 3, input: vec![input], output: vec![TxOut {
+ value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
+ }]}
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ };
+ // Transaction should fail as it's evaluated as non-final for propagation.
+ match nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()) {
+ Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
+ assert_eq!(format!("Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final"), err);
+ },
+ _ => panic!()
+ }
+
+ // However, transaction should be accepted if it's in a +2 headroom from best block.
+ tx.lock_time -= 1;
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
+ get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+}
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff