//! Further functional tests which test blockchain reorganizations.
#[cfg(anchors)]
-use crate::chain::keysinterface::{ChannelSigner, EcdsaChannelSigner};
+use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, EcdsaChannelSigner};
#[cfg(anchors)]
use crate::chain::channelmonitor::LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, Balance};
use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
+#[cfg(anchors)]
+use crate::events::bump_transaction::BumpTransactionEvent;
+use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
use crate::ln::channel;
#[cfg(anchors)]
use crate::ln::chan_utils;
-use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, PaymentId};
+#[cfg(anchors)]
+use crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager;
+use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields};
use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
#[cfg(anchors)]
use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
#[cfg(anchors)]
-use crate::util::events::BumpTransactionEvent;
-use crate::util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
+use crate::util::crypto::sign;
+use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
+use crate::util::test_utils;
+#[cfg(anchors)]
+use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
#[cfg(anchors)]
-use bitcoin::{Amount, Script, TxIn, TxOut, PackedLockTime};
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::SecretKey;
+#[cfg(anchors)]
+use bitcoin::{Amount, PublicKey, Script, TxIn, TxOut, PackedLockTime, Witness};
use bitcoin::Transaction;
+#[cfg(anchors)]
+use bitcoin::util::sighash::SighashCache;
use crate::prelude::*;
let (update_a, _, chan_id_2, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1_000_000);
- nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
+ RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let bs_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id_2);
let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
+ let sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
+ claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ payment_hash,
+ };
+ let sent_htlc_timeout_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
+ claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
+ };
+ let received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
+ expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ payment_hash,
+ };
+ let received_htlc_timeout_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
+ expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
+ };
+ let received_htlc_claiming_balance = Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
+ timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ payment_hash,
+ payment_preimage,
+ };
+ let received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance = Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
+ timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
+ payment_preimage: timeout_payment_preimage,
+ };
+
// Before B receives the payment preimage, it only suggests the push_msat value of 1_000 sats
// as claimable. A lists both its to-self balance and the (possibly-claimable) HTLCs.
assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - chan_feerate *
(channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
- }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
- claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
- claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
- }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
- claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
- claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
- }]),
+ }, sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
- }, Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
- claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
- expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
- }, Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
- claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
- expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
- }]),
+ }, received_htlc_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
chan_feerate * (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) +
if prev_commitment_tx { 1 } else { 2 } *
channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
- }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
- claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
- claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
- }];
+ }, sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()];
if !prev_commitment_tx {
- a_expected_balances.push(Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
- claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
- claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
- });
+ a_expected_balances.push(sent_htlc_balance.clone());
}
assert_eq!(sorted_vec(a_expected_balances),
sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - chan_feerate *
(channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
- }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
- claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
- claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
- }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
- claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
- claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
- }]),
+ }, sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
// The main non-HTLC balance is just awaiting confirmations, but the claimable height is the
// CSV delay, not ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
},
// Both HTLC balances are "contentious" as our counterparty could claim them if we wait too
// long.
- Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
- claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
- timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
- }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
- claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
- timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
- }]),
+ received_htlc_claiming_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
// After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will consider its balance fully spendable and generate a
// `SpendableOutputs` event. However, B still has to wait for the CSV delay.
- assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
- claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
- claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
- }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
- claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
- claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
- }]),
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
- }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
- claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
- timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
- }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
- claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
- timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
- }]),
+ }, received_htlc_claiming_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
} else {
expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
}
- assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
- claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
- claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
- }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
- claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
- claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
- }]),
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
- assert_eq!(vec![Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
- claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
- claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
- }],
+ assert_eq!(vec![sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()],
nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
// When the HTLC timeout output is spendable in the next block, A should broadcast it
- connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout - nodes[0].best_block_info().1 - 1);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
let a_broadcast_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn.len(), 2);
assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
}, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
- }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
- claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
- timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
- }]),
+ }, received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
// After reaching the commitment output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutputs event for it and have
assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
- }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
- claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
- timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
- }]),
+ }, received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
// After reaching the claimed HTLC output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutptus event for it and
connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_htlc_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
- assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
- claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
- timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
- }],
+ assert_eq!(vec![received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()],
nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
// Finally, mine the HTLC timeout transaction that A broadcasted (even though B should be able
// to claim this HTLC with the preimage it knows!). It will remain listed as a claimable HTLC
// until ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations on the spend.
mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &a_broadcast_txn[1]);
- assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
- claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
- timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
- }],
+ assert_eq!(vec![received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()],
nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000_000);
let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
- nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
+ RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000_000);
let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 20_000_000);
- nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_2, payment_hash_2,
+ RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
+ let htlc_balance_known_preimage = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
+ claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ payment_hash,
+ };
+ let htlc_balance_unknown_preimage = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
+ claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ payment_hash: payment_hash_2,
+ };
+
assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
(channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
- }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
- claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
- claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
- }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
- claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
- claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
- }]),
+ }, htlc_balance_known_preimage.clone(), htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
// Get nodes[1]'s HTLC claim tx for the second HTLC
claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
(channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
- }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
- claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
- claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
- }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
- claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
- claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
- }]),
+ }, htlc_balance_known_preimage.clone(), htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
assert_eq!(as_txn[1].lock_time.0, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1); // as_txn[1] can be included in the next block
}, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
- }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
- claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
- claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
- }]),
+ }, htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
// Now confirm nodes[1]'s HTLC claim, giving nodes[0] the preimage. Note that the "maybe
}, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
- }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
- claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
- claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
- }]),
+ }, htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
// Finally make the HTLC transactions have ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks. This call previously
let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
+ let a_sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
+ claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash,
+ };
+ let a_received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
+ expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash,
+ };
+ let b_received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
+ expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash,
+ };
+ let b_sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
+ claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash,
+ };
+
// Both A and B will have an HTLC that's claimable on timeout and one that's claimable if they
// receive the preimage. These will remain the same through the channel closure and until the
// HTLC output is spent.
assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
(channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
- }, Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
- claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
- expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
- }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
- claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
- claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
- }]),
+ }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), a_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]),
sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
claimable_amount_satoshis: 500_000 - 20_000,
- }, Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
- claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
- expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
- }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
- claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
- claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
- }]),
+ }, b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), b_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]),
sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
// Get nodes[0]'s commitment transaction and HTLC-Timeout transaction
claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
(channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
- }, Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
- claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
- expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
- }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
- claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
- claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
- }]);
+ }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), a_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]);
mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);
nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
let mut bs_pre_spend_claims = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
claimable_amount_satoshis: 500_000 - 20_000,
confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
- }, Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
- claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
- expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
- }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
- claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
- claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
- }]);
+ }, b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), b_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]);
assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
// HTLC has been spent, even after the HTLC expires. We'll also fail the inbound HTLC, but it
// won't do anything as the channel is already closed.
- connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
let as_htlc_timeout_claim = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
assert_eq!(as_htlc_timeout_claim.len(), 1);
check_spends!(as_htlc_timeout_claim[0], as_txn[0]);
// The next few blocks for B look the same as for A, though for the opposite HTLC
nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
- connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - (ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) - 1);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - (ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1));
expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions!(nodes[1],
[HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash }]);
let bs_htlc_timeout_claim = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
(channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
- }, Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
- claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
- expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
- }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
confirmation_height: as_timeout_claimable_height,
}]),
claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
(channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
- }, Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
- claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
- expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
- }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
confirmation_height: as_timeout_claimable_height,
}]),
// was already claimed.
mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
let bs_timeout_claimable_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
- assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
- claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
- expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
- }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
confirmation_height: bs_timeout_claimable_height,
}]),
sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
- assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
- claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
- expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
- }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
confirmation_height: bs_timeout_claimable_height,
}]),
connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], to_a_failed_payment_hash, false);
- assert_eq!(vec![Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
- claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
- expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
- }],
+ assert_eq!(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone()],
nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
}, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
claimable_amount_satoshis: 2_000,
claimable_height: missing_htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ payment_hash: missing_htlc_payment_hash,
}, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
}, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
claimable_amount_satoshis: 5_000,
claimable_height: live_htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ payment_hash: live_payment_hash,
}]),
sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
- let revoked_htlc_success_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
-
- assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_success_txn.len(), 1);
- assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
- assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
- check_spends!(revoked_htlc_success_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
+ let revoked_htlc_success = {
+ let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
+ assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(txn[0].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ check_spends!(txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
+ txn.pop().unwrap()
+ };
connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
- let revoked_htlc_timeout_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
- assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_timeout_txn.len(), 1);
- check_spends!(revoked_htlc_timeout_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
- assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_timeout_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
- assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_success_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0);
- assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_timeout_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0);
+ let revoked_htlc_timeout = {
+ let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
+ assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
+ if txn[0].input[0].previous_output == revoked_htlc_success.input[0].previous_output {
+ txn.remove(1)
+ } else {
+ txn.remove(0)
+ }
+ };
+ check_spends!(revoked_htlc_timeout, revoked_local_txn[0]);
+ assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_success.input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_timeout.input[0].previous_output);
+ assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_success.lock_time.0, 0);
+ assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_timeout.lock_time.0, 0);
// A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
assert_eq!(as_balances,
sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
- mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_success_txn[0]);
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_success);
let as_htlc_claim_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx.len(), 2);
- check_spends!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_success_txn[0]);
+ check_spends!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_success);
check_spends!(as_htlc_claim_tx[1], revoked_local_txn[0]); // A has to generate a new claim for the remaining revoked
// outputs (which no longer includes the spent HTLC output)
assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output.len(), 1);
fuzzy_assert_eq(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
- 3_000 - chan_feerate * (revoked_htlc_success_txn[0].weight() + as_htlc_claim_tx[0].weight()) as u64 / 1000);
+ 3_000 - chan_feerate * (revoked_htlc_success.weight() + as_htlc_claim_tx[0].weight()) as u64 / 1000);
mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_claim_tx[0]);
assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
}]),
sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
- connect_blocks(&nodes[0], revoked_htlc_timeout_txn[0].lock_time.0 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], revoked_htlc_timeout.lock_time.0 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(&nodes[0],
[HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: failed_payment_hash }]);
// As time goes on A may split its revocation claim transaction into multiple.
check_spends!(tx, revoked_local_txn[0]);
}
- mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_timeout_txn[0]);
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_timeout);
let as_second_htlc_claim_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx.len(), 2);
- check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_timeout_txn[0]);
+ check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_timeout);
check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
// Connect blocks to finalize the HTLC resolution with the HTLC-Timeout transaction. In a
}, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ payment_hash: revoked_payment_hash,
}, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ payment_hash: claimed_payment_hash,
}]),
sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
}
+fn do_test_restored_packages_retry(check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade: bool) {
+ // Tests that we'll retry packages that were previously timelocked after we've restored them.
+ let persister;
+ let new_chain_monitor;
+ let node_deserialized;
+
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ // Open a channel, lock in an HTLC, and immediately broadcast the commitment transaction. This
+ // ensures that the HTLC timeout package is held until we reach its expiration height.
+ let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 50_000_000);
+ route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000);
+
+ nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
+ check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
+ check_closed_event(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false);
+
+ let commitment_tx = {
+ let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
+ assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 3);
+ check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
+ txn.pop().unwrap()
+ };
+
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx);
+
+ // Connect blocks until the HTLC's expiration is met, expecting a transaction broadcast.
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
+ let htlc_timeout_tx = {
+ let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
+ assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(txn[0], commitment_tx);
+ txn.pop().unwrap()
+ };
+
+ // Check that we can still rebroadcast these packages/transactions if we're upgrading from an
+ // old `ChannelMonitor` that did not exercise said rebroadcasting logic.
+ if check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade {
+ let serialized_monitor = hex::decode(
+ 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+ ).unwrap();
+ reload_node!(nodes[0], &nodes[0].node.encode(), &[&serialized_monitor], persister, new_chain_monitor, node_deserialized);
+ }
+
+ // Connecting more blocks should result in the HTLC transactions being rebroadcast.
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
+ if check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade {
+ check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
+ }
+ {
+ let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
+ if !nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().skips_blocks() {
+ assert_eq!(txn.len(), 6);
+ } else {
+ assert!(txn.len() < 6);
+ }
+ for tx in txn {
+ assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), htlc_timeout_tx.input.len());
+ assert_eq!(tx.output.len(), htlc_timeout_tx.output.len());
+ assert_eq!(tx.input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
+ assert_eq!(tx.output[0], htlc_timeout_tx.output[0]);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_restored_packages_retry() {
+ do_test_restored_packages_retry(false);
+ do_test_restored_packages_retry(true);
+}
+
+fn do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(anchors: bool) {
+ // Test that we will retry broadcasting pending claims for a force-closed channel on every
+ // `ChainMonitor::rebroadcast_pending_claims` call.
+ if anchors {
+ assert!(cfg!(anchors));
+ }
+ let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
+ if anchors {
+ #[cfg(anchors)] {
+ config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
+ }
+ }
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), Some(config)]);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ let (_, _, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(
+ &nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 500_000_000
+ );
+ const HTLC_AMT_MSAT: u64 = 1_000_000;
+ const HTLC_AMT_SAT: u64 = HTLC_AMT_MSAT / 1000;
+ route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], HTLC_AMT_MSAT);
+
+ let htlc_expiry = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1;
+
+ let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(&nodes[0], &chan_id);
+ assert_eq!(commitment_txn.len(), if anchors { 1 /* commitment tx only */} else { 2 /* commitment and htlc timeout tx */ });
+ check_spends!(&commitment_txn[0], &funding_tx);
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_txn[0]);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(&nodes[0], true);
+ check_closed_event(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false);
+ check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
+
+ // Set up a helper closure we'll use throughout our test. We should only expect retries without
+ // bumps if fees have not increased after a block has been connected (assuming the height timer
+ // re-evaluates at every block) or after `ChainMonitor::rebroadcast_pending_claims` is called.
+ let mut prev_htlc_tx_feerate = None;
+ let mut check_htlc_retry = |should_retry: bool, should_bump: bool| -> Option<Transaction> {
+ let (htlc_tx, htlc_tx_feerate) = if anchors {
+ assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().is_empty());
+ let mut events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), if should_retry { 1 } else { 0 });
+ if !should_retry {
+ return None;
+ }
+ #[allow(unused_assignments)]
+ let mut tx = Transaction {
+ version: 2,
+ lock_time: bitcoin::PackedLockTime::ZERO,
+ input: vec![],
+ output: vec![],
+ };
+ #[allow(unused_assignments)]
+ let mut feerate = 0;
+ #[cfg(anchors)] {
+ feerate = if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution {
+ target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, mut htlc_descriptors, tx_lock_time,
+ }) = events.pop().unwrap() {
+ let secp = Secp256k1::new();
+ assert_eq!(htlc_descriptors.len(), 1);
+ let descriptor = htlc_descriptors.pop().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(descriptor.commitment_txid, commitment_txn[0].txid());
+ let htlc_output_idx = descriptor.htlc.transaction_output_index.unwrap() as usize;
+ assert!(htlc_output_idx < commitment_txn[0].output.len());
+ tx.lock_time = tx_lock_time;
+ // Note that we don't care about actually making the HTLC transaction meet the
+ // feerate for the test, we just want to make sure the feerates we receive from
+ // the events never decrease.
+ tx.input.push(descriptor.unsigned_tx_input());
+ let signer = nodes[0].keys_manager.derive_channel_keys(
+ descriptor.channel_value_satoshis, &descriptor.channel_keys_id,
+ );
+ let per_commitment_point = signer.get_per_commitment_point(
+ descriptor.per_commitment_number, &secp
+ );
+ tx.output.push(descriptor.tx_output(&per_commitment_point, &secp));
+ let our_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&mut tx, 0, &descriptor, &secp).unwrap();
+ let witness_script = descriptor.witness_script(&per_commitment_point, &secp);
+ tx.input[0].witness = descriptor.tx_input_witness(&our_sig, &witness_script);
+ target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight as u64
+ } else { panic!("unexpected event"); };
+ }
+ (tx, feerate)
+ } else {
+ assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+ let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
+ assert_eq!(txn.len(), if should_retry { 1 } else { 0 });
+ if !should_retry {
+ return None;
+ }
+ let htlc_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
+ check_spends!(htlc_tx, commitment_txn[0]);
+ let htlc_tx_fee = HTLC_AMT_SAT - htlc_tx.output[0].value;
+ let htlc_tx_feerate = htlc_tx_fee * 1000 / htlc_tx.weight() as u64;
+ (htlc_tx, htlc_tx_feerate)
+ };
+ if should_bump {
+ assert!(htlc_tx_feerate > prev_htlc_tx_feerate.take().unwrap());
+ } else if let Some(prev_feerate) = prev_htlc_tx_feerate.take() {
+ assert_eq!(htlc_tx_feerate, prev_feerate);
+ }
+ prev_htlc_tx_feerate = Some(htlc_tx_feerate);
+ Some(htlc_tx)
+ };
+
+ // Connect blocks up to one before the HTLC expires. This should not result in a claim/retry.
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_expiry - nodes[0].best_block_info().1 - 1);
+ check_htlc_retry(false, false);
+
+ // Connect one more block, producing our first claim.
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
+ check_htlc_retry(true, false);
+
+ // Connect one more block, expecting a retry with a fee bump. Unfortunately, we cannot bump HTLC
+ // transactions pre-anchors.
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
+ check_htlc_retry(true, anchors);
+
+ // Trigger a call and we should have another retry, but without a bump.
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
+ check_htlc_retry(true, false);
+
+ // Double the feerate and trigger a call, expecting a fee-bumped retry.
+ *nodes[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
+ check_htlc_retry(true, anchors);
+
+ // Connect one more block, expecting a retry with a fee bump. Unfortunately, we cannot bump HTLC
+ // transactions pre-anchors.
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
+ let htlc_tx = check_htlc_retry(true, anchors).unwrap();
+
+ // Mine the HTLC transaction to ensure we don't retry claims while they're confirmed.
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_tx);
+ // If we have a `ConnectStyle` that advertises the new block first without the transasctions,
+ // we'll receive an extra bumped claim.
+ if nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
+ check_htlc_retry(true, anchors);
+ }
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
+ check_htlc_retry(false, false);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_monitor_timer_based_claim() {
+ do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(false);
+ #[cfg(anchors)]
+ do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(true);
+}
+
#[cfg(anchors)]
#[test]
fn test_yield_anchors_events() {
let mut holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
// Certain block `ConnectStyle`s cause an extra `ChannelClose` event to be emitted since the
- // best block is being updated prior to the confirmed transactions.
+ // best block is updated before the confirmed transactions are notified.
match *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow() {
ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstReorgsOnlyTip|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks => {
assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 3);
let mut htlc_txs = Vec::with_capacity(2);
for event in holder_events {
match event {
- Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { htlc_descriptors, .. }) => {
+ Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { htlc_descriptors, tx_lock_time, .. }) => {
assert_eq!(htlc_descriptors.len(), 1);
let htlc_descriptor = &htlc_descriptors[0];
let signer = nodes[0].keys_manager.derive_channel_keys(
let per_commitment_point = signer.get_per_commitment_point(htlc_descriptor.per_commitment_number, &secp);
let mut htlc_tx = Transaction {
version: 2,
- lock_time: if htlc_descriptor.htlc.offered {
- PackedLockTime(htlc_descriptor.htlc.cltv_expiry)
- } else {
- PackedLockTime::ZERO
- },
+ lock_time: tx_lock_time,
input: vec![
htlc_descriptor.unsigned_tx_input(), // HTLC input
TxIn { ..Default::default() } // Fee input
// Clear the remaining events as they're not relevant to what we're testing.
nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
}
+
+#[cfg(anchors)]
+#[test]
+fn test_anchors_aggregated_revoked_htlc_tx() {
+ // Test that `ChannelMonitor`s can properly detect and claim funds from a counterparty claiming
+ // multiple HTLCs from multiple channels in a single transaction via the success path from a
+ // revoked commitment.
+ let secp = Secp256k1::new();
+ let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ // Required to sign a revoked commitment transaction
+ chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let mut anchors_config = UserConfig::default();
+ anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
+ anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config), Some(anchors_config)]);
+
+ let bob_persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
+ let bob_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
+ let bob_deserialized: ChannelManager<
+ &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface,
+ &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
+ &test_utils::TestRouter, &test_utils::TestLogger,
+ >;
+
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ let chan_a = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 20_000_000);
+ let chan_b = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 20_000_000);
+
+ // Serialize Bob with the initial state of both channels, which we'll use later.
+ let bob_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
+
+ // Route two payments for each channel from Alice to Bob to lock in the HTLCs.
+ let payment_a = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
+ let payment_b = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
+ let payment_c = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
+ let payment_d = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
+
+ // Serialize Bob's monitors with the HTLCs locked in. We'll restart Bob later on with the state
+ // at this point such that he broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction with the HTLCs
+ // present.
+ let bob_serialized_monitor_a = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_a.2).encode();
+ let bob_serialized_monitor_b = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_b.2).encode();
+
+ // Bob claims all the HTLCs...
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_a.0);
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_b.0);
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_c.0);
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_d.0);
+
+ // ...and sends one back through each channel such that he has a motive to broadcast his
+ // revoked state.
+ send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 30_000_000);
+ send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 30_000_000);
+
+ // Restart Bob with the revoked state and provide the HTLC preimages he claimed.
+ reload_node!(
+ nodes[1], anchors_config, bob_serialized, &[&bob_serialized_monitor_a, &bob_serialized_monitor_b],
+ bob_persister, bob_chain_monitor, bob_deserialized
+ );
+ for chan_id in [chan_a.2, chan_b.2].iter() {
+ let monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id);
+ for payment in [payment_a, payment_b, payment_c, payment_d].iter() {
+ monitor.provide_payment_preimage(
+ &payment.1, &payment.0, &node_cfgs[1].tx_broadcaster,
+ &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator), &nodes[1].logger
+ );
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Bob force closes by restarting with the outdated state, prompting the ChannelMonitors to
+ // broadcast the latest commitment transaction known to them, which in our case is the one with
+ // the HTLCs still pending.
+ nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
+ check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 2);
+ check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 2, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
+ let (revoked_commitment_a, revoked_commitment_b) = {
+ let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
+ assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
+ assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 6); // 2 HTLC outputs + 1 to_self output + 1 to_remote output + 2 anchor outputs
+ assert_eq!(txn[1].output.len(), 6); // 2 HTLC outputs + 1 to_self output + 1 to_remote output + 2 anchor outputs
+ if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == chan_a.3.txid() {
+ check_spends!(&txn[0], &chan_a.3);
+ check_spends!(&txn[1], &chan_b.3);
+ (txn[0].clone(), txn[1].clone())
+ } else {
+ check_spends!(&txn[1], &chan_a.3);
+ check_spends!(&txn[0], &chan_b.3);
+ (txn[1].clone(), txn[0].clone())
+ }
+ };
+
+ // Bob should now receive two events to bump his revoked commitment transaction fees.
+ assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+ let events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
+ let anchor_tx = {
+ let secret_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap();
+ let public_key = PublicKey::new(secret_key.public_key(&secp));
+ let fee_utxo_script = Script::new_v0_p2wpkh(&public_key.wpubkey_hash().unwrap());
+ let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
+ version: 2,
+ lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
+ input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
+ output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `anchor_tx`
+ value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
+ script_pubkey: fee_utxo_script.clone(),
+ }],
+ };
+ let mut anchor_tx = Transaction {
+ version: 2,
+ lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
+ input: vec![
+ TxIn { // Fee input
+ previous_output: bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
+ ..Default::default()
+ },
+ ],
+ output: vec![TxOut { // Fee input change
+ value: coinbase_tx.output[0].value / 2 ,
+ script_pubkey: Script::new_op_return(&[]),
+ }],
+ };
+ let mut signers = Vec::with_capacity(2);
+ for event in events {
+ match event {
+ Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { anchor_descriptor, .. }) => {
+ anchor_tx.input.push(TxIn {
+ previous_output: anchor_descriptor.outpoint,
+ ..Default::default()
+ });
+ let signer = nodes[1].keys_manager.derive_channel_keys(
+ anchor_descriptor.channel_value_satoshis, &anchor_descriptor.channel_keys_id,
+ );
+ signers.push(signer);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ }
+ for (i, signer) in signers.into_iter().enumerate() {
+ let anchor_idx = i + 1;
+ let funding_sig = signer.sign_holder_anchor_input(&mut anchor_tx, anchor_idx, &secp).unwrap();
+ anchor_tx.input[anchor_idx].witness = chan_utils::build_anchor_input_witness(
+ &signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey, &funding_sig
+ );
+ }
+ let fee_utxo_sig = {
+ let witness_script = Script::new_p2pkh(&public_key.pubkey_hash());
+ let sighash = hash_to_message!(&SighashCache::new(&anchor_tx).segwit_signature_hash(
+ 0, &witness_script, coinbase_tx.output[0].value, EcdsaSighashType::All
+ ).unwrap()[..]);
+ let sig = sign(&secp, &sighash, &secret_key);
+ let mut sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
+ sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
+ sig
+ };
+ anchor_tx.input[0].witness = Witness::from_vec(vec![fee_utxo_sig, public_key.to_bytes()]);
+ check_spends!(anchor_tx, coinbase_tx, revoked_commitment_a, revoked_commitment_b);
+ anchor_tx
+ };
+
+ for node in &nodes {
+ mine_transactions(node, &[&revoked_commitment_a, &revoked_commitment_b, &anchor_tx]);
+ }
+ check_added_monitors!(&nodes[0], 2);
+ check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 2, true);
+ check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
+
+ // Alice should detect the confirmed revoked commitments, and attempt to claim all of the
+ // revoked outputs.
+ {
+ let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
+ assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
+
+ let (revoked_claim_a, revoked_claim_b) = if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_commitment_a.txid() {
+ (&txn[0], &txn[1])
+ } else {
+ (&txn[1], &txn[0])
+ };
+
+ // TODO: to_self claim must be separate from HTLC claims
+ assert_eq!(revoked_claim_a.input.len(), 3); // Spends both HTLC outputs and to_self output
+ assert_eq!(revoked_claim_a.output.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(revoked_claim_a, revoked_commitment_a);
+ assert_eq!(revoked_claim_b.input.len(), 3); // Spends both HTLC outputs and to_self output
+ assert_eq!(revoked_claim_b.output.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(revoked_claim_b, revoked_commitment_b);
+ }
+
+ // Since Bob was able to confirm his revoked commitment, he'll now try to claim the HTLCs
+ // through the success path.
+ assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+ let mut events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ // Certain block `ConnectStyle`s cause an extra `ChannelClose` event to be emitted since the
+ // best block is updated before the confirmed transactions are notified.
+ match *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow() {
+ ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstReorgsOnlyTip|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks => {
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
+ if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = events.remove(0) {}
+ else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
+ if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = events.remove(1) {}
+ else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
+
+ },
+ _ => assert_eq!(events.len(), 2),
+ };
+ let htlc_tx = {
+ let secret_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap();
+ let public_key = PublicKey::new(secret_key.public_key(&secp));
+ let fee_utxo_script = Script::new_v0_p2wpkh(&public_key.wpubkey_hash().unwrap());
+ let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
+ version: 2,
+ lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
+ input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
+ output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `htlc_tx`
+ value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
+ script_pubkey: fee_utxo_script.clone(),
+ }],
+ };
+ let mut htlc_tx = Transaction {
+ version: 2,
+ lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
+ input: vec![TxIn { // Fee input
+ previous_output: bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
+ ..Default::default()
+ }],
+ output: vec![TxOut { // Fee input change
+ value: coinbase_tx.output[0].value / 2 ,
+ script_pubkey: Script::new_op_return(&[]),
+ }],
+ };
+ let mut descriptors = Vec::with_capacity(4);
+ for event in events {
+ if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { mut htlc_descriptors, tx_lock_time, .. }) = event {
+ assert_eq!(htlc_descriptors.len(), 2);
+ for htlc_descriptor in &htlc_descriptors {
+ assert!(!htlc_descriptor.htlc.offered);
+ let signer = nodes[1].keys_manager.derive_channel_keys(
+ htlc_descriptor.channel_value_satoshis, &htlc_descriptor.channel_keys_id
+ );
+ let per_commitment_point = signer.get_per_commitment_point(htlc_descriptor.per_commitment_number, &secp);
+ htlc_tx.input.push(htlc_descriptor.unsigned_tx_input());
+ htlc_tx.output.push(htlc_descriptor.tx_output(&per_commitment_point, &secp));
+ }
+ descriptors.append(&mut htlc_descriptors);
+ htlc_tx.lock_time = tx_lock_time;
+ } else {
+ panic!("Unexpected event");
+ }
+ }
+ for (idx, htlc_descriptor) in descriptors.into_iter().enumerate() {
+ let htlc_input_idx = idx + 1;
+ let signer = nodes[1].keys_manager.derive_channel_keys(
+ htlc_descriptor.channel_value_satoshis, &htlc_descriptor.channel_keys_id
+ );
+ let our_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, htlc_input_idx, &htlc_descriptor, &secp).unwrap();
+ let per_commitment_point = signer.get_per_commitment_point(htlc_descriptor.per_commitment_number, &secp);
+ let witness_script = htlc_descriptor.witness_script(&per_commitment_point, &secp);
+ htlc_tx.input[htlc_input_idx].witness = htlc_descriptor.tx_input_witness(&our_sig, &witness_script);
+ }
+ let fee_utxo_sig = {
+ let witness_script = Script::new_p2pkh(&public_key.pubkey_hash());
+ let sighash = hash_to_message!(&SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(
+ 0, &witness_script, coinbase_tx.output[0].value, EcdsaSighashType::All
+ ).unwrap()[..]);
+ let sig = sign(&secp, &sighash, &secret_key);
+ let mut sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
+ sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
+ sig
+ };
+ htlc_tx.input[0].witness = Witness::from_vec(vec![fee_utxo_sig, public_key.to_bytes()]);
+ check_spends!(htlc_tx, coinbase_tx, revoked_commitment_a, revoked_commitment_b);
+ htlc_tx
+ };
+
+ for node in &nodes {
+ mine_transaction(node, &htlc_tx);
+ }
+
+ // Alice should see that Bob is trying to claim to HTLCs, so she should now try to claim them at
+ // the second level instead.
+ let revoked_claims = {
+ let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
+ assert_eq!(txn.len(), 4);
+
+ let revoked_to_self_claim_a = txn.iter().find(|tx|
+ tx.input.len() == 1 &&
+ tx.output.len() == 1 &&
+ tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_commitment_a.txid()
+ ).unwrap();
+ check_spends!(revoked_to_self_claim_a, revoked_commitment_a);
+
+ let revoked_to_self_claim_b = txn.iter().find(|tx|
+ tx.input.len() == 1 &&
+ tx.output.len() == 1 &&
+ tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_commitment_b.txid()
+ ).unwrap();
+ check_spends!(revoked_to_self_claim_b, revoked_commitment_b);
+
+ let revoked_htlc_claims = txn.iter().filter(|tx|
+ tx.input.len() == 2 &&
+ tx.output.len() == 1 &&
+ tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == htlc_tx.txid()
+ ).collect::<Vec<_>>();
+ assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claims.len(), 2);
+ for revoked_htlc_claim in revoked_htlc_claims {
+ check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim, htlc_tx);
+ }
+
+ txn
+ };
+ for node in &nodes {
+ mine_transactions(node, &revoked_claims.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>());
+ }
+
+
+ // Connect one block to make sure the HTLC events are not yielded while ANTI_REORG_DELAY has not
+ // been reached.
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
+
+ assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+ assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+
+ // Connect the remaining blocks to reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
+
+ assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+ let spendable_output_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(spendable_output_events.len(), 4);
+ for (idx, event) in spendable_output_events.iter().enumerate() {
+ if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = event {
+ assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
+ let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(
+ &[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), Script::new_op_return(&[]), 253, &Secp256k1::new(),
+ ).unwrap();
+ check_spends!(spend_tx, revoked_claims[idx]);
+ } else {
+ panic!("unexpected event");
+ }
+ }
+
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
+ assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_claimable_balances(&[]).is_empty());
+ // TODO: From Bob's PoV, he still thinks he can claim the outputs from his revoked commitment.
+ // This needs to be fixed before we enable pruning `ChannelMonitor`s once they don't have any
+ // balances to claim.
+ //
+ // The 6 claimable balances correspond to his `to_self` outputs and the 2 HTLC outputs in each
+ // revoked commitment which Bob has the preimage for.
+ assert_eq!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_claimable_balances(&[]).len(), 6);
+}
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff