use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
use ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
use ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
+use routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, find_route, get_route};
use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures, NodeFeatures};
use ln::msgs;
use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
-use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
+use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
+use bitcoin::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, Witness};
+use bitcoin::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
// Stand up a network of 2 nodes
use ln::channel::TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS;
let mut cfg = UserConfig::default();
- cfg.peer_channel_config_limits.max_funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1;
+ cfg.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1;
let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(cfg)]);
// When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
// It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
- config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
+ config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
// Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
- nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan_1.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_1.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
{
// Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
// broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
- nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan_2.2, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_2.2, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
{
// nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
// HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
- nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&chan_3.2, &nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
+ nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_3.2, &nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
let node2_commitment_txid;
check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
(close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
};
- nodes[3].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
- nodes[4].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
+ nodes[3].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
+ nodes[4].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
fn test_justice_tx() {
// Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
- alice_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
- alice_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
- alice_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
+ alice_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
+ alice_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
+ alice_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
- bob_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
- bob_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
- bob_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
+ bob_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
+ bob_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
+ bob_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
// Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
- send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
// node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
- let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
- let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
+ let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
+ let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
// Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
- expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
- let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment
assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
// Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
+ check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
+
+ // Finally, mine the penalty transaction and check that we get an HTLC failure after
+ // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
+ expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
}
get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
// Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
- send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
// node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
// time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
- let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
- let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
+ let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
+ let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
// Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
}
connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
- expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
- let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
assert!(node_txn.len() == 9 || node_txn.len() == 10);
// Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
+
+ // Finally, mine the penalty transactions and check that we get an HTLC failure after
+ // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[2]);
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[3]);
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[4]);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
+ expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
}
get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
- nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
// state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
// transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
- nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
+ nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
};
// Provide the channel announcement and public updates to the network graph
- nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap();
- nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
- nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
for node in nodes.iter() {
- assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
- node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
- node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
+ assert!(node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
+ node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
+ node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
}
send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
for node in nodes.iter() {
- assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
- node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
- node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
+ assert!(node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
+ node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
+ node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
}
send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
- nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
- nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
// When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
// It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
- config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
+ config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
&[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
// When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
// It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
- config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
+ config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
&[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
let seed = [42; 32];
let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
- let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph: &chanmon_cfgs[0].network_graph, node_seed: seed, features: InitFeatures::known() };
+ let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source.genesis_hash, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger);
+ let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph, node_seed: seed, features: InitFeatures::known() };
let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
node_cfgs.remove(0);
node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
// When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
// It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
- config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
+ config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
+
connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
- timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
+ timeout_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..)
+ .filter(|tx| tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == bs_commitment_tx[0].txid()).collect();
+ check_spends!(timeout_tx[0], bs_commitment_tx[0]);
+ // For both a revoked or non-revoked commitment transaction, after ANTI_REORG_DELAY the
+ // dust HTLC should have been failed.
+ expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
+
if !revoked {
- expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
- // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout tx on remote commitment tx
- mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
- assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
- connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
- expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
} else {
- // If revoked, both dust & non-dust HTLCs should have been failed after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confs of revoked
- // commitment tx
- let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
- let first;
- match events[0] {
- Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
- if payment_hash == dust_hash { first = true; }
- else { first = false; }
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
- match events[1] {
- Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
- if first { assert_eq!(payment_hash, non_dust_hash); }
- else { assert_eq!(payment_hash, dust_hash); }
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
+ assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].lock_time, 0);
}
+ // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout/revocation-claim tx
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
+ expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
}
}
// We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
- low_our_to_self_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
+ low_our_to_self_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
- high_their_to_self_config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
+ high_their_to_self_config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
} else { assert!(false); }
}
-#[test]
-fn test_data_loss_protect() {
- // We want to be sure that :
- // * we don't broadcast our Local Commitment Tx in case of fallen behind
- // (but this is not quite true - we broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr)
- // * we close channel in case of detecting other being fallen behind
- // * we are able to claim our own outputs thanks to to_remote being static
- // TODO: this test is incomplete and the data_loss_protect implementation is incomplete - see issue #775
+fn do_test_data_loss_protect(reconnect_panicing: bool) {
+ // When we get a data_loss_protect proving we're behind, we immediately panic as the
+ // chain::Watch API requirements have been violated (e.g. the user restored from a backup). The
+ // panic message informs the user they should force-close without broadcasting, which is tested
+ // if `reconnect_panicing` is not set.
let persister;
let logger;
let fee_estimator;
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
- nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
+ if reconnect_panicing {
+ nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
+ nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
- let reestablish_0 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
+ let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
- // Check we don't broadcast any transactions following learning of per_commitment_point from B
- nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_0[0]);
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ // Check we close channel detecting A is fallen-behind
+ // Check that we sent the warning message when we detected that A has fallen behind,
+ // and give the possibility for A to recover from the warning.
+ nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
+ let warn_msg = "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned();
+ assert!(check_warn_msg!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), chan.2).contains(&warn_msg));
+
+ {
+ let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
+ // The node B should not broadcast the transaction to force close the channel!
+ assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
+ }
+
+ let reestablish_0 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
+ // Check A panics upon seeing proof it has fallen behind.
+ nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_0[0]);
+ return; // By this point we should have panic'ed!
+ }
+ nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
{
- let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
+ let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
}
- let mut reestablish_1 = Vec::with_capacity(1);
for msg in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
- if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } = msg {
- assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- reestablish_1.push(msg.clone());
- } else if let MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } = msg {
+ if let MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } = msg {
} else if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg {
match action {
&ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
- assert_eq!(msg.data, "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting");
+ assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel force-closed");
},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
}
} else {
- panic!("Unexpected event")
+ panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", msg)
}
}
- // Check we close channel detecting A is fallen-behind
- // Check that we sent the warning message when we detected that A has fallen behind,
- // and give the possibility for A to recover from the warning.
- nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
- let warn_msg = "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned();
- assert!(check_warn_msg!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), chan.2).contains(&warn_msg));
-
- // Check A is able to claim to_remote output
- let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
- // The node B should not broadcast the transaction to force close the channel!
- assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
- // B should now detect that there is something wrong and should force close the channel.
- let exp_err = "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can\'t do any automated broadcasting";
- check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: exp_err.to_string() });
-
// after the warning message sent by B, we should not able to
// use the channel, or reconnect with success to the channel.
assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().is_empty());
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
}
+#[test]
+#[should_panic]
+fn test_data_loss_protect_showing_stale_state_panics() {
+ do_test_data_loss_protect(true);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_force_close_without_broadcast() {
+ do_test_data_loss_protect(false);
+}
+
#[test]
fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
// Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
// Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
- override_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
+ override_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
#[test]
fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
- zero_config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
+ zero_config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
// 2. MUST be set to less than or equal to the `max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` received from the peer.
let mut config_30_percent = UserConfig::default();
- config_30_percent.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
- config_30_percent.own_channel_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 30;
+ config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
+ config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 30;
let mut config_50_percent = UserConfig::default();
- config_50_percent.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
- config_50_percent.own_channel_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 50;
+ config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
+ config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 50;
let mut config_95_percent = UserConfig::default();
- config_95_percent.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
- config_95_percent.own_channel_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 95;
+ config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
+ config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 95;
let mut config_100_percent = UserConfig::default();
- config_100_percent.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
- config_100_percent.own_channel_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 100;
+ config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
+ config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 100;
let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
- nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
match events[0] {
Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
- nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
}
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
force_closing_node = 1;
counterparty_node = 0;
}
- nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_channel(&chan_ab.2, &nodes[counterparty_node].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
+ nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_ab.2, &nodes[counterparty_node].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
// funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
// security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
// un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
+ //
+ // Further, if the funding transaction is consensus-valid, confirms, and is later spent, we'd
+ // previously have crashed in `ChannelMonitor` even though we closed the channel as bogus and
+ // gave up on it. We test this here by generating such a transaction.
let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
+
+ // Create a witness program which can be spent by a 4-empty-stack-elements witness and which is
+ // 136 bytes long. This matches our "accepted HTLC preimage spend" matching, previously causing
+ // a panic as we'd try to extract a 32 byte preimage from a witness element without checking
+ // its length.
+ let mut wit_program: Vec<u8> = channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program();
+ assert!(chan_utils::HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(wit_program.len()).unwrap() ==
+ chan_utils::HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC);
+
+ let wit_program_script: Script = wit_program.clone().into();
for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
// Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
- output.script_pubkey = bitcoin::Script::new();
+ output.script_pubkey = Script::new_v0_p2wsh(&wit_program_script.wscript_hash());
}
nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
} else { panic!(); }
} else { panic!(); }
assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
+
+ // Now confirm a spend of the (bogus) funding transaction. As long as the witness is 5 elements
+ // long the ChannelMonitor will try to read 32 bytes from the second-to-last element, panicing
+ // as its not 32 bytes long.
+ let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
+ version: 2i32, lock_time: 0,
+ input: tx.output.iter().enumerate().map(|(idx, _)| TxIn {
+ previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
+ txid: tx.txid(),
+ vout: idx as u32,
+ },
+ script_sig: Script::new(),
+ sequence: 0xfffffffd,
+ witness: Witness::from_vec(channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness())
+ }).collect(),
+ output: vec![TxOut {
+ value: 1000,
+ script_pubkey: Script::new(),
+ }]
+ };
+ check_spends!(spend_tx, tx);
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &spend_tx);
}
fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
- expect_payment_failed_conditions!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
+ expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
}
nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_2.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[2], fail_updates_2.commitment_signed, false);
- expect_payment_failed_conditions!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
+ expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
};
let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
- let route = find_route(&payer_pubkey, &route_params, network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
+ let route = find_route(&payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
let route = find_route(
- &payer_pubkey, &route_params, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
+ &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
).unwrap();
let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
- config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = 5_000_000; // default setting value
+ config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = 5_000_000; // default setting value
let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
chan.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64
};
let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
- let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
+ let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
- let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
+ let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 25;
- let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
+ let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
if on_holder_tx {
if dust_outbound_balance {
if on_holder_tx {
let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
- unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
+ unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
} else {
- unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
+ unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
}
} else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
// Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
- nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
+ nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
} else {
// Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
- nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
+ nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
}
} else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 2_500_000);
do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_non_final_funding_tx() {
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
+ let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_message);
+ let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel_message);
+
+ let best_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
+
+ let chan_id = *nodes[0].network_chan_count.borrow();
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ let input = TxIn { previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint::null(), script_sig: bitcoin::Script::new(), sequence: 0x1, witness: Witness::from_vec(vec!(vec!(1))) };
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ let mut tx = match events[0] {
+ Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } => {
+ // Timelock the transaction _beyond_ the best client height + 2.
+ Transaction { version: chan_id as i32, lock_time: best_height + 3, input: vec![input], output: vec![TxOut {
+ value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
+ }]}
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ };
+ // Transaction should fail as it's evaluated as non-final for propagation.
+ match nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()) {
+ Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
+ assert_eq!(format!("Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final"), err);
+ },
+ _ => panic!()
+ }
+
+ // However, transaction should be accepted if it's in a +2 headroom from best block.
+ tx.lock_time -= 1;
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
+ get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+}
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff