Include counterparty node id and channel id in shutdown log
[rust-lightning] / lightning / src / ln / functional_tests.rs
index 8e78f48e68561ecb8a861b14ae07866a76b2ff8b..8df252586a30acd9dc902cb42e4a55b9071a06f8 100644 (file)
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
 use crate::chain::channelmonitor;
 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
-use crate::sign::{EcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
+use crate::sign::{ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PathFailure, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
 use crate::ln::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
 use crate::ln::channel::{commitment_tx_base_weight, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, COINBASE_MATURITY, ChannelPhase};
@@ -1415,6 +1415,7 @@ fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
                cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
                onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
                skimmed_fee_msat: None,
+               blinding_point: None,
        };
 
        nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
@@ -1611,6 +1612,7 @@ fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
                cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
                onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
                skimmed_fee_msat: None,
+               blinding_point: None,
        };
 
        nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
@@ -1789,6 +1791,7 @@ fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
                cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
                onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
                skimmed_fee_msat: None,
+               blinding_point: None,
        };
 
        nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
@@ -2590,8 +2593,8 @@ fn do_test_forming_justice_tx_from_monitor_updates(broadcast_initial_commitment:
        // that a revoked commitment transaction is broadcasted
        // (Similar to `revoked_output_claim` test but we get the justice tx + broadcast manually)
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
-       let destination_script0 = chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.get_destination_script().unwrap();
-       let destination_script1 = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_destination_script().unwrap();
+       let destination_script0 = chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.get_destination_script([0; 32]).unwrap();
+       let destination_script1 = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_destination_script([0; 32]).unwrap();
        let persisters = vec![WatchtowerPersister::new(destination_script0),
                WatchtowerPersister::new(destination_script1)];
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs_with_persisters(2, &chanmon_cfgs, persisters.iter().collect());
@@ -3510,6 +3513,7 @@ fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
                        cltv_expiry,
                        onion_routing_packet,
                        skimmed_fee_msat: None,
+                       blinding_point: None,
                };
                nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
        }
@@ -6205,6 +6209,30 @@ fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 }
 
+#[test]
+fn test_payment_route_reaching_same_channel_twice() {
+       //A route should not go through the same channel twice
+       //It is enforced when constructing a route.
+       let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+       let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+       let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
+       let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+       let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0);
+
+       let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0)
+               .with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
+       let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], payment_params, 100000000);
+
+       // Extend the path by itself, essentially simulating route going through same channel twice
+       let cloned_hops = route.paths[0].hops.clone();
+       route.paths[0].hops.extend_from_slice(&cloned_hops);
+
+       unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
+               RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
+       ), false, APIError::InvalidRoute { ref err },
+       assert_eq!(err, &"Path went through the same channel twice"));
+}
+
 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
@@ -6457,6 +6485,7 @@ fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
                cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
                onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
                skimmed_fee_msat: None,
+               blinding_point: None,
        };
 
        for i in 0..50 {