use crate::chain::channelmonitor;
use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
-use crate::sign::{EcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
+use crate::sign::{ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PathFailure, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
use crate::ln::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
use crate::ln::channel::{commitment_tx_base_weight, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, COINBASE_MATURITY, ChannelPhase};
use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
-use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
+use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
+use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, ScriptBuf};
use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
-use bitcoin::{PackedLockTime, Sequence, Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, Witness};
+use bitcoin::{Sequence, Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, Witness};
use bitcoin::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
// Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
- nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None, None).unwrap();
// Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
- match nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1, 0, 42, None) {
+ match nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1, 0, 42, None, None) {
Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
assert_eq!(format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1), err);
},
push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 4 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
- let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, if send_from_initiator { 0 } else { push_amt }, 42, None).unwrap();
+ let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, if send_from_initiator { 0 } else { push_amt }, 42, None, None).unwrap();
let mut open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
if !send_from_initiator {
open_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
}
if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
- nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
*feerate_lock += 4;
}
nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
- nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
+ nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel", format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
&mut htlcs,
&local_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
);
- local_chan_signer.as_ecdsa().unwrap().sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
+ local_chan_signer.as_ecdsa().unwrap().sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
};
let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
//check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
//Should produce and error.
nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
- nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_string(), 1);
+ nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee", 3);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") },
cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
skimmed_fee_msat: None,
+ blinding_point: None,
};
nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
&mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
&local_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
);
- local_chan_signer.as_ecdsa().unwrap().sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
+ local_chan_signer.as_ecdsa().unwrap().sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
};
let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
};
- nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
+ nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel",
format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", raa_msg.channel_id), 1);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
skimmed_fee_msat: None,
+ blinding_point: None,
};
nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
// Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
- nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
+ nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value", 3);
assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
// HTLC.
let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, &channel_type_features);
- assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None).unwrap_err(),
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None, None).unwrap_err(),
APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding amount (356) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of 357.".to_string() });
// During open, we don't have a "counterparty channel reserve" to check against, so that
// requirement only comes into play on the open_channel handling side.
push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
- nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None, None).unwrap();
let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
open_channel_msg.push_msat += 1;
nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
skimmed_fee_msat: None,
+ blinding_point: None,
};
nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
// Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
- nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string(), 1);
+ nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value", 3);
assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
// attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
{
let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
- .with_bolt11_features(nodes[2].node.invoice_features()).unwrap().with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
+ .with_bolt11_features(nodes[2].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap().with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], payment_params, recv_value_0);
route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
assert!(route.paths[0].hops.iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
}
let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
- .with_bolt11_features(nodes[2].node.invoice_features()).unwrap().with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
+ .with_bolt11_features(nodes[2].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap().with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, recv_value_0).unwrap();
let (payment_preimage, ..) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], recv_value_0);
claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_1.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
{
let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
+ if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
+ let _ = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
+ }
+
mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, Some(node_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
- check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
// One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 3_000_000);
// that a revoked commitment transaction is broadcasted
// (Similar to `revoked_output_claim` test but we get the justice tx + broadcast manually)
let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
- let destination_script0 = chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.get_destination_script().unwrap();
- let destination_script1 = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_destination_script().unwrap();
+ let destination_script0 = chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.get_destination_script([0; 32]).unwrap();
+ let destination_script1 = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_destination_script([0; 32]).unwrap();
let persisters = vec![WatchtowerPersister::new(destination_script0),
WatchtowerPersister::new(destination_script1)];
let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs_with_persisters(2, &chanmon_cfgs, persisters.iter().collect());
assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO);
// Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]));
// Node[0]: 2 * HTLC-timeout tx
check_spends!(node_txn[0], $commitment_tx);
check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
- assert_ne!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0);
- assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0);
+ assert_ne!(node_txn[0].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO);
+ assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO);
if $htlc_offered {
assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
- assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time.0, nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
+ assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time.to_consensus_u32(), nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
// We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
// we already checked the same situation with A.
let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 3 + nodes.len() - 1 } else { 4 + nodes.len() });
- match events[0] {
- Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => { },
- _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
- }
- match events[1] {
- Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
- assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
- match events[2] {
- Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
- assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
+ assert!(events.iter().any(|ev| matches!(
+ ev,
+ Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. }
+ )));
+ assert!(events.iter().any(|ev| matches!(
+ ev,
+ Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } if *payment_hash == fourth_payment_hash
+ )));
+ assert!(events.iter().any(|ev| matches!(
+ ev,
+ Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } if *payment_hash == fourth_payment_hash
+ )));
nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
cltv_expiry,
onion_routing_packet,
skimmed_fee_msat: None,
+ blinding_point: None,
};
nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
}
// connect_style.
return;
}
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ let funding_tx = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).3;
route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
- let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
- assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0].txid(), node_txn[1].txid());
+ let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[0], funding_tx);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
- let block = create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]);
+ let block = create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![node_txn[0].clone()]);
connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
- let tx = {
+ let commitment_tx = {
let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
// Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
// have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
node_txn.remove(0)
};
- mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx);
// Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
.provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator), &node_cfgs[2].logger);
}
- mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx);
- let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx);
+ let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), if nodes[2].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() { 2 } else { 1 });
+ let htlc_tx = node_txn.pop().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(htlc_tx.input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, commitment_tx.txid());
+ assert_eq!(htlc_tx.lock_time, LockTime::ZERO); // Must be an HTLC-Success
+ assert_eq!(htlc_tx.input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
- check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
+ check_spends!(htlc_tx, commitment_tx);
}
#[test]
// Open a channel between `nodes[0]` and `nodes[1]`, for which the funding transaction is never
// broadcasted, even though it's created by `nodes[0]`.
- let expected_temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
+ let expected_temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
- assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // HTLC-Timeout
+ assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO); // HTLC-Timeout
// B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()]));
check_spends!(c_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
assert_eq!(c_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
- assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Success tx
+ assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO); // Success tx
// So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), c_txn[0].clone()]));
check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
- assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time.0, nodes[1].best_block_info().1); // Success tx
+ assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time.to_consensus_u32(), nodes[1].best_block_info().1); // Success tx
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
// script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
// ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40)
- .with_bolt11_features(nodes[3].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
+ .with_bolt11_features(nodes[3].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], payment_params, 800_000);
send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 800_000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
// BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
let push_msat=10001;
- nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None, None).unwrap();
let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
// Create a second channel with the same random values. This used to panic due to a colliding
// channel_id, but now panics due to a colliding outbound SCID alias.
- assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None, None).is_err());
}
#[test]
// BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
let push_msat=10001;
- assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None, None).is_err());
// BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
// Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
- assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None, None).is_err());
// BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
let push_msat=10001;
- assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
let push_msat=10001;
- nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None, None).unwrap();
let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
// us to surface its failure to the user.
chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
- nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", chan.2), 1);
+ nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel", format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", chan.2), 1);
// Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
// to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
- nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", chan.2), 1);
+ nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel", format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", chan.2), 1);
// Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
}
+#[test]
+fn test_payment_route_reaching_same_channel_twice() {
+ //A route should not go through the same channel twice
+ //It is enforced when constructing a route.
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+ let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0);
+
+ let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0)
+ .with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
+ let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], payment_params, 100000000);
+
+ // Extend the path by itself, essentially simulating route going through same channel twice
+ let cloned_hops = route.paths[0].hops.clone();
+ route.paths[0].hops.extend_from_slice(&cloned_hops);
+
+ unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
+ RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
+ ), false, APIError::InvalidRoute { ref err },
+ assert_eq!(err, &"Path went through the same channel twice"));
+}
+
// BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
// BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
//TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
- nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
+ nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC", 3);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() },
let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0);
let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0)
- .with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
+ .with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], payment_params, 100000000);
route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta = 500000001;
unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
skimmed_fee_msat: None,
+ blinding_point: None,
};
for i in 0..50 {
if !revoked {
assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
} else {
- assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].lock_time.0, 11);
+ assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].lock_time.to_consensus_u32(), 11);
}
// We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout/revocation-claim tx
mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
// We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in OutboundV1Channel::new()
if let Err(error) = OutboundV1Channel::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
&nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), 1000000, 1000000, 0,
- &low_our_to_self_config, 0, 42)
+ &low_our_to_self_config, 0, 42, None)
{
match error {
APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
} else { assert!(false) }
// We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in InboundV1Channel::new()
- nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
if let Err(error) = InboundV1Channel::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
} else { assert!(false); }
// We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
- nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
// We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in InboundV1Channel::new()
- nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
if let Err(error) = InboundV1Channel::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
- let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
- TEST_FINAL_CLTV).with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
+ let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
+ .with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000);
let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(),
None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 30)
- .with_bolt11_features(nodes[0].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
+ .with_bolt11_features(nodes[0].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_params, 3000000);
send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
- feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
+ feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu();
penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
node_txn.clear();
};
// Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
- feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
+ feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu();
// Verify 25% bump heuristic
assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
node_txn.clear();
// Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
- feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
+ feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu();
// Verify 25% bump heuristic
assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
node_txn.clear();
let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
// Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
- let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 50).with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
+ let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 50).with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 3_000_000);
let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None,
nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
- let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 50).with_bolt11_features(nodes[0].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
+ let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 50)
+ .with_bolt11_features(nodes[0].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 3_000_000);
let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[1].network_graph.read_only(), None,
nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
first = node_txn[3].txid();
// Store both feerates for later comparison
let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[1].output[0].value - node_txn[3].output[0].value;
- feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[3].weight() as u64;
+ feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[3].weight().to_wu();
penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
node_txn.clear();
}
// Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[1].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
- let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
+ let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu();
assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
node_txn.clear();
preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
- feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
+ feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu();
let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output == node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output {
(node_txn[2].clone(), node_txn[1].clone())
timeout = timeout_tx.txid();
let index = timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout;
let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - timeout_tx.output[0].value;
- feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / timeout_tx.weight() as u64;
+ feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / timeout_tx.weight().to_wu();
node_txn.clear();
};
let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
- let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.weight() as u64;
+ let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.weight().to_wu();
assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
- let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
+ let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu();
assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
override_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
- nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, None, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
// Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
- nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, None, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
- let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
+ let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
- nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
- nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), height + 1, &None).unwrap();
// Edit amt_to_forward to simulate the sender having set
// the final amount and the routing node taking less fee
- if let msgs::OutboundOnionPayload::Receive { ref mut amt_msat, .. } = onion_payloads[1] {
- *amt_msat = 99_000;
+ if let msgs::OutboundOnionPayload::Receive {
+ ref mut sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat, ..
+ } = onion_payloads[1] {
+ *sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat = 99_000;
} else { panic!() }
let new_onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash).unwrap();
payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet = new_onion_packet;
watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST);
// Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
- let alice_state = {
+ {
let mut txn = alice_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
- txn.remove(0)
+ check_spends!(txn[0], chan_1.3);
+ check_spends!(txn[1], txn[0]);
};
// Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
{
let htlc_txn = alice_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
- assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
+ assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 1);
check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
- // Alice doesn't clean up the old HTLC claim since it hasn't seen a conflicting spend for
- // it. However, she should, because it now has an invalid parent.
- check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], alice_state);
}
}
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
// Create an initial channel
- nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
} else {
- assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
+ if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
+ assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 3);
+ assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].txid(), bob_txn[1].txid());
+ } else {
+ assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
+ }
check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
}
}
// If Alice force-closed, Bob only broadcasts a HTLC-output-claiming transaction. Otherwise,
// Bob force-closed and broadcasts the commitment transaction along with a
// HTLC-output-claiming transaction.
- let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
+ let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
if broadcast_alice {
assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
} else {
- assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
- check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
- assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
+ assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() { 3 } else { 2 });
+ let htlc_tx = bob_txn.pop().unwrap();
+ check_spends!(htlc_tx, txn_to_broadcast[0]);
+ assert_eq!(htlc_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
}
}
}
let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
// Create an first channel channel
- nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
let mut open_chan_msg_chan_1_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
// Create an second channel
- nodes[2].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 43, None).unwrap();
+ nodes[2].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 43, None, None).unwrap();
let mut open_chan_msg_chan_2_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
// Modify the `OpenChannel` from `nodes[2]` to `nodes[0]` to ensure that it uses the same
}
}
+#[test]
+fn test_peer_funding_sidechannel() {
+ // Test that if a peer somehow learns which txid we'll use for our channel funding before we
+ // receive `funding_transaction_generated` the peer cannot cause us to crash. We'd previously
+ // assumed that LDK would receive `funding_transaction_generated` prior to our peer learning
+ // the txid and panicked if the peer tried to open a redundant channel to us with the same
+ // funding outpoint.
+ //
+ // While this assumption is generally safe, some users may have out-of-band protocols where
+ // they notify their LSP about a funding outpoint first, or this may be violated in the future
+ // with collaborative transaction construction protocols, i.e. dual-funding.
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
+ let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ let temp_chan_id_ab = exchange_open_accept_chan(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
+ let temp_chan_id_ca = exchange_open_accept_chan(&nodes[2], &nodes[0], 1_000_000, 0);
+
+ let (_, tx, funding_output) =
+ create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
+
+ let cs_funding_events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(cs_funding_events.len(), 1);
+ match cs_funding_events[0] {
+ Event::FundingGenerationReady { .. } => {}
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", cs_funding_events),
+ }
+
+ nodes[2].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temp_chan_id_ca, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone(), funding_output.index).unwrap();
+ let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[0].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
+ get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
+ expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ let res = nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_chan_id_ab, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone());
+ let err_msg = format!("{:?}", res.unwrap_err());
+ assert!(err_msg.contains("An existing channel using outpoint "));
+ assert!(err_msg.contains(" is open with peer"));
+ // Even though the last funding_transaction_generated errored, it still generated a
+ // SendFundingCreated. However, when the peer responds with a funding_signed it will send the
+ // appropriate error message.
+ let as_funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_created);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: format!("An existing channel using outpoint {} is open with peer {}", funding_output, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), };
+ check_closed_events(&nodes[0], &[ExpectedCloseEvent::from_id_reason(funding_output.to_channel_id(), true, reason)]);
+
+ let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
+ get_err_msg(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_duplicate_conflicting_funding_from_second_peer() {
+ // Test that if a user tries to fund a channel with a funding outpoint they'd previously used
+ // we don't try to remove the previous ChannelMonitor. This is largely a test to ensure we
+ // don't regress in the fuzzer, as such funding getting passed our outpoint-matches checks
+ // implies the user (and our counterparty) has reused cryptographic keys across channels, which
+ // we require the user not do.
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
+ let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ let temp_chan_id = exchange_open_accept_chan(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
+
+ let (_, tx, funding_output) =
+ create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
+
+ // Now that we have a funding outpoint, create a dummy `ChannelMonitor` and insert it into
+ // nodes[0]'s ChainMonitor so that the initial `ChannelMonitor` write fails.
+ let dummy_chan_id = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[2], &nodes[3]).3;
+ let dummy_monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[2], dummy_chan_id).clone();
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(funding_output, dummy_monitor).unwrap();
+
+ nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
+
+ let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
+ let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
+ // At this point, the channel should be closed, after having generated one monitor write (the
+ // watch_channel call which failed), but zero monitor updates.
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ get_err_msg(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ let err_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned() };
+ check_closed_events(&nodes[0], &[ExpectedCloseEvent::from_id_reason(funding_signed_msg.channel_id, true, err_reason)]);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_duplicate_funding_err_in_funding() {
+ // Test that if we have a live channel with one peer, then another peer comes along and tries
+ // to create a second channel with the same txid we'll fail and not overwrite the
+ // outpoint_to_peer map in `ChannelManager`.
+ //
+ // This was previously broken.
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
+ let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ let (_, _, _, real_channel_id, funding_tx) = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
+ let real_chan_funding_txo = chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
+ assert_eq!(real_chan_funding_txo.to_channel_id(), real_channel_id);
+
+ nodes[2].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
+ let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ let node_c_temp_chan_id = open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id;
+ open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = real_channel_id;
+ nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
+ let mut accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
+ accept_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = node_c_temp_chan_id;
+ nodes[2].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan_msg);
+
+ // Now that we have a second channel with the same funding txo, send a bogus funding message
+ // and let nodes[1] remove the inbound channel.
+ let (_, funding_tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[2], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
+
+ nodes[2].node.funding_transaction_generated(&node_c_temp_chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), funding_tx).unwrap();
+
+ let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ funding_created_msg.temporary_channel_id = real_channel_id;
+ // Make the signature invalid by changing the funding output
+ funding_created_msg.funding_output_index += 10;
+ nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
+ get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
+ let err = "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned();
+ let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err };
+ let expected_closing = ExpectedCloseEvent::from_id_reason(real_channel_id, false, reason);
+ check_closed_events(&nodes[1], &[expected_closing]);
+
+ assert_eq!(
+ *nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().get(&real_chan_funding_txo).unwrap(),
+ nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
+ );
+}
+
#[test]
fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
// Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
// Create an initial channel
- nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
}
// Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
- nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_2_msg);
nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
- let (_, funding_created) = {
+ let funding_created = {
let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let mut a_peer_state = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
// Once we call `get_funding_created` the channel has a duplicate channel_id as
// try to create another channel. Instead, we drop the channel entirely here (leaving the
// channelmanager in a possibly nonsense state instead).
match a_peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap() {
- ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
+ ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(mut chan) => {
let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap()
},
_ => panic!("Unexpected ChannelPhase variant"),
- }
+ }.unwrap()
};
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
// without trying to persist the `ChannelMonitor`.
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
+ check_closed_events(&nodes[1], &[
+ ExpectedCloseEvent::from_id_reason(funding_created.temporary_channel_id, false, ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
+ err: "Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned()
+ })
+ ]);
+
// ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
{
let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
- nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
// a panic as we'd try to extract a 32 byte preimage from a witness element without checking
// its length.
let mut wit_program: Vec<u8> = channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program();
- let wit_program_script: Script = wit_program.into();
+ let wit_program_script: ScriptBuf = wit_program.into();
for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
// Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
- output.script_pubkey = Script::new_v0_p2wsh(&wit_program_script.wscript_hash());
+ output.script_pubkey = ScriptBuf::new_v0_p2wsh(&wit_program_script.wscript_hash());
}
nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
// long the ChannelMonitor will try to read 32 bytes from the second-to-last element, panicing
// as its not 32 bytes long.
let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
- version: 2i32, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
+ version: 2i32, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
input: tx.output.iter().enumerate().map(|(idx, _)| TxIn {
previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
txid: tx.txid(),
vout: idx as u32,
},
- script_sig: Script::new(),
+ script_sig: ScriptBuf::new(),
sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
- witness: Witness::from_vec(channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness())
+ witness: Witness::from_slice(&channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness())
}).collect(),
output: vec![TxOut {
value: 1000,
- script_pubkey: Script::new(),
+ script_pubkey: ScriptBuf::new(),
}]
};
check_spends!(spend_tx, tx);
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
- nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
// We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
- assert_eq!(spending_txn[0].txid(), node_txn[0].txid());
- check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
+ let htlc_tx = if spending_txn[0].txid() == node_txn[0].txid() {
+ &spending_txn[1]
+ } else {
+ &spending_txn[0]
+ };
+ check_spends!(htlc_tx, node_txn[0]);
// We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
// timelock is up).
let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
// should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
// additional block built on top of the current chain.
nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
- &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
+ &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, htlc_tx)], conf_height + 1);
expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: channel_id }]);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
- .with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
+ .with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 10_000).unwrap();
let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
let chan_2_3 =create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0);
let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
- .with_bolt11_features(nodes[3].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
+ .with_bolt11_features(nodes[3].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
let mut route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 15_000_000).unwrap();
assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
- nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
open_channel.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
open_channel.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
// Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
- nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
+ nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel", format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
} else {
// Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
- nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
+ nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel",
format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx - 1) + dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat + 4,
max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
- let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
+ let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
let chan_id = *nodes[0].network_chan_count.borrow();
let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- let input = TxIn { previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint::null(), script_sig: bitcoin::Script::new(), sequence: Sequence(1), witness: Witness::from_vec(vec!(vec!(1))) };
+ let input = TxIn { previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint::null(), script_sig: bitcoin::ScriptBuf::new(), sequence: Sequence(1), witness: Witness::from_slice(&[&[1]]) };
assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
let mut tx = match events[0] {
Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } => {
// Timelock the transaction _beyond_ the best client height + 1.
- Transaction { version: chan_id as i32, lock_time: PackedLockTime(best_height + 2), input: vec![input], output: vec![TxOut {
+ Transaction { version: chan_id as i32, lock_time: LockTime::from_height(best_height + 2).unwrap(), input: vec![input], output: vec![TxOut {
value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
}]}
},
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
- let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
+ let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
let chan_id = *nodes[0].network_chan_count.borrow();
let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- let input = TxIn { previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint::null(), script_sig: bitcoin::Script::new(), sequence: Sequence(1), witness: Witness::from_vec(vec!(vec!(1))) };
+ let input = TxIn { previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint::null(), script_sig: bitcoin::ScriptBuf::new(), sequence: Sequence(1), witness: Witness::from_slice(&[[1]]) };
assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
let mut tx = match events[0] {
Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } => {
// Timelock the transaction within a +1 headroom from the best block.
- Transaction { version: chan_id as i32, lock_time: PackedLockTime(best_height + 1), input: vec![input], output: vec![TxOut {
+ Transaction { version: chan_id as i32, lock_time: LockTime::from_consensus(best_height + 1), input: vec![input], output: vec![TxOut {
value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
}]}
},
MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
- err: "Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: 1000. Our expected lower limit: 5000 (- 250)".to_owned() },
+ err: "Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: 1000. Our expected lower limit: 5000".to_owned() },
[nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
- let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
+ let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
- let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
+ let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
// The channels in the batch will close immediately.
- let channel_id_1 = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id();
- let channel_id_2 = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 1 }.to_channel_id();
+ let funding_txo_1 = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
+ let funding_txo_2 = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 1 };
+ let channel_id_1 = funding_txo_1.to_channel_id();
+ let channel_id_2 = funding_txo_2.to_channel_id();
check_closed_events(&nodes[0], &[
ExpectedCloseEvent {
channel_id: Some(channel_id_1),
discard_funding: true,
+ channel_funding_txo: Some(funding_txo_1),
+ user_channel_id: Some(42),
..Default::default()
},
ExpectedCloseEvent {
channel_id: Some(channel_id_2),
discard_funding: true,
+ channel_funding_txo: Some(funding_txo_2),
+ user_channel_id: Some(43),
..Default::default()
},
]);
assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().len(), 0);
// Force-close the channel for which we've completed the initial monitor.
- let channel_id_1 = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id();
- let channel_id_2 = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 1 }.to_channel_id();
+ let funding_txo_1 = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
+ let funding_txo_2 = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 1 };
+ let channel_id_1 = funding_txo_1.to_channel_id();
+ let channel_id_2 = funding_txo_2.to_channel_id();
nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id_1, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 2);
{
ExpectedCloseEvent {
channel_id: Some(channel_id_1),
discard_funding: true,
+ channel_funding_txo: Some(funding_txo_1),
+ user_channel_id: Some(42),
..Default::default()
},
ExpectedCloseEvent {
channel_id: Some(channel_id_2),
discard_funding: true,
+ channel_funding_txo: Some(funding_txo_2),
+ user_channel_id: Some(43),
..Default::default()
},
]);