//! Further functional tests which test blockchain reorganizations.
-use chain::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, Balance};
-use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
-use ln::channel;
-use ln::channelmanager::BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
-use ln::features::InitFeatures;
-use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
-use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
-use routing::network_graph::NetworkUpdate;
+use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, Balance};
+use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
+use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
+use crate::ln::channel;
+use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, PaymentId};
+use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
+use crate::util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
+use bitcoin::Transaction;
-use prelude::*;
+use crate::prelude::*;
-use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
+use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
#[test]
fn chanmon_fail_from_stale_commitment() {
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
- let (update_a, _, chan_id_2, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
+ let (update_a, _, chan_id_2, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1_000_000);
- nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let bs_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id_2);
assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_id_2 }]);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
let fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, update_a.contents.short_channel_id, true);
}
+fn test_spendable_output<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(node: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, spendable_tx: &Transaction) {
+ let mut spendable = node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(spendable.len(), 1);
+ if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = spendable.pop().unwrap() {
+ assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
+ let spend_tx = node.keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
+ Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
+ check_spends!(spend_tx, spendable_tx);
+ } else { panic!(); }
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn revoked_output_htlc_resolution_timing() {
+ // Tests that HTLCs which were present in a broadcasted remote revoked commitment transaction
+ // are resolved only after a spend of the HTLC output reaches six confirmations. Preivously
+ // they would resolve after the revoked commitment transaction itself reaches six
+ // confirmations.
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
+
+ let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000).1;
+
+ // Get a commitment transaction which contains the HTLC we care about, but which we'll revoke
+ // before forwarding.
+ let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
+ assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
+
+ // Route a dust payment to revoke the above commitment transaction
+ route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000);
+
+ // Confirm the revoked commitment transaction, closing the channel.
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
+
+ let bs_spend_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
+ assert_eq!(bs_spend_txn.len(), 2);
+ check_spends!(bs_spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
+ check_spends!(bs_spend_txn[1], chan.3);
+
+ // After the commitment transaction confirms, we should still wait on the HTLC spend
+ // transaction to confirm before resolving the HTLC.
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+
+ // Spend the HTLC output, generating a HTLC failure event after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_spend_txn[0]);
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
+ expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, false);
+}
+
#[test]
fn chanmon_claim_value_coop_close() {
// Tests `get_claimable_balances` returns the correct values across a simple cooperative claim.
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64;
+ let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_id);
assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
- claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT / 1000
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000
}],
nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000, }],
nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
- nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_id).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &node_0_shutdown);
+ nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &node_0_shutdown);
let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &node_1_shutdown);
+ nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &node_1_shutdown);
let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed);
assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
- claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT / 1000,
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000,
confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
}],
nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
- let mut node_a_spendable = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(node_a_spendable.len(), 1);
- if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_a_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
- assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
- let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
- Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
- check_spends!(spend_tx, shutdown_tx[0]);
- }
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0]);
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0]);
- let mut node_b_spendable = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(node_b_spendable.len(), 1);
- if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_b_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
- assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
- let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
- Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
- check_spends!(spend_tx, shutdown_tx[0]);
- }
check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
}
v
}
+/// Asserts that `a` and `b` are close, but maybe off by up to 5.
+/// This is useful when checking fees and weights on transactions as things may vary by a few based
+/// on signature size and signature size estimation being non-exact.
+fn fuzzy_assert_eq<V: core::convert::TryInto<u64>>(a: V, b: V) {
+ let a_u64 = a.try_into().map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
+ let b_u64 = b.try_into().map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
+ eprintln!("Checking {} and {} for fuzzy equality", a_u64, b_u64);
+ assert!(a_u64 >= b_u64 - 5);
+ assert!(b_u64 >= a_u64 - 5);
+}
+
fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) {
// Tests `get_claimable_balances` with an HTLC across a force-close.
// We build a channel with an HTLC pending, then force close the channel and check that the
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
// This HTLC is immediately claimed, giving node B the preimage
- let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
+ let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
// This HTLC is allowed to time out, letting A claim it. However, in order to test claimable
// balances more fully we also give B the preimage for this HTLC.
let (timeout_payment_preimage, timeout_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 4_000_000);
let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64;
+ let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_id);
let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
// Before B receives the payment preimage, it only suggests the push_msat value of 1_000 sats
// as claimable. A lists both its to-self balance and the (possibly-claimable) HTLCs.
assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - chan_feerate *
- (channel::COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
- }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
+ (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
+ }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
- }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
+ }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
}]),
sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
- assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
- }],
- nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
+ }, Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
+ expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ }, Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
+ expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ }]),
+ sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
+
let b_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
// We claim the dust payment here as well, but it won't impact our claimable balances as its
// dust and thus doesn't appear on chain at all.
nodes[1].node.claim_funds(dust_payment_preimage);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], dust_payment_hash, 3_000);
+
nodes[1].node.claim_funds(timeout_payment_preimage);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], timeout_payment_hash, 4_000_000);
if prev_commitment_tx {
// To build a previous commitment transaction, deliver one round of commitment messages.
1_000 - // The push_msat value in satoshis
3 - // The dust HTLC value in satoshis
// The commitment transaction fee with two HTLC outputs:
- chan_feerate * (channel::COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT +
+ chan_feerate * (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) +
if prev_commitment_tx { 1 } else { 2 } *
channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
- }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
+ }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
}];
if !prev_commitment_tx {
- a_expected_balances.push(Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
+ a_expected_balances.push(Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
});
assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - chan_feerate *
- (channel::COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
+ (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
- }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
+ }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
- }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
+ }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
}]),
sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
- expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_payment_hash, true);
+ expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_payment_hash, false);
connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
// After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will consider its balance fully spendable and generate a
// `SpendableOutputs` event. However, B still has to wait for the CSV delay.
- assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
- }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
+ }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
}]),
}]),
sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
- let mut node_a_spendable = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(node_a_spendable.len(), 1);
- if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_a_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
- assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
- let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
- Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
- check_spends!(spend_tx, remote_txn[0]);
- }
-
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
// After broadcasting the HTLC claim transaction, node A will still consider the HTLC
} else {
expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
}
- assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
- }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
+ }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
}]),
sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
- assert_eq!(vec![Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
+ assert_eq!(vec![Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
}],
connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
- expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], timeout_payment_hash, true);
+ expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], timeout_payment_hash, false);
- let mut node_a_spendable = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(node_a_spendable.len(), 1);
- if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_a_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
- assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
- let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
- Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
- check_spends!(spend_tx, a_broadcast_txn[2]);
- } else { panic!(); }
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[2]);
// Node B will no longer consider the HTLC "contentious" after the HTLC claim transaction
// confirms, and consider it simply "awaiting confirmations". Note that it has to wait for the
// After reaching the commitment output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutputs event for it and have
// only the HTLCs claimable on node B.
connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_commitment_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
-
- let mut node_b_spendable = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(node_b_spendable.len(), 1);
- if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_b_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
- assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
- let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
- Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
- check_spends!(spend_tx, remote_txn[0]);
- }
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
// After reaching the claimed HTLC output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutptus event for it and
// have only one HTLC output left spendable.
connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_htlc_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
-
- let mut node_b_spendable = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(node_b_spendable.len(), 1);
- if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_b_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
- assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
- let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
- Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
- check_spends!(spend_tx, b_broadcast_txn[0]);
- } else { panic!(); }
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
+
+ // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
+ // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
+ // monitor events or claimable balances.
+ for node in nodes.iter() {
+ connect_blocks(node, 6);
+ connect_blocks(node, 6);
+ assert!(node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+ assert!(node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
+ }
}
#[test]
do_test_claim_value_force_close(true);
do_test_claim_value_force_close(false);
}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs() {
+ // Previously, when handling the broadcast of a local commitment transactions (with associated
+ // CSV delays prior to spendability), we incorrectly handled the CSV delays on HTLC
+ // transactions. This caused us to miss spendable outputs for HTLCs which were awaiting a CSV
+ // delay prior to spendability.
+ //
+ // Further, because of this, we could hit an assertion as `get_claimable_balances` asserted
+ // that HTLCs were resolved after the funding spend was resolved, which was not true if the
+ // HTLC did not have a CSV delay attached (due to the above bug or due to it being an HTLC
+ // claim by our counterparty).
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ // Create a single channel with two pending HTLCs from nodes[0] to nodes[1], one which nodes[1]
+ // knows the preimage for, one which it does not.
+ let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
+ let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
+
+ let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000_000);
+ let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
+
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
+ expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000_000);
+
+ let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 20_000_000);
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
+
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
+ expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 20_000_000);
+ nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
+ get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000_000);
+
+ let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64;
+ let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_id);
+
+ // Get nodes[0]'s commitment transaction and HTLC-Timeout transactions
+ let as_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
+ assert_eq!(as_txn.len(), 3);
+ check_spends!(as_txn[1], as_txn[0]);
+ check_spends!(as_txn[2], as_txn[0]);
+ check_spends!(as_txn[0], funding_tx);
+
+ // First confirm the commitment transaction on nodes[0], which should leave us with three
+ // claimable balances.
+ let node_a_commitment_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
+
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
+ (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
+ confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
+ }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
+ claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
+ claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ }]),
+ sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ // Get nodes[1]'s HTLC claim tx for the second HTLC
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0]);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
+ let bs_htlc_claim_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
+ assert_eq!(bs_htlc_claim_txn.len(), 3);
+ check_spends!(bs_htlc_claim_txn[0], as_txn[0]);
+ check_spends!(bs_htlc_claim_txn[1], funding_tx);
+ check_spends!(bs_htlc_claim_txn[2], bs_htlc_claim_txn[1]);
+
+ // Connect blocks until the HTLCs expire, allowing us to (validly) broadcast the HTLC-Timeout
+ // transaction.
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
+ (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
+ confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
+ }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
+ claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
+ claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ }]),
+ sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+ assert_eq!(as_txn[1].lock_time.0, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1); // as_txn[1] can be included in the next block
+
+ // Now confirm nodes[0]'s HTLC-Timeout transaction, which changes the claimable balance to an
+ // "awaiting confirmations" one.
+ let node_a_htlc_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[1]);
+ // Note that prior to the fix in the commit which introduced this test, this (and the next
+ // balance) check failed. With this check removed, the code panicked in the `connect_blocks`
+ // call, as described, two hunks down.
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
+ (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
+ confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
+ }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
+ confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
+ }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
+ claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ }]),
+ sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ // Now confirm nodes[1]'s HTLC claim, giving nodes[0] the preimage. Note that the "maybe
+ // claimable" balance remains until we see ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks.
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_htlc_claim_txn[0]);
+ expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
+ (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
+ confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
+ }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
+ confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
+ }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
+ claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ }]),
+ sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ // Finally make the HTLC transactions have ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks. This call previously
+ // panicked as described in the test introduction. This will remove the "maybe claimable"
+ // spendable output as nodes[1] has fully claimed the second HTLC.
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
+ expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false);
+
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
+ (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
+ confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
+ }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
+ confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
+ }]),
+ sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ // Connect blocks until the commitment transaction's CSV expires, providing us the relevant
+ // `SpendableOutputs` event and removing the claimable balance entry.
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_commitment_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
+ assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
+ confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
+ }],
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);
+
+ // Connect blocks until the HTLC-Timeout's CSV expires, providing us the relevant
+ // `SpendableOutputs` event and removing the claimable balance entry.
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_htlc_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
+ assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_txn[1]);
+
+ // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
+ // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
+ // monitor events or claimable balances.
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
+ assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+ assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_no_preimage_inbound_htlc_balances() {
+ // Tests that MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC are generated for inbound HTLCs for which we do not
+ // have a preimage.
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
+ let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
+
+ // Send two HTLCs, one from A to B, and one from B to A.
+ let to_b_failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000).1;
+ let to_a_failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 20_000_000).1;
+ let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
+
+ let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64;
+ let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_id);
+
+ // Both A and B will have an HTLC that's claimable on timeout and one that's claimable if they
+ // receive the preimage. These will remain the same through the channel closure and until the
+ // HTLC output is spent.
+
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
+ (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
+ }, Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
+ expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
+ claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ }]),
+ sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 500_000 - 20_000,
+ }, Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
+ expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
+ claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ }]),
+ sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ // Get nodes[0]'s commitment transaction and HTLC-Timeout transaction
+ let as_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
+ assert_eq!(as_txn.len(), 2);
+ check_spends!(as_txn[1], as_txn[0]);
+ check_spends!(as_txn[0], funding_tx);
+
+ // Now close the channel by confirming A's commitment transaction on both nodes, checking the
+ // claimable balances remain the same except for the non-HTLC balance changing variant.
+ let node_a_commitment_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
+ let as_pre_spend_claims = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
+ (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
+ confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
+ }, Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
+ expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
+ claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ }]);
+
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);
+ nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
+
+ assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
+ sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0]);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
+
+ let node_b_commitment_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
+ let mut bs_pre_spend_claims = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 500_000 - 20_000,
+ confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
+ }, Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
+ expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
+ claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ }]);
+ assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
+ sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ // We'll broadcast the HTLC-Timeout transaction one block prior to the htlc's expiration (as it
+ // is confirmable in the next block), but will still include the same claimable balances as no
+ // HTLC has been spent, even after the HTLC expires. We'll also fail the inbound HTLC, but it
+ // won't do anything as the channel is already closed.
+
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
+ let as_htlc_timeout_claim = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
+ assert_eq!(as_htlc_timeout_claim.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(as_htlc_timeout_claim[0], as_txn[0]);
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions!(nodes[0],
+ [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash }]);
+
+ assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
+ sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
+ assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
+ sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ // For node B, we'll get the non-HTLC funds claimable after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0]);
+ bs_pre_spend_claims.retain(|e| if let Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { .. } = e { false } else { true });
+
+ // The next few blocks for B look the same as for A, though for the opposite HTLC
+ nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - (ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) - 1);
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions!(nodes[1],
+ [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash }]);
+ let bs_htlc_timeout_claim = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
+ assert_eq!(bs_htlc_timeout_claim.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0], as_txn[0]);
+
+ assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
+ sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
+ assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
+ sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ // Now confirm the two HTLC timeout transactions for A, checking that the inbound HTLC resolves
+ // after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations and the other takes BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT confirmations.
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
+ let as_timeout_claimable_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + (BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32) - 1;
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
+ (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
+ confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
+ }, Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
+ expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
+ confirmation_height: as_timeout_claimable_height,
+ }]),
+ sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
+ (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
+ confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
+ }, Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
+ expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
+ confirmation_height: as_timeout_claimable_height,
+ }]),
+ sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ // Once as_htlc_timeout_claim[0] reaches ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations, we should get a
+ // payment failure event.
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
+ expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], to_b_failed_payment_hash, false);
+
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
+ (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
+ confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
+ }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
+ confirmation_height: core::cmp::max(as_timeout_claimable_height, htlc_cltv_timeout),
+ }]),
+ sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_commitment_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
+ assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
+ confirmation_height: core::cmp::max(as_timeout_claimable_height, htlc_cltv_timeout),
+ }],
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);
+
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], as_timeout_claimable_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
+ assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
+
+ // The process for B should be completely identical as well, noting that the non-HTLC-balance
+ // was already claimed.
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
+ let bs_timeout_claimable_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
+ expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
+ confirmation_height: bs_timeout_claimable_height,
+ }]),
+ sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
+ expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
+ confirmation_height: bs_timeout_claimable_height,
+ }]),
+ sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
+ expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], to_a_failed_payment_hash, false);
+
+ assert_eq!(vec![Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
+ expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ }],
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
+
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
+ assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
+
+ // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
+ // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
+ // monitor events or claimable balances.
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
+ assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+ assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
+}
+
+fn sorted_vec_with_additions<T: Ord + Clone>(v_orig: &Vec<T>, extra_ts: &[&T]) -> Vec<T> {
+ let mut v = v_orig.clone();
+ for t in extra_ts {
+ v.push((*t).clone());
+ }
+ v.sort_unstable();
+ v
+}
+
+fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(confirm_htlc_spend_first: bool) {
+ // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revoked counterparty commitment transactions.
+ let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
+ // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
+ // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
+ // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
+ chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 100_000_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
+ let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
+ assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
+
+ // We create five HTLCs for B to claim against A's revoked commitment transaction:
+ //
+ // (1) one for which A is the originator and B knows the preimage
+ // (2) one for which B is the originator where the HTLC has since timed-out
+ // (3) one for which B is the originator but where the HTLC has not yet timed-out
+ // (4) one dust HTLC which is lost in the channel closure
+ // (5) one that actually isn't in the revoked commitment transaction at all, but was added in
+ // later commitment transaction updates
+ //
+ // Though they could all be claimed in a single claim transaction, due to CLTV timeouts they
+ // are all currently claimed in separate transactions, which helps us test as we can claim
+ // HTLCs individually.
+
+ let (claimed_payment_preimage, claimed_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
+ let timeout_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 4_000_000).1;
+ let dust_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000).1;
+
+ let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
+
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 10);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 10);
+
+ let live_htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
+ let live_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 5_000_000).1;
+
+ // Get the latest commitment transaction from A and then update the fee to revoke it
+ let as_revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
+ let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_id);
+
+ let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64;
+
+ let missing_htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
+ let missing_htlc_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 2_000_000).1;
+
+ nodes[1].node.claim_funds(claimed_payment_preimage);
+ expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], claimed_payment_hash, 3_000_000);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let _b_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout + 1 - 10);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 6);
+ let mut failed_payments: HashSet<_> =
+ [timeout_payment_hash, dust_payment_hash, live_payment_hash, missing_htlc_payment_hash]
+ .iter().map(|a| *a).collect();
+ events.retain(|ev| {
+ match ev {
+ Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { failed_next_destination: HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id, channel_id }, .. } => {
+ assert_eq!(*channel_id, chan_id);
+ assert_eq!(*node_id, Some(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
+ false
+ },
+ Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { failed_next_destination: HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }, .. } => {
+ assert!(failed_payments.remove(payment_hash));
+ false
+ },
+ _ => true,
+ }
+ });
+ assert!(failed_payments.is_empty());
+ if let Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
+ match &events[1] {
+ Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!(),
+ }
+
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], htlc_cltv_timeout + 1 - 10);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
+
+ // Prior to channel closure, B considers the preimage HTLC as its own, and otherwise only
+ // lists the two on-chain timeout-able HTLCs as claimable balances.
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3 - 2_000 + 3_000,
+ }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 2_000,
+ claimable_height: missing_htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
+ claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 5_000,
+ claimable_height: live_htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ }]),
+ sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
+ let mut claim_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..).filter(|tx| tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.txid == as_revoked_txn[0].txid())).collect();
+ // Currently the revoked commitment is claimed in four transactions as the HTLCs all expire
+ // quite soon.
+ assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 4);
+ claim_txn.sort_unstable_by_key(|tx| tx.output.iter().map(|output| output.value).sum::<u64>());
+
+ // The following constants were determined experimentally
+ const BS_TO_SELF_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT: usize = 483;
+ const OUTBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT: usize = 571;
+ const INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT: usize = 578;
+
+ // Check that the weight is close to the expected weight. Note that signature sizes vary
+ // somewhat so it may not always be exact.
+ fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[0].weight(), OUTBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
+ fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[1].weight(), INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
+ fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[2].weight(), INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
+ fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[3].weight(), BS_TO_SELF_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
+
+ // The expected balance for the next three checks, with the largest-HTLC and to_self output
+ // claim balances separated out.
+ let expected_balance = vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3,
+ confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5,
+ }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
+ }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
+ }];
+
+ let to_self_unclaimed_balance = Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
+ (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 3 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
+ };
+ let to_self_claimed_avail_height;
+ let largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance = Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 5_000,
+ };
+ let largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height;
+
+ // Once the channel has been closed by A, B now considers all of the commitment transactions'
+ // outputs as `CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable`.
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_unclaimed_balance, &largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance]),
+ sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[2]);
+ largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5;
+ to_self_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 6; // will be claimed in the next block
+ } else {
+ // Connect the to_self output claim, taking all of A's non-HTLC funds
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[3]);
+ to_self_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5;
+ largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 6; // will be claimed in the next block
+ }
+
+ let largest_htlc_claimed_balance = Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 5_000 - chan_feerate * INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT as u64 / 1000,
+ confirmation_height: largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height,
+ };
+ let to_self_claimed_balance = Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
+ (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 3 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
+ - chan_feerate * claim_txn[3].weight() as u64 / 1000,
+ confirmation_height: to_self_claimed_avail_height,
+ };
+
+ if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_unclaimed_balance, &largest_htlc_claimed_balance]),
+ sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+ } else {
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_claimed_balance, &largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance]),
+ sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+ }
+
+ if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[3]);
+ } else {
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[2]);
+ }
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_claimed_balance, &largest_htlc_claimed_balance]),
+ sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ // Finally, connect the last two remaining HTLC spends and check that they move to
+ // `ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations`
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[0]);
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[1]);
+
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3,
+ confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 1,
+ }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
+ (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 3 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
+ - chan_feerate * claim_txn[3].weight() as u64 / 1000,
+ confirmation_height: to_self_claimed_avail_height,
+ }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000 - chan_feerate * OUTBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT as u64 / 1000,
+ confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 4,
+ }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000 - chan_feerate * INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT as u64 / 1000,
+ confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5,
+ }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 5_000 - chan_feerate * INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT as u64 / 1000,
+ confirmation_height: largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height,
+ }]),
+ sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
+
+ let mut payment_failed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ expect_payment_failed_conditions_event(&nodes[1], payment_failed_events.pop().unwrap(),
+ dust_payment_hash, false, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
+ expect_payment_failed_conditions_event(&nodes[1], payment_failed_events.pop().unwrap(),
+ missing_htlc_payment_hash, false, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
+ assert!(payment_failed_events.is_empty());
+
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[if confirm_htlc_spend_first { 2 } else { 3 }]);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[if confirm_htlc_spend_first { 3 } else { 2 }]);
+ expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], live_payment_hash, false);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[0]);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[1]);
+ expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], timeout_payment_hash, false);
+ assert_eq!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances(), Vec::new());
+
+ // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
+ // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
+ // monitor events or claimable balances.
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
+ assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+ assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances() {
+ do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(true);
+ do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(false);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances() {
+ // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revocation spends of HTLC transactions.
+ let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ // Create some initial channels
+ let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 11_000_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
+ let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
+ assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
+
+ let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
+ let failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000).1;
+ let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
+ assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
+
+ // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have two HTLCs and an output for both sides
+ assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
+
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
+
+ let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64;
+ let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_id);
+
+ // B will generate an HTLC-Success from its revoked commitment tx
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
+ let revoked_htlc_success_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
+
+ assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_success_txn.len(), 2);
+ assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ check_spends!(revoked_htlc_success_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
+ check_spends!(revoked_htlc_success_txn[1], funding_tx);
+
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
+ let revoked_htlc_timeout_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
+ assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_timeout_txn.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(revoked_htlc_timeout_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
+ assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_timeout_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
+ assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_success_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0);
+ assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_timeout_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0);
+
+ // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
+ let to_remote_conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
+
+ let as_commitment_claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
+ assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn.len(), 2);
+ check_spends!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
+ check_spends!(as_commitment_claim_txn[1], funding_tx);
+
+ // The next two checks have the same balance set for A - even though we confirm a revoked HTLC
+ // transaction our balance tracking doesn't use the on-chain value so the
+ // `CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable` entry doesn't change.
+ let as_balances = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ // to_remote output in B's revoked commitment
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 11_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
+ (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
+ confirmation_height: to_remote_conf_height,
+ }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
+ // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
+ }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
+ }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
+ }]);
+ assert_eq!(as_balances,
+ sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_success_txn[0]);
+ let as_htlc_claim_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
+ assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx.len(), 2);
+ check_spends!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_success_txn[0]);
+ check_spends!(as_htlc_claim_tx[1], revoked_local_txn[0]); // A has to generate a new claim for the remaining revoked
+ // outputs (which no longer includes the spent HTLC output)
+
+ assert_eq!(as_balances,
+ sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output.len(), 1);
+ fuzzy_assert_eq(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
+ 3_000 - chan_feerate * (revoked_htlc_success_txn[0].weight() + as_htlc_claim_tx[0].weight()) as u64 / 1000);
+
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_claim_tx[0]);
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ // to_remote output in B's revoked commitment
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 11_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
+ (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
+ confirmation_height: to_remote_conf_height,
+ }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
+ // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
+ }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
+ }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
+ confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
+ }]),
+ sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 3);
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
+ // to_self output to B
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
+ }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
+ }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
+ confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 2,
+ }]),
+ sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2);
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_claim_tx[0]);
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
+ // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
+ }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
+ }]),
+ sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], revoked_htlc_timeout_txn[0].lock_time.0 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(&nodes[0],
+ [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: failed_payment_hash }]);
+ // As time goes on A may split its revocation claim transaction into multiple.
+ let as_fewer_input_rbf = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
+ for tx in as_fewer_input_rbf.iter() {
+ check_spends!(tx, revoked_local_txn[0]);
+ }
+
+ // Connect a number of additional blocks to ensure we don't forget the HTLC output needs
+ // claiming.
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
+ let as_fewer_input_rbf = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
+ for tx in as_fewer_input_rbf.iter() {
+ check_spends!(tx, revoked_local_txn[0]);
+ }
+
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_timeout_txn[0]);
+ let as_second_htlc_claim_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
+ assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx.len(), 2);
+
+ check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_timeout_txn[0]);
+ check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
+
+ // Connect blocks to finalize the HTLC resolution with the HTLC-Timeout transaction. In a
+ // previous iteration of the revoked balance handling this would result in us "forgetting" that
+ // the revoked HTLC output still needed to be claimed.
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
+ // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
+ }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
+ }]),
+ sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0]);
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
+ // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
+ }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
+ confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
+ }]),
+ sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1]);
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1].output[0].value,
+ confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
+ }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
+ confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2,
+ }]),
+ sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0]);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1]);
+
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances(), Vec::new());
+
+ // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
+ // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
+ // monitor events or claimable balances.
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
+ assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+ assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims() {
+ // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revoked counterparty commitment transactions when
+ // claiming with an aggregated claim transaction.
+ let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
+ // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
+ // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
+ // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
+ chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 100_000_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
+ let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
+ assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
+
+ // We create two HTLCs, one which we will give A the preimage to to generate an HTLC-Success
+ // transaction, and one which we will not, allowing B to claim the HTLC output in an aggregated
+ // revocation-claim transaction.
+
+ let (claimed_payment_preimage, claimed_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
+ let revoked_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 4_000_000).1;
+
+ let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
+
+ // Cheat by giving A's ChannelMonitor the preimage to the to-be-claimed HTLC so that we have an
+ // HTLC-claim transaction on the to-be-revoked state.
+ get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(&claimed_payment_hash, &claimed_payment_preimage,
+ &node_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator), &nodes[0].logger);
+
+ // Now get the latest commitment transaction from A and then update the fee to revoke it
+ let as_revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
+
+ assert_eq!(as_revoked_txn.len(), 2);
+ check_spends!(as_revoked_txn[0], funding_tx);
+ check_spends!(as_revoked_txn[1], as_revoked_txn[0]); // The HTLC-Claim transaction
+
+ let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_id);
+ let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64;
+
+ {
+ let mut feerate = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
+ *feerate += 1;
+ }
+ nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ let fee_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &fee_update.update_fee.unwrap());
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], fee_update.commitment_signed, false);
+
+ nodes[0].node.claim_funds(claimed_payment_preimage);
+ expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], claimed_payment_hash, 3_000_000);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let _a_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
+ }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
+ claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
+ claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ }]),
+ sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ let mut claim_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..).filter(|tx| tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.txid == as_revoked_txn[0].txid())).collect();
+ // Currently the revoked commitment outputs are all claimed in one aggregated transaction
+ assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
+ check_spends!(claim_txn[0], as_revoked_txn[0]);
+
+ let to_remote_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
+
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
+ confirmation_height: to_remote_maturity,
+ }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
+ // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
+ (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
+ }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
+ }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
+ }]),
+ sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ // Confirm A's HTLC-Success tranasction which presumably raced B's claim, causing B to create a
+ // new claim.
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[1]);
+ expect_payment_sent!(nodes[1], claimed_payment_preimage);
+ let mut claim_txn_2: Vec<_> = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
+ claim_txn_2.sort_unstable_by_key(|tx| if tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.txid == as_revoked_txn[0].txid()) { 0 } else { 1 });
+ // Once B sees the HTLC-Success transaction it splits its claim transaction into two, though in
+ // theory it could re-aggregate the claims as well.
+ assert_eq!(claim_txn_2.len(), 2);
+ assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[0].input.len(), 2);
+ check_spends!(claim_txn_2[0], as_revoked_txn[0]);
+ assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(claim_txn_2[1], as_revoked_txn[1]);
+
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
+ confirmation_height: to_remote_maturity,
+ }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
+ // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
+ (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
+ }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
+ }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
+ // The amount here is a bit of a misnomer, really its been reduced by the HTLC
+ // transaction fee, but the claimable amount is always a bit of an overshoot for HTLCs
+ // anyway, so its not a big change.
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
+ }]),
+ sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
+
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
+ // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
+ (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
+ }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
+ }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
+ // The amount here is a bit of a misnomer, really its been reduced by the HTLC
+ // transaction fee, but the claimable amount is always a bit of an overshoot for HTLCs
+ // anyway, so its not a big change.
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
+ }]),
+ sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[1]);
+ let htlc_2_claim_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
+
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
+ // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
+ (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
+ }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
+ }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { // HTLC 2
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[1].output[0].value,
+ confirmation_height: htlc_2_claim_maturity,
+ }]),
+ sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[1]);
+
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
+ // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
+ (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
+ }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
+ }]),
+ sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[0]);
+ let rest_claim_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
+
+ assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[0].output[0].value,
+ confirmation_height: rest_claim_maturity,
+ }],
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
+
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); // We shouldn't fail the payment until we spend the output
+
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
+ expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], revoked_payment_hash, false);
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[0]);
+ assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
+
+ // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
+ // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
+ // monitor events or claimable balances.
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
+ assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+ assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
+}
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff