+// This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
+// history.
+//
+// This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
+// or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
+// <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
+// You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
+// licenses.
+
//! The logic to build claims and bump in-flight transactions until confirmations.
//!
-//! OnchainTxHandler objetcs are fully-part of ChannelMonitor and encapsulates all
+//! OnchainTxHandler objects are fully-part of ChannelMonitor and encapsulates all
//! building, tracking, bumping and notifications functions.
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, SigHashType};
use bitcoin::secp256k1;
use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
-use ln::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER, InputMaterial, ClaimRequest};
use ln::channelmanager::PaymentPreimage;
use ln::chan_utils;
-use ln::chan_utils::{TxCreationKeys, LocalCommitmentTransaction};
+use ln::chan_utils::{TxCreationKeys, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction};
use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, MIN_RELAY_FEE_SAT_PER_1000_WEIGHT};
-use chain::keysinterface::ChannelKeys;
+use chain::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER, InputMaterial, ClaimRequest};
+use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface};
use util::logger::Logger;
-use util::ser::{Readable, Writer, Writeable};
+use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writer, Writeable, VecWriter};
use util::byte_utils;
use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map};
use std::cmp;
use std::ops::Deref;
+use std::mem::replace;
const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
Claim {
claim_request: Txid,
},
- /// Claim tx aggregate multiple claimable outpoints. One of the outpoint may be claimed by a remote party tx.
+ /// Claim tx aggregate multiple claimable outpoints. One of the outpoint may be claimed by a counterparty party tx.
/// In this case, we need to drop the outpoint and regenerate a new claim tx. By safety, we keep tracking
/// the outpoint to be sure to resurect it back to the claim tx if reorgs happen.
ContentiousOutpoint {
// much time for confirmation and we need to bump it.
height_timer: Option<u32>,
// Tracked in case of reorg to wipe out now-superflous bump material
- feerate_previous: u64,
+ feerate_previous: u32,
// Soonest timelocks among set of outpoints claimed, used to compute
// a priority of not feerate
soonest_timelock: u32,
impl Writeable for ClaimTxBumpMaterial {
fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
self.height_timer.write(writer)?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.feerate_previous))?;
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.feerate_previous))?;
writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.soonest_timelock))?;
writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.per_input_material.len() as u64))?;
for (outp, tx_material) in self.per_input_material.iter() {
RevokedReceivedHTLC,
OfferedHTLC,
ReceivedHTLC,
- RevokedOutput, // either a revoked to_local output on commitment tx, a revoked HTLC-Timeout output or a revoked HTLC-Success output
+ RevokedOutput, // either a revoked to_holder output on commitment tx, a revoked HTLC-Timeout output or a revoked HTLC-Success output
}
impl Writeable for InputDescriptors {
macro_rules! subtract_high_prio_fee {
($logger: ident, $fee_estimator: expr, $value: expr, $predicted_weight: expr, $used_feerate: expr) => {
{
- $used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority);
- let mut fee = $used_feerate * ($predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
+ $used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority).into();
+ let mut fee = $used_feerate as u64 * $predicted_weight / 1000;
if $value <= fee {
- $used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
- fee = $used_feerate * ($predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
- if $value <= fee {
- $used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
- fee = $used_feerate * ($predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
+ $used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal).into();
+ fee = $used_feerate as u64 * $predicted_weight / 1000;
+ if $value <= fee.into() {
+ $used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background).into();
+ fee = $used_feerate as u64 * $predicted_weight / 1000;
if $value <= fee {
log_error!($logger, "Failed to generate an on-chain punishment tx as even low priority fee ({} sat) was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
fee, $value);
/// OnchainTxHandler receives claiming requests, aggregates them if it's sound, broadcast and
/// do RBF bumping if possible.
-pub struct OnchainTxHandler<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
+pub struct OnchainTxHandler<ChannelSigner: Sign> {
destination_script: Script,
- local_commitment: Option<LocalCommitmentTransaction>,
- // local_htlc_sigs and prev_local_htlc_sigs are in the order as they appear in the commitment
+ holder_commitment: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
+ // holder_htlc_sigs and prev_holder_htlc_sigs are in the order as they appear in the commitment
// transaction outputs (hence the Option<>s inside the Vec). The first usize is the index in
- // the set of HTLCs in the LocalCommitmentTransaction (including those which do not appear in
- // the commitment transaction).
- local_htlc_sigs: Option<Vec<Option<(usize, Signature)>>>,
- prev_local_commitment: Option<LocalCommitmentTransaction>,
- prev_local_htlc_sigs: Option<Vec<Option<(usize, Signature)>>>,
- local_csv: u16,
+ // the set of HTLCs in the HolderCommitmentTransaction.
+ holder_htlc_sigs: Option<Vec<Option<(usize, Signature)>>>,
+ prev_holder_commitment: Option<HolderCommitmentTransaction>,
+ prev_holder_htlc_sigs: Option<Vec<Option<(usize, Signature)>>>,
- key_storage: ChanSigner,
+ signer: ChannelSigner,
+ pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
// Used to track claiming requests. If claim tx doesn't confirm before height timer expiration we need to bump
// it (RBF or CPFP). If an input has been part of an aggregate tx at first claim try, we need to keep it within
onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap<u32, Vec<OnchainEvent>>,
+ latest_height: u32,
+
secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
}
-impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Writeable> OnchainTxHandler<ChanSigner> {
+impl<ChannelSigner: Sign> OnchainTxHandler<ChannelSigner> {
pub(crate) fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
- self.local_commitment.write(writer)?;
- self.local_htlc_sigs.write(writer)?;
- self.prev_local_commitment.write(writer)?;
- self.prev_local_htlc_sigs.write(writer)?;
+ self.holder_commitment.write(writer)?;
+ self.holder_htlc_sigs.write(writer)?;
+ self.prev_holder_commitment.write(writer)?;
+ self.prev_holder_htlc_sigs.write(writer)?;
- self.local_csv.write(writer)?;
+ self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
- self.key_storage.write(writer)?;
+ let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
+ self.signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
+ assert!(key_data.0.len() < std::usize::MAX);
+ assert!(key_data.0.len() < std::u32::MAX as usize);
+ (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
+ writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_claim_requests.len() as u64))?;
for (ref ancestor_claim_txid, claim_tx_data) in self.pending_claim_requests.iter() {
}
}
}
+ self.latest_height.write(writer)?;
Ok(())
}
}
-impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable> Readable for OnchainTxHandler<ChanSigner> {
- fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+impl<'a, K: KeysInterface> ReadableArgs<&'a K> for OnchainTxHandler<K::Signer> {
+ fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, keys_manager: &'a K) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let local_commitment = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let local_htlc_sigs = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let prev_local_commitment = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let prev_local_htlc_sigs = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let holder_commitment = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let holder_htlc_sigs = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let prev_holder_commitment = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let prev_holder_htlc_sigs = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let local_csv = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let channel_parameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let key_storage = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut keys_data = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE));
+ while keys_data.len() != keys_len as usize {
+ // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
+ let mut data = [0; 1024];
+ let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.len())];
+ reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
+ keys_data.extend_from_slice(read_slice);
+ }
+ let signer = keys_manager.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
let pending_claim_requests_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
let mut pending_claim_requests = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_claim_requests_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
}
onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.insert(height_target, events);
}
+ let latest_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
Ok(OnchainTxHandler {
destination_script,
- local_commitment,
- local_htlc_sigs,
- prev_local_commitment,
- prev_local_htlc_sigs,
- local_csv,
- key_storage,
+ holder_commitment,
+ holder_htlc_sigs,
+ prev_holder_commitment,
+ prev_holder_htlc_sigs,
+ signer,
+ channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
claimable_outpoints,
pending_claim_requests,
onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf,
+ latest_height,
secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
})
}
}
-impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> OnchainTxHandler<ChanSigner> {
- pub(super) fn new(destination_script: Script, keys: ChanSigner, local_csv: u16) -> Self {
-
- let key_storage = keys;
-
+impl<ChannelSigner: Sign> OnchainTxHandler<ChannelSigner> {
+ pub(crate) fn new(destination_script: Script, signer: ChannelSigner, channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters, holder_commitment: HolderCommitmentTransaction) -> Self {
OnchainTxHandler {
destination_script,
- local_commitment: None,
- local_htlc_sigs: None,
- prev_local_commitment: None,
- prev_local_htlc_sigs: None,
- local_csv,
- key_storage,
+ holder_commitment,
+ holder_htlc_sigs: None,
+ prev_holder_commitment: None,
+ prev_holder_htlc_sigs: None,
+ signer,
+ channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
pending_claim_requests: HashMap::new(),
claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap::new(),
+ latest_height: 0,
secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
}
}
- pub(super) fn get_witnesses_weight(inputs: &[InputDescriptors]) -> usize {
+ pub(crate) fn get_witnesses_weight(inputs: &[InputDescriptors]) -> usize {
let mut tx_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
for inp in inputs {
// We use expected weight (and not actual) as signatures and time lock delays may vary
&InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC => {
1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 33 + 1 + 139
},
- // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + remotehtlc_sig + preimage_length + preimage + witness_script_length + witness_script
+ // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + counterpartyhtlc_sig + preimage_length + preimage + witness_script_length + witness_script
&InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC => {
1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 32 + 1 + 133
},
/// Lightning security model (i.e being able to redeem/timeout HTLC or penalize coutnerparty onchain) lays on the assumption of claim transactions getting confirmed before timelock expiration
/// (CSV or CLTV following cases). In case of high-fee spikes, claim tx may stuck in the mempool, so you need to bump its feerate quickly using Replace-By-Fee or Child-Pay-For-Parent.
- fn generate_claim_tx<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, cached_claim_datas: &ClaimTxBumpMaterial, fee_estimator: F, logger: L) -> Option<(Option<u32>, u64, Transaction)>
+ /// Panics if there are signing errors, because signing operations in reaction to on-chain events
+ /// are not expected to fail, and if they do, we may lose funds.
+ fn generate_claim_tx<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, cached_claim_datas: &ClaimTxBumpMaterial, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L) -> Option<(Option<u32>, u32, Transaction)>
where F::Target: FeeEstimator,
L::Target: Logger,
{
macro_rules! RBF_bump {
($amount: expr, $old_feerate: expr, $fee_estimator: expr, $predicted_weight: expr) => {
{
- let mut used_feerate;
+ let mut used_feerate: u32;
// If old feerate inferior to actual one given back by Fee Estimator, use it to compute new fee...
let new_fee = if $old_feerate < $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) {
let mut value = $amount;
if subtract_high_prio_fee!(logger, $fee_estimator, value, $predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
// Overflow check is done in subtract_high_prio_fee
- $amount - value
+ ($amount - value)
} else {
log_trace!(logger, "Can't new-estimation bump new claiming tx, amount {} is too small", $amount);
return None;
}
// ...else just increase the previous feerate by 25% (because that's a nice number)
} else {
- let fee = $old_feerate * $predicted_weight / 750;
+ let fee = $old_feerate as u64 * ($predicted_weight as u64) / 750;
if $amount <= fee {
log_trace!(logger, "Can't 25% bump new claiming tx, amount {} is too small", $amount);
return None;
fee
};
- let previous_fee = $old_feerate * $predicted_weight / 1000;
- let min_relay_fee = MIN_RELAY_FEE_SAT_PER_1000_WEIGHT * $predicted_weight / 1000;
+ let previous_fee = $old_feerate as u64 * ($predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
+ let min_relay_fee = MIN_RELAY_FEE_SAT_PER_1000_WEIGHT * ($predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
// BIP 125 Opt-in Full Replace-by-Fee Signaling
// * 3. The replacement transaction pays an absolute fee of at least the sum paid by the original transactions.
// * 4. The replacement transaction must also pay for its own bandwidth at or above the rate set by the node's minimum relay fee setting.
} else {
new_fee
};
- Some((new_fee, new_fee * 1000 / $predicted_weight))
+ Some((new_fee, new_fee * 1000 / ($predicted_weight as u64)))
}
}
}
inputs_witnesses_weight += Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[*input_descriptor]);
amt += *amount;
},
- &InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { ref preimage, ref htlc, .. } => {
+ &InputMaterial::CounterpartyHTLC { ref preimage, ref htlc, .. } => {
inputs_witnesses_weight += Self::get_witnesses_weight(if preimage.is_some() { &[InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC] } else { &[InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC] });
amt += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
},
- &InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { .. } => {
+ &InputMaterial::HolderHTLC { .. } => {
dynamic_fee = false;
},
&InputMaterial::Funding { .. } => {
}
}
if dynamic_fee {
- let predicted_weight = bumped_tx.get_weight() + inputs_witnesses_weight;
+ let predicted_weight = (bumped_tx.get_weight() + inputs_witnesses_weight) as u64;
let mut new_feerate;
// If old feerate is 0, first iteration of this claim, use normal fee calculation
if cached_claim_datas.feerate_previous != 0 {
- if let Some((new_fee, feerate)) = RBF_bump!(amt, cached_claim_datas.feerate_previous, fee_estimator, predicted_weight as u64) {
+ if let Some((new_fee, feerate)) = RBF_bump!(amt, cached_claim_datas.feerate_previous, fee_estimator, predicted_weight) {
// If new computed fee is superior at the whole claimable amount burn all in fees
- if new_fee > amt {
+ if new_fee as u64 > amt {
bumped_tx.output[0].value = 0;
} else {
- bumped_tx.output[0].value = amt - new_fee;
+ bumped_tx.output[0].value = amt - new_fee as u64;
}
new_feerate = feerate;
} else { return None; }
for (i, (outp, per_outp_material)) in cached_claim_datas.per_input_material.iter().enumerate() {
match per_outp_material {
- &InputMaterial::Revoked { ref per_commitment_point, ref remote_delayed_payment_base_key, ref remote_htlc_base_key, ref per_commitment_key, ref input_descriptor, ref amount, ref htlc, ref on_remote_tx_csv } => {
- if let Ok(chan_keys) = TxCreationKeys::new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, remote_delayed_payment_base_key, remote_htlc_base_key, &self.key_storage.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint, &self.key_storage.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint) {
+ &InputMaterial::Revoked { ref per_commitment_point, ref counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, ref counterparty_htlc_base_key, ref per_commitment_key, ref input_descriptor, ref amount, ref htlc, ref on_counterparty_tx_csv } => {
+ if let Ok(tx_keys) = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key, &self.signer.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint, &self.signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint) {
let witness_script = if let Some(ref htlc) = *htlc {
- chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &chan_keys.a_htlc_key, &chan_keys.b_htlc_key, &chan_keys.revocation_key)
+ chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &tx_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &tx_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &tx_keys.revocation_key)
} else {
- chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&chan_keys.revocation_key, *on_remote_tx_csv, &chan_keys.a_delayed_payment_key)
+ chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&tx_keys.revocation_key, *on_counterparty_tx_csv, &tx_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key)
};
- if let Ok(sig) = self.key_storage.sign_justice_transaction(&bumped_tx, i, &witness_script, *amount, &per_commitment_key, &chan_keys.revocation_key, htlc.is_some(), &self.secp_ctx) {
- bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
- bumped_tx.input[i].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
- if htlc.is_some() {
- bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(chan_keys.revocation_key.clone().serialize().to_vec());
- } else {
- bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(vec!(1));
- }
- bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(witness_script.clone().into_bytes());
- } else { return None; }
- //TODO: panic ?
+ let sig = self.signer.sign_justice_transaction(&bumped_tx, i, *amount, &per_commitment_key, htlc, &self.secp_ctx).expect("sign justice tx");
+ bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
+ bumped_tx.input[i].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
+ if htlc.is_some() {
+ bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(tx_keys.revocation_key.clone().serialize().to_vec());
+ } else {
+ bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(vec!(1));
+ }
+ bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(witness_script.clone().into_bytes());
- log_trace!(logger, "Going to broadcast Penalty Transaction {} claiming revoked {} output {} from {} with new feerate {}...", bumped_tx.txid(), if *input_descriptor == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput { "to_local" } else if *input_descriptor == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC { "offered" } else if *input_descriptor == InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC { "received" } else { "" }, outp.vout, outp.txid, new_feerate);
+ log_trace!(logger, "Going to broadcast Penalty Transaction {} claiming revoked {} output {} from {} with new feerate {}...", bumped_tx.txid(), if *input_descriptor == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput { "to_holder" } else if *input_descriptor == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC { "offered" } else if *input_descriptor == InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC { "received" } else { "" }, outp.vout, outp.txid, new_feerate);
}
},
- &InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { ref per_commitment_point, ref remote_delayed_payment_base_key, ref remote_htlc_base_key, ref preimage, ref htlc } => {
- if let Ok(chan_keys) = TxCreationKeys::new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, remote_delayed_payment_base_key, remote_htlc_base_key, &self.key_storage.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint, &self.key_storage.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint) {
- let witness_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &chan_keys.a_htlc_key, &chan_keys.b_htlc_key, &chan_keys.revocation_key);
+ &InputMaterial::CounterpartyHTLC { ref per_commitment_point, ref counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, ref counterparty_htlc_base_key, ref preimage, ref htlc } => {
+ if let Ok(tx_keys) = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key, &self.signer.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint, &self.signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint) {
+ let witness_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &tx_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &tx_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &tx_keys.revocation_key);
if !preimage.is_some() { bumped_tx.lock_time = htlc.cltv_expiry }; // Right now we don't aggregate time-locked transaction, if we do we should set lock_time before to avoid breaking hash computation
- if let Ok(sig) = self.key_storage.sign_remote_htlc_transaction(&bumped_tx, i, &witness_script, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, &per_commitment_point, preimage, &self.secp_ctx) {
- bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
- bumped_tx.input[i].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
- if let &Some(preimage) = preimage {
- bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(preimage.0.to_vec());
- } else {
- // Due to BIP146 (MINIMALIF) this must be a zero-length element to relay.
- bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(vec![]);
- }
- bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(witness_script.clone().into_bytes());
+ let sig = self.signer.sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(&bumped_tx, i, &htlc.amount_msat / 1000, &per_commitment_point, htlc, &self.secp_ctx).expect("sign counterparty HTLC tx");
+ bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
+ bumped_tx.input[i].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
+ if let &Some(preimage) = preimage {
+ bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(preimage.0.to_vec());
+ } else {
+ // Due to BIP146 (MINIMALIF) this must be a zero-length element to relay.
+ bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(vec![]);
}
- log_trace!(logger, "Going to broadcast Claim Transaction {} claiming remote {} htlc output {} from {} with new feerate {}...", bumped_tx.txid(), if preimage.is_some() { "offered" } else { "received" }, outp.vout, outp.txid, new_feerate);
+ bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(witness_script.clone().into_bytes());
+ log_trace!(logger, "Going to broadcast Claim Transaction {} claiming counterparty {} htlc output {} from {} with new feerate {}...", bumped_tx.txid(), if preimage.is_some() { "offered" } else { "received" }, outp.vout, outp.txid, new_feerate);
}
},
_ => unreachable!()
}
}
log_trace!(logger, "...with timer {}", new_timer.unwrap());
- assert!(predicted_weight >= bumped_tx.get_weight());
- return Some((new_timer, new_feerate, bumped_tx))
+ assert!(predicted_weight >= bumped_tx.get_weight() as u64);
+ return Some((new_timer, new_feerate as u32, bumped_tx))
} else {
for (_, (outp, per_outp_material)) in cached_claim_datas.per_input_material.iter().enumerate() {
match per_outp_material {
- &InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { ref preimage, ref amount } => {
+ &InputMaterial::HolderHTLC { ref preimage, ref amount } => {
let htlc_tx = self.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(outp, preimage);
if let Some(htlc_tx) = htlc_tx {
let feerate = (amount - htlc_tx.output[0].value) * 1000 / htlc_tx.get_weight() as u64;
// Timer set to $NEVER given we can't bump tx without anchor outputs
- log_trace!(logger, "Going to broadcast Local HTLC-{} claiming HTLC output {} from {}...", if preimage.is_some() { "Success" } else { "Timeout" }, outp.vout, outp.txid);
- return Some((None, feerate, htlc_tx));
+ log_trace!(logger, "Going to broadcast Holder HTLC-{} claiming HTLC output {} from {}...", if preimage.is_some() { "Success" } else { "Timeout" }, outp.vout, outp.txid);
+ return Some((None, feerate as u32, htlc_tx));
}
return None;
},
&InputMaterial::Funding { ref funding_redeemscript } => {
- let signed_tx = self.get_fully_signed_local_tx(funding_redeemscript).unwrap();
+ let signed_tx = self.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(funding_redeemscript);
// Timer set to $NEVER given we can't bump tx without anchor outputs
- log_trace!(logger, "Going to broadcast Local Transaction {} claiming funding output {} from {}...", signed_tx.txid(), outp.vout, outp.txid);
- return Some((None, self.local_commitment.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, signed_tx));
+ log_trace!(logger, "Going to broadcast Holder Transaction {} claiming funding output {} from {}...", signed_tx.txid(), outp.vout, outp.txid);
+ return Some((None, self.holder_commitment.feerate_per_kw(), signed_tx));
}
_ => unreachable!()
}
None
}
- pub(super) fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], claimable_outpoints: Vec<ClaimRequest>, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L)
+ /// Upon channelmonitor.block_connected(..) or upon provision of a preimage on the forward link
+ /// for this channel, provide new relevant on-chain transactions and/or new claim requests.
+ /// Formerly this was named `block_connected`, but it is now also used for claiming an HTLC output
+ /// if we receive a preimage after force-close.
+ pub(crate) fn update_claims_view<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], claimable_outpoints: Vec<ClaimRequest>, latest_height: Option<u32>, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L)
where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
F::Target: FeeEstimator,
L::Target: Logger,
{
- log_trace!(logger, "Block at height {} connected with {} claim requests", height, claimable_outpoints.len());
+ let height = match latest_height {
+ Some(h) => h,
+ None => self.latest_height,
+ };
+ log_trace!(logger, "Updating claims view at height {} with {} matched transactions and {} claim requests", height, txn_matched.len(), claimable_outpoints.len());
let mut new_claims = Vec::new();
let mut aggregated_claim = HashMap::new();
let mut aggregated_soonest = ::std::u32::MAX;
}
}
- pub(super) fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L)
+ pub(crate) fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L)
where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
F::Target: FeeEstimator,
L::Target: Logger,
}
}
for (_, claim_material) in bump_candidates.iter_mut() {
- if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate, bump_tx)) = self.generate_claim_tx(height, &claim_material, &*fee_estimator, &*logger) {
+ if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate, bump_tx)) = self.generate_claim_tx(height, &claim_material, &&*fee_estimator, &&*logger) {
claim_material.height_timer = new_timer;
claim_material.feerate_previous = new_feerate;
broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&bump_tx);
}
}
- pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_tx(&mut self, tx: LocalCommitmentTransaction) -> Result<(), ()> {
- // To prevent any unsafe state discrepancy between offchain and onchain, once local
- // commitment transaction has been signed due to an event (either block height for
- // HTLC-timeout or channel force-closure), don't allow any further update of local
- // commitment transaction view to avoid delivery of revocation secret to counterparty
- // for the aformentionned signed transaction.
- if self.local_htlc_sigs.is_some() || self.prev_local_htlc_sigs.is_some() {
- return Err(());
- }
- self.prev_local_commitment = self.local_commitment.take();
- self.local_commitment = Some(tx);
- Ok(())
+ pub(crate) fn provide_latest_holder_tx(&mut self, tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction) {
+ self.prev_holder_commitment = Some(replace(&mut self.holder_commitment, tx));
+ self.holder_htlc_sigs = None;
}
- fn sign_latest_local_htlcs(&mut self) {
- if let Some(ref local_commitment) = self.local_commitment {
- if let Ok(sigs) = self.key_storage.sign_local_commitment_htlc_transactions(local_commitment, self.local_csv, &self.secp_ctx) {
- self.local_htlc_sigs = Some(Vec::new());
- let ret = self.local_htlc_sigs.as_mut().unwrap();
- for (htlc_idx, (local_sig, &(ref htlc, _))) in sigs.iter().zip(local_commitment.per_htlc.iter()).enumerate() {
- if let Some(tx_idx) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
- if ret.len() <= tx_idx as usize { ret.resize(tx_idx as usize + 1, None); }
- ret[tx_idx as usize] = Some((htlc_idx, local_sig.expect("Did not receive a signature for a non-dust HTLC")));
- } else {
- assert!(local_sig.is_none(), "Received a signature for a dust HTLC");
- }
- }
- }
+ // Normally holder HTLCs are signed at the same time as the holder commitment tx. However,
+ // in some configurations, the holder commitment tx has been signed and broadcast by a
+ // ChannelMonitor replica, so we handle that case here.
+ fn sign_latest_holder_htlcs(&mut self) {
+ if self.holder_htlc_sigs.is_none() {
+ let (_sig, sigs) = self.signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&self.holder_commitment, &self.secp_ctx).expect("sign holder commitment");
+ self.holder_htlc_sigs = Some(Self::extract_holder_sigs(&self.holder_commitment, sigs));
}
}
- fn sign_prev_local_htlcs(&mut self) {
- if let Some(ref local_commitment) = self.prev_local_commitment {
- if let Ok(sigs) = self.key_storage.sign_local_commitment_htlc_transactions(local_commitment, self.local_csv, &self.secp_ctx) {
- self.prev_local_htlc_sigs = Some(Vec::new());
- let ret = self.prev_local_htlc_sigs.as_mut().unwrap();
- for (htlc_idx, (local_sig, &(ref htlc, _))) in sigs.iter().zip(local_commitment.per_htlc.iter()).enumerate() {
- if let Some(tx_idx) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
- if ret.len() <= tx_idx as usize { ret.resize(tx_idx as usize + 1, None); }
- ret[tx_idx as usize] = Some((htlc_idx, local_sig.expect("Did not receive a signature for a non-dust HTLC")));
- } else {
- assert!(local_sig.is_none(), "Received a signature for a dust HTLC");
- }
- }
+
+ // Normally only the latest commitment tx and HTLCs need to be signed. However, in some
+ // configurations we may have updated our holder commitment but a replica of the ChannelMonitor
+ // broadcast the previous one before we sync with it. We handle that case here.
+ fn sign_prev_holder_htlcs(&mut self) {
+ if self.prev_holder_htlc_sigs.is_none() {
+ if let Some(ref holder_commitment) = self.prev_holder_commitment {
+ let (_sig, sigs) = self.signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(holder_commitment, &self.secp_ctx).expect("sign previous holder commitment");
+ self.prev_holder_htlc_sigs = Some(Self::extract_holder_sigs(holder_commitment, sigs));
}
}
}
- //TODO: getting lastest local transactions should be infaillible and result in us "force-closing the channel", but we may
- // have empty local commitment transaction if a ChannelMonitor is asked to force-close just after Channel::get_outbound_funding_created,
+ fn extract_holder_sigs(holder_commitment: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, sigs: Vec<Signature>) -> Vec<Option<(usize, Signature)>> {
+ let mut ret = Vec::new();
+ for (htlc_idx, (holder_sig, htlc)) in sigs.iter().zip(holder_commitment.htlcs().iter()).enumerate() {
+ let tx_idx = htlc.transaction_output_index.unwrap();
+ if ret.len() <= tx_idx as usize { ret.resize(tx_idx as usize + 1, None); }
+ ret[tx_idx as usize] = Some((htlc_idx, holder_sig.clone()));
+ }
+ ret
+ }
+
+ //TODO: getting lastest holder transactions should be infallible and result in us "force-closing the channel", but we may
+ // have empty holder commitment transaction if a ChannelMonitor is asked to force-close just after Channel::get_outbound_funding_created,
// before providing a initial commitment transaction. For outbound channel, init ChannelMonitor at Channel::funding_signed, there is nothing
// to monitor before.
- pub(super) fn get_fully_signed_local_tx(&mut self, funding_redeemscript: &Script) -> Option<Transaction> {
- if let Some(ref mut local_commitment) = self.local_commitment {
- match self.key_storage.sign_local_commitment(local_commitment, &self.secp_ctx) {
- Ok(sig) => Some(local_commitment.add_local_sig(funding_redeemscript, sig)),
- Err(_) => return None,
- }
- } else {
- None
- }
+ pub(crate) fn get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&mut self, funding_redeemscript: &Script) -> Transaction {
+ let (sig, htlc_sigs) = self.signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&self.holder_commitment, &self.secp_ctx).expect("signing holder commitment");
+ self.holder_htlc_sigs = Some(Self::extract_holder_sigs(&self.holder_commitment, htlc_sigs));
+ self.holder_commitment.add_holder_sig(funding_redeemscript, sig)
}
- #[cfg(test)]
- pub(super) fn get_fully_signed_copy_local_tx(&mut self, funding_redeemscript: &Script) -> Option<Transaction> {
- if let Some(ref mut local_commitment) = self.local_commitment {
- let local_commitment = local_commitment.clone();
- match self.key_storage.sign_local_commitment(&local_commitment, &self.secp_ctx) {
- Ok(sig) => Some(local_commitment.add_local_sig(funding_redeemscript, sig)),
- Err(_) => return None,
- }
- } else {
- None
- }
+ #[cfg(any(test, feature="unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
+ pub(crate) fn get_fully_signed_copy_holder_tx(&mut self, funding_redeemscript: &Script) -> Transaction {
+ let (sig, htlc_sigs) = self.signer.unsafe_sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&self.holder_commitment, &self.secp_ctx).expect("sign holder commitment");
+ self.holder_htlc_sigs = Some(Self::extract_holder_sigs(&self.holder_commitment, htlc_sigs));
+ self.holder_commitment.add_holder_sig(funding_redeemscript, sig)
}
- pub(super) fn get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(&mut self, outp: &::bitcoin::OutPoint, preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Option<Transaction> {
+ pub(crate) fn get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(&mut self, outp: &::bitcoin::OutPoint, preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Option<Transaction> {
let mut htlc_tx = None;
- if self.local_commitment.is_some() {
- let commitment_txid = self.local_commitment.as_ref().unwrap().txid();
- if commitment_txid == outp.txid {
- self.sign_latest_local_htlcs();
- if let &Some(ref htlc_sigs) = &self.local_htlc_sigs {
- let &(ref htlc_idx, ref htlc_sig) = htlc_sigs[outp.vout as usize].as_ref().unwrap();
- htlc_tx = Some(self.local_commitment.as_ref().unwrap()
- .get_signed_htlc_tx(*htlc_idx, htlc_sig, preimage, self.local_csv));
- }
+ let commitment_txid = self.holder_commitment.trust().txid();
+ // Check if the HTLC spends from the current holder commitment
+ if commitment_txid == outp.txid {
+ self.sign_latest_holder_htlcs();
+ if let &Some(ref htlc_sigs) = &self.holder_htlc_sigs {
+ let &(ref htlc_idx, ref htlc_sig) = htlc_sigs[outp.vout as usize].as_ref().unwrap();
+ let trusted_tx = self.holder_commitment.trust();
+ let counterparty_htlc_sig = self.holder_commitment.counterparty_htlc_sigs[*htlc_idx];
+ htlc_tx = Some(trusted_tx
+ .get_signed_htlc_tx(&self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable(), *htlc_idx, &counterparty_htlc_sig, htlc_sig, preimage));
}
}
- if self.prev_local_commitment.is_some() {
- let commitment_txid = self.prev_local_commitment.as_ref().unwrap().txid();
+ // If the HTLC doesn't spend the current holder commitment, check if it spends the previous one
+ if htlc_tx.is_none() && self.prev_holder_commitment.is_some() {
+ let commitment_txid = self.prev_holder_commitment.as_ref().unwrap().trust().txid();
if commitment_txid == outp.txid {
- self.sign_prev_local_htlcs();
- if let &Some(ref htlc_sigs) = &self.prev_local_htlc_sigs {
+ self.sign_prev_holder_htlcs();
+ if let &Some(ref htlc_sigs) = &self.prev_holder_htlc_sigs {
let &(ref htlc_idx, ref htlc_sig) = htlc_sigs[outp.vout as usize].as_ref().unwrap();
- htlc_tx = Some(self.prev_local_commitment.as_ref().unwrap()
- .get_signed_htlc_tx(*htlc_idx, htlc_sig, preimage, self.local_csv));
+ let holder_commitment = self.prev_holder_commitment.as_ref().unwrap();
+ let trusted_tx = holder_commitment.trust();
+ let counterparty_htlc_sig = holder_commitment.counterparty_htlc_sigs[*htlc_idx];
+ htlc_tx = Some(trusted_tx
+ .get_signed_htlc_tx(&self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable(), *htlc_idx, &counterparty_htlc_sig, htlc_sig, preimage));
}
}
}
htlc_tx
}
- #[cfg(test)]
- pub(super) fn unsafe_get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(&mut self, outp: &::bitcoin::OutPoint, preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Option<Transaction> {
- let latest_had_sigs = self.local_htlc_sigs.is_some();
- let prev_had_sigs = self.prev_local_htlc_sigs.is_some();
+ #[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
+ pub(crate) fn unsafe_get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(&mut self, outp: &::bitcoin::OutPoint, preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Option<Transaction> {
+ let latest_had_sigs = self.holder_htlc_sigs.is_some();
+ let prev_had_sigs = self.prev_holder_htlc_sigs.is_some();
let ret = self.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(outp, preimage);
if !latest_had_sigs {
- self.local_htlc_sigs = None;
+ self.holder_htlc_sigs = None;
}
if !prev_had_sigs {
- self.prev_local_htlc_sigs = None;
+ self.prev_holder_htlc_sigs = None;
}
ret
}