//! Further functional tests which test blockchain reorganizations.
-use crate::sign::EcdsaChannelSigner;
+use crate::sign::{EcdsaChannelSigner, SpendableOutputDescriptor};
use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, Balance};
use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
use crate::chain::chaininterface::{LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight};
use crate::events::bump_transaction::{BumpTransactionEvent, WalletSource};
use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
use crate::ln::channel;
-use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ChannelManager, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields};
+use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields};
use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
use crate::util::crypto::sign;
use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
+use crate::util::scid_utils::block_from_scid;
use crate::util::test_utils;
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, update_a.contents.short_channel_id, true);
}
-fn test_spendable_output<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(node: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, spendable_tx: &Transaction) {
+fn test_spendable_output<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(node: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, spendable_tx: &Transaction, has_anchors_htlc_event: bool) -> Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor> {
let mut spendable = node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(spendable.len(), 1);
- if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = spendable.pop().unwrap() {
+ assert_eq!(spendable.len(), if has_anchors_htlc_event { 2 } else { 1 });
+ if has_anchors_htlc_event {
+ if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { .. }) = spendable.pop().unwrap() {}
+ else { panic!(); }
+ }
+ if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs, .. } = spendable.pop().unwrap() {
assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
let spend_tx = node.keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, None, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
check_spends!(spend_tx, spendable_tx);
+ outputs
} else { panic!(); }
}
expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, false);
}
-#[test]
-fn chanmon_claim_value_coop_close() {
+fn do_chanmon_claim_value_coop_close(anchors: bool) {
// Tests `get_claimable_balances` returns the correct values across a simple cooperative claim.
// Specifically, this tests that the channel non-HTLC balances show up in
// `get_claimable_balances` until the cooperative claims have confirmed and generated a
// `SpendableOutputs` event, and no longer.
let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
- let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
+ let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
+ if anchors {
+ user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
+ user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
+ }
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
+ let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate * channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000;
+ let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 };
assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
- amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000
+ amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value
}],
nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { amount_satoshis: 1_000, }],
assert_eq!(shutdown_tx, nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0));
assert_eq!(shutdown_tx.len(), 1);
- mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0]);
- mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0]);
+ let shutdown_tx_conf_height_a = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0]));
+ let shutdown_tx_conf_height_b = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0]));
assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
- amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000,
+ amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
}],
nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
}],
nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
- connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
- connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
+
+ assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id)
+ .get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_a).is_empty());
+ assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id)
+ .get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_b).is_empty());
+
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
- test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0]);
- test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0]);
+ let spendable_outputs_a = test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0], false);
+ assert_eq!(
+ get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_a),
+ spendable_outputs_a
+ );
+
+ let spendable_outputs_b = test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0], false);
+ assert_eq!(
+ get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_b),
+ spendable_outputs_b
+ );
check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
}
+#[test]
+fn chanmon_claim_value_coop_close() {
+ do_chanmon_claim_value_coop_close(false);
+ do_chanmon_claim_value_coop_close(true);
+}
+
fn sorted_vec<T: Ord>(mut v: Vec<T>) -> Vec<T> {
v.sort_unstable();
v
assert!(b_u64 >= a_u64 - 5);
}
-fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) {
+fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(anchors: bool, prev_commitment_tx: bool) {
// Tests `get_claimable_balances` with an HTLC across a force-close.
// We build a channel with an HTLC pending, then force close the channel and check that the
// `get_claimable_balances` return value is correct as transactions confirm on-chain.
chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
}
let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
- let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
+ let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
+ if anchors {
+ user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
+ user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
+ }
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+ let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
+ version: 2,
+ lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
+ input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
+ output: vec![
+ TxOut {
+ value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
+ script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
+ },
+ TxOut {
+ value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
+ script_pubkey: nodes[1].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
+ },
+ ],
+ };
+ if anchors {
+ nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
+ nodes[1].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 1 }, coinbase_tx.output[1].value);
+ }
+
let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000);
let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
// This HTLC is immediately claimed, giving node B the preimage
- let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
+ let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
// This HTLC is allowed to time out, letting A claim it. However, in order to test claimable
// balances more fully we also give B the preimage for this HTLC.
- let (timeout_payment_preimage, timeout_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 4_000_000);
+ let (timeout_payment_preimage, timeout_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 4_000_000);
// This HTLC will be dust, and not be claimable at all:
- let (dust_payment_preimage, dust_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000);
+ let (dust_payment_preimage, dust_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000);
let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
- let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
+ let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
// Before B receives the payment preimage, it only suggests the push_msat value of 1_000 sats
// as claimable. A lists both its to-self balance and the (possibly-claimable) HTLCs.
+ let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate as u64 *
+ (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
+ let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { 2 * channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI } else { 0 };
assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
- amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - chan_feerate *
- (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
+ amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
}, sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
// Once B has received the payment preimage, it includes the value of the HTLC in its
// "claimable if you were to close the channel" balance.
+ let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate as u64 *
+ (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) +
+ if prev_commitment_tx { 1 } else { 2 } * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
let mut a_expected_balances = vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - // Channel funding value in satoshis
4_000 - // The to-be-failed HTLC value in satoshis
3_000 - // The claimed HTLC value in satoshis
1_000 - // The push_msat value in satoshis
3 - // The dust HTLC value in satoshis
- // The commitment transaction fee with two HTLC outputs:
- chan_feerate * (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) +
- if prev_commitment_tx { 1 } else { 2 } *
- channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
+ commitment_tx_fee - // The commitment transaction fee with two HTLC outputs
+ anchor_outputs_value, // The anchor outputs value in satoshis
}, sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()];
if !prev_commitment_tx {
a_expected_balances.push(sent_htlc_balance.clone());
mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
- let b_broadcast_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
+ if anchors {
+ let mut events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events.pop().unwrap() {
+ Event::BumpTransaction(bump_event) => {
+ let mut first_htlc_event = bump_event.clone();
+ if let BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { ref mut htlc_descriptors, .. } = &mut first_htlc_event {
+ htlc_descriptors.remove(1);
+ } else {
+ panic!("Unexpected event");
+ }
+ let mut second_htlc_event = bump_event;
+ if let BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { ref mut htlc_descriptors, .. } = &mut second_htlc_event {
+ htlc_descriptors.remove(0);
+ } else {
+ panic!("Unexpected event");
+ }
+ nodes[1].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&first_htlc_event);
+ nodes[1].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&second_htlc_event);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ }
+
+ let b_broadcast_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn.len(), 2);
// b_broadcast_txn should spend the HTLCs output of the commitment tx for 3_000 and 4_000 sats
- check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
- check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
- assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
- assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0], coinbase_tx);
+ check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0], coinbase_tx);
+ assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 });
+ assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 });
assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
// other Balance variants, as close has already happened.
assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
-
+ let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate as u64 *
+ (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
- amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - chan_feerate *
- (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
+ amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
}, sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
}, received_htlc_claiming_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
- test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0], false);
assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
// After broadcasting the HTLC claim transaction, node A will still consider the HTLC
nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], timeout_payment_hash, false);
- test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[1]);
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[1], false);
// Node B will no longer consider the HTLC "contentious" after the HTLC claim transaction
// confirms, and consider it simply "awaiting confirmations". Note that it has to wait for the
// After reaching the commitment output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutputs event for it and have
// only the HTLCs claimable on node B.
connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_commitment_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
- test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0], anchors);
assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
amount_satoshis: 3_000,
// After reaching the claimed HTLC output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutptus event for it and
// have only one HTLC output left spendable.
connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_htlc_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
- test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0], anchors);
assert_eq!(vec![received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()],
nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
#[test]
fn test_claim_value_force_close() {
- do_test_claim_value_force_close(true);
- do_test_claim_value_force_close(false);
+ do_test_claim_value_force_close(false, true);
+ do_test_claim_value_force_close(false, false);
+ do_test_claim_value_force_close(true, true);
+ do_test_claim_value_force_close(true, false);
}
-#[test]
-fn test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs() {
+fn do_test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs(anchors: bool) {
// Previously, when handling the broadcast of a local commitment transactions (with associated
// CSV delays prior to spendability), we incorrectly handled the CSV delays on HTLC
// transactions. This caused us to miss spendable outputs for HTLCs which were awaiting a CSV
// claim by our counterparty).
let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
- let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
+ let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
+ if anchors {
+ user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
+ user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
+ }
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+ let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
+ version: 2,
+ lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
+ input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
+ output: vec![
+ TxOut {
+ value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
+ script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
+ },
+ TxOut {
+ value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
+ script_pubkey: nodes[1].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
+ },
+ ],
+ };
+ if anchors {
+ nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
+ nodes[1].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 1 }, coinbase_tx.output[1].value);
+ }
+
// Create a single channel with two pending HTLCs from nodes[0] to nodes[1], one which nodes[1]
// knows the preimage for, one which it does not.
let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 0);
let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
- // Get nodes[0]'s commitment transaction and HTLC-Timeout transactions
- let as_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
- assert_eq!(as_txn.len(), 3);
- check_spends!(as_txn[1], as_txn[0]);
- check_spends!(as_txn[2], as_txn[0]);
- check_spends!(as_txn[0], funding_tx);
-
// First confirm the commitment transaction on nodes[0], which should leave us with three
// claimable balances.
let node_a_commitment_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
- mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);
+ nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
- check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
+ let commitment_tx = {
+ let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
+ assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
+ let commitment_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
+ check_spends!(commitment_tx, funding_tx);
+ commitment_tx
+ };
+ let commitment_tx_conf_height_a = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx));
+ if anchors && nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
+ let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
+ assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(txn[0].txid(), commitment_tx.txid());
+ }
let htlc_balance_known_preimage = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
amount_satoshis: 10_000,
payment_hash: payment_hash_2,
};
+ let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate *
+ (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
+ let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { 2 * channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI } else { 0 };
assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
- amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
- (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
+ amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
}, htlc_balance_known_preimage.clone(), htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
// Get nodes[1]'s HTLC claim tx for the second HTLC
- mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0]);
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
let bs_htlc_claim_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
assert_eq!(bs_htlc_claim_txn.len(), 1);
- check_spends!(bs_htlc_claim_txn[0], as_txn[0]);
+ check_spends!(bs_htlc_claim_txn[0], commitment_tx);
// Connect blocks until the HTLCs expire, allowing us to (validly) broadcast the HTLC-Timeout
// transaction.
- connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
- amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
- (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
+ amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
}, htlc_balance_known_preimage.clone(), htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
- assert_eq!(as_txn[1].lock_time.0, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1); // as_txn[1] can be included in the next block
+ if anchors {
+ handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[0], 2);
+ }
+ let timeout_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
+ assert_eq!(timeout_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
+ check_spends!(timeout_htlc_txn[0], commitment_tx, coinbase_tx);
+ check_spends!(timeout_htlc_txn[1], commitment_tx, coinbase_tx);
// Now confirm nodes[0]'s HTLC-Timeout transaction, which changes the claimable balance to an
// "awaiting confirmations" one.
let node_a_htlc_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
- mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[1]);
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_htlc_txn[0]);
// Note that prior to the fix in the commit which introduced this test, this (and the next
// balance) check failed. With this check removed, the code panicked in the `connect_blocks`
// call, as described, two hunks down.
assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
- amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
- (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
+ amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
}, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
amount_satoshis: 10_000,
mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_htlc_claim_txn[0]);
expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage_2, None, true, false);
assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
- amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
- (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
+ amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
}, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
amount_satoshis: 10_000,
expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false);
assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
- amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
- (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
+ amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
}, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
amount_satoshis: 10_000,
// Connect blocks until the commitment transaction's CSV expires, providing us the relevant
// `SpendableOutputs` event and removing the claimable balance entry.
- connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_commitment_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_commitment_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1 - 1);
+ assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id)
+ .get_spendable_outputs(&commitment_tx, commitment_tx_conf_height_a).is_empty());
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
amount_satoshis: 10_000,
confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
}],
nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
- test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);
+ let to_self_spendable_output = test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx, false);
+ assert_eq!(
+ get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&commitment_tx, commitment_tx_conf_height_a),
+ to_self_spendable_output
+ );
// Connect blocks until the HTLC-Timeout's CSV expires, providing us the relevant
// `SpendableOutputs` event and removing the claimable balance entry.
connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_htlc_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
- test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_txn[1]);
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &timeout_htlc_txn[0], false);
// Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
// using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
}
+#[test]
+fn test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs() {
+ do_test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs(false);
+ do_test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs(true);
+}
+
#[test]
fn test_no_preimage_inbound_htlc_balances() {
// Tests that MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC are generated for inbound HTLCs for which we do not
// For node B, we'll get the non-HTLC funds claimable after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations
connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
- test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0]);
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0], false);
bs_pre_spend_claims.retain(|e| if let Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { .. } = e { false } else { true });
// The next few blocks for B look the same as for A, though for the opposite HTLC
confirmation_height: core::cmp::max(as_timeout_claimable_height, htlc_cltv_timeout),
}],
nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
- test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0], false);
connect_blocks(&nodes[0], as_timeout_claimable_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
- test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0], false);
// The process for B should be completely identical as well, noting that the non-HTLC-balance
// was already claimed.
assert_eq!(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone()],
nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
- test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0], false);
connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
v
}
-fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(confirm_htlc_spend_first: bool) {
+fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(anchors: bool, confirm_htlc_spend_first: bool) {
// Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revoked counterparty commitment transactions.
let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
// We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
// transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
- let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
+ let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
+ if anchors {
+ user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
+ user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
+ }
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
assert!(failed_payments.is_empty());
if let Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
match &events[1] {
- Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
+ Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, .. } => {},
_ => panic!(),
}
connect_blocks(&nodes[1], htlc_cltv_timeout + 1 - 10);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
// Prior to channel closure, B considers the preimage HTLC as its own, and otherwise only
// lists the two on-chain timeout-able HTLCs as claimable balances.
// The following constants were determined experimentally
const BS_TO_SELF_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT: usize = 483;
- const OUTBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT: usize = 571;
- const INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT: usize = 578;
+ let outbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight: usize = if anchors { 574 } else { 571 };
+ let inbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight: usize = if anchors { 582 } else { 578 };
// Check that the weight is close to the expected weight. Note that signature sizes vary
// somewhat so it may not always be exact.
- fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[0].weight(), OUTBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
- fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[1].weight(), INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
- fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[2].weight(), INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
+ fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[0].weight(), outbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight);
+ fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[1].weight(), inbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight);
+ fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[2].weight(), inbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight);
fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[3].weight(), BS_TO_SELF_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
+ let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate *
+ (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 3 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
+ let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 };
+ let inbound_htlc_claim_fee = chan_feerate * inbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight as u64 / 1000;
+ let outbound_htlc_claim_fee = chan_feerate * outbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight as u64 / 1000;
+ let to_self_claim_fee = chan_feerate * claim_txn[3].weight() as u64 / 1000;
+
// The expected balance for the next three checks, with the largest-HTLC and to_self output
// claim balances separated out.
let expected_balance = vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
}];
let to_self_unclaimed_balance = Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
- amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
- (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 3 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
+ amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
};
let to_self_claimed_avail_height;
let largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance = Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
}
let largest_htlc_claimed_balance = Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
- amount_satoshis: 5_000 - chan_feerate * INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT as u64 / 1000,
+ amount_satoshis: 5_000 - inbound_htlc_claim_fee,
confirmation_height: largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height,
};
let to_self_claimed_balance = Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
- amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
- (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 3 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
- - chan_feerate * claim_txn[3].weight() as u64 / 1000,
+ amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value - to_self_claim_fee,
confirmation_height: to_self_claimed_avail_height,
};
amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3,
confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 1,
}, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
- amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
- (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 3 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
- - chan_feerate * claim_txn[3].weight() as u64 / 1000,
+ amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value - to_self_claim_fee,
confirmation_height: to_self_claimed_avail_height,
}, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
- amount_satoshis: 3_000 - chan_feerate * OUTBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT as u64 / 1000,
+ amount_satoshis: 3_000 - outbound_htlc_claim_fee,
confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 4,
}, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
- amount_satoshis: 4_000 - chan_feerate * INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT as u64 / 1000,
+ amount_satoshis: 4_000 - inbound_htlc_claim_fee,
confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5,
}, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
- amount_satoshis: 5_000 - chan_feerate * INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT as u64 / 1000,
+ amount_satoshis: 5_000 - inbound_htlc_claim_fee,
confirmation_height: largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height,
}]),
sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
- test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0], false);
let mut payment_failed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
expect_payment_failed_conditions_event(payment_failed_events[..2].to_vec(),
dust_payment_hash, false, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
- test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[if confirm_htlc_spend_first { 2 } else { 3 }]);
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[if confirm_htlc_spend_first { 2 } else { 3 }], false);
connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
- test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[if confirm_htlc_spend_first { 3 } else { 2 }]);
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[if confirm_htlc_spend_first { 3 } else { 2 }], false);
expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], live_payment_hash, false);
connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
- test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[0]);
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[0], false);
connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
- test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[1]);
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[1], false);
expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], timeout_payment_hash, false);
assert_eq!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances(), Vec::new());
#[test]
fn test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances() {
- do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(true);
- do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(false);
+ do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(false, true);
+ do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(false, false);
+ do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(true, true);
+ do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(true, false);
}
#[test]
sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 3);
- test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], false);
assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
// to_self output to B
amount_satoshis: 10_000,
sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2);
- test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_claim_tx[0]);
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_claim_tx[0], false);
assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
// to_self output in B's revoked commitment
amount_satoshis: 10_000,
sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
- test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0]);
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0], false);
connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
- test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1]);
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1], false);
assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances(), Vec::new());
sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
- test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0], false);
assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
// to_self output in A's revoked commitment
sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
- test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[1]);
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[1], false);
assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
// to_self output in A's revoked commitment
connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], revoked_payment_hash, false);
- test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[0]);
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[0], false);
assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
// Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config), Some(anchors_config)]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
- let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(
+ let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(
&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000
- ).2;
- route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
- let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
+ );
+ let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
+ let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 2_000_000);
assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
*nodes[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
+
connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
- check_closed_broadcast!(&nodes[0], true);
- assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
+ assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().is_empty());
+
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
+ {
+ let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
+ assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
+ }
get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(
- &payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster,
+ &payment_hash_2, &payment_preimage_2, &node_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster,
&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator), &nodes[0].logger
);
+ get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(
+ &payment_hash_1, &payment_preimage_1, &node_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster,
+ &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator), &nodes[1].logger
+ );
let mut holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
let anchor_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
let commitment_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
+ check_spends!(commitment_tx, funding_tx);
check_spends!(anchor_tx, coinbase_tx, commitment_tx);
(commitment_tx, anchor_tx)
},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
};
+ assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output[2].value, 1_000); // HTLC A -> B
+ assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output[3].value, 2_000); // HTLC B -> A
+
mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&commitment_tx, &anchor_tx]);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ mine_transactions(&nodes[1], &[&commitment_tx, &anchor_tx]);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ {
+ let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
+ assert_eq!(txn.len(), if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() { 3 } else { 2 });
+
+ let htlc_preimage_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(htlc_preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(htlc_preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, 3);
+ check_spends!(htlc_preimage_tx, commitment_tx);
+
+ let htlc_timeout_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_tx.input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
+ check_spends!(htlc_timeout_tx, commitment_tx);
+
+ if let Some(commitment_tx) = txn.pop() {
+ check_spends!(commitment_tx, funding_tx);
+ }
+ }
let mut holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
// Certain block `ConnectStyle`s cause an extra `ChannelClose` event to be emitted since the
// best block is updated before the confirmed transactions are notified.
- match *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow() {
- ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstReorgsOnlyTip|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks => {
- assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 3);
- if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = holder_events.remove(0) {}
- else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
-
- },
- _ => assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 2),
- };
+ if nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
+ assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 3);
+ if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = holder_events.remove(0) {}
+ else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
+ } else {
+ assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 2);
+ }
let mut htlc_txs = Vec::with_capacity(2);
for event in holder_events {
match event {
// Clear the remaining events as they're not relevant to what we're testing.
nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
}
#[test]
// Alice should see that Bob is trying to claim to HTLCs, so she should now try to claim them at
// the second level instead.
- let revoked_claims = {
+ let revoked_claim_transactions = {
let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim, htlc_tx);
}
- txn
+ let mut revoked_claim_transaction_map = HashMap::new();
+ for current_tx in txn.into_iter() {
+ revoked_claim_transaction_map.insert(current_tx.txid(), current_tx);
+ }
+ revoked_claim_transaction_map
};
for node in &nodes {
- mine_transactions(node, &revoked_claims.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>());
+ mine_transactions(node, &revoked_claim_transactions.values().collect::<Vec<_>>());
}
assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
let spendable_output_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(spendable_output_events.len(), 2);
- for (idx, event) in spendable_output_events.iter().enumerate() {
- if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = event {
+ assert_eq!(spendable_output_events.len(), 4);
+ for event in spendable_output_events {
+ if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs, channel_id } = event {
assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
+ assert!(vec![chan_b.2, chan_a.2].contains(&channel_id.unwrap()));
let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(
&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), Script::new_op_return(&[]), 253, None, &Secp256k1::new(),
).unwrap();
- check_spends!(spend_tx, revoked_claims[idx]);
+
+ if let SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(_) = &outputs[0] {
+ check_spends!(spend_tx, &revoked_commitment_a, &revoked_commitment_b);
+ } else {
+ check_spends!(spend_tx, revoked_claim_transactions.get(&spend_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid).unwrap());
+ }
} else {
panic!("unexpected event");
}
// revoked commitment which Bob has the preimage for.
assert_eq!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_claimable_balances(&[]).len(), 6);
}
+
+fn do_test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload(confirm_commitment_before_reload: bool) {
+ // Tests that we'll fix a ChannelMonitor's `counterparty_payment_script` for an anchor outputs
+ // channel upon deserialization.
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let persister;
+ let chain_monitor;
+ let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
+ user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
+ user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
+ let node_deserialized;
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 50_000_000);
+
+ // Set the monitor's `counterparty_payment_script` to a dummy P2WPKH script.
+ let secp = Secp256k1::new();
+ let privkey = bitcoin::PrivateKey::from_slice(&[1; 32], bitcoin::Network::Testnet).unwrap();
+ let pubkey = bitcoin::PublicKey::from_private_key(&secp, &privkey);
+ let p2wpkh_script = Script::new_v0_p2wpkh(&pubkey.wpubkey_hash().unwrap());
+ get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).set_counterparty_payment_script(p2wpkh_script.clone());
+ assert_eq!(get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_counterparty_payment_script(), p2wpkh_script);
+
+ // Confirm the counterparty's commitment and reload the monitor (either before or after) such
+ // that we arrive at the correct `counterparty_payment_script` after the reload.
+ nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
+ check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
+ check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false,
+ [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
+
+ let commitment_tx = {
+ let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
+ assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 4);
+ check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
+ txn.pop().unwrap()
+ };
+
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx);
+ let commitment_tx_conf_height = if confirm_commitment_before_reload {
+ // We should expect our round trip serialization check to fail as we're writing the monitor
+ // with the incorrect P2WPKH script but reading it with the correct P2WSH script.
+ *nodes[1].chain_monitor.expect_monitor_round_trip_fail.lock().unwrap() = Some(chan_id);
+ let commitment_tx_conf_height = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx));
+ let serialized_monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).encode();
+ reload_node!(nodes[1], user_config, &nodes[1].node.encode(), &[&serialized_monitor], persister, chain_monitor, node_deserialized);
+ commitment_tx_conf_height
+ } else {
+ let serialized_monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).encode();
+ reload_node!(nodes[1], user_config, &nodes[1].node.encode(), &[&serialized_monitor], persister, chain_monitor, node_deserialized);
+ let commitment_tx_conf_height = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx));
+ check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
+ check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
+ commitment_tx_conf_height
+ };
+ check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false,
+ [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
+ assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_counterparty_payment_script().is_v0_p2wsh());
+
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
+
+ if confirm_commitment_before_reload {
+ // If we saw the commitment before our `counterparty_payment_script` was fixed, we'll never
+ // get the spendable output event for the `to_remote` output, so we'll need to get it
+ // manually via `get_spendable_outputs`.
+ check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
+ let outputs = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&commitment_tx, commitment_tx_conf_height);
+ assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
+ let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(
+ &[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
+ 253, None, &secp
+ ).unwrap();
+ check_spends!(spend_tx, &commitment_tx);
+ } else {
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx, false);
+ }
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload() {
+ do_test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload(false);
+ do_test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload(true);
+}