use crate::events::bump_transaction::{BumpTransactionEvent, WalletSource};
use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
use crate::ln::channel;
-use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ChannelManager, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields};
+use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields};
use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
use crate::util::crypto::sign;
fn test_spendable_output<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(node: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, spendable_tx: &Transaction) {
let mut spendable = node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
assert_eq!(spendable.len(), 1);
- if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = spendable.pop().unwrap() {
+ if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs, .. } = spendable.pop().unwrap() {
assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
let spend_tx = node.keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, None, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
// This HTLC is immediately claimed, giving node B the preimage
- let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
+ let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
// This HTLC is allowed to time out, letting A claim it. However, in order to test claimable
// balances more fully we also give B the preimage for this HTLC.
- let (timeout_payment_preimage, timeout_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 4_000_000);
+ let (timeout_payment_preimage, timeout_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 4_000_000);
// This HTLC will be dust, and not be claimable at all:
- let (dust_payment_preimage, dust_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000);
+ let (dust_payment_preimage, dust_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000);
let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
if prev_commitment_tx {
// To build a previous commitment transaction, deliver one round of commitment messages.
nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
- expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
+ expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.commitment_signed);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let (as_raa, as_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
if prev_commitment_tx {
expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
} else {
- expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
+ expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, true, false);
}
assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
// Now confirm nodes[1]'s HTLC claim, giving nodes[0] the preimage. Note that the "maybe
// claimable" balance remains until we see ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks.
mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_htlc_claim_txn[0]);
- expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
+ expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage_2, None, true, false);
assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
(channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
assert!(failed_payments.is_empty());
if let Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
match &events[1] {
- Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
+ Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, .. } => {},
_ => panic!(),
}
connect_blocks(&nodes[1], htlc_cltv_timeout + 1 - 10);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
// Prior to channel closure, B considers the preimage HTLC as its own, and otherwise only
// lists the two on-chain timeout-able HTLCs as claimable balances.
// Confirm A's HTLC-Success tranasction which presumably raced B's claim, causing B to create a
// new claim.
mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[1]);
- expect_payment_sent!(nodes[1], claimed_payment_preimage);
+ expect_payment_sent(&nodes[1], claimed_payment_preimage, None, true, false);
let mut claim_txn_2: Vec<_> = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
claim_txn_2.sort_unstable_by_key(|tx| if tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.txid == as_revoked_txn[0].txid()) { 0 } else { 1 });
// Once B sees the HTLC-Success transaction it splits its claim transaction into two, though in
fn do_test_restored_packages_retry(check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade: bool) {
// Tests that we'll retry packages that were previously timelocked after we've restored them.
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
let persister;
let new_chain_monitor;
- let node_deserialized;
- let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
- let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
+ let node_deserialized;
+
let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
// Open a channel, lock in an HTLC, and immediately broadcast the commitment transaction. This
&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000
).2;
route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
- let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
+ let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
// Required to sign a revoked commitment transaction
chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let bob_persister;
+ let bob_chain_monitor;
+
let mut anchors_config = UserConfig::default();
anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config), Some(anchors_config)]);
-
- let bob_persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
- let bob_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
- let bob_deserialized: ChannelManager<
- &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface,
- &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
- &test_utils::TestRouter, &test_utils::TestLogger,
- >;
+ let bob_deserialized;
let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
// Alice should see that Bob is trying to claim to HTLCs, so she should now try to claim them at
// the second level instead.
- let revoked_claims = {
+ let revoked_claim_transactions = {
let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim, htlc_tx);
}
- txn
+ let mut revoked_claim_transaction_map = HashMap::new();
+ for current_tx in txn.into_iter() {
+ revoked_claim_transaction_map.insert(current_tx.txid(), current_tx);
+ }
+ revoked_claim_transaction_map
};
for node in &nodes {
- mine_transactions(node, &revoked_claims.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>());
+ mine_transactions(node, &revoked_claim_transactions.values().collect::<Vec<_>>());
}
assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
let spendable_output_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
assert_eq!(spendable_output_events.len(), 2);
- for (idx, event) in spendable_output_events.iter().enumerate() {
- if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = event {
+ for event in spendable_output_events.iter() {
+ if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs, channel_id } = event {
assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
+ assert!(vec![chan_b.2, chan_a.2].contains(&channel_id.unwrap()));
let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(
&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), Script::new_op_return(&[]), 253, None, &Secp256k1::new(),
).unwrap();
- check_spends!(spend_tx, revoked_claims[idx]);
+
+ check_spends!(spend_tx, revoked_claim_transactions.get(&spend_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid).unwrap());
} else {
panic!("unexpected event");
}
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff