check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
let bs_spend_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
- assert_eq!(bs_spend_txn.len(), 2);
+ assert_eq!(bs_spend_txn.len(), 1);
check_spends!(bs_spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
- check_spends!(bs_spend_txn[1], chan.3);
// After the commitment transaction confirms, we should still wait on the HTLC spend
// transaction to confirm before resolving the HTLC.
let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
- let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64;
- let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_id);
+ let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
+ let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000
let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
- let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64;
- let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_id);
+ let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
+ let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
// Before B receives the payment preimage, it only suggests the push_msat value of 1_000 sats
mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
let b_broadcast_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
- assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn.len(), if prev_commitment_tx { 4 } else { 5 });
- if prev_commitment_tx {
- check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[3], b_broadcast_txn[2]);
- } else {
- assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[0], b_broadcast_txn[3]);
- assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[1], b_broadcast_txn[4]);
- }
- // b_broadcast_txn[0] should spend the HTLC output of the commitment tx for 3_000 sats
+ assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn.len(), 2);
+ // b_broadcast_txn should spend the HTLCs output of the commitment tx for 3_000 and 4_000 sats
check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
- check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[2], funding_tx);
assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
// When the HTLC timeout output is spendable in the next block, A should broadcast it
connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout - nodes[0].best_block_info().1 - 1);
let a_broadcast_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
- assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn.len(), 3);
- check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[0], funding_tx);
+ assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn.len(), 2);
+ assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
- assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
- check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
- assert_ne!(a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout,
- a_broadcast_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
- // a_broadcast_txn [1] and [2] should spend the HTLC outputs of the commitment tx
- assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
- assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
+ assert_ne!(a_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout,
+ a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
+ // a_broadcast_txn [0] and [1] should spend the HTLC outputs of the commitment tx
+ assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
+ assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
// Once the HTLC-Timeout transaction confirms, A will no longer consider the HTLC
// "MaybeClaimable", but instead move it to "AwaitingConfirmations".
- mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[2]);
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[1]);
assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], timeout_payment_hash, false);
- test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[2]);
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[1]);
// Node B will no longer consider the HTLC "contentious" after the HTLC claim transaction
// confirms, and consider it simply "awaiting confirmations". Note that it has to wait for the
// Finally, mine the HTLC timeout transaction that A broadcasted (even though B should be able
// to claim this HTLC with the preimage it knows!). It will remain listed as a claimable HTLC
// until ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations on the spend.
- mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &a_broadcast_txn[2]);
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &a_broadcast_txn[1]);
assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
- expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000_000);
+ expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000_000);
let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 20_000_000);
nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
- expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 20_000_000);
+ expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 20_000_000);
nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000_000);
- let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64;
- let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_id);
+ let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
+ let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
// Get nodes[0]'s commitment transaction and HTLC-Timeout transactions
let as_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
let bs_htlc_claim_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
- assert_eq!(bs_htlc_claim_txn.len(), 3);
+ assert_eq!(bs_htlc_claim_txn.len(), 1);
check_spends!(bs_htlc_claim_txn[0], as_txn[0]);
- check_spends!(bs_htlc_claim_txn[1], funding_tx);
- check_spends!(bs_htlc_claim_txn[2], bs_htlc_claim_txn[1]);
// Connect blocks until the HTLCs expire, allowing us to (validly) broadcast the HTLC-Timeout
// transaction.
let to_a_failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 20_000_000).1;
let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
- let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64;
- let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_id);
+ let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
+ let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
// Both A and B will have an HTLC that's claimable on timeout and one that's claimable if they
// receive the preimage. These will remain the same through the channel closure and until the
// Get the latest commitment transaction from A and then update the fee to revoke it
let as_revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
- let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_id);
+ let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
- let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64;
+ let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
let missing_htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
let missing_htlc_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 2_000_000).1;
claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
- let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64;
- let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_id);
+ let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
+ let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
// B will generate an HTLC-Success from its revoked commitment tx
mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
let revoked_htlc_success_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
- assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_success_txn.len(), 2);
+ assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_success_txn.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
check_spends!(revoked_htlc_success_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
- check_spends!(revoked_htlc_success_txn[1], funding_tx);
connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
let revoked_htlc_timeout_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
let to_remote_conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
let as_commitment_claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
- assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn.len(), 2);
+ assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn.len(), 1);
check_spends!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
- check_spends!(as_commitment_claim_txn[1], funding_tx);
// The next two checks have the same balance set for A - even though we confirm a revoked HTLC
// transaction our balance tracking doesn't use the on-chain value so the
check_spends!(as_revoked_txn[0], funding_tx);
check_spends!(as_revoked_txn[1], as_revoked_txn[0]); // The HTLC-Claim transaction
- let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_id);
- let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64;
+ let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
+ let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
{
let mut feerate = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff