Avoid generating redundant claims after initial confirmation

[rust-lightning] / lightning / src / ln / functional_tests.rs

diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs b/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs
index eb6d7032fee67d7714005f807d2ac121c48a9a8d..a2e59b58c871c7212282122ae6162046c081b342 100644 (file)
--- a/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs
+++ b/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs
@@ -2951,26 +2951,8 @@ fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
        mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
-       {
-               // B will rebroadcast a fee-bumped timeout transaction here.
-               let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
-               assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
-               check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
-       }
 
        connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
-       {
-               // B may rebroadcast its own holder commitment transaction here, as a safeguard against
-               // some incredibly unlikely partial-eclipse-attack scenarios. That said, because the
-               // original commitment_tx[0] (also spending chan_2.3) has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY B really
-               // shouldn't broadcast anything here, and in some connect style scenarios we do not.
-               let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
-               if node_txn.len() == 1 {
-                       check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
-               } else {
-                       assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
-               }
-       }
 
        expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
@@ -8001,22 +7983,6 @@ fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
        connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
        let header_131 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_130.block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
        connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_131, txdata: Vec::new() });
-       {
-               let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
-               assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // 2 bumped penalty txn on revoked commitment tx
-
-               check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
-               check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
-               // Note that these are both bogus - they spend outputs already claimed in block 129:
-               if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output == revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output  {
-                       assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
-               } else {
-                       assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
-                       assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
-               }
-
-               node_txn.clear();
-       };
 
        // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
        connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);