use crate::chain::chaininterface::{LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight};
use crate::events::bump_transaction::{BumpTransactionEvent, WalletSource};
use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
-use crate::ln::{channel, ChannelId};
+use crate::ln::channel;
+use crate::ln::types::ChannelId;
use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields};
use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
-use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
use crate::crypto::utils::sign;
use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
use crate::util::scid_utils::block_from_scid;
use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, SecretKey};
use bitcoin::sighash::{SighashCache, EcdsaSighashType};
+use bitcoin::transaction::Version;
use crate::prelude::*;
expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, false);
}
+#[test]
+fn archive_fully_resolved_monitors() {
+ // Test we can archive fully resolved channel monitor.
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000);
+
+ nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
+ let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown);
+ let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown);
+
+ let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed);
+ let node_1_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed);
+ let (_, node_0_2nd_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_closing_signed.unwrap());
+ let (_, _) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ let shutdown_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
+
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0]);
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0]);
+
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
+
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
+
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.list_monitors().len(), 1);
+ // First archive should set balances_empty_height to current block height
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.archive_fully_resolved_channel_monitors();
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.list_monitors().len(), 1);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4032);
+ // Second call after 4032 blocks, should archive the monitor
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.archive_fully_resolved_channel_monitors();
+ // Should have no monitors left
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.list_monitors().len(), 0);
+ // Remove the corresponding outputs and transactions the chain source is
+ // watching. This is to make sure the `Drop` function assertions pass.
+ nodes.get_mut(0).unwrap().chain_source.remove_watched_txn_and_outputs(
+ OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 },
+ funding_tx.output[0].script_pubkey.clone()
+ );
+}
+
fn do_chanmon_claim_value_coop_close(anchors: bool) {
// Tests `get_claimable_balances` returns the correct values across a simple cooperative claim.
// Specifically, this tests that the channel non-HTLC balances show up in
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
- version: 2,
+ version: Version::TWO,
lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
output: vec![
TxOut {
- value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
+ value: Amount::ONE_BTC,
script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
},
TxOut {
- value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
+ value: Amount::ONE_BTC,
script_pubkey: nodes[1].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
},
],
check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0], coinbase_tx);
assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 });
assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 });
- assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
- assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
+ assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value.to_sat(), 3_000);
+ assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value.to_sat(), 4_000);
assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
assert_ne!(a_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout,
a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
// a_broadcast_txn [0] and [1] should spend the HTLC outputs of the commitment tx
- assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
- assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
+ assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value.to_sat(), 3_000);
+ assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value.to_sat(), 4_000);
// Once the HTLC-Timeout transaction confirms, A will no longer consider the HTLC
// "MaybeClaimable", but instead move it to "AwaitingConfirmations".
let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
- version: 2,
+ version: Version::TWO,
lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
output: vec![
TxOut {
- value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
+ value: Amount::ONE_BTC,
script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
},
TxOut {
- value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
+ value: Amount::ONE_BTC,
script_pubkey: nodes[1].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
},
],
// First confirm the commitment transaction on nodes[0], which should leave us with three
// claimable balances.
+ let error_message = "Channel force-closed";
let node_a_commitment_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
- nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), error_message.to_string()).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
- check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed { broadcasted_latest_txn: Some(true) }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
let commitment_tx = {
let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
// Currently the revoked commitment is claimed in four transactions as the HTLCs all expire
// quite soon.
assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 4);
- claim_txn.sort_unstable_by_key(|tx| tx.output.iter().map(|output| output.value).sum::<u64>());
+ claim_txn.sort_unstable_by_key(|tx| tx.output.iter().map(|output| output.value.to_sat()).sum::<u64>());
// The following constants were determined experimentally
const BS_TO_SELF_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT: u64 = 483;
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
- version: 2,
+ version: Version::TWO,
lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
output: vec![
TxOut {
- value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
+ value: Amount::ONE_BTC,
script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
},
TxOut {
- value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
+ value: Amount::ONE_BTC,
script_pubkey: nodes[1].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
},
],
assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
if anchors {
- assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[4].value, 11000); // to_self output
+ assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[4].value.to_sat(), 11000); // to_self output
} else {
- assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[2].value, 11000); // to_self output
+ assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[2].value.to_sat(), 11000); // to_self output
}
// The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have two HTLCs, an output for each side, and an
if anchors {
// With anchors, B can pay for revoked_htlc_success's fee with additional inputs, rather
// than with the HTLC itself.
- fuzzy_assert_eq(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
+ fuzzy_assert_eq(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value.to_sat(),
3_000 - as_revoked_htlc_success_claim_fee);
} else {
- fuzzy_assert_eq(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
+ fuzzy_assert_eq(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value.to_sat(),
3_000 - revoked_htlc_success_fee - as_revoked_htlc_success_claim_fee);
}
}, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
amount_satoshis: 1_000,
}, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
- amount_satoshis: as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
+ amount_satoshis: as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value.to_sat(),
confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
}]),
sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
}, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
amount_satoshis: 1_000,
}, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
- amount_satoshis: as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
+ amount_satoshis: as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value.to_sat(),
confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 2,
}]),
sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
// to_self output in B's revoked commitment
amount_satoshis: 11_000,
}, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
- amount_satoshis: revoked_htlc_timeout_claim.output[0].value,
+ amount_satoshis: revoked_htlc_timeout_claim.output[0].value.to_sat(),
confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
}]),
sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_to_self_claim);
assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
// to_self output in B's revoked commitment
- amount_satoshis: revoked_to_self_claim.output[0].value,
+ amount_satoshis: revoked_to_self_claim.output[0].value.to_sat(),
confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
}, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
- amount_satoshis: revoked_htlc_timeout_claim.output[0].value,
+ amount_satoshis: revoked_htlc_timeout_claim.output[0].value.to_sat(),
confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2,
}]),
sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
- version: 2,
+ version: Version::TWO,
lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
output: vec![TxOut {
- value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
+ value: Amount::ONE_BTC,
script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
}],
};
}, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
amount_satoshis: 4_000,
}, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { // HTLC 2
- amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[0].output[0].value,
+ amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[0].output[0].value.to_sat(),
confirmation_height: htlc_2_claim_maturity,
}]),
sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
if anchors {
assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
- amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[1].output[0].value,
+ amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[1].output[0].value.to_sat(),
confirmation_height: rest_claim_maturity,
}, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
- amount_satoshis: revoked_to_self_claim.as_ref().unwrap().output[0].value,
+ amount_satoshis: revoked_to_self_claim.as_ref().unwrap().output[0].value.to_sat(),
confirmation_height: rest_claim_maturity,
}],
nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
} else {
assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
- amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[1].output[0].value,
+ amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[1].output[0].value.to_sat(),
confirmation_height: rest_claim_maturity,
}],
nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
// ensures that the HTLC timeout package is held until we reach its expiration height.
let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 50_000_000);
route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000);
-
- nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
+ let error_message = "Channel force-closed";
+ nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), error_message.to_string()).unwrap();
check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
- check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false,
+ check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed { broadcasted_latest_txn: Some(true) }, false,
[nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
let commitment_tx = {
check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
- version: 2,
+ version: Version::TWO,
lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `htlc_tx` on anchors
- value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
+ value: Amount::ONE_BTC,
script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
}],
};
assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
let htlc_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
check_spends!(&htlc_tx, &commitment_txn[0], &coinbase_tx);
- let htlc_tx_fee = HTLC_AMT_SAT + coinbase_tx.output[0].value -
- htlc_tx.output.iter().map(|output| output.value).sum::<u64>();
+ let htlc_tx_fee = HTLC_AMT_SAT + coinbase_tx.output[0].value.to_sat() -
+ htlc_tx.output.iter().map(|output| output.value.to_sat()).sum::<u64>();
let htlc_tx_weight = htlc_tx.weight().to_wu();
(htlc_tx, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(htlc_tx_fee, htlc_tx_weight))
}
}
let htlc_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
check_spends!(htlc_tx, commitment_txn[0]);
- let htlc_tx_fee = HTLC_AMT_SAT - htlc_tx.output[0].value;
+ let htlc_tx_fee = HTLC_AMT_SAT - htlc_tx.output[0].value.to_sat();
let htlc_tx_weight = htlc_tx.weight().to_wu();
(htlc_tx, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(htlc_tx_fee, htlc_tx_weight))
};
// emitted by LDK, such that the consumer can attach fees to the zero fee HTLC transactions.
let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
- let mut anchors_config = UserConfig::default();
+ let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
let (commitment_tx, anchor_tx) = match holder_events.pop().unwrap() {
Event::BumpTransaction(event) => {
let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
- version: 2,
+ version: Version::TWO,
lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `anchor_tx`
- value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
+ value: Amount::ONE_BTC,
script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
}],
};
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
};
- assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output[2].value, 1_000); // HTLC A -> B
- assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output[3].value, 2_000); // HTLC B -> A
+ assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output[2].value.to_sat(), 1_000); // HTLC A -> B
+ assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output[3].value.to_sat(), 2_000); // HTLC B -> A
mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&commitment_tx, &anchor_tx]);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let bob_persister;
let bob_chain_monitor;
- let mut anchors_config = UserConfig::default();
+ let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
let mut revoked_commitment_txs = Vec::with_capacity(events.len());
let mut anchor_txs = Vec::with_capacity(events.len());
for (idx, event) in events.into_iter().enumerate() {
- let utxo_value = Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat() * (idx + 1) as u64;
+ let utxo_value = Amount::ONE_BTC * (idx + 1) as u64;
let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
- version: 2,
+ version: Version::TWO,
lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `anchor_tx`
let htlc_tx = {
let secret_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap();
let public_key = PublicKey::new(secret_key.public_key(&secp));
- let fee_utxo_script = ScriptBuf::new_v0_p2wpkh(&public_key.wpubkey_hash().unwrap());
+ let fee_utxo_script = ScriptBuf::new_p2wpkh(&public_key.wpubkey_hash().unwrap());
let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
- version: 2,
+ version: Version::TWO,
lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `htlc_tx`
- value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
+ value: Amount::ONE_BTC,
script_pubkey: fee_utxo_script.clone(),
}],
};
let mut htlc_tx = Transaction {
- version: 2,
+ version: Version::TWO,
lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
input: vec![TxIn { // Fee input
previous_output: bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
}
let fee_utxo_sig = {
let witness_script = ScriptBuf::new_p2pkh(&public_key.pubkey_hash());
- let sighash = hash_to_message!(&SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(
+ let sighash = hash_to_message!(&SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).p2wsh_signature_hash(
0, &witness_script, coinbase_tx.output[0].value, EcdsaSighashType::All
).unwrap()[..]);
let sig = sign(&secp, &sighash, &secret_key);
let secp = Secp256k1::new();
let privkey = bitcoin::PrivateKey::from_slice(&[1; 32], bitcoin::Network::Testnet).unwrap();
let pubkey = bitcoin::PublicKey::from_private_key(&secp, &privkey);
- let p2wpkh_script = ScriptBuf::new_v0_p2wpkh(&pubkey.wpubkey_hash().unwrap());
+ let p2wpkh_script = ScriptBuf::new_p2wpkh(&pubkey.wpubkey_hash().unwrap());
get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).set_counterparty_payment_script(p2wpkh_script.clone());
assert_eq!(get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_counterparty_payment_script(), p2wpkh_script);
// Confirm the counterparty's commitment and reload the monitor (either before or after) such
// that we arrive at the correct `counterparty_payment_script` after the reload.
- nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
+ let error_message = "Channel force-closed";
+ nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), error_message.to_string()).unwrap();
check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
- check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false,
+ check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed { broadcasted_latest_txn: Some(true) }, false,
[nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
let commitment_tx = {
};
check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false,
[nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
- assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_counterparty_payment_script().is_v0_p2wsh());
+ assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_counterparty_payment_script().is_p2wsh());
connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
- version: 2,
+ version: Version::TWO,
lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
output: vec![
TxOut {
- value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
+ value: Amount::ONE_BTC,
script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
},
],
do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(true, false);
do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(true, true);
}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_event_replay_causing_monitor_replay() {
+ // In LDK 0.0.121 there was a bug where if a `PaymentSent` event caused an RAA
+ // `ChannelMonitorUpdate` hold and then the node was restarted after the `PaymentSent` event
+ // and `ChannelMonitorUpdate` both completed but without persisting the `ChannelManager` we'd
+ // replay the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` on restart (which is fine, but triggered a safety panic).
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let persister;
+ let new_chain_monitor;
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
+ let node_deserialized;
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
+
+ let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000).0;
+
+ do_claim_payment_along_route(
+ ClaimAlongRouteArgs::new(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1]]], payment_preimage)
+ );
+
+ // At this point the `PaymentSent` event has not been processed but the full commitment signed
+ // dance has completed.
+ let serialized_channel_manager = nodes[0].node.encode();
+
+ // Now process the `PaymentSent` to get the final RAA `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, checking that it
+ // resulted in a `ChannelManager` persistence request.
+ nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_needs_persistence();
+ expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, true, true /* expected post-event monitor update*/);
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_needs_persistence());
+
+ let serialized_monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan.2).encode();
+ reload_node!(nodes[0], &serialized_channel_manager, &[&serialized_monitor], persister, new_chain_monitor, node_deserialized);
+
+ // Expect the `PaymentSent` to get replayed, this time without the duplicate monitor update
+ expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false /* expected post-event monitor update*/);
+}
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff