use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
use crate::blinded_path::payment::{BlindedPaymentTlvs, ForwardTlvs, ReceiveTlvs};
-use crate::ln::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
+use crate::ln::types::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
use crate::ln::onion_utils;
use crate::onion_message;
use crate::sign::{NodeSigner, Recipient};
+#[allow(unused_imports)]
use crate::prelude::*;
-#[cfg(feature = "std")]
-use core::convert::TryFrom;
+
use core::fmt;
use core::fmt::Debug;
use core::ops::Deref;
use crate::io::{self, Cursor, Read};
use crate::io_extras::read_to_end;
-use crate::events::{EventsProvider, MessageSendEventsProvider};
+use crate::events::MessageSendEventsProvider;
use crate::crypto::streams::ChaChaPolyReadAdapter;
use crate::util::logger;
-use crate::util::ser::{LengthReadable, LengthReadableArgs, Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, WithoutLength, FixedLengthReader, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize, Hostname, TransactionU16LenLimited, BigSize};
+use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize, Hostname, LengthRead, LengthReadable, LengthReadableArgs, Readable, ReadableArgs, TransactionU16LenLimited, WithoutLength, Writeable, Writer};
use crate::util::base32;
use crate::routing::gossip::{NodeAlias, NodeId};
Io(io::ErrorKind),
/// The message included zlib-compressed values, which we don't support.
UnsupportedCompression,
+ /// Value is validly encoded but is dangerous to use.
+ ///
+ /// This is used for things like [`ChannelManager`] deserialization where we want to ensure
+ /// that we don't use a [`ChannelManager`] which is in out of sync with the [`ChannelMonitor`].
+ /// This indicates that there is a critical implementation flaw in the storage implementation
+ /// and it's unsafe to continue.
+ ///
+ /// [`ChannelManager`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager
+ /// [`ChannelMonitor`]: crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor
+ DangerousValue,
}
/// An [`init`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
pub short_channel_id_alias: Option<u64>,
}
-/// An stfu (quiescence) message to be sent by or received from the stfu initiator.
-// TODO(splicing): Add spec link for `stfu`; still in draft, using from https://github.com/lightning/bolts/pull/863
+/// A randomly chosen number that is used to identify inputs within an interactive transaction
+/// construction.
+pub type SerialId = u64;
+
+/// An `stfu` (quiescence) message to be sent by or received from the stfu initiator.
+///
+// TODO(splicing): Add spec link for `stfu`; still in draft, using from https://github.com/lightning/bolts/pull/1160
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct Stfu {
/// The channel ID where quiescence is intended
pub initiator: u8,
}
-/// A splice message to be sent by or received from the stfu initiator (splice initiator).
-// TODO(splicing): Add spec link for `splice`; still in draft, using from https://github.com/lightning/bolts/pull/863
+/// A `splice_init` message to be sent by or received from the stfu initiator (splice initiator).
+///
+// TODO(splicing): Add spec link for `splice_init`; still in draft, using from https://github.com/lightning/bolts/pull/1160
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
-pub struct Splice {
+pub struct SpliceInit {
/// The channel ID where splicing is intended
pub channel_id: ChannelId,
- /// The genesis hash of the blockchain where the channel is intended to be spliced
- pub chain_hash: ChainHash,
- /// The intended change in channel capacity: the amount to be added (positive value)
- /// or removed (negative value) by the sender (splice initiator) by splicing into/from the channel.
- pub relative_satoshis: i64,
+ /// The amount the splice initiator is intending to add to its channel balance (splice-in)
+ /// or remove from its channel balance (splice-out).
+ pub funding_contribution_satoshis: i64,
/// The feerate for the new funding transaction, set by the splice initiator
pub funding_feerate_perkw: u32,
/// The locktime for the new funding transaction
pub locktime: u32,
/// The key of the sender (splice initiator) controlling the new funding transaction
pub funding_pubkey: PublicKey,
+ /// If set, only confirmed inputs added (by the splice acceptor) will be accepted
+ pub require_confirmed_inputs: Option<()>,
}
-/// A splice_ack message to be received by or sent to the splice initiator.
+/// A `splice_ack` message to be received by or sent to the splice initiator.
///
-// TODO(splicing): Add spec link for `splice_ack`; still in draft, using from https://github.com/lightning/bolts/pull/863
+// TODO(splicing): Add spec link for `splice_ack`; still in draft, using from https://github.com/lightning/bolts/pull/1160
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct SpliceAck {
/// The channel ID where splicing is intended
pub channel_id: ChannelId,
- /// The genesis hash of the blockchain where the channel is intended to be spliced
- pub chain_hash: ChainHash,
- /// The intended change in channel capacity: the amount to be added (positive value)
- /// or removed (negative value) by the sender (splice acceptor) by splicing into/from the channel.
- pub relative_satoshis: i64,
+ /// The amount the splice acceptor is intending to add to its channel balance (splice-in)
+ /// or remove from its channel balance (splice-out).
+ pub funding_contribution_satoshis: i64,
/// The key of the sender (splice acceptor) controlling the new funding transaction
pub funding_pubkey: PublicKey,
+ /// If set, only confirmed inputs added (by the splice initiator) will be accepted
+ pub require_confirmed_inputs: Option<()>,
}
-/// A splice_locked message to be sent to or received from a peer.
+/// A `splice_locked` message to be sent to or received from a peer.
///
-// TODO(splicing): Add spec link for `splice_locked`; still in draft, using from https://github.com/lightning/bolts/pull/863
+// TODO(splicing): Add spec link for `splice_locked`; still in draft, using from https://github.com/lightning/bolts/pull/1160
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct SpliceLocked {
/// The channel ID
pub channel_id: ChannelId,
+ /// The ID of the new funding transaction that has been locked
+ pub splice_txid: Txid,
}
/// A tx_add_input message for adding an input during interactive transaction construction
pub channel_id: ChannelId,
/// A randomly chosen unique identifier for this input, which is even for initiators and odd for
/// non-initiators.
- pub serial_id: u64,
+ pub serial_id: SerialId,
/// Serialized transaction that contains the output this input spends to verify that it is non
/// malleable.
pub prevtx: TransactionU16LenLimited,
pub prevtx_out: u32,
/// The sequence number of this input
pub sequence: u32,
+ /// The ID of the previous funding transaction, when it is being added as an input during splicing
+ pub shared_input_txid: Option<Txid>,
}
/// A tx_add_output message for adding an output during interactive transaction construction.
pub channel_id: ChannelId,
/// A randomly chosen unique identifier for this output, which is even for initiators and odd for
/// non-initiators.
- pub serial_id: u64,
+ pub serial_id: SerialId,
/// The satoshi value of the output
pub sats: u64,
/// The scriptPubKey for the output
/// The channel ID
pub channel_id: ChannelId,
/// The serial ID of the input to be removed
- pub serial_id: u64,
+ pub serial_id: SerialId,
}
/// A tx_remove_output message for removing an output during interactive transaction construction.
/// The channel ID
pub channel_id: ChannelId,
/// The serial ID of the output to be removed
- pub serial_id: u64,
+ pub serial_id: SerialId,
}
/// A tx_complete message signalling the conclusion of a peer's transaction contributions during
pub tx_hash: Txid,
/// The list of witnesses
pub witnesses: Vec<Witness>,
+ /// Optional signature for the shared input -- the previous funding outpoint -- signed by both peers
+ pub shared_input_signature: Option<Signature>,
}
/// A tx_init_rbf message which initiates a replacement of the transaction after it's been
pub failure_code: u16,
}
+/// Optional batch parameters for `commitment_signed` message.
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub struct CommitmentSignedBatch {
+ /// Batch size N: all N `commitment_signed` messages must be received before being processed
+ pub batch_size: u16,
+ /// The funding transaction, to discriminate among multiple pending funding transactions (e.g. in case of splicing)
+ pub funding_txid: Txid,
+}
+
/// A [`commitment_signed`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
///
/// [`commitment_signed`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#committing-updates-so-far-commitment_signed
pub signature: Signature,
/// Signatures on the HTLC transactions
pub htlc_signatures: Vec<Signature>,
+ /// Optional batch size and other parameters
+ pub batch: Option<CommitmentSignedBatch>,
#[cfg(taproot)]
/// The partial Taproot signature on the commitment transaction
pub partial_signature_with_nonce: Option<PartialSignatureWithNonce>,
pub alias: NodeAlias,
/// List of addresses on which this node is reachable
pub addresses: Vec<SocketAddress>,
- pub(crate) excess_address_data: Vec<u8>,
- pub(crate) excess_data: Vec<u8>,
+ /// Excess address data which was signed as a part of the message which we do not (yet) understand how
+ /// to decode.
+ ///
+ /// This is stored to ensure forward-compatibility as new address types are added to the lightning gossip protocol.
+ pub excess_address_data: Vec<u8>,
+ /// Excess data which was signed as a part of the message which we do not (yet) understand how
+ /// to decode.
+ ///
+ /// This is stored to ensure forward-compatibility as new fields are added to the lightning gossip protocol.
+ pub excess_data: Vec<u8>,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
/// A [`node_announcement`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
pub short_channel_id: u64,
/// A strictly monotonic announcement counter, with gaps allowed, specific to this channel
pub timestamp: u32,
- /// Channel flags
- pub flags: u8,
+ /// Flags pertaining to this message.
+ pub message_flags: u8,
+ /// Flags pertaining to the channel, including to which direction in the channel this update
+ /// applies and whether the direction is currently able to forward HTLCs.
+ pub channel_flags: u8,
/// The number of blocks such that if:
/// `incoming_htlc.cltv_expiry < outgoing_htlc.cltv_expiry + cltv_expiry_delta`
/// then we need to fail the HTLC backwards. When forwarding an HTLC, `cltv_expiry_delta` determines
fn handle_stfu(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &Stfu);
// Splicing
- /// Handle an incoming `splice` message from the given peer.
- fn handle_splice(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &Splice);
+ /// Handle an incoming `splice_init` message from the given peer.
+ #[cfg(splicing)]
+ fn handle_splice_init(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &SpliceInit);
/// Handle an incoming `splice_ack` message from the given peer.
+ #[cfg(splicing)]
fn handle_splice_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &SpliceAck);
/// Handle an incoming `splice_locked` message from the given peer.
+ #[cfg(splicing)]
fn handle_splice_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &SpliceLocked);
// Interactive channel construction
}
/// A handler for received [`OnionMessage`]s and for providing generated ones to send.
-pub trait OnionMessageHandler: EventsProvider {
+pub trait OnionMessageHandler {
/// Handle an incoming `onion_message` message from the given peer.
fn handle_onion_message(&self, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &OnionMessage);
mod fuzzy_internal_msgs {
use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
- use crate::blinded_path::payment::{PaymentConstraints, PaymentRelay};
- use crate::prelude::*;
- use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
+ use crate::blinded_path::payment::{PaymentConstraints, PaymentContext, PaymentRelay};
+ use crate::ln::types::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
use crate::ln::features::BlindedHopFeatures;
- use super::FinalOnionHopData;
+ use super::{FinalOnionHopData, TrampolineOnionPacket};
+
+ #[allow(unused_imports)]
+ use crate::prelude::*;
// These types aren't intended to be pub, but are exposed for direct fuzzing (as we deserialize
// them from untrusted input):
cltv_expiry_height: u32,
payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
payment_constraints: PaymentConstraints,
+ payment_context: PaymentContext,
intro_node_blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
+ keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
+ custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
}
}
- pub(crate) enum OutboundOnionPayload {
+ pub(crate) enum OutboundOnionPayload<'a> {
Forward {
short_channel_id: u64,
/// The value, in msat, of the payment after this hop's fee is deducted.
amt_to_forward: u64,
outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
},
+ #[allow(unused)]
+ TrampolineEntrypoint {
+ amt_to_forward: u64,
+ outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
+ multipath_trampoline_data: Option<FinalOnionHopData>,
+ trampoline_packet: TrampolineOnionPacket,
+ },
Receive {
payment_data: Option<FinalOnionHopData>,
- payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
+ payment_metadata: Option<&'a Vec<u8>>,
keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
- custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
+ custom_tlvs: &'a Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: u64,
cltv_expiry_height: u32,
},
BlindedForward {
- encrypted_tlvs: Vec<u8>,
+ encrypted_tlvs: &'a Vec<u8>,
intro_node_blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
},
BlindedReceive {
sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: u64,
total_msat: u64,
cltv_expiry_height: u32,
- encrypted_tlvs: Vec<u8>,
+ encrypted_tlvs: &'a Vec<u8>,
intro_node_blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>, // Set if the introduction node of the blinded path is the final node
+ keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
+ custom_tlvs: &'a Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
+ }
+ }
+
+ pub(crate) enum OutboundTrampolinePayload {
+ #[allow(unused)]
+ Forward {
+ /// The value, in msat, of the payment after this hop's fee is deducted.
+ amt_to_forward: u64,
+ outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
+ /// The node id to which the trampoline node must find a route
+ outgoing_node_id: PublicKey,
}
}
// Unlike the onion packets used for payments, Trampoline onion packets have to be shorter than
// 1300 bytes. The expected default is 650 bytes.
// TODO: if 650 ends up being the most common size, optimize this to be:
- // enum { ThirteenHundred([u8; 650]), VarLen(Vec<u8>) }
+ // enum { SixFifty([u8; 650]), VarLen(Vec<u8>) }
pub hop_data: Vec<u8>,
/// HMAC to verify the integrity of hop_data
pub hmac: [u8; 32],
}
}
+impl LengthReadable for TrampolineOnionPacket {
+ fn read<R: LengthRead>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+ let version = Readable::read(r)?;
+ let public_key = Readable::read(r)?;
+
+ let hop_data_len = r.total_bytes().saturating_sub(66); // 1 (version) + 33 (pubkey) + 32 (HMAC) = 66
+ let mut rd = FixedLengthReader::new(r, hop_data_len);
+ let hop_data = WithoutLength::<Vec<u8>>::read(&mut rd)?.0;
+
+ let hmac = Readable::read(r)?;
+
+ Ok(TrampolineOnionPacket {
+ version,
+ public_key,
+ hop_data,
+ hmac,
+ })
+ }
+}
+
impl Debug for TrampolineOnionPacket {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
f.write_fmt(format_args!("TrampolineOnionPacket version {} with hmac {:?}", self.version, &self.hmac[..]))
DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor => f.write_str("A length descriptor in the packet didn't describe the later data correctly"),
DecodeError::Io(ref e) => fmt::Debug::fmt(e, f),
DecodeError::UnsupportedCompression => f.write_str("We don't support receiving messages with zlib-compressed fields"),
+ DecodeError::DangerousValue => f.write_str("Value would be dangerous to continue execution with"),
}
}
}
initiator,
}, {});
-impl_writeable_msg!(Splice, {
+impl_writeable_msg!(SpliceInit, {
channel_id,
- chain_hash,
- relative_satoshis,
+ funding_contribution_satoshis,
funding_feerate_perkw,
locktime,
funding_pubkey,
-}, {});
+}, {
+ (2, require_confirmed_inputs, option), // `splice_init_tlvs`
+});
impl_writeable_msg!(SpliceAck, {
channel_id,
- chain_hash,
- relative_satoshis,
+ funding_contribution_satoshis,
funding_pubkey,
-}, {});
+}, {
+ (2, require_confirmed_inputs, option), // `splice_ack_tlvs`
+});
impl_writeable_msg!(SpliceLocked, {
channel_id,
+ splice_txid,
}, {});
impl_writeable_msg!(TxAddInput, {
prevtx,
prevtx_out,
sequence,
-}, {});
+}, {
+ (0, shared_input_txid, option), // `funding_txid`
+});
impl_writeable_msg!(TxAddOutput, {
channel_id,
channel_id,
tx_hash,
witnesses,
-}, {});
+}, {
+ (0, shared_input_signature, option), // `signature`
+});
impl_writeable_msg!(TxInitRbf, {
channel_id,
max_fee_satoshis
});
+impl_writeable_msg!(CommitmentSignedBatch, {
+ batch_size,
+ funding_txid,
+}, {});
+
#[cfg(not(taproot))]
impl_writeable_msg!(CommitmentSigned, {
channel_id,
signature,
htlc_signatures
-}, {});
+}, {
+ (0, batch, option),
+});
#[cfg(taproot)]
impl_writeable_msg!(CommitmentSigned, {
signature,
htlc_signatures
}, {
- (2, partial_signature_with_nonce, option)
+ (0, batch, option),
+ (2, partial_signature_with_nonce, option),
});
impl_writeable!(DecodedOnionErrorPacket, {
}
}
-impl Writeable for OutboundOnionPayload {
+impl<'a> Writeable for OutboundOnionPayload<'a> {
fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
match self {
Self::Forward { short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value } => {
(6, short_channel_id, required)
});
},
+ Self::TrampolineEntrypoint {
+ amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, ref multipath_trampoline_data,
+ ref trampoline_packet
+ } => {
+ _encode_varint_length_prefixed_tlv!(w, {
+ (2, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(*amt_to_forward), required),
+ (4, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(*outgoing_cltv_value), required),
+ (8, multipath_trampoline_data, option),
+ (20, trampoline_packet, required)
+ });
+ },
Self::Receive {
ref payment_data, ref payment_metadata, ref keysend_preimage, sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat,
cltv_expiry_height, ref custom_tlvs,
(2, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(*sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat), required),
(4, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(*cltv_expiry_height), required),
(8, payment_data, option),
- (16, payment_metadata.as_ref().map(|m| WithoutLength(m)), option)
+ (16, payment_metadata.map(|m| WithoutLength(m)), option)
}, custom_tlvs.iter());
},
Self::BlindedForward { encrypted_tlvs, intro_node_blinding_point } => {
_encode_varint_length_prefixed_tlv!(w, {
- (10, *encrypted_tlvs, required_vec),
+ (10, **encrypted_tlvs, required_vec),
(12, intro_node_blinding_point, option)
});
},
Self::BlindedReceive {
sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat, total_msat, cltv_expiry_height, encrypted_tlvs,
- intro_node_blinding_point,
+ intro_node_blinding_point, keysend_preimage, ref custom_tlvs,
} => {
+ // We need to update [`ln::outbound_payment::RecipientOnionFields::with_custom_tlvs`]
+ // to reject any reserved types in the experimental range if new ones are ever
+ // standardized.
+ let keysend_tlv = keysend_preimage.map(|preimage| (5482373484, preimage.encode()));
+ let mut custom_tlvs: Vec<&(u64, Vec<u8>)> = custom_tlvs.iter().chain(keysend_tlv.iter()).collect();
+ custom_tlvs.sort_unstable_by_key(|(typ, _)| *typ);
_encode_varint_length_prefixed_tlv!(w, {
(2, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(*sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat), required),
(4, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(*cltv_expiry_height), required),
- (10, *encrypted_tlvs, required_vec),
+ (10, **encrypted_tlvs, required_vec),
(12, intro_node_blinding_point, option),
(18, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(*total_msat), required)
- });
+ }, custom_tlvs.iter());
},
}
Ok(())
}
}
+impl Writeable for OutboundTrampolinePayload {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
+ match self {
+ Self::Forward { amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, outgoing_node_id } => {
+ _encode_varint_length_prefixed_tlv!(w, {
+ (2, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(*amt_to_forward), required),
+ (4, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(*outgoing_cltv_value), required),
+ (14, outgoing_node_id, required)
+ });
+ }
+ }
+ Ok(())
+ }
+}
+
+
impl<NS: Deref> ReadableArgs<(Option<PublicKey>, &NS)> for InboundOnionPayload where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R, args: (Option<PublicKey>, &NS)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
let (update_add_blinding_point, node_signer) = args;
}
if let Some(blinding_point) = intro_node_blinding_point.or(update_add_blinding_point) {
- if short_id.is_some() || payment_data.is_some() || payment_metadata.is_some() ||
- keysend_preimage.is_some()
- {
+ if short_id.is_some() || payment_data.is_some() || payment_metadata.is_some() {
return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
}
let enc_tlvs = encrypted_tlvs_opt.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?.0;
ChaChaPolyReadAdapter { readable: BlindedPaymentTlvs::Forward(ForwardTlvs {
short_channel_id, payment_relay, payment_constraints, features
})} => {
- if amt.is_some() || cltv_value.is_some() || total_msat.is_some() {
+ if amt.is_some() || cltv_value.is_some() || total_msat.is_some() ||
+ keysend_preimage.is_some()
+ {
return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
}
Ok(Self::BlindedForward {
})
},
ChaChaPolyReadAdapter { readable: BlindedPaymentTlvs::Receive(ReceiveTlvs {
- payment_secret, payment_constraints
+ payment_secret, payment_constraints, payment_context
})} => {
if total_msat.unwrap_or(0) > MAX_VALUE_MSAT { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
Ok(Self::BlindedReceive {
cltv_expiry_height: cltv_value.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?,
payment_secret,
payment_constraints,
+ payment_context,
intro_node_blinding_point,
+ keysend_preimage,
+ custom_tlvs,
})
},
}
impl Writeable for UnsignedChannelUpdate {
fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
- // `message_flags` used to indicate presence of `htlc_maximum_msat`, but was deprecated in the spec.
- const MESSAGE_FLAGS: u8 = 1;
self.chain_hash.write(w)?;
self.short_channel_id.write(w)?;
self.timestamp.write(w)?;
- let all_flags = self.flags as u16 | ((MESSAGE_FLAGS as u16) << 8);
- all_flags.write(w)?;
+ // Thw low bit of message_flags used to indicate the presence of `htlc_maximum_msat`, and
+ // now must be set
+ (self.message_flags | 1).write(w)?;
+ self.channel_flags.write(w)?;
self.cltv_expiry_delta.write(w)?;
self.htlc_minimum_msat.write(w)?;
self.fee_base_msat.write(w)?;
impl Readable for UnsignedChannelUpdate {
fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
- Ok(Self {
+ let res = Self {
chain_hash: Readable::read(r)?,
short_channel_id: Readable::read(r)?,
timestamp: Readable::read(r)?,
- flags: {
- let flags: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
- // Note: we ignore the `message_flags` for now, since it was deprecated by the spec.
- flags as u8
- },
+ message_flags: Readable::read(r)?,
+ channel_flags: Readable::read(r)?,
cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(r)?,
htlc_minimum_msat: Readable::read(r)?,
fee_base_msat: Readable::read(r)?,
fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(r)?,
htlc_maximum_msat: Readable::read(r)?,
excess_data: read_to_end(r)?,
- })
+ };
+ if res.message_flags & 1 != 1 {
+ // The `must_be_one` flag should be set (historically it indicated the presence of the
+ // `htlc_maximum_msat` field, which is now required).
+ Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
+ } else {
+ Ok(res)
+ }
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
- use std::convert::TryFrom;
- use bitcoin::{Transaction, TxIn, ScriptBuf, Sequence, Witness, TxOut};
+ use bitcoin::{Amount, Transaction, TxIn, ScriptBuf, Sequence, Witness, TxOut};
use hex::DisplayHex;
- use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
- use crate::ln::ChannelId;
+ use crate::ln::types::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
- use crate::ln::msgs::{self, FinalOnionHopData, OnionErrorPacket, CommonOpenChannelFields, CommonAcceptChannelFields};
+ use crate::ln::msgs::{self, FinalOnionHopData, OnionErrorPacket, CommonOpenChannelFields, CommonAcceptChannelFields, TrampolineOnionPacket};
use crate::ln::msgs::SocketAddress;
use crate::routing::gossip::{NodeAlias, NodeId};
- use crate::util::ser::{Writeable, Readable, ReadableArgs, Hostname, TransactionU16LenLimited};
+ use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Hostname, LengthReadable, Readable, ReadableArgs, TransactionU16LenLimited, Writeable};
use crate::util::test_utils;
use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
use bitcoin::address::Address;
- use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
+ use bitcoin::network::Network;
use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
use bitcoin::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
+ use bitcoin::transaction::Version;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message};
macro_rules! get_sig_on {
($privkey: expr, $ctx: expr, $string: expr) => {
{
- let sighash = Message::from_slice(&$string.into_bytes()[..]).unwrap();
+ let sighash = Message::from_digest_slice(&$string.into_bytes()[..]).unwrap();
$ctx.sign_ecdsa(&sighash, &$privkey)
}
}
chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin),
short_channel_id: 2316138423780173,
timestamp: 20190119,
- flags: if direction { 1 } else { 0 } | if disable { 1 << 1 } else { 0 },
+ message_flags: 1, // Only must_be_one
+ channel_flags: if direction { 1 } else { 0 } | if disable { 1 << 1 } else { 0 },
cltv_expiry_delta: 144,
htlc_minimum_msat: 1000000,
htlc_maximum_msat: 131355275467161,
}
#[test]
- fn encoding_splice() {
+ fn encoding_splice_init() {
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
let (_, pubkey_1,) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
- let splice = msgs::Splice {
- chain_hash: ChainHash::from_hex("6fe28c0ab6f1b372c1a6a246ae63f74f931e8365e15a089c68d6190000000000").unwrap(),
+ let splice_init = msgs::SpliceInit {
channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
- relative_satoshis: 123456,
+ funding_contribution_satoshis: -123456,
funding_feerate_perkw: 2000,
locktime: 0,
funding_pubkey: pubkey_1,
+ require_confirmed_inputs: Some(()),
};
- let encoded_value = splice.encode();
- assert_eq!(encoded_value.as_hex().to_string(), "02020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202026fe28c0ab6f1b372c1a6a246ae63f74f931e8365e15a089c68d6190000000000000000000001e240000007d000000000031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f");
+ let encoded_value = splice_init.encode();
+ assert_eq!(encoded_value.as_hex().to_string(), "0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202fffffffffffe1dc0000007d000000000031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f0200");
}
#[test]
fn encoding_splice_ack() {
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
let (_, pubkey_1,) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
- let splice = msgs::SpliceAck {
- chain_hash: ChainHash::from_hex("6fe28c0ab6f1b372c1a6a246ae63f74f931e8365e15a089c68d6190000000000").unwrap(),
+ let splice_ack = msgs::SpliceAck {
channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
- relative_satoshis: 123456,
+ funding_contribution_satoshis: -123456,
funding_pubkey: pubkey_1,
+ require_confirmed_inputs: Some(()),
};
- let encoded_value = splice.encode();
- assert_eq!(encoded_value.as_hex().to_string(), "02020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202026fe28c0ab6f1b372c1a6a246ae63f74f931e8365e15a089c68d6190000000000000000000001e240031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f");
+ let encoded_value = splice_ack.encode();
+ assert_eq!(encoded_value.as_hex().to_string(), "0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202fffffffffffe1dc0031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f0200");
}
#[test]
fn encoding_splice_locked() {
- let splice = msgs::SpliceLocked {
+ let splice_locked = msgs::SpliceLocked {
channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
+ splice_txid: Txid::from_str("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap(),
};
- let encoded_value = splice.encode();
- assert_eq!(encoded_value.as_hex().to_string(), "0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202");
+ let encoded_value = splice_locked.encode();
+ assert_eq!(encoded_value.as_hex().to_string(), "02020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202026e96fe9f8b0ddcd729ba03cfafa5a27b050b39d354dd980814268dfa9a44d4c2");
}
#[test]
channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
serial_id: 4886718345,
prevtx: TransactionU16LenLimited::new(Transaction {
- version: 2,
+ version: Version::TWO,
lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
input: vec![TxIn {
previous_output: OutPoint { txid: Txid::from_str("305bab643ee297b8b6b76b320792c8223d55082122cb606bf89382146ced9c77").unwrap(), index: 2 }.into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
}],
output: vec![
TxOut {
- value: 12704566,
- script_pubkey: Address::from_str("bc1qzlffunw52jav8vwdu5x3jfk6sr8u22rmq3xzw2").unwrap().payload.script_pubkey(),
+ value: Amount::from_sat(12704566),
+ script_pubkey: Address::from_str("bc1qzlffunw52jav8vwdu5x3jfk6sr8u22rmq3xzw2").unwrap().payload().script_pubkey(),
},
TxOut {
- value: 245148,
- script_pubkey: Address::from_str("bc1qxmk834g5marzm227dgqvynd23y2nvt2ztwcw2z").unwrap().payload.script_pubkey(),
+ value: Amount::from_sat(245148),
+ script_pubkey: Address::from_str("bc1qxmk834g5marzm227dgqvynd23y2nvt2ztwcw2z").unwrap().payload().script_pubkey(),
},
],
}).unwrap(),
prevtx_out: 305419896,
sequence: 305419896,
+ shared_input_txid: Some(Txid::from_str("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap()),
};
let encoded_value = tx_add_input.encode();
- let target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("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").unwrap();
- assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
+ let target_value = "0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202000000012345678900de02000000000101779ced6c148293f86b60cb222108553d22c89207326bb7b6b897e23e64ab5b300200000000fdffffff0236dbc1000000000016001417d29e4dd454bac3b1cde50d1926da80cfc5287b9cbd03000000000016001436ec78d514df462da95e6a00c24daa8915362d420247304402206af85b7dd67450ad12c979302fac49dfacbc6a8620f49c5da2b5721cf9565ca502207002b32fed9ce1bf095f57aeb10c36928ac60b12e723d97d2964a54640ceefa701210301ab7dc16488303549bfcdd80f6ae5ee4c20bf97ab5410bbd6b1bfa85dcd694400000000123456781234567800206e96fe9f8b0ddcd729ba03cfafa5a27b050b39d354dd980814268dfa9a44d4c2";
+ assert_eq!(encoded_value.as_hex().to_string(), target_value);
}
#[test]
channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
serial_id: 4886718345,
sats: 4886718345,
- script: Address::from_str("bc1qxmk834g5marzm227dgqvynd23y2nvt2ztwcw2z").unwrap().payload.script_pubkey(),
+ script: Address::from_str("bc1qxmk834g5marzm227dgqvynd23y2nvt2ztwcw2z").unwrap().payload().script_pubkey(),
};
let encoded_value = tx_add_output.encode();
let target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202000000012345678900000001234567890016001436ec78d514df462da95e6a00c24daa8915362d42").unwrap();
#[test]
fn encoding_tx_signatures() {
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+ let (privkey_1, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
+ let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
+
let tx_signatures = msgs::TxSignatures {
channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
tx_hash: Txid::from_str("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap(),
<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("3045022100ee00dbf4a862463e837d7c08509de814d620e4d9830fa84818713e0fa358f145022021c3c7060c4d53fe84fd165d60208451108a778c13b92ca4c6bad439236126cc01").unwrap(),
<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("028fbbf0b16f5ba5bcb5dd37cd4047ce6f726a21c06682f9ec2f52b057de1dbdb5").unwrap()]),
],
+ shared_input_signature: Some(sig_1),
};
let encoded_value = tx_signatures.encode();
let mut target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap(); // channel_id
target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("3045022100ee00dbf4a862463e837d7c08509de814d620e4d9830fa84818713e0fa358f145022021c3c7060c4d53fe84fd165d60208451108a778c13b92ca4c6bad439236126cc01").unwrap());
target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("21").unwrap()); // len of witness element data (VarInt)
target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("028fbbf0b16f5ba5bcb5dd37cd4047ce6f726a21c06682f9ec2f52b057de1dbdb5").unwrap());
+ target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0040").unwrap()); // type and len (64)
+ target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap());
assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
}
channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
signature: sig_1,
htlc_signatures: if htlcs { vec![sig_2, sig_3, sig_4] } else { Vec::new() },
+ batch: Some(msgs::CommitmentSignedBatch { batch_size: 3, funding_txid: Txid::from_str("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap() }),
#[cfg(taproot)]
partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
};
let encoded_value = commitment_signed.encode();
- let mut target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap();
+ let mut target_value = "0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a".to_string();
if htlcs {
- target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("00031735b6a427e80d5fe7cd90a2f4ee08dc9c27cda7c35a4172e5d85b12c49d4232537e98f9b1f3c5e6989a8b9644e90e8918127680dbd0d4043510840fc0f1e11a216c280b5395a2546e7e4b2663e04f811622f15a4f91e83aa2e92ba2a573c139142c54ae63072a1ec1ee7dc0c04bde5c847806172aa05c92c22ae8e308d1d2692b12cc195ce0a2d1bda6a88befa19fa07f51caa75ce83837f28965600b8aacab0855ffb0e741ec5f7c41421e9829a9d48611c8c831f71be5ea73e66594977ffd").unwrap());
+ target_value += "00031735b6a427e80d5fe7cd90a2f4ee08dc9c27cda7c35a4172e5d85b12c49d4232537e98f9b1f3c5e6989a8b9644e90e8918127680dbd0d4043510840fc0f1e11a216c280b5395a2546e7e4b2663e04f811622f15a4f91e83aa2e92ba2a573c139142c54ae63072a1ec1ee7dc0c04bde5c847806172aa05c92c22ae8e308d1d2692b12cc195ce0a2d1bda6a88befa19fa07f51caa75ce83837f28965600b8aacab0855ffb0e741ec5f7c41421e9829a9d48611c8c831f71be5ea73e66594977ffd";
} else {
- target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000").unwrap());
+ target_value += "0000";
}
- assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
+ target_value += "002200036e96fe9f8b0ddcd729ba03cfafa5a27b050b39d354dd980814268dfa9a44d4c2"; // batch
+ assert_eq!(encoded_value.as_hex().to_string(), target_value);
}
#[test]
keysend_preimage: None,
sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 0x0badf00d01020304,
cltv_expiry_height: 0xffffffff,
- custom_tlvs: vec![],
+ custom_tlvs: &vec![],
};
let encoded_value = outbound_msg.encode();
let target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1002080badf00d010203040404ffffffff").unwrap();
keysend_preimage: None,
sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 0x0badf00d01020304,
cltv_expiry_height: 0xffffffff,
- custom_tlvs: vec![],
+ custom_tlvs: &vec![],
};
let encoded_value = outbound_msg.encode();
let target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("3602080badf00d010203040404ffffffff082442424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242421badca1f").unwrap();
payment_data: None,
payment_metadata: None,
keysend_preimage: None,
- custom_tlvs: bad_type_range_tlvs,
+ custom_tlvs: &bad_type_range_tlvs,
sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 0x0badf00d01020304,
cltv_expiry_height: 0xffffffff,
};
((1 << 16) - 1, vec![42; 32]),
];
if let msgs::OutboundOnionPayload::Receive { ref mut custom_tlvs, .. } = msg {
- *custom_tlvs = good_type_range_tlvs.clone();
+ *custom_tlvs = &good_type_range_tlvs;
}
let encoded_value = msg.encode();
let inbound_msg = ReadableArgs::read(&mut Cursor::new(&encoded_value[..]), (None, &&node_signer)).unwrap();
payment_data: None,
payment_metadata: None,
keysend_preimage: None,
- custom_tlvs: expected_custom_tlvs.clone(),
+ custom_tlvs: &expected_custom_tlvs,
sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 0x0badf00d01020304,
cltv_expiry_height: 0xffffffff,
};
} else { panic!(); }
}
+ #[test]
+ fn encoding_final_onion_hop_data_with_trampoline_packet() {
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+ let (_private_key, public_key) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
+
+ let compressed_public_key = public_key.serialize();
+ assert_eq!(compressed_public_key.len(), 33);
+
+ let trampoline_packet = TrampolineOnionPacket {
+ version: 0,
+ public_key,
+ hop_data: vec![1; 650], // this should be the standard encoded length
+ hmac: [2; 32],
+ };
+ let encoded_trampoline_packet = trampoline_packet.encode();
+ assert_eq!(encoded_trampoline_packet.len(), 716);
+
+ { // verify that a codec round trip works
+ let mut reader = Cursor::new(&encoded_trampoline_packet);
+ let mut trampoline_packet_reader = FixedLengthReader::new(&mut reader, encoded_trampoline_packet.len() as u64);
+ let decoded_trampoline_packet: TrampolineOnionPacket = <TrampolineOnionPacket as LengthReadable>::read(&mut trampoline_packet_reader).unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(decoded_trampoline_packet.encode(), encoded_trampoline_packet);
+ }
+
+ let msg = msgs::OutboundOnionPayload::TrampolineEntrypoint {
+ multipath_trampoline_data: None,
+ amt_to_forward: 0x0badf00d01020304,
+ outgoing_cltv_value: 0xffffffff,
+ trampoline_packet,
+ };
+ let encoded_payload = msg.encode();
+
+ let trampoline_type_bytes = &encoded_payload[19..=19];
+ let mut trampoline_type_cursor = Cursor::new(trampoline_type_bytes);
+ let trampoline_type_big_size: BigSize = Readable::read(&mut trampoline_type_cursor).unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(trampoline_type_big_size.0, 20);
+
+ let trampoline_length_bytes = &encoded_payload[20..=22];
+ let mut trampoline_length_cursor = Cursor::new(trampoline_length_bytes);
+ let trampoline_length_big_size: BigSize = Readable::read(&mut trampoline_length_cursor).unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(trampoline_length_big_size.0, encoded_trampoline_packet.len() as u64);
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn encoding_final_onion_hop_data_with_eclair_trampoline_packet() {
+ let public_key = PublicKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()).unwrap();
+ let hop_data = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("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").unwrap();
+ let hmac_vector = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("bb079bfc4b35190eee9f59a1d7b41ba2f773179f322dafb4b1af900c289ebd6c").unwrap();
+ let mut hmac = [0; 32];
+ hmac.copy_from_slice(&hmac_vector);
+
+ let compressed_public_key = public_key.serialize();
+ assert_eq!(compressed_public_key.len(), 33);
+
+ let trampoline_packet = TrampolineOnionPacket {
+ version: 0,
+ public_key,
+ hop_data,
+ hmac,
+ };
+ let encoded_trampoline_packet = trampoline_packet.encode();
+ let expected_eclair_trampoline_packet = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("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").unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(encoded_trampoline_packet, expected_eclair_trampoline_packet);
+ }
+
#[test]
fn query_channel_range_end_blocknum() {
let tests: Vec<(u32, u32, u32)> = vec
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff