//! Further functional tests which test blockchain reorganizations.
+#[cfg(anchors)]
+use crate::chain::keysinterface::{ChannelSigner, EcdsaChannelSigner};
+#[cfg(anchors)]
+use crate::chain::channelmonitor::LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, Balance};
use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
+#[cfg(anchors)]
+use crate::events::bump_transaction::BumpTransactionEvent;
+use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
use crate::ln::channel;
-use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, PaymentId};
+#[cfg(anchors)]
+use crate::ln::chan_utils;
+#[cfg(anchors)]
+use crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager;
+use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, PaymentId};
use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
-use crate::util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
-
+#[cfg(anchors)]
+use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
+#[cfg(anchors)]
+use crate::util::crypto::sign;
+#[cfg(anchors)]
+use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
+#[cfg(anchors)]
+use crate::util::test_utils;
+
+#[cfg(anchors)]
+use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
+#[cfg(anchors)]
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::SecretKey;
+#[cfg(anchors)]
+use bitcoin::{Amount, PublicKey, Script, TxIn, TxOut, PackedLockTime, Witness};
use bitcoin::Transaction;
+#[cfg(anchors)]
+use bitcoin::util::sighash::SighashCache;
use crate::prelude::*;
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
- let (update_a, _, chan_id_2, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ let (update_a, _, chan_id_2, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1_000_000);
nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
- let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000).1;
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000);
let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
- let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64;
- let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_id);
+ let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
+ let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000
nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &node_0_shutdown);
+ nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown);
let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &node_1_shutdown);
+ nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown);
let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000);
let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
- let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64;
- let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_id);
+ let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
+ let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
// Before B receives the payment preimage, it only suggests the push_msat value of 1_000 sats
// Create a single channel with two pending HTLCs from nodes[0] to nodes[1], one which nodes[1]
// knows the preimage for, one which it does not.
- let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
+ let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 0);
let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000_000);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000_000);
- let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64;
- let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_id);
+ let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
+ let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
// Get nodes[0]'s commitment transaction and HTLC-Timeout transactions
let as_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
- let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
+ let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
// Send two HTLCs, one from A to B, and one from B to A.
let to_a_failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 20_000_000).1;
let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
- let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64;
- let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_id);
+ let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
+ let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
// Both A and B will have an HTLC that's claimable on timeout and one that's claimable if they
// receive the preimage. These will remain the same through the channel closure and until the
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 100_000_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 100_000_000);
let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
// Get the latest commitment transaction from A and then update the fee to revoke it
let as_revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
- let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_id);
+ let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
- let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64;
+ let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
let missing_htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
let missing_htlc_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 2_000_000).1;
test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
let mut payment_failed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- expect_payment_failed_conditions_event(&nodes[1], payment_failed_events.pop().unwrap(),
- dust_payment_hash, false, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
- expect_payment_failed_conditions_event(&nodes[1], payment_failed_events.pop().unwrap(),
+ expect_payment_failed_conditions_event(payment_failed_events[..2].to_vec(),
missing_htlc_payment_hash, false, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
- assert!(payment_failed_events.is_empty());
+ expect_payment_failed_conditions_event(payment_failed_events[2..].to_vec(),
+ dust_payment_hash, false, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[if confirm_htlc_spend_first { 2 } else { 3 }]);
// Create some initial channels
let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 11_000_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 11_000_000);
let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
- let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64;
- let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_id);
+ let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
+ let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
// B will generate an HTLC-Success from its revoked commitment tx
mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 100_000_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 100_000_000);
let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
check_spends!(as_revoked_txn[0], funding_tx);
check_spends!(as_revoked_txn[1], as_revoked_txn[0]); // The HTLC-Claim transaction
- let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_id);
- let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64;
+ let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
+ let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
{
let mut feerate = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
}
+
+#[cfg(anchors)]
+#[test]
+fn test_yield_anchors_events() {
+ // Tests that two parties supporting anchor outputs can open a channel, route payments over
+ // it, and finalize its resolution uncooperatively. Once the HTLCs are locked in, one side will
+ // force close once the HTLCs expire. The force close should stem from an event emitted by LDK,
+ // allowing the consumer to provide additional fees to the commitment transaction to be
+ // broadcast. Once the commitment transaction confirms, events for the HTLC resolution should be
+ // emitted by LDK, such that the consumer can attach fees to the zero fee HTLC transactions.
+ let secp = Secp256k1::new();
+ let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let mut anchors_config = UserConfig::default();
+ anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
+ anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config), Some(anchors_config)]);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(
+ &nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000
+ ).2;
+ route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
+ let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
+
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(&nodes[0], true);
+ assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
+
+ get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(
+ &payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster,
+ &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator), &nodes[0].logger
+ );
+
+ let mut holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 1);
+ let (commitment_tx, anchor_tx) = match holder_events.pop().unwrap() {
+ Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { commitment_tx, anchor_descriptor, .. }) => {
+ assert_eq!(commitment_tx.input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 6);
+ let mut anchor_tx = Transaction {
+ version: 2,
+ lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
+ input: vec![
+ TxIn { previous_output: anchor_descriptor.outpoint, ..Default::default() },
+ TxIn { ..Default::default() },
+ ],
+ output: vec![TxOut {
+ value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
+ script_pubkey: Script::new_op_return(&[]),
+ }],
+ };
+ let signer = nodes[0].keys_manager.derive_channel_keys(
+ anchor_descriptor.channel_value_satoshis, &anchor_descriptor.channel_keys_id,
+ );
+ let funding_sig = signer.sign_holder_anchor_input(&mut anchor_tx, 0, &secp).unwrap();
+ anchor_tx.input[0].witness = chan_utils::build_anchor_input_witness(
+ &signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey, &funding_sig
+ );
+ (commitment_tx, anchor_tx)
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ };
+
+ mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&commitment_tx, &anchor_tx]);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ let mut holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ // Certain block `ConnectStyle`s cause an extra `ChannelClose` event to be emitted since the
+ // best block is updated before the confirmed transactions are notified.
+ match *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow() {
+ ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstReorgsOnlyTip|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks => {
+ assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 3);
+ if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = holder_events.remove(0) {}
+ else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
+
+ },
+ _ => assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 2),
+ };
+ let mut htlc_txs = Vec::with_capacity(2);
+ for event in holder_events {
+ match event {
+ Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { htlc_descriptors, tx_lock_time, .. }) => {
+ assert_eq!(htlc_descriptors.len(), 1);
+ let htlc_descriptor = &htlc_descriptors[0];
+ let signer = nodes[0].keys_manager.derive_channel_keys(
+ htlc_descriptor.channel_value_satoshis, &htlc_descriptor.channel_keys_id
+ );
+ let per_commitment_point = signer.get_per_commitment_point(htlc_descriptor.per_commitment_number, &secp);
+ let mut htlc_tx = Transaction {
+ version: 2,
+ lock_time: tx_lock_time,
+ input: vec![
+ htlc_descriptor.unsigned_tx_input(), // HTLC input
+ TxIn { ..Default::default() } // Fee input
+ ],
+ output: vec![
+ htlc_descriptor.tx_output(&per_commitment_point, &secp), // HTLC output
+ TxOut { // Fee input change
+ value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
+ script_pubkey: Script::new_op_return(&[]),
+ }
+ ]
+ };
+ let our_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&mut htlc_tx, 0, htlc_descriptor, &secp).unwrap();
+ let witness_script = htlc_descriptor.witness_script(&per_commitment_point, &secp);
+ htlc_tx.input[0].witness = htlc_descriptor.tx_input_witness(&our_sig, &witness_script);
+ htlc_txs.push(htlc_tx);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ }
+
+ mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&htlc_txs[0], &htlc_txs[1]]);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
+
+ assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
+
+ let holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 3);
+ for event in holder_events {
+ match event {
+ Event::SpendableOutputs { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Clear the remaining events as they're not relevant to what we're testing.
+ nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+}
+
+#[cfg(anchors)]
+#[test]
+fn test_anchors_aggregated_revoked_htlc_tx() {
+ // Test that `ChannelMonitor`s can properly detect and claim funds from a counterparty claiming
+ // multiple HTLCs from multiple channels in a single transaction via the success path from a
+ // revoked commitment.
+ let secp = Secp256k1::new();
+ let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ // Required to sign a revoked commitment transaction
+ chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let mut anchors_config = UserConfig::default();
+ anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
+ anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config), Some(anchors_config)]);
+
+ let bob_persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
+ let bob_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
+ let bob_deserialized: ChannelManager<
+ &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface,
+ &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
+ &test_utils::TestRouter, &test_utils::TestLogger,
+ >;
+
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ let chan_a = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 20_000_000);
+ let chan_b = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 20_000_000);
+
+ // Serialize Bob with the initial state of both channels, which we'll use later.
+ let bob_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
+
+ // Route two payments for each channel from Alice to Bob to lock in the HTLCs.
+ let payment_a = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
+ let payment_b = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
+ let payment_c = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
+ let payment_d = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
+
+ // Serialize Bob's monitors with the HTLCs locked in. We'll restart Bob later on with the state
+ // at this point such that he broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction with the HTLCs
+ // present.
+ let bob_serialized_monitor_a = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_a.2).encode();
+ let bob_serialized_monitor_b = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_b.2).encode();
+
+ // Bob claims all the HTLCs...
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_a.0);
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_b.0);
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_c.0);
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_d.0);
+
+ // ...and sends one back through each channel such that he has a motive to broadcast his
+ // revoked state.
+ send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 30_000_000);
+ send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 30_000_000);
+
+ // Restart Bob with the revoked state and provide the HTLC preimages he claimed.
+ reload_node!(
+ nodes[1], anchors_config, bob_serialized, &[&bob_serialized_monitor_a, &bob_serialized_monitor_b],
+ bob_persister, bob_chain_monitor, bob_deserialized
+ );
+ for chan_id in [chan_a.2, chan_b.2].iter() {
+ let monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id);
+ for payment in [payment_a, payment_b, payment_c, payment_d].iter() {
+ monitor.provide_payment_preimage(
+ &payment.1, &payment.0, &node_cfgs[1].tx_broadcaster,
+ &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator), &nodes[1].logger
+ );
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Bob force closes by restarting with the outdated state, prompting the ChannelMonitors to
+ // broadcast the latest commitment transaction known to them, which in our case is the one with
+ // the HTLCs still pending.
+ nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
+ check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 2);
+ check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 2, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
+ let (revoked_commitment_a, revoked_commitment_b) = {
+ let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
+ assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
+ assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 6); // 2 HTLC outputs + 1 to_self output + 1 to_remote output + 2 anchor outputs
+ assert_eq!(txn[1].output.len(), 6); // 2 HTLC outputs + 1 to_self output + 1 to_remote output + 2 anchor outputs
+ if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == chan_a.3.txid() {
+ check_spends!(&txn[0], &chan_a.3);
+ check_spends!(&txn[1], &chan_b.3);
+ (txn[0].clone(), txn[1].clone())
+ } else {
+ check_spends!(&txn[1], &chan_a.3);
+ check_spends!(&txn[0], &chan_b.3);
+ (txn[1].clone(), txn[0].clone())
+ }
+ };
+
+ // Bob should now receive two events to bump his revoked commitment transaction fees.
+ assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+ let events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
+ let anchor_tx = {
+ let secret_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap();
+ let public_key = PublicKey::new(secret_key.public_key(&secp));
+ let fee_utxo_script = Script::new_v0_p2wpkh(&public_key.wpubkey_hash().unwrap());
+ let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
+ version: 2,
+ lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
+ input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
+ output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `anchor_tx`
+ value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
+ script_pubkey: fee_utxo_script.clone(),
+ }],
+ };
+ let mut anchor_tx = Transaction {
+ version: 2,
+ lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
+ input: vec![
+ TxIn { // Fee input
+ previous_output: bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
+ ..Default::default()
+ },
+ ],
+ output: vec![TxOut { // Fee input change
+ value: coinbase_tx.output[0].value / 2 ,
+ script_pubkey: Script::new_op_return(&[]),
+ }],
+ };
+ let mut signers = Vec::with_capacity(2);
+ for event in events {
+ match event {
+ Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { anchor_descriptor, .. }) => {
+ anchor_tx.input.push(TxIn {
+ previous_output: anchor_descriptor.outpoint,
+ ..Default::default()
+ });
+ let signer = nodes[1].keys_manager.derive_channel_keys(
+ anchor_descriptor.channel_value_satoshis, &anchor_descriptor.channel_keys_id,
+ );
+ signers.push(signer);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ }
+ for (i, signer) in signers.into_iter().enumerate() {
+ let anchor_idx = i + 1;
+ let funding_sig = signer.sign_holder_anchor_input(&mut anchor_tx, anchor_idx, &secp).unwrap();
+ anchor_tx.input[anchor_idx].witness = chan_utils::build_anchor_input_witness(
+ &signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey, &funding_sig
+ );
+ }
+ let fee_utxo_sig = {
+ let witness_script = Script::new_p2pkh(&public_key.pubkey_hash());
+ let sighash = hash_to_message!(&SighashCache::new(&anchor_tx).segwit_signature_hash(
+ 0, &witness_script, coinbase_tx.output[0].value, EcdsaSighashType::All
+ ).unwrap()[..]);
+ let sig = sign(&secp, &sighash, &secret_key);
+ let mut sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
+ sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
+ sig
+ };
+ anchor_tx.input[0].witness = Witness::from_vec(vec![fee_utxo_sig, public_key.to_bytes()]);
+ check_spends!(anchor_tx, coinbase_tx, revoked_commitment_a, revoked_commitment_b);
+ anchor_tx
+ };
+
+ for node in &nodes {
+ mine_transactions(node, &[&revoked_commitment_a, &revoked_commitment_b, &anchor_tx]);
+ }
+ check_added_monitors!(&nodes[0], 2);
+ check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 2, true);
+ check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
+
+ // Alice should detect the confirmed revoked commitments, and attempt to claim all of the
+ // revoked outputs.
+ {
+ let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
+ assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
+
+ let (revoked_claim_a, revoked_claim_b) = if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_commitment_a.txid() {
+ (&txn[0], &txn[1])
+ } else {
+ (&txn[1], &txn[0])
+ };
+
+ // TODO: to_self claim must be separate from HTLC claims
+ assert_eq!(revoked_claim_a.input.len(), 3); // Spends both HTLC outputs and to_self output
+ assert_eq!(revoked_claim_a.output.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(revoked_claim_a, revoked_commitment_a);
+ assert_eq!(revoked_claim_b.input.len(), 3); // Spends both HTLC outputs and to_self output
+ assert_eq!(revoked_claim_b.output.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(revoked_claim_b, revoked_commitment_b);
+ }
+
+ // Since Bob was able to confirm his revoked commitment, he'll now try to claim the HTLCs
+ // through the success path.
+ assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+ let mut events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ // Certain block `ConnectStyle`s cause an extra `ChannelClose` event to be emitted since the
+ // best block is updated before the confirmed transactions are notified.
+ match *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow() {
+ ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstReorgsOnlyTip|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks => {
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
+ if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = events.remove(0) {}
+ else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
+ if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = events.remove(1) {}
+ else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
+
+ },
+ _ => assert_eq!(events.len(), 2),
+ };
+ let htlc_tx = {
+ let secret_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap();
+ let public_key = PublicKey::new(secret_key.public_key(&secp));
+ let fee_utxo_script = Script::new_v0_p2wpkh(&public_key.wpubkey_hash().unwrap());
+ let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
+ version: 2,
+ lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
+ input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
+ output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `htlc_tx`
+ value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
+ script_pubkey: fee_utxo_script.clone(),
+ }],
+ };
+ let mut htlc_tx = Transaction {
+ version: 2,
+ lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
+ input: vec![TxIn { // Fee input
+ previous_output: bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
+ ..Default::default()
+ }],
+ output: vec![TxOut { // Fee input change
+ value: coinbase_tx.output[0].value / 2 ,
+ script_pubkey: Script::new_op_return(&[]),
+ }],
+ };
+ let mut descriptors = Vec::with_capacity(4);
+ for event in events {
+ if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { mut htlc_descriptors, tx_lock_time, .. }) = event {
+ assert_eq!(htlc_descriptors.len(), 2);
+ for htlc_descriptor in &htlc_descriptors {
+ assert!(!htlc_descriptor.htlc.offered);
+ let signer = nodes[1].keys_manager.derive_channel_keys(
+ htlc_descriptor.channel_value_satoshis, &htlc_descriptor.channel_keys_id
+ );
+ let per_commitment_point = signer.get_per_commitment_point(htlc_descriptor.per_commitment_number, &secp);
+ htlc_tx.input.push(htlc_descriptor.unsigned_tx_input());
+ htlc_tx.output.push(htlc_descriptor.tx_output(&per_commitment_point, &secp));
+ }
+ descriptors.append(&mut htlc_descriptors);
+ htlc_tx.lock_time = tx_lock_time;
+ } else {
+ panic!("Unexpected event");
+ }
+ }
+ for (idx, htlc_descriptor) in descriptors.into_iter().enumerate() {
+ let htlc_input_idx = idx + 1;
+ let signer = nodes[1].keys_manager.derive_channel_keys(
+ htlc_descriptor.channel_value_satoshis, &htlc_descriptor.channel_keys_id
+ );
+ let our_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, htlc_input_idx, &htlc_descriptor, &secp).unwrap();
+ let per_commitment_point = signer.get_per_commitment_point(htlc_descriptor.per_commitment_number, &secp);
+ let witness_script = htlc_descriptor.witness_script(&per_commitment_point, &secp);
+ htlc_tx.input[htlc_input_idx].witness = htlc_descriptor.tx_input_witness(&our_sig, &witness_script);
+ }
+ let fee_utxo_sig = {
+ let witness_script = Script::new_p2pkh(&public_key.pubkey_hash());
+ let sighash = hash_to_message!(&SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(
+ 0, &witness_script, coinbase_tx.output[0].value, EcdsaSighashType::All
+ ).unwrap()[..]);
+ let sig = sign(&secp, &sighash, &secret_key);
+ let mut sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
+ sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
+ sig
+ };
+ htlc_tx.input[0].witness = Witness::from_vec(vec![fee_utxo_sig, public_key.to_bytes()]);
+ check_spends!(htlc_tx, coinbase_tx, revoked_commitment_a, revoked_commitment_b);
+ htlc_tx
+ };
+
+ for node in &nodes {
+ mine_transaction(node, &htlc_tx);
+ }
+
+ // Alice should see that Bob is trying to claim to HTLCs, so she should now try to claim them at
+ // the second level instead.
+ let revoked_claims = {
+ let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
+ assert_eq!(txn.len(), 4);
+
+ let revoked_to_self_claim_a = txn.iter().find(|tx|
+ tx.input.len() == 1 &&
+ tx.output.len() == 1 &&
+ tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_commitment_a.txid()
+ ).unwrap();
+ check_spends!(revoked_to_self_claim_a, revoked_commitment_a);
+
+ let revoked_to_self_claim_b = txn.iter().find(|tx|
+ tx.input.len() == 1 &&
+ tx.output.len() == 1 &&
+ tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_commitment_b.txid()
+ ).unwrap();
+ check_spends!(revoked_to_self_claim_b, revoked_commitment_b);
+
+ let revoked_htlc_claims = txn.iter().filter(|tx|
+ tx.input.len() == 2 &&
+ tx.output.len() == 1 &&
+ tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == htlc_tx.txid()
+ ).collect::<Vec<_>>();
+ assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claims.len(), 2);
+ for revoked_htlc_claim in revoked_htlc_claims {
+ check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim, htlc_tx);
+ }
+
+ txn
+ };
+ for node in &nodes {
+ mine_transactions(node, &revoked_claims.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>());
+ }
+
+
+ // Connect one block to make sure the HTLC events are not yielded while ANTI_REORG_DELAY has not
+ // been reached.
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
+
+ assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+ assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+
+ // Connect the remaining blocks to reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
+
+ assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+ let spendable_output_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(spendable_output_events.len(), 4);
+ for (idx, event) in spendable_output_events.iter().enumerate() {
+ if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = event {
+ assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
+ let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(
+ &[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), Script::new_op_return(&[]), 253, &Secp256k1::new(),
+ ).unwrap();
+ check_spends!(spend_tx, revoked_claims[idx]);
+ } else {
+ panic!("unexpected event");
+ }
+ }
+
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
+ assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_claimable_balances(&[]).is_empty());
+ // TODO: From Bob's PoV, he still thinks he can claim the outputs from his revoked commitment.
+ // This needs to be fixed before we enable pruning `ChannelMonitor`s once they don't have any
+ // balances to claim.
+ //
+ // The 6 claimable balances correspond to his `to_self` outputs and the 2 HTLC outputs in each
+ // revoked commitment which Bob has the preimage for.
+ assert_eq!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_claimable_balances(&[]).len(), 6);
+}
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff