use crate::chain::{ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Confirm, Listen, Watch};
use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
use crate::chain::channelmonitor;
-use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
+use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
-use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, EcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
+use crate::sign::{ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PathFailure, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
use crate::ln::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
-use crate::ln::channel::{commitment_tx_base_weight, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, COINBASE_MATURITY};
+use crate::ln::channel::{commitment_tx_base_weight, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, COINBASE_MATURITY, ChannelPhase};
use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS, DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA};
use crate::ln::channel::{DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS, ChannelError};
use crate::ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
-use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
+use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
+use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, ScriptBuf};
use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
-use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
+use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
-use bitcoin::{PackedLockTime, Sequence, Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, Witness};
+use bitcoin::{Sequence, Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, Witness};
use bitcoin::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
// Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
- nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None, None).unwrap();
// Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
- match nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1, 0, 42, None) {
+ match nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1, 0, 42, None, None) {
Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
assert_eq!(format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1), err);
},
push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 4 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
- let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, if send_from_initiator { 0 } else { push_amt }, 42, None).unwrap();
+ let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, if send_from_initiator { 0 } else { push_amt }, 42, None, None).unwrap();
let mut open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
if !send_from_initiator {
open_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
let counterparty_node = if send_from_initiator { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
let mut sender_node_per_peer_lock;
let mut sender_node_peer_state_lock;
- if send_from_initiator {
- let chan = get_inbound_v1_channel_ref!(sender_node, counterparty_node, sender_node_per_peer_lock, sender_node_peer_state_lock, temp_channel_id);
- chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
- chan.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
- } else {
- let chan = get_outbound_v1_channel_ref!(sender_node, counterparty_node, sender_node_per_peer_lock, sender_node_peer_state_lock, temp_channel_id);
- chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
- chan.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
+
+ let channel_phase = get_channel_ref!(sender_node, counterparty_node, sender_node_per_peer_lock, sender_node_peer_state_lock, temp_channel_id);
+ match channel_phase {
+ ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
+ let chan_context = channel_phase.context_mut();
+ chan_context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
+ chan_context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
+ },
+ ChannelPhase::Funded(_) => assert!(false),
}
}
}
if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
- nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
- let local_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
+ let local_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).map(
+ |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
+ ).flatten().unwrap();
let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
let pubkeys = chan_signer.as_ref().pubkeys();
(pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
let per_peer_state = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
- let remote_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
+ let remote_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).map(
+ |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
+ ).flatten().unwrap();
let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
let pubkeys = chan_signer.as_ref().pubkeys();
(pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
let res = {
let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let local_chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
- let local_chan = local_chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
+ let local_chan = local_chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).map(
+ |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
+ ).flatten().unwrap();
let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
fee_msat: 0,
- cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
+ cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32,
+ maybe_announced_channel: true,
});
hops.push(RouteHop {
pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
fee_msat: 0,
- cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
+ cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32,
+ maybe_announced_channel: true,
});
hops.push(RouteHop {
pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
channel_features: nodes[1].node.channel_features(),
fee_msat: 1000000,
cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
+ maybe_announced_channel: true,
});
hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
fee_msat: 0,
- cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
+ cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32,
+ maybe_announced_channel: true,
});
hops.push(RouteHop {
pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
fee_msat: 0,
- cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
+ cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32,
+ maybe_announced_channel: true,
});
hops.push(RouteHop {
pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
channel_features: nodes[1].node.channel_features(),
fee_msat: 1000000,
cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
+ maybe_announced_channel: true,
});
hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
- let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
+ let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
*nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
// balancing
send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
- let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
+ let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
for e in events {
match e {
MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
- MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
+ MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { ref msg } } => {
assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
+ assert_eq!(msg.as_ref().unwrap().data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
},
MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
skimmed_fee_msat: None,
+ blinding_point: None,
};
nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
- let local_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
+ let local_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).map(
+ |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
+ ).flatten().unwrap();
let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
// Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
chan_signer.as_ecdsa().unwrap().get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
let per_peer_state = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
- let remote_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
+ let remote_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).map(
+ |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
+ ).flatten().unwrap();
let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
let pubkeys = chan_signer.as_ref().pubkeys();
(pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
let res = {
let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let local_chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
- let local_chan = local_chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
+ let local_chan = local_chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).map(
+ |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
+ ).flatten().unwrap();
let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
commitment_number,
let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
// Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
- let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
+ route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
}
// However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
// Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
- let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
+ route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
}
let (mut route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) =
cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
skimmed_fee_msat: None,
+ blinding_point: None,
};
nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
// In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
// reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
// commitment transaction fee.
- let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
+ route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
// Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
- let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
+ route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
}
// One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
// HTLC.
let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, &channel_type_features);
- assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None).unwrap_err(),
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None, None).unwrap_err(),
APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding amount (356) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of 357.".to_string() });
// During open, we don't have a "counterparty channel reserve" to check against, so that
// requirement only comes into play on the open_channel handling side.
push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
- nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None, None).unwrap();
let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
open_channel_msg.push_msat += 1;
nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
// In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
- let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
- let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
- let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
- let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
+ route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
+ route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
+ route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
+ route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
// Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
- let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
- let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
- let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
- let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
- let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
+ route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
+ route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
+ route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
+ route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
+ route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
// And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
// counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
// transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
- let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
+ route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
}
#[test]
cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
skimmed_fee_msat: None,
+ blinding_point: None,
};
nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
// attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
{
let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
- .with_bolt11_features(nodes[2].node.invoice_features()).unwrap().with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
+ .with_bolt11_features(nodes[2].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap().with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], payment_params, recv_value_0);
route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
assert!(route.paths[0].hops.iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
}
let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
- .with_bolt11_features(nodes[2].node.invoice_features()).unwrap().with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
+ .with_bolt11_features(nodes[2].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap().with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, recv_value_0).unwrap();
let (payment_preimage, ..) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], recv_value_0);
claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2);
// Route the first two HTLCs.
let payment_value_1 = b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000;
- let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_value_1);
- let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20_000);
+ let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_value_1);
+ let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20_000);
// Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
// One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
- let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 3_000_000);
+ let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 3_000_000);
// Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
// broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
// One pending HTLC to time out:
- let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[3], &[&nodes[4]], 3_000_000);
+ let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[3], &[&nodes[4]], 3_000_000);
// CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
// buffer space).
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
};
match events[1] {
- MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
+ MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { .. }, node_id } => {
assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
};
match events[1] {
- MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
+ MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { .. }, node_id } => {
assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
assert_eq!(nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon),
- ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
- check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
- check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
+ Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed));
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
}
#[test]
// that a revoked commitment transaction is broadcasted
// (Similar to `revoked_output_claim` test but we get the justice tx + broadcast manually)
let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
- let destination_script0 = chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.get_destination_script().unwrap();
- let destination_script1 = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_destination_script().unwrap();
+ let destination_script0 = chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.get_destination_script([0; 32]).unwrap();
+ let destination_script1 = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_destination_script([0; 32]).unwrap();
let persisters = vec![WatchtowerPersister::new(destination_script0),
WatchtowerPersister::new(destination_script1)];
let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs_with_persisters(2, &chanmon_cfgs, persisters.iter().collect());
send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
// node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
- let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
+ let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
// Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
// node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
// time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
- let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
+ let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
// Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
- let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
- let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
+ let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
+ let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
// Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
// Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO);
// Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]));
let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
match nodes_2_event {
- MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
+ MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
// Node[0]: 2 * HTLC-timeout tx
check_spends!(node_txn[0], $commitment_tx);
check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
- assert_ne!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0);
- assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0);
+ assert_ne!(node_txn[0].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO);
+ assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO);
if $htlc_offered {
assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
- assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time.0, nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
+ assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time.to_consensus_u32(), nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
// We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
// we already checked the same situation with A.
send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
- let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
+ let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
// Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
- let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
+ let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
// Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
// Revoke the old state
claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
- let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
+ let (_, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
- let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
+ let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
// Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
// The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
// well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
nodes[2].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
- .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
+ .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().context().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
} else { 3000000 };
- let (_, first_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
- let (_, second_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
- let (_, third_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
+ let (_, first_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
+ let (_, second_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
+ let (_, third_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash);
expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: first_payment_hash }]);
let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
match nodes_2_event {
- MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => {
+ MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data }) }, node_id: _ } => {
assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
},
cltv_expiry,
onion_routing_packet,
skimmed_fee_msat: None,
+ blinding_point: None,
};
nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
}
assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO); // Must be an HTLC-Success
assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
- let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
+ let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_000_000);
// Open a channel between `nodes[0]` and `nodes[1]`, for which the funding transaction is never
// broadcasted, even though it's created by `nodes[0]`.
- let expected_temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
+ let expected_temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer, false
+ check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer, true
, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer, false
, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]));
- let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
+ let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
} else if messages_delivered == 3 {
// nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
- reconnect_args.pending_htlc_adds.0 = -1;
+ reconnect_args.pending_responding_commitment_signed.0 = true;
reconnect_args.pending_raa.0 = true;
reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
} else if messages_delivered == 4 {
// nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
- reconnect_args.pending_htlc_adds.0 = -1;
+ reconnect_args.pending_responding_commitment_signed.0 = true;
reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
} else if messages_delivered == 5 {
// nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
} else if messages_delivered == 2 {
// nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
- reconnect_args.pending_htlc_adds.1 = -1;
+ reconnect_args.pending_responding_commitment_signed.1 = true;
reconnect_args.pending_raa.1 = true;
reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
} else if messages_delivered == 3 {
// nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
- reconnect_args.pending_htlc_adds.1 = -1;
+ reconnect_args.pending_responding_commitment_signed.1 = true;
reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
} else if messages_delivered == 4 {
// nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
- let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
+ let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
// Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
// Create some initial channels
let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
- let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
+ let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
// Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
- let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
+ let (_, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
- assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // HTLC-Timeout
+ assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO); // HTLC-Timeout
// B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()]));
send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
- let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
+ let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
check_spends!(c_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
assert_eq!(c_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
- assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Success tx
+ assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO); // Success tx
// So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), c_txn[0].clone()]));
let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut msg_events);
match nodes_2_event {
- MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
+ MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
- assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time.0, nodes[1].best_block_info().1); // Success tx
+ assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time.to_consensus_u32(), nodes[1].best_block_info().1); // Success tx
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
- let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 900_000);
+ let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 900_000);
let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
// We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
// script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
// ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40)
- .with_bolt11_features(nodes[3].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
+ .with_bolt11_features(nodes[3].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], payment_params, 800_000);
send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 800_000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
// Create some initial channels
let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
- let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
+ let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id())
- .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan_2_3.2).unwrap().context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
+ .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan_2_3.2).unwrap().context().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
// 0th HTLC:
- let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
+ let (_, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
// 1st HTLC:
- let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
+ let (_, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
// 2nd HTLC:
send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
// 3rd HTLC:
send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
// 4th HTLC:
- let (_, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
+ let (_, payment_hash_3, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
// 5th HTLC:
- let (_, payment_hash_4, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
+ let (_, payment_hash_4, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
// 6th HTLC:
send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200, None).unwrap());
send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200, None).unwrap());
// 8th HTLC:
- let (_, payment_hash_5, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
+ let (_, payment_hash_5, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
// 9th HTLC:
let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
// 10th HTLC:
- let (_, payment_hash_6, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
+ let (_, payment_hash_6, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
// 11th HTLC:
let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200, None).unwrap());
// Create some initial channels
let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
- let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
+ let (_, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
- let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
+ let (_, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
- let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
+ let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
// Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
// present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
}
fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
}
fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
// Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
// actually revoked.
let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
- let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
+ let (_, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
} else {
expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
}
// BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
let push_msat=10001;
- nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None, None).unwrap();
let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
// Create a second channel with the same random values. This used to panic due to a colliding
// channel_id, but now panics due to a colliding outbound SCID alias.
- assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None, None).is_err());
}
#[test]
// BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
let push_msat=10001;
- assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None, None).is_err());
// BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
// Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
- assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None, None).is_err());
// BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
let push_msat=10001;
- assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
// BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
- let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
- assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
+ let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Testnet);
+ assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash, chain_hash);
// BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
let push_msat=10001;
- nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None, None).unwrap();
let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
}
+#[test]
+fn test_payment_route_reaching_same_channel_twice() {
+ //A route should not go through the same channel twice
+ //It is enforced when constructing a route.
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+ let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0);
+
+ let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0)
+ .with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
+ let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], payment_params, 100000000);
+
+ // Extend the path by itself, essentially simulating route going through same channel twice
+ let cloned_hops = route.paths[0].hops.clone();
+ route.paths[0].hops.extend_from_slice(&cloned_hops);
+
+ unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
+ RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
+ ), false, APIError::InvalidRoute { ref err },
+ assert_eq!(err, &"Path went through the same channel twice"));
+}
+
// BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
// BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
//TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0);
let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0)
- .with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
+ .with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], payment_params, 100000000);
route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta = 500000001;
unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0);
let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
- .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
+ .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().context().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
// Fetch a route in advance as we will be unable to once we're unable to send.
let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
let channel = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
- htlc_minimum_msat = channel.context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
+ htlc_minimum_msat = channel.context().get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
}
let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
skimmed_fee_msat: None,
+ blinding_point: None,
};
for i in 0..50 {
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
- let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
+ let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
- let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
+ let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
- .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
+ .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().context().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
// We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
- let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
- let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
+ let (_, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
+ let (_, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
// Cache one local commitment tx as previous
let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
- .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
+ .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().context().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
- let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, _payment_secret_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
- let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
+ let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
+ let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
// We revoked bs_commitment_tx
if revoked {
- let (payment_preimage_3, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
+ let (payment_preimage_3, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
}
if !revoked {
assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
} else {
- assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].lock_time.0, 11);
+ assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].lock_time.to_consensus_u32(), 11);
}
// We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout/revocation-claim tx
mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
// We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in OutboundV1Channel::new()
if let Err(error) = OutboundV1Channel::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
&nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), 1000000, 1000000, 0,
- &low_our_to_self_config, 0, 42)
+ &low_our_to_self_config, 0, 42, None)
{
match error {
APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
} else { assert!(false) }
// We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in InboundV1Channel::new()
- nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
if let Err(error) = InboundV1Channel::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
} else { assert!(false); }
// We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
- nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
// We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in InboundV1Channel::new()
- nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
if let Err(error) = InboundV1Channel::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
- let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
- TEST_FINAL_CLTV).with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
+ let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
+ .with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000);
let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(),
- None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
+ None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200, None).unwrap();
nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 30)
- .with_bolt11_features(nodes[0].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
+ .with_bolt11_features(nodes[0].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_params, 3000000);
send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
- feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
+ feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu();
penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
node_txn.clear();
};
// Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
- feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
+ feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu();
// Verify 25% bump heuristic
assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
node_txn.clear();
// Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
- feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
+ feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu();
// Verify 25% bump heuristic
assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
node_txn.clear();
let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
// Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
- let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 50).with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
+ let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 50).with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 3_000_000);
let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None,
- nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
- let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 50).with_bolt11_features(nodes[0].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
+ let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 50)
+ .with_bolt11_features(nodes[0].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 3_000_000);
let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[1].network_graph.read_only(), None,
- nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
first = node_txn[3].txid();
// Store both feerates for later comparison
let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[1].output[0].value - node_txn[3].output[0].value;
- feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[3].weight() as u64;
+ feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[3].weight().to_wu();
penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
node_txn.clear();
}
// Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[1].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
- let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
+ let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu();
assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
node_txn.clear();
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
- let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
+ let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
// Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
- feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
+ feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu();
let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output == node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output {
(node_txn[2].clone(), node_txn[1].clone())
timeout = timeout_tx.txid();
let index = timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout;
let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - timeout_tx.output[0].value;
- feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / timeout_tx.weight() as u64;
+ feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / timeout_tx.weight().to_wu();
node_txn.clear();
};
let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
- let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.weight() as u64;
+ let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.weight().to_wu();
assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
- let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
+ let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu();
assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
{
let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let mut guard = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
- let keys = guard.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer();
+ let keys = guard.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).map(
+ |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
+ ).flatten().unwrap().get_signer();
const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
// Lock HTLC in both directions
- let (payment_preimage_1, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000);
- let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000);
+ let (payment_preimage_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000);
+ let (_, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000);
let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
match close_ev[0] {
- MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
+ MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
+ assert_eq!(msg.as_ref().unwrap().data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
override_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
- nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, None, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
// Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
- nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, None, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
- let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
+ let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
- nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
- nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
// Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
- let (preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
+ let (preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
// Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
new_monitor
};
let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
- assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
+ assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed));
watchtower
};
let block = create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, Vec::new());
{
let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
- let mut channel = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, chan_1.2);
- if let Ok(Some(update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
- assert_eq!(watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure);
- assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
- } else { assert!(false); }
+ if let ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut channel) = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, chan_1.2) {
+ if let Ok(Some(update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
+ assert_eq!(watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress);
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
+ } else { assert!(false); }
+ } else {
+ assert!(false);
+ }
}
// Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
new_monitor
};
let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &alice_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
- assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
+ assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed));
watchtower
};
let block = create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, Vec::new());
new_monitor
};
let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &bob_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
- assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
+ assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed));
watchtower
};
watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, Vec::new()), HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST - 1);
{
let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
- let mut channel = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, chan_1.2);
- if let Ok(Some(update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
- // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
- assert_eq!(watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure);
- assert_eq!(watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
- assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
- } else { assert!(false); }
+ if let ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut channel) = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, chan_1.2) {
+ if let Ok(Some(update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
+ // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
+ assert_eq!(watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress);
+ assert_eq!(watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
+ } else { assert!(false); }
+ } else {
+ assert!(false);
+ }
}
// Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let height = HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST + 1;
connect_blocks(&nodes[0], height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
- check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false,
+ check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false,
[nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, vec![bob_state_y.clone()]), height);
check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
// Create an initial channel
- nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString("Hi".to_string()) }, true,
- [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(); 2], 100000);
+ [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
}
#[test]
let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
- let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
+ let (_, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
// Steps (1) and (2):
// Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
- let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
+ let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
// Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
- expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], if go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1 { None } else { Some(1000) }, false, false);
+ let went_onchain = go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1;
+ expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], if went_onchain { None } else { Some(1000) }, went_onchain, false);
// If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
// Create an first channel channel
- nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
let mut open_chan_msg_chan_1_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
// Create an second channel
- nodes[2].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 43, None).unwrap();
+ nodes[2].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 43, None, None).unwrap();
let mut open_chan_msg_chan_2_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
// Modify the `OpenChannel` from `nodes[2]` to `nodes[0]` to ensure that it uses the same
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
// Create an initial channel
- nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
}
// Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
- nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_2_msg);
nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
// another channel in the ChannelManager - an invalid state. Thus, we'd panic later when we
// try to create another channel. Instead, we drop the channel entirely here (leaving the
// channelmanager in a possibly nonsense state instead).
- let mut as_chan = a_peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.remove(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
- let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
- as_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap()
+ match a_peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap() {
+ ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
+ let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
+ chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap()
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected ChannelPhase variant"),
+ }
};
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
- nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
+ nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created.unwrap());
// At this point we'll look up if the channel_id is present and immediately fail the channel
// without trying to persist the `ChannelMonitor`.
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
- nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
// a panic as we'd try to extract a 32 byte preimage from a witness element without checking
// its length.
let mut wit_program: Vec<u8> = channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program();
- let wit_program_script: Script = wit_program.into();
+ let wit_program_script: ScriptBuf = wit_program.into();
for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
// Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
- output.script_pubkey = Script::new_v0_p2wsh(&wit_program_script.wscript_hash());
+ output.script_pubkey = ScriptBuf::new_v0_p2wsh(&wit_program_script.wscript_hash());
}
nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- if let msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } = action {
- assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
+ if let msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg } = action {
+ assert_eq!(msg.as_ref().unwrap().data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
} else { panic!(); }
} else { panic!(); }
assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
// long the ChannelMonitor will try to read 32 bytes from the second-to-last element, panicing
// as its not 32 bytes long.
let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
- version: 2i32, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
+ version: 2i32, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
input: tx.output.iter().enumerate().map(|(idx, _)| TxIn {
previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
txid: tx.txid(),
vout: idx as u32,
},
- script_sig: Script::new(),
+ script_sig: ScriptBuf::new(),
sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
- witness: Witness::from_vec(channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness())
+ witness: Witness::from_slice(&channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness())
}).collect(),
output: vec![TxOut {
value: 1000,
- script_pubkey: Script::new(),
+ script_pubkey: ScriptBuf::new(),
}]
};
check_spends!(spend_tx, tx);
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
- nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
- let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
+ let (_, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
- .with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
+ .with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 10_000).unwrap();
let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
let chan_2_3 =create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0);
let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
- .with_bolt11_features(nodes[3].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
+ .with_bolt11_features(nodes[3].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
let mut route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 15_000_000).unwrap();
assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
- nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
open_channel.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
open_channel.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
if on_holder_tx {
let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
- let mut chan = get_outbound_v1_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, temporary_channel_id);
- chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
+ match get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, temporary_channel_id) {
+ ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
+ chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected ChannelPhase variant"),
+ }
}
nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
let chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
- (chan.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64,
- chan.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator(nodes[0].fee_estimator)))
+ (chan.context().get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64,
+ chan.context().get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator(nodes[0].fee_estimator)))
};
let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
- let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
+ let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
let chan_id = *nodes[0].network_chan_count.borrow();
let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- let input = TxIn { previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint::null(), script_sig: bitcoin::Script::new(), sequence: Sequence(1), witness: Witness::from_vec(vec!(vec!(1))) };
+ let input = TxIn { previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint::null(), script_sig: bitcoin::ScriptBuf::new(), sequence: Sequence(1), witness: Witness::from_slice(&[&[1]]) };
assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
let mut tx = match events[0] {
Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } => {
// Timelock the transaction _beyond_ the best client height + 1.
- Transaction { version: chan_id as i32, lock_time: PackedLockTime(best_height + 2), input: vec![input], output: vec![TxOut {
+ Transaction { version: chan_id as i32, lock_time: LockTime::from_height(best_height + 2).unwrap(), input: vec![input], output: vec![TxOut {
value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
}]}
},
},
_ => panic!()
}
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ Event::ChannelClosed { channel_id, .. } => {
+ assert_eq!(channel_id, temp_channel_id);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+}
- // However, transaction should be accepted if it's in a +1 headroom from best block.
- tx.lock_time = PackedLockTime(tx.lock_time.0 - 1);
+#[test]
+fn test_non_final_funding_tx_within_headroom() {
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
+ let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
+ let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
+
+ let best_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
+
+ let chan_id = *nodes[0].network_chan_count.borrow();
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ let input = TxIn { previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint::null(), script_sig: bitcoin::ScriptBuf::new(), sequence: Sequence(1), witness: Witness::from_slice(&[[1]]) };
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ let mut tx = match events[0] {
+ Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } => {
+ // Timelock the transaction within a +1 headroom from the best block.
+ Transaction { version: chan_id as i32, lock_time: LockTime::from_consensus(best_height + 1), input: vec![input], output: vec![TxOut {
+ value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
+ }]}
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ };
+
+ // Transaction should be accepted if it's in a +1 headroom from best block.
assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
}
MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
- err: "Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: 1000. Our expected lower limit: 5000 (- 250)".to_owned() },
+ err: "Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: 1000. Our expected lower limit: 5000".to_owned() },
[nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
- let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
+ let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
let check_outbound_channel_existence = |should_exist: bool| {
let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(chan_lock.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.contains_key(&temp_channel_id), should_exist);
+ assert_eq!(chan_lock.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temp_channel_id), should_exist);
};
// Channel should exist without any timer ticks.
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
- let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
+ let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
let check_inbound_channel_existence = |should_exist: bool| {
let per_peer_state = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(chan_lock.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.contains_key(&temp_channel_id), should_exist);
+ assert_eq!(chan_lock.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temp_channel_id), should_exist);
};
// Channel should exist without any timer ticks.
send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
- let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
- let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
+ let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
+ let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
do_test_multi_post_event_actions(true);
do_test_multi_post_event_actions(false);
}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_batch_channel_open() {
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
+ let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ // Initiate channel opening and create the batch channel funding transaction.
+ let (tx, funding_created_msgs) = create_batch_channel_funding(&nodes[0], &[
+ (&nodes[1], 100_000, 0, 42, None),
+ (&nodes[2], 200_000, 0, 43, None),
+ ]);
+
+ // Go through the funding_created and funding_signed flow with node 1.
+ nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msgs[0]);
+ check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
+ expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
+ check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
+
+ // The transaction should not have been broadcast before all channels are ready.
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
+
+ // Go through the funding_created and funding_signed flow with node 2.
+ nodes[2].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msgs[1]);
+ check_added_monitors(&nodes[2], 1);
+ expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[2], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ chanmon_cfgs[0].persister.set_update_ret(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress);
+ nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
+ check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
+
+ // The transaction should not have been broadcast before persisting all monitors has been
+ // completed.
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().len(), 0);
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
+
+ // Complete the persistence of the monitor.
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.complete_sole_pending_chan_update(
+ &OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 1 }.to_channel_id()
+ );
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+
+ // The transaction should only have been broadcast now.
+ let broadcasted_txs = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
+ assert_eq!(broadcasted_txs.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(broadcasted_txs[0], tx);
+
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
+ assert!(events.iter().any(|e| matches!(
+ *e,
+ crate::events::Event::ChannelPending {
+ ref counterparty_node_id,
+ ..
+ } if counterparty_node_id == &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
+ )));
+ assert!(events.iter().any(|e| matches!(
+ *e,
+ crate::events::Event::ChannelPending {
+ ref counterparty_node_id,
+ ..
+ } if counterparty_node_id == &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
+ )));
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_disconnect_in_funding_batch() {
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
+ let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ // Initiate channel opening and create the batch channel funding transaction.
+ let (tx, funding_created_msgs) = create_batch_channel_funding(&nodes[0], &[
+ (&nodes[1], 100_000, 0, 42, None),
+ (&nodes[2], 200_000, 0, 43, None),
+ ]);
+
+ // Go through the funding_created and funding_signed flow with node 1.
+ nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msgs[0]);
+ check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
+ expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
+ check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
+
+ // The transaction should not have been broadcast before all channels are ready.
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().len(), 0);
+
+ // The remaining peer in the batch disconnects.
+ nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ // The channels in the batch will close immediately.
+ let channel_id_1 = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id();
+ let channel_id_2 = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 1 }.to_channel_id();
+ check_closed_events(&nodes[0], &[
+ ExpectedCloseEvent {
+ channel_id: Some(channel_id_1),
+ discard_funding: true,
+ ..Default::default()
+ },
+ ExpectedCloseEvent {
+ channel_id: Some(channel_id_2),
+ discard_funding: true,
+ ..Default::default()
+ },
+ ]);
+
+ // The monitor should become closed.
+ check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
+ {
+ let mut monitor_updates = nodes[0].chain_monitor.monitor_updates.lock().unwrap();
+ let monitor_updates_1 = monitor_updates.get(&channel_id_1).unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(monitor_updates_1.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(monitor_updates_1[0].update_id, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID);
+ }
+
+ // The funding transaction should not have been broadcast, and therefore, we don't need
+ // to broadcast a force-close transaction for the closed monitor.
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().len(), 0);
+
+ // Ensure the channels don't exist anymore.
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_batch_funding_close_after_funding_signed() {
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
+ let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ // Initiate channel opening and create the batch channel funding transaction.
+ let (tx, funding_created_msgs) = create_batch_channel_funding(&nodes[0], &[
+ (&nodes[1], 100_000, 0, 42, None),
+ (&nodes[2], 200_000, 0, 43, None),
+ ]);
+
+ // Go through the funding_created and funding_signed flow with node 1.
+ nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msgs[0]);
+ check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
+ expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
+ check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
+
+ // Go through the funding_created and funding_signed flow with node 2.
+ nodes[2].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msgs[1]);
+ check_added_monitors(&nodes[2], 1);
+ expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[2], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ chanmon_cfgs[0].persister.set_update_ret(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress);
+ nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
+ check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
+
+ // The transaction should not have been broadcast before all channels are ready.
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().len(), 0);
+
+ // Force-close the channel for which we've completed the initial monitor.
+ let channel_id_1 = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id();
+ let channel_id_2 = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 1 }.to_channel_id();
+ nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id_1, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 2);
+ {
+ let mut monitor_updates = nodes[0].chain_monitor.monitor_updates.lock().unwrap();
+ let monitor_updates_1 = monitor_updates.get(&channel_id_1).unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(monitor_updates_1.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(monitor_updates_1[0].update_id, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID);
+ let monitor_updates_2 = monitor_updates.get(&channel_id_2).unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(monitor_updates_2.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(monitor_updates_2[0].update_id, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID);
+ }
+ let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ match msg_events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => (),
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected message."),
+ }
+
+ // We broadcast the commitment transaction as part of the force-close.
+ {
+ let broadcasted_txs = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
+ assert_eq!(broadcasted_txs.len(), 1);
+ assert!(broadcasted_txs[0].txid() != tx.txid());
+ assert_eq!(broadcasted_txs[0].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(broadcasted_txs[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
+ }
+
+ // All channels in the batch should close immediately.
+ check_closed_events(&nodes[0], &[
+ ExpectedCloseEvent {
+ channel_id: Some(channel_id_1),
+ discard_funding: true,
+ ..Default::default()
+ },
+ ExpectedCloseEvent {
+ channel_id: Some(channel_id_2),
+ discard_funding: true,
+ ..Default::default()
+ },
+ ]);
+
+ // Ensure the channels don't exist anymore.
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
+}
+
+fn do_test_funding_and_commitment_tx_confirm_same_block(confirm_remote_commitment: bool) {
+ // Tests that a node will forget the channel (when it only requires 1 confirmation) if the
+ // funding and commitment transaction confirm in the same block.
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let mut min_depth_1_block_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
+ min_depth_1_block_cfg.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(min_depth_1_block_cfg), Some(min_depth_1_block_cfg)]);
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
+ let chan_id = chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id();
+
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
+
+ let (closing_node, other_node) = if confirm_remote_commitment {
+ (&nodes[1], &nodes[0])
+ } else {
+ (&nodes[0], &nodes[1])
+ };
+
+ closing_node.node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &other_node.node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
+ let mut msg_events = closing_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
+ match msg_events.pop().unwrap() {
+ MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { .. }, .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ check_added_monitors(closing_node, 1);
+ check_closed_event(closing_node, 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false, &[other_node.node.get_our_node_id()], 1_000_000);
+
+ let commitment_tx = {
+ let mut txn = closing_node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
+ assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
+ let commitment_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
+ check_spends!(commitment_tx, funding_tx);
+ commitment_tx
+ };
+
+ mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&funding_tx, &commitment_tx]);
+ mine_transactions(&nodes[1], &[&funding_tx, &commitment_tx]);
+
+ check_closed_broadcast(other_node, 1, true);
+ check_added_monitors(other_node, 1);
+ check_closed_event(other_node, 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false, &[closing_node.node.get_our_node_id()], 1_000_000);
+
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_funding_and_commitment_tx_confirm_same_block() {
+ do_test_funding_and_commitment_tx_confirm_same_block(false);
+ do_test_funding_and_commitment_tx_confirm_same_block(true);
+}
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff